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Issue No. 101

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William Norris Clarke, S.J.

Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst.

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Univ. of Wisconsin

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An Alert and Independent Thomist:

Kant's Ethical Commonwealth: The Highest Good as a Social Goal

Are We In Time?

Does Disagreement Imply Relativism?

The Claims of Perfection: A Revisionary Defense. of Kant's Theory of Dependent Beauty

Appearance and the Laws of Logic in Advaita Vedanta

BOOK REVIEWS

MARCH 1986

Gerald A. McCool, S.J.

Sharon Anderson-Gold

Charles M. Sherover

William J. Wainwright

Paul Crowther

R. Puligandla and Donald Matesz

Fordham University Vew York

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
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Digitized by Arva Samai Foundation Chennal and eGangotri Presenting Our Authors

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Frithjof Schuon, born in Basel, Switzerland and educated in France, is widely recognized as one of the leading spokesmen of the perennial philosophy of our time. Since 1936 he has been a regular contributor to the French journal Etudes Traditionelles and more recently, to the new journal Connaissance des Religions; he has also been for many years a regular contributor to the British journal Studies in Comparative Religion. The author of some eighteen books in French, his books and articles have also appeared in German, Italian, Spanish, Swedish and other languages. To date, fifteen of his works have appeared in English, some of the most important of which are: Understanding Islam (6th ed. 1979), Esoterism as Principle and as Way (1981), Logic and Transcendence (2nd ed 1984), Christianity/Islam (1985), and an anthology of his works, The Writings of Frithjof Schuon—A Basic Reader (1986). A new title—Survey of Metaphysics and Esoterism—is now in preparation.

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An Alert And Independent Thomist: William Norris Clarke, S.J.

Gerald A. McCool, S.J.

THE EUROPEAN BACKGROUND

N 1936 Norris Clarke was sent as a young Scholastic to study for his licentiate in philosophy at the Collège Saint Louis on the island of Jersey. There for the next three years, in the philosophate of the Paris Province of the Society of Jesus, he came across the tensions of the neo-scholastic movement in the teaching of the remarkable group of Jesuit professors on its faculty. Pedro Descoqs, the passionate defender of Suarez's interpretation of St. Thomas, had little sympathy for his equally distinguished colleague, André Marc.² Marc was a Thomist and, in Descoqs' eyes, a Jesuit Thomist was bad enough. Even worse, however, Marc was one of those Jesuit Thomists influenced by the thought of Joseph Maréchal, and Maréchalian Thomism, associated with Kant's subjective starting point in epistemology, was vigorously opposed by the Suarezians on the Jesuit faculties of philosophy and theology. One reflection of their hostility to anything like a subjective starting point was the absence of Blondel's L'Action³ from the list of books recommended for reading at the Collège Saint Louis. Recommended or not, however, L'Action was read with care and appreciation by the young Scholastics, and, by the time he returned to New York to take his M.A. at Fordham, Norris Clarke had mastered it thoroughly. At Fordham, where he wrote his thesis, under the mentorship of Anton Pegis, he became well acquainted with the Thomism of Etienne Gilson.

After theological studies and ordination at Woodstock College, the Jesuit seminary in Woodstock, Md., he returned to Europe in 1947 for two more years of philosophical study. At Louvain, from which he recived his Ph.D. in 1949, he encountered again the inner tensions at work in the development of Neo-Thomism.

During the eleven years which had intervened between his arrival at Jersey and his return to Europe, a number of important developments had taken place within the Neo-Thomist movement. One of these was the rediscovery of the central place of the act of existence in St. Thomas' epistemology and metaphysics. The distinguishing

¹For an excellent account of Descoqs' Suarezianism see Helen James John, *The Thomist Spectrum* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1966), pp. 72–86. For Descoqs' epistemology see George Van Riet, *L'Epistémologie Thomiste* (Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946), pp. 377–387.

²For André Marc's Thomism see *The Thomist Spectrum*, pp. 63-71. See also Gerald A. McCool, S.J., "Phenomenology and Dialectic: The Philosophy of André Marc, S.J.," *The Modern Schoolman*, 40 (1963), 321-45.

³Maurice Blondel, *L'Action* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1893). Unobtainable for years, the 1893 edition of *L'Action* was reprinted in 1950 by Presses Universitaires de France. The University of Notre Dame Press brought out an English edition in 1984, translation and introduction by Olivia Blanchette.

characteristic of Thomism, it was now claimed, was its uniqueness as a metaphysics of *esse*. The outcome of this revolutionary shift in the interpretation of St. Thomas—for which, above all others, credit is due to Etienne Gilson—was the emergence of post-war existential Thomism.⁴ For the existential Thomists, being was *esse*, the concrete act of existence. The real was the actual existent. It was not, as Avicenna thought,⁵ intelligible essence and—no matter what Pedro Descoqs might claim—neither was it the possible being of Suarezian metaphysics.⁶ Nor was being primarily substance as Aristotle believed.⁷ The act which made being real and intelligible was not substantial form; it was concrete *esse*.

In that case the intelligibility of being could not be grasped through any sort of conceptual abstraction. Even the third degree of abstraction, favored by Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, was unequal to the task. Being's intelligibility could be grasped through the judgment of existence alone; and its abstraction was really a separation accomplished through the negative judgment distinguishing *esse* from any of its concrete subjects. This meant, of course, that the classical Thomism of the Dominican Commentators, on which Maritain had built his *Degrees of Knowledge*, was no more authentic Thomism than the metaphysics of Pedro Descoqs' idol, Francis Suarez.

Another important development in Neo-Thomism had been the rediscovery of the important role played by Neo-Platonic participation metaphysics in the philosophy of St. Thomas. Cornelio Fabro had called attention to St. Thomas' participation metaphysics in 1939. His pioneering study, La Nozione Metafisica di Participazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino,⁹ had challenged Gilson's interpretation of St. Thomas as an Aristotelian anti-Platonist. For Gilson, St. Thomas, in opposition to St. Bonaventure, had made the decisive move away from Plato to Aristotle. Thomism therefore was fundamentally opposed to Augustinianism, Bonaventurianism, or any form of Platonism. Because Thomas had sided with Aristotle against Plato, he had been able to guarantee the proper autonomy of created agents in their being, activity, and knowledge.¹⁰ Because Thomas had taken his stand against the Platonic metaphysics of the good proposed by Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Eriugena, he had been able to create his Christian philosophy of being.¹¹

Gilsonian anti-Platonism was soon challenged by another important study on participation. The well-known Dominican Thomist, L.-B. Geiger, published his major work, La Participation dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin in 1942.¹² The

⁴See *The Thomist Spectrum*, pp. 32-41. See also Helen James John, "Emergence of the Act of Existing in Recent Thomism," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 2 (1962), 600-625.

⁵Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institue of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), pp. 74-82.

⁶Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 96-107.

⁷Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 41-50.

^{*}Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 202-208.

⁹Cornelio Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica di Participazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1939). A second, revised edition was brought out by the Società Editrice Internazionale in 1950. For Fabro's metaphysics of participation in the act of existence see *The Thomist Spectrum*, pp, 87–107.

¹⁰These were important themes in Gilson's interpretation of medieval philosophy. See Gilson's *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, English translation by A.H.C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), pp. 128-48.

¹¹Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 93-94. See also Gilson's God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 57-73.

¹²L.B. Geiger, O.P., *La Participation dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1942). A second edition appeared in 1953. For Geiger's participation metaphysics see *The Thomist Spectrum*, pp. 108–122.

influence of the new interpretation of St. Thomas was soon felt around Europe. At Louvain, the distinguished metaphysician, Louis De Raeymaeker recognized the significance of the rediscovery of St. Thomas' participation metaphysics and revised his own metaphysics in the light of it.¹³

The systematic vigor and historical scholarship of the Neo-Thomistic renaissance were still in evidence during those early post-war years. At Louvain De Raeymaeker, Dondeyne, and Van Riet made major contributions to Neo-Thomism's understanding of its own history and to the realization of its speculative possibilities. Among the historians of philosophy on the faculty, Fernand Van Steenberghen—a systematic philosopher in his own right—challenged Gilson's interpretation of St. Bonaventure's Christian philosophy.¹⁴ Through his study of heterodox Aristotelianism and the intellectual movements of the time, Van Steenberghen, in fact, was one of Gilson's more outspoken critics.¹⁵ Thus, although Gilson's metaphysics of *esse* might have received a sympathetic reception at Louvain, his anti-Platonism was rejected by De Raeymaeker and his understanding of Christian philosophy was contested by Van Steenberghen.

Maritain was a stranger to Louvain and the University faculty had never been particularly friendly to Maréchal. Suarezianism, as a Jesuit invention, was not especially welcome at a University whose relations with the Society of Jesus had not always been cordial. At Louvain, therefore, Father Clarke encountered a Thomism which did not embrace any of the schools with which Americans were familiar during the postwar years. It was neither Maritainian nor Gilsonian. It was not Suarezian. Neither was it transcendental Thomist. Alert, historically and systematically, to all the currents in Thomism, the Thomism of Louvain in the post-war years was independent. That sort of alertness and independence, on the evidence of his own career, must have been congenial to Father Clarke.

CAREER IN AMERICA

In 1949 Father Clarke was appointed to the pontifical faculty of philosophy at Woodstock, Maryland. The pontifical faculties of philosophy and theology for the Maryland and New York Provinces of the Society of Jesus were located there at that time. When the philosophical faculty was transferred to Bellarmine College, Plattsburg, N.Y., Father Clarke went with it and continued to serve as its professor of metaphysics until his appointment to Fordham University in 1955.

From the beginning of his career as a teacher and writer in America, Father Clarke's publications and his courses in metaphysics, epistemology, medieval philosophy

¹³Louis De Raeymaeker, La Philosophie de l'Être (Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1947); English translation by E.H. Ziegelmeyer, The Philosophy of Being (St. Louis: Herder, 1947). In this remarkable book the notion of participation served as the organizing principle for its treatment of finite being. For De Raeymaeker's participation metaphysics see The Thomist Spectrum, pp. 123–126.

¹⁴Van Steenberghen's *Epistémologie* (Louvain: Editions de l'Institute Supérieur de Philosophie, 1945) appeared in several editions and was translated into a number of European languages; English translation by Martin J. Flynn, *Epistemology* (New York: Wagner, 1949). His *Ontologie* (Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946) likewise appeared in a number of editions and was also translated into several European languages; English translation by Lawrence Moonan, *Ontology* (New York: Wagner, 1970).

¹⁵See Van Steenberghen's Aristotle in the West (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955), pp. 147-62. See also The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1955), pp. 56-74. Also La Philosophie au XIII Siècle (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1966), pp. 190-271.

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and philosophy of religion showed the influence of the Maréchalianism, existential Thomism, participationism and personalism with which he had become acquainted in Europe. Five years of study at two distinguished faculties of philosophy had made him a careful historian of medieval philosophy with a deep respect for the text of St. Thomas. They had also given him the philosophical orientation which he retained through thirty-five years of interaction with other American philosophers. Father Clarke was a Thomist, sympathetic to the leading schools of contemporary Thomism and ready to learn from them, but independent in his approach to all of them.

Maréchalianism had influenced his thinking through André Marc in his student days at Jersey. In the early articles, published relatively soon after his return from Europe, high praise was given to Joseph de Finance's *Être et agir*.¹⁶ Continued openness to the Maréchalian emphasis on the subject was shown through his translation of de Finance's article, "Being and Subjectivity," in 1956.¹⁷ The following year the name of Norris Clarke was mentioned among the list of colleagues to whom Bernard Lonergan expressed his thanks in the preface to his *Insight*.¹⁸

Although Maréchalian Thomism and Gilsonian existential Thomism were generally considered incompatible, Norris Clarke, like de Finance, saw no intrinsic incompatibility between a stress on the personal subject as the starting point of metaphysics and a focus on the act of existence as the unifying ground of St. Thomas' participation metaphysics. In the philosophy of St. Thomas, God, as Infinite Esse, the pure act of existence, was a free and consciously active person. God's expansive generosity as Infinite Good, the unitary active source through whose causality being was communicated, was the creative ground of a finite community of subsisting agents. Active communication of existence by their free, intelligent Creator endowed the multiplicity of finite existents with their own power of active self-communication. At being's highest created level, on which finite existents shared in their Creator's free selfpossession, the community of interacting beings was a community of interacting persons. Each personal agent imitated the expansive goodness of its unitary source by sharing its own reality with the other members of its community. At the same time, however, each conscious agent retained its personal identity through its dynamic selfpossession as an intelligent free subject.

In this metaphysics of creative participation, the starting point of philosophical reflection should not be restricted to reflection by an isolated subject on the conditions of possibility for its own thought. A reflection adequate to full self-awareness must include a reflection on the implications of experience of a personal agent in a community of interacting persons. From this it followed that Marcel's criticism of Descartes was justified. Philosophy should not begin with the implications of a Cartesian "I think." Rather it should begin with the dynamic "we are" of a community of personal

¹⁶Joseph de Finance, S.J., *Être et Agir dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1945). For an account of de Finance and the Maréchalian recovery of *esse* see *The Thomist Spectrum*, pp. 151–158. For Father Clarke's praise of de Finance see "The Limitation of Act by Potency," *The New Scholasticism*, 24 (1952), 167–94, esp. 168, n. 2. See also "The Platonic Heritage of Thomism," *The Review of Metaphysics*, 8 (1954), 105–24, esp. 106, n. 2.

¹⁷Joseph de Finance, S.J., "Being and Subjectivity," Cross Currents, 6 (1956), 163-78.

¹⁸Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J., *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. xv.

¹⁹For a defense of this position, written later in Father Clarke's career, see "Interpersonal Dialogue: Key to Realism" in Robert J. Roth, S.J. (ed.), *Person and Community* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1975), pp. 141–53.

agents who reveal themselves to each other through their action. Reflection on interpersonal experience, Norris Clarke believed, opened the way to a participation metaphysics of action and creation which could incorporate the insights of Maréchalian and existential Thomism into a richer and more authentic Thomistic synthesis. At the same time it distinguished his own epistemology, on the one hand, from both the epistemology of Maréchal and Lonergan, whose starting point was the dynamism of the isolated subject, and, on the other hand, from the epistemology of Gilson and Maritain, whose starting point was the objective judgment of sense experience.

A number of articles, published soon after Father Clarke's return from Europe, were devoted to the implications of St. Thomas' metaphysics of participation.²⁰ Fairly soon, they were followed by the brief but revolutionary essay, "What Is Really Real?," in which, committing himself to a radically existential Thomism, he argued, against the Suarezians and traditional Thomists, that possible being, since it was incapable of action, had no title to reality.²¹ Through these early publications, several essential elements of his own metaphysics—existence, participation, interaction—were defended as authentic characteristics of St. Thomas' own thought.

Later in his career Father Clarke engaged in a protracted dialogue with American philosophy. Personal experience of the East and his work as editor of the *International Philosophical Quarterly* stimulated his interest in Oriental metaphysics and philosophy of religion. One of the results of these new interests was a fruitful encounter between his own metaphysics of existence, action, and person with American process philosophy. Another was an equally fruitful dialogue with American linguistic philosophy on the nature and validity of the human person's knowledge of God through analogous language. A third was a stimulating reflection on the philosophy of the self in Eastern and Western thought.²²

Building upon his experience of European Thomism, Father Clarke worked out a nuanced, yet highly coherent, metaphysics in his thirty-five years of teaching and writing in America. It was a Thomism, deeply respectful of St. Thomas' own text, yet fearlessly original in its personal development of basic Thomistic insights. In his own philosophy, Norris Clarke felt no compunction in parting company with St. Thomas' own teaching—as he did, for example, in his proofs for God's existence—when another approach recommended itself as sounder and more in keeping with St. Thomas' own principles.²³

In tracing the development of Father Clarke's metaphysics through its earlier and later stages we are struck with its originality, consistency, and power. Even from a purely historical point of view, in fact, retracing his career can be quite instructive. His teaching career overlapped the career of Bernard Lonergan and the major part of Karl Rahner's intellectual activity. Outstanding representatives of St. Thomas' inspiration though they were, Lonergan and Rahner were both theologians. No Thomist, to my knowledge, who has devoted himself to purely philosophical activity, has retained without interruption a position of distinction as Father Clarke has from 1950 to the present. In that respect, his status as a contemporary representative of the Thomistic

²⁰"Recent European Trends in Metaphysics," *Proceedings of the Jesuit Philosophical Association*, 12 (1950), 48–73; "The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas," *Proceedings of the Catholic Philosophical Association*, 26 (1952), 147–57. See also note 16.

²¹"What Is Really Real?" in J. A. McWilliams (ed.), *Progress in Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955), pp. 61–90.

²²"The Self in Eastern and Western Thought," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 6 (1969), 101-109. ²³The Philosophical Approach to God: A Neo-Thomist Perspective (Winston-Salem: Wake Forest University, 1979), pp. 35-37.

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tradition is quite unique. Nevertheless, we can observe in his philosophical development an evolution not unlike the evolution which occurred in the Thomism of Lonergan and Rahner. Like these Thomist theologians, he has lived through the transition from the Thomism of the ecclesiastical faculties to the Thomism of the University. Like them, he has experienced the change from a Thomism marked by its fidelity to one or other of the doctrinal schools to a Thomism of personal philosophical commitment. As an historian of philosophy Father Clarke has always been very conscious of his responsibility to the text. As a creative philosopher, on the other hand, his only responsibility has been to himself and to the truth. For him, to be a Thomist is not to be a member of a school; it is to philosophize freely and responsibly in the light of a great tradition.

A METAPHYSICS OF THE ACTING PERSON

Through his early publications on participation Father Clarke began to work out his own dynamic metaphysics of the acting person. God was the supreme Intelligible and the highest Good because He was the Infinite Pure Act of *Esse*. In his own philosophy of being St. Thomas had transformed Plotinus' metaphysics of the good into his own metaphysics of being and creation. By doing that, Thomas had also transformed his Aristotelian metaphysics of potency and act from a metaphysics of change to a Platonically inspired participation metaphysics. The act of existence was the ultimate perfection conferred on each creature through God's efficient causality. Concrete essence was the receptive principle limiting the perfection which made it real. This transformation, Father Clarke argued, was one of St. Thomas' great contributions to Western metaphysics.²⁴ *Esse*, the perfection shared by the multitude of finite existents, was not only the abiding effect of God's creative action; it was itself the dynamic source of every finite being's own activity. That is why, in his controversial essay, "What Is Really Real?," Father Clarke argued that the possibles, which have no act of existence of their own, must lack reality because they are incapable of action.²⁵

Final causality was as important as formal, material, and efficient causality in St. Thomas' transformed metaphysics of emanation and return. In a Plotinian universe the infinite Good was not only the dynamic source from which all finite beings took their origin; the Good was also the infinite Goal to which every finite being endeavored to return through its own activity.²⁶ For St. Thomas, to act meant to tend toward God. Moved by the love of its Creator, present within it and grounding its finite *esse* by His creative causality, each finite agent strove to "become like God," to participate as fully as possible in the goodness of Infinite *Esse*.

In the early years of this century, a brilliant young Thomist theologian, Pierre Rousselot, had called attention to St. Thomas' Platonic metaphysics of emanation and return and linked it to the dynamic drive of finite thought and love.²⁷ Aware of itself intuitively, through its non-conceptual act of *intellectus*, the human mind, in Rousselot's interpretation of St. Thomas, was moved to its acts of discursive conceptual

²⁴"The Limitation of Act by Potency," 190-194.

²⁵See note 21. Father Clarke returned to this controversial thesis in his "The Possibles Revisited," *The New Scholasticism*, 34 (1960), 79-102.

²⁶ Infinity in Plotinus: A Reply," Gregorianium, 50 (1959), 75-98.

²⁷Pierre Rousselot, S.J., *L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1936). The first edition of this celebrated work appeared in 1908. Rousselot was killed in action as a French soldier in 1915.

knowledge by its innate drive to share in God's reality through the culminating intuition of the Beatific Vision. St. Thomas' philosophy of knowledge, Rousselot claimed, was not the deductive rationalism of the great Post-Cartesian philosophers, whose ideal was a tightly locked system of static concepts. On the contrary, St. Thomas' epistemology was an intellectualism. Its ideal was the intuitive self-knowledge of the angel or the soul's intuitive grasp of God through the Beatific Vision. For St. Thomas, in fact, Rousselot continued, no static concept of itself could guarantee the mind's hold on being. Being was grasped through the judgment, whose own truth was guaranteed by the mind's implicit awareness of its innate drive to God's infinite reality. In other words, to use Rousselot's celebrated phrase, "the intellect was the faculty of the real because it was the faculty of the divine."

The heritage of Rousselot was preserved and developed by Maréchal, de Lubac, de Finance, Rahner and Lonergan. It became the Transcendental Thomist tradition in which the subject's implicit awareness of the knowing and willing activity of his own spirit provides the critical justification for a realistic metaphysics. In this tradition, as we have seen, the dynamic human subject's self-reflection is linked to a participation metaphysics of emanation and return. This was a tradition with which Father Clarke had been familiar and with which he had remained in sympathetic contact. It is no surprise then that, in his courses at Fordham and in his later publications, he was more than willing to draw upon the resources which it offered. Sympathy, however, need not mean discipleship; and, in a number of important points, Father Clarke's critical grounding of his metaphysics differs clearly from the justification proposed by Transcendental Thomists.

COMPARISON WITH TRANSCENDENTAL THOMISM

For Father Clarke, in opposition to Maréchal and Lonergan, the starting point of metaphysics must be a reflection on human subjects actively engaged, through dialogue, in the process of mutual self-communication. In that reflection there can be no "bracketing" - even methodologically-of the other person. Through its disciplined use of concepts, reflection makes explicit the richer, if less precise, knowledge of the self already possessed through the non-conceptual act of intuitive intellectus. Like Rousselot's Thomism, Father Clarke's critically grounded metaphysics is an intellectualism in which more is always known through intellectus than can be enclosed in the sharply defined concepts of discursive ratio. For its judgments to be adequate to the rich fullness of self-knowledge, their concepts must be "read in the light" of intellectus, the non-conceptual knowledge which surrounds them. The reader who overlooks that fact will fail to see the force of much of Father Clarke's metaphysical reflection. He will not be able, for example, to see the cogency of Father Clarke's defense of analogous knowledge in his philosophy of God, and the force of Father Clarke's argument for the abiding personal subject, against process philosophy, may escape him. In these, as in many of the most significant reflections in Father Clarke's metaphysics, immediate grasp of interpersonal experience through intellectus provides the evidence for his position.

That is why it is most important to observe that the experience on which Father Clarke reflects is not simply personal experience but interpersonal experience.²⁹ For

²⁸L'Intellectualisme, p. v.

²⁹See note 19.

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this is an experience from which the active presence of the other cannot be methodologically excluded. In the experience of mutual self-communication, immanent and transient action, even though known only implicitly, reveal their reality immediately. It is through a lived response to a world in which dialogue constantly occurs that the knower becomes aware of the infinite goal of the drive which ceaselessly moves him to learn more about the world's constituents. *Intellectus*, therefore, tells Norris Clarke, as it told Pierre Rousselot, that his infinitely questing mind is the faculty of the real because it is the faculty of the divine. But simultaneously—in time and nature—*intellectus* tells him that his mind is the faculty of the real because it grasps another finite person immediately in dialogue.³⁰ It follows then that action, finality, and being are given immediately, though implicitly, in the experience of a human subject. For his questions reach out to the infinite and their answers are formulated in a language shared with other acting persons. Being, given immediately in experience, is more than simply a transcendental condition of possibility for experience. Father Clarke is an immediate, though reflective, realist. He is not a Transcendental Thomist.

Nevertheless, as opposed to Gilson and Maritain, his realism is grounded immediately upon the free person. For, once reflection on interpersonal experience has been made attentively, it confronts the human subject with a number of vital questions. Is he really in contact with another human subject? Is genuine self-communication of being taking place between them? Is the unlimited desire for knowledge and goodness which he experiences an intelligible movement toward a real goal; or is it no more than an absurd quest for the unattainable? Deductive logic cannot provide the answer to these questions. For they challenge the very intelligibility of being, and the intelligibility of being cannot be derived from the logical principle of contradiction.³¹

Every human knower must answer these questions for himself. He must take upon his own shoulders the accountability for the free and intelligent stand which he adopts to the world in which he already finds himself. Is this world of questions, gestures, signs and inherited language an intelligible universe of being? Whether his answer be yes or no, it remains a personal option. Should his answer be yes, it is a lived commitment to the principle of intelligibility, the principle on which every realistic metaphysics must rest. Intellectually justified but freely made, an affirmative response is an act of free certitude through which the responsible subject commits himself in thought and action to the intelligibility of being.³²

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

In every free intelligent agent, whose activity is sustained by God's own concurring action, there is an in-built drive of intellect and will to the infinite *Esse* of which the agent is a created likeness. This, after all, is a demand of St. Thomas' Platonic metaphysics of participated existence, emanation, and return. Confirmation of its truth, Father Clarke believes, can be found in the history of religious experience. History of religion, in the East and West, gives evidence of this dynamic drive toward the tran-

³⁰In Father Clarke's metaphysics being manifests its active presence to the human subject through the immanent and transient action of inter-subjective dialogue. Father Clarke's metaphysics text, available up to now only in privately printed form, will be published by the Fordham University Press.

³¹"Analytical Philosophy and Knowledge of God," in George McLean, O.M.I., (ed.), *Christian Philosophy and Religious Renewal* (Washington: The Catholic Uniersity of America Press, 1966), pp. 39–71, esp. pp. 48–49.

^{32&}quot;Analytic Philosophy and Knowledge of God," pp. 49-50.

scendent in every human heart. It gives testimony as well to the human spirit's intuitive awareness of the transcendent source of its being working within it. Although transcendent, this dynamic source and term of human activity cannot be "totally other." For knowledge and love require a similitude, even if it be a defective one, between the finite agent and the transcendent object of these acts.

God's immanence within the conscious human spirit, as the efficient cause of the in-built drive to know and love of which He is the transcendent term, is the natural root of religious experience.³³ For that reason, Father Clarke believes, the human spirit's implicit awareness of God's presence within it as its efficient and final cause, can also provide the starting point for a philosophical reflection which justifies a reasonable assent to God's existence.

It should not be a modern representation of St. Thomas' own Five Ways. For Father Clarke does not find the Five Ways very useful to the contemporary philosopher. One of them, in fact, the Third, he considers seriously flawed by a logical fallacy.³⁴ Neither should it be a rigidly logical demonstration in the tradition of the great rationalist philosophers. Its goal is not Cartesian mathematical certitude. Its aim, on the contrary, is at once more modest and more reasonable. No more is intended than to justify an assent to God's existence through the reasonable personal commitment which the Thomists call free certitude.³⁵

Drawing on the resources of St. Thomas' own metaphysics, Father Clarke's reflection follows a double path. An outward path considers the finite beings of the surrounding world. An inner path focuses on the dynamism of the reflecting subject's intellect and will. Whichever path the reflection follows, its conclusion is the same. There must exist a unique transcendent source of all beings. Immanent and transcendent at once, this dynamic originating source works intimately within the finite beings of the world as their ultimate ground and efficient cause. As the ultimate good in which all finite beings participate, this source is also the world's final cause, drawing all finite beings toward itself.³⁶

Leading his readers along both paths through a series of causal arguments, Father Clarke ascends from the many beings in the world to their unitary source and from the finite beings in the world to their infinite originating ground.³⁷ The twofold reflection which leads to God, as Father Clarke presents it, carries forward the quest for the meaning of interpersonal experience which should already have led his reader to commit himself to the principle of intelligibility. If being is intelligible, it must have an intelligible ground. What then is the ground of finite beings, the finite minds which know them and of the intelligible relationship between minds and beings? Once the natural act of faith in being's intelligibility has been placed, the reflecting subject knows that human minds really act and that their cognitive activity, besides having a real object, has a real goal. But an intelligible striving for intelligibility and goodness whose goal has shown itself to be infinite cannot have its intelligible ground either in the finite beings of the world or in the finite minds which know them. If man is not absurd and the world of being is intelligible, there must be one infinite intelligible

^{33&}quot;The Natural Roots of Religious Experience," Religious Studies, 17 (1981), 511-23.

³⁴Philosophical Approach to God, pp. 35-37.

³⁵Philosophical Approach to God, p. 38. See also "Analytic Philosophy and Knowledge of God," pp. 65-66.

³⁶Philosophical Approach to God, pp. 17-28; 33-34.

³⁷ Philosophical Approach to God, pp. 37-49.

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ground of both. If the principle of intelligibility is justified, then God exists. Once more we have returned to Father Clarke's great operative principle: the intelligibility of the free reflecting person and of his interaction with his world.

THE ANALOGY OF BEING

Knowledge and love of the world's transcendent ground, Father Clarke argues, is the in-built goal of the personal agent's spiritual activity. Since, therefore, "like is known by like," as Plato, Plotinus, and St. Thomas saw so clearly, the transcendent ground and goal of man's spiritual activity cannot be the "totally other." Nevertheless, no specific or generic similitude between finite and infinite is possible. That is why St. Thomas' participation metaphysics calls for a similitude between them in which their whole reality is simultaneously like and unlike. This is the imperfect ontological similitude between the one and the many in St. Thomas' participation metaphysics which grounds the conceptual analogy of being.

The analogy between God and creature, however, is not an analogy of proper proportionality, as Cajetan and the Thomist tradition after him had claimed.³⁹ According to Cajetan, the likeness between God and creatures is a proportional one: a similarity among sets of relations. The relation between God's essence and His existence or action is imperfectly like the relation between each finite essence and its own existence or action. Apart from this relationship, no likeness is claimed to exist between infinite and finite essences or infinite and finite existences or actions.

Because of his real distinction between essence and existence St. Thomas could use the analogy of proper proportionality. He was not forced to resort to the Aristotelian analogy of attribution as Francis Suarez had been. This indeed was fortunate, the Thomists claimed. For the analogy of attribution, based on the cause-effect relation, cannot account for an intrinsic similitude between God and creatures. Color may be related to health as its effect and medicine may be related to it as its cause. But this does not imply that either color or medicine possesses health intrinsically. In Norris Clarke's student days at the Collège Saint Louis when Pedro Descoqs was teaching there, the analogy of being was a hotly debated issue. Thomists and Suarezians both claimed the authority of St. Thomas for their conflicting understandings of its nature.

Historical research by Lyttgens,⁴⁰ Montagnes⁴¹ and Klubertanz,⁴² and his own familiarity with the text of St. Thomas, undermined Father Clarke's confidence in Cajetan's interpretation of St. Thomas. St. Thomas had indeed used the analogy of proper proportionality in his early works but he had soon abandoned it. After a number of shifts, not always mutually compatible, he finally settled on an analogy of causal participation which combined the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proper proportionality in a single synthesis. This analogy did justice both to the proportional similarity of acts of existence diversified by their varied essences and to the intrinsic similitude

^{38&#}x27;The Natural Roots of Religious Experience," 515-16.

³⁹ Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God: A Reply to Kai Nielsen," *The Thomist*, 40 (1976), 61–95, esp. 87–88.

⁴⁰Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wikselle, 1952).

⁴¹Bernard Montagnes, L'Analogie de l'Être d'après S. Thomas (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1964).

⁴²George Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960).

between finite participants and the Infinite Final and Efficient Cause to which they were dynamically related as their transcendent source and goal.⁴³

As a systematic philosopher, Father Clarke also came to realize that the analogy of proper proportionality, when used alone, was of little service to the philosopher of God. What could a purely formal rule, informing us that the relation between essence and activity was proportionally similar in God and creatures, tell us about what actions like knowing and loving in God might be when, apart from the rule, God's essence and action remained utterly unknown? Father Clarke could sympathize with the linguistic philosophers who complained that the analogy of proper proportionality, even if it were true, was trivial.⁴⁴ He was convinced, however, that the same complaint could not be made about St. Thomas' analogy of causal participation.

GOD-TALK AND LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY

In a series of significant essays, Father Clarke drew on the resources of his own metaphysics of being, action, and participation to counter the challenge of linguistic philosophy to the meaningfulness of God-talk.⁴⁵ When concepts are moved heedlessly from one language game into another, the linguistic philosophers observe, their meaning can be considerably altered. A philosopher can make that sort of linguistic shift without adverting to what he is doing. The result is that he begins to talk nonsense.

God-talk can entail that sort of nonsense. Concepts denoting sense objects, human cognition, or emotion are meaningful enough in the context of intra-worldly discourse. When they are shifted, without fair warning, into a new and strange language game in which the subject to which they are applied is an infinite extra-worldly being, the linguistic situation becomes quite different. In their new context, where they function in a completely different way, their meaning becomes extremely hard to specify. In fact, since they no longer refer to a designatable intra-worldly object of experience, what, if anything, such concepts mean is an open question. Analogous language used of God may be nonsense for all we know; and, if theists wish to use it, they must justify its meaningfulness before they do so.

Father Clarke is more than willing to meet the challenge. His appeal once more is to the natural roots of religious experience. These roots, as we recall, are the human spirit's intuitive awareness of God's active presence and of its own ceaseless drive in knowledge and love to a transcendent object which must be, in some way, like it.⁴⁶ This experience, known through *intellectus*, played an important part in Father Clarke's argument for God's existence. It plays an equally important role in his justification of analogous language about God.

Present through His activity in the human spirit, God is not the "totally other"—an unknown being without relationship to man or to the world. On the contrary, as the only intelligible ground for the world's existence (its cause in the authentic metaphysical sense of that term) He is present in the world while transcending it.⁴⁷ God can be known then by mounting from the realities encountered in the world through

^{43&}quot;Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God," 85-88.

^{44&}quot;Analytic Philosophy and Knowledge of God," pp. 61-62.

⁴⁵See notes 31 and 39. Also "Linguistic Analysis and Natural Theology," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 34 (1960), 110–126.

⁴⁶See note 33.

⁴⁷ Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God," 81-83. *Philosophical Approach to God*, p. 48.

the classic triple way: affirming finite realities, negating their limitations, and raising their perfection to an infinite degree. For Father Clarke, therefore, defense of analogous language used of God is built upon a realistic causal metaphysics of creation and participation, emanation and return.

The concepts in which analogous knowledge of God is expressed are open-ended and systematically vague. Some are open-ended at both ends—they have neither "ceiling" nor "floor," as Fr. Clarke puts it, i.e. they are applicable throughout the whole range of being, from the highest to the lowest, as, for example, being, activity, unity, intelligibility, goodness; others are open-ended at the top but not at the bottom (they have no "ceiling" but they do have a "floor"), i.e. they are not applicable below a certain level of being, as for example, intelligence, life, freedom, personality, love. But in both cases concepts applicable to God must be open-ended at the top. For perfections which are unlimited in their very nature can transcend every finite mode of intraworldly instantiation. Concepts representing them can "stretch their meaning" to embrace infinite instantiation in the infinite source of the finite world. How the perfections they represent manifest themselves in that transcendent source, they themselves, as limited human concepts, cannot reveal. Vague and open-ended, as they must be, they elude all attempts to pin them down to sharp, positive definition.

This does not mean, however, that analogous concepts are devoid of meaning. In their lived use in human judgments, vague as they are, these concepts preserve an identifiable unity of meaning as they move from one linguistic context to another. As they shift, in lived human experience from one language game to another, they "stretch their meaning," as expanding heuristic concepts, to embrace the similarities which the human mind discovers in the inter-related objects of its universe of being.

For, once assent has been given to being's intelligibility through the natural act of faith, the human knower is aware that the real beings which he encounters in his experience possess the power of active presence. Since each of them, through its active presence, can partially satisfy the boundless desire of his spirit to know and love, each of these beings, related to one another in an intelligible world of unity and multiplicity, must possess, in its own unique way, the transcendental attributes of unity, intelligibility and goodness. And so, Father Clarke declares, the human mind is engaged, from the very beginning of its intellectual life, in a necessary co-involvement with being, intelligibility, and analogy.⁵⁰

The dissatisfaction, which the mind experiences with the limit imposed upon its drive by any finite object, moves it to transcend all limits and to strive to know the infinite. How precisely that infinite being will manifest the absolutely transcendental attributes of unity, intelligibility, power, activity and goodness, the finite inquiring mind cannot know. But it does understand that, as the object of the same desire, the infinite must be *like* the finite beings which the mind already knows in its possession of these absolutely transcendental attributes.⁵¹

⁴⁸"Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God," 73-74.

⁴⁹ Philosophical Approach to God, pp. 51-52.

⁵⁰ Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God," 83-84. *Philosophical Approach to God*, pp. 51-54.

⁵¹ Philosophical Approach to God, pp. 54-57.

In similar manner, the dissatisfaction of the human will with the limited goods which it has attained or still intends points it beyond the finite world to a being of limitless goodness and value. Limited and unsatisfying as they are in their finite instantiations, there are values which demand the personal agent's unconditional approval. They manifest themselves as perfections which he judges absolutely better to have than not to have. Once these pure perfections have been freed from their finite limitations, they can be projected upward upon an open-ended scale and affirmed of the infinite source in whose truth and goodness all finite values participate. Such are the pure perfections which Father Clarke considers relatively transcendental properties legitimately affirmed of God. Among them can be listed knowledge, consciousness, love, joy, happiness and similar properties of personality in the widest possible sense.⁵²

Urged on by the restless drive of his spiritual dynamism, the human knower is impelled constantly to expand the horizon of his knowledge and, as he does so, to thematize his discoveries through the open-ended heuristic concepts of his analogous discourse. Analogy as such does not extend human knowledge. The drive of the mind does that. Analogy enables the knower to unify and organize his expanded knowledge when it is acquired.⁵³

Thus, it is the drive of the finite spirit, intuitively grasped by intellectus, which enables the analogous concepts of discursive ratio to preserve their unity while they "stretch their meaning" to adjust to the mounting levels of intelligibility through which the mind passes on its ascent to God. Intuitive awareness of its own restless movement becomes the intelligent "pointer" which enables the mind to understand, in a flash of intuitive insight, that, infinitely different from them as it must be, the transcendent source of the finite perfections which fail to satisfy its drive to know and love must still be in some way like them. Intuitive insight, therefore, guarantees the "shift in meaning" which open-ended heuristic concepts undergo when they are used in the living language game of God-talk. If that be true, as Father Clarke contends, the attempt of some distinguished Thomists to vindicate the meaningful employment of analogous concepts through an analysis of analogy's logical structure alone cannot succeed.54 Without a careful reflection on man's lived experience, cognitive, affective, and religious, the restless movement penetrated by his natural desire for the transcendent infinite operating within it, the intelligent justification of meaningful analogous discourse about God will not manifest itself.55

That is why the Thomist should resolutely reject the demand of linguistic philosophers that God's definition be specified clearly in advance of any effort to establish God's existence. For, in Father Clarke's realistic metaphysics, God's transcendental attributes emerge from the same ascending movement of the mind which establishes God's existence. The Thomist metaphysician does not start out "to prove God's existence." On the contrary, committing himself to the intelligibility of being through his act of natural faith, he draws upon the resources of his whole conscious experience in a persistent quest for the intelligible ground of his own activity and of the world with which he interacts.

⁵² Philosophical Approach to God, pp. 58-60.

⁵³ Philosophical Approach to God, p. 54.

⁵⁴Philosophical Approach to God, p. 52.

^{55&}quot;Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God," 93-94.

^{56&}quot;Analytic Philosophy and Knowledge of God," pp. 663-64.

DIALOGUE WITH PROCESS PHILOSOPHY

As a metaphysician with a keen interest in philosophy of religion, Norris Clarke had a natural sympathy for Whitehead's process philosophy and many of his good friends were found among its adherents. For all of that, he was never tempted to become a Whiteheadian himself. There were too many fundamental differences between his own metaphysics and Whiteheadian metaphysics for that to be possible. Norris Clarke's metaphysics was a Thomistic metaphysics built upon the act of existence. Its God, Infinite Existence, grounded the multiplicity of contingent finite existents through His creative efficient causality. No finite reality could be causa sui as Whitehead's creativity was claimed to be. As the unique self-grounding ground of a contingent multiplicity, therefore, Norris Clarke's God was very different from the God of Whitehead's metaphysics, the finite supreme instantiation of self-grounding creativity. The relation between the grounding one and the grounded many in Norris Clarke's metaphysics was asymmetrical. God could act on creatures but creatures could not act on God. This made Norris Clarke's God what Whitehead claimed God could never be, namely, the supreme exception in the universe. Known only indirectly through analogy, God transcended the finite multitude who needed Him but of which He had no need.

Even on the finite level there were fundamental differences between Norris Clarke's and Whitehead's metaphysics. In Norris Clarke's metaphysics, for example, action—the key to his realistic philosophy of being—did not "come from behind" as it did in Whitehead's process metaphysics. Action and passion were always simultaneous. And, above all, whereas substance was the Whiteheadian's *bête noire*, Norris Clarke believed that Thomism's dynamic metaphysics of substance was one of its greatest contributions to contemporary philosophy.⁵⁷

St. Thomas' substance, he insisted, should not be confused with the inert substance of Descartes and Locke which Whitehead had rightly criticized. Far from being the unknowable substrate of accidents, as Locke's inert substance had been, St. Thomas' substance manifested itself to human consciousness as the dynamic intelligible ground of the personal identity which perdured through the personal agent's intellectual and moral activity. Far from being inert, substance (united with its accidents to form one complete subsisting being) was a dynamic source and recipient of change. It both changed itself and was changed by others. The perduring identity of personal agents through their mutual communication of being in the process of dialogue was evidence of that. Properly understood, Norris Clarke maintained, the dynamic Thomistic metaphysics of substance was more adequate to the intellectual and moral experience of the human person than the Whiteheadian metaphysics of the "atomic" actual entity.

Nevertheless, despite the difference between them, Whiteheadians could still teach Thomists a thing or two. Norris Clarke was quite convinced of that, and two of the most interesting modifications which he believes should be made in contemporary Thomism were suggested to him by his contact with process metaphysics.

The first is an extensive overhaul of its Aristotelian metaphysics of relations. In its reaction against the Cartesian metaphysics of the isolated, self-sufficient substance, Whiteheadian metaphysics emphasized the interrelatedness of the actual entities in

⁵⁷"What is Most and Least Relevant in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Today?" *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 14 (1974), 411-44, esp. 425-426.

our universe. In Whiteheadian process philosophy every actual entity is influenced in its concrescence by every other actual entity in the world which it prehends. Interrelatedness, in fact, was one of the most cogent reasons for Whitehead's decision to substitute a metaphysics of processive, prehending actual entities for a metaphysics of static and self-sufficient substances. In his own metaphysics of actual entities, to be meant is to be in relation.

As Father Clarke sees it, Whitehead was partly right. True enough, in St. Thomas' metaphysics, substance was dynamic, not static. Nevertheless, the Angelic Doctor's commitment to the Aristotelian metaphysics of predicamental relations left the dynamic substance of his own metaphysics far too isolated and self-sufficient to do justice to our contemporary knowledge of nature and society.

St. Thomas' predicamental relation—the Aristotelian pros ti—was no more than an accident inhering in the individual finite substances. For that reason, Father Clarke believes, unless Thomism's metaphysics of relations is radically modified, it cannot do justice to the world of our contemporary experience. For, in that world, dynamic substances do not live in self-sufficient isolation. They exist as members of a system. Far from being related to other substances in a purely accidental way, each substance, in some way or other, is intrinsically constituted by its relation to a system which integrates the individuals within it into a higher unity. Lower systems are incorporated into higher systems, making our universe a system of systems.

Thus, although each substance retains its subsisting identity, its relation to the system in which it exists can enter into its essential constitution. To be a substance therefore means to be a nodal center of actions and relations which Aristotle's metaphysics of substance and *pros ti* can no longer handle. Thomists must admit that fact and adapt their metaphysics of relations to integrate the reality of system into their category scheme.⁵⁸

The second modification which Father Clarke suggests for contemporary Thomism is a revised metaphysics of God's immutability and of God's relation to the world. The eternal, impassively immutable God of Thomism has been severely criticized by philosophers in the Whiteheadian tradition, such as Charles Hartshorne for example. How can a changeless God, unaffected by human action, untroubled by sin, unmoved by prayer, receiving nothing from our devoted service, be the personal, provident God of biblical revelation? Whiteheadians, of course, are not the only ones who object to St. Thomas' philosophy of God; Hegelians have their problems with it too. Nor is Father Clarke the only Thomist to modify his own philosophy of God in order to take account of the objections brought against it. Karl Rahner, to mention one celebrated example, has argued that the infinite God of creation and redemption, though immutable in His own reality, can undergo change "in His other," the finite world in which he "expresses Himself" through His natural and supernatural causality.⁵⁹

Father Clarke's dialogue, however, has been with Whiteheadian process metaphysics and, in his endeavor to meet its difficulties, his own philosophy of God has evolved progressively in the last decade and a half. In 1973, in his essay, "A New Look

^{58&}quot;System: A New Category of Being," Proceedings of the Jesuit Philosophical Association, 24 (1962), 143-57.

 ⁵⁹Gerald A. McCool, S.J., (ed.), A Rahner Reader. (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. xxvi; 120-21.
 ⁶⁰ A New Look at the Immutability of God," in Robert J. Roth, S.J., (ed.), God Knowable and Unknowable (New York: Fordham University Press, 1973), pp. 43-72.

at the Immutability of God,"60 he resorted to the distinction between real and intentional being which he had established in "What Is Really Real?"61 The being enjoyed in consciousness by the objects of knowledge and love was intentional being; it was not the real being of the actual existent. It followed then that, in the philosophy of God, a distinction should be made between the purely intentional being which the objects of God's love and knowledge enjoyed in His consciousness and the real being of the infinite existence with which God's essence was identified. Even though God's real being could never change, the intentional objects of His consciousness would vary, depending upon God's free choice to create or not to create a finite world. Furthermore, although God's real being could not be affected by the action of His creatures, the intentional being of the objects known and loved by God would vary according to the free choices made by saints and sinners. The provident love of a personal God would have to "vary," in its own timeless way, in order to respond as it should to the acts, vice and virtue, which mark the historical course of a human life. Thomists were right enough in saying that a God, whose infinitely simple esse could undergo no physical change, could not be really related to the world. But they had by no means said all that they should have said. For an infinite person, whom creatures could affect in the intentional being of His consciousness, must also be considered intentionally related to the world. Thomists therefore should insist that the provident God of their metaphysics is truly, though personally, related to the world. Mutable, as He is, in the intentional order, St. Thomas' God is indeed the God of biblical revelation.

By 1979, however, the year in which his *The Philosophical Approach to God* was published, Norris Clarke still believed that what he had said in 1973 was technically defensible. Nevertheless, he no longer considered it an adequate response to process metaphysics.⁶² It would be more profitable, he now thought, simply to drop the distinction between real and personal relations. Thomists should honestly admit that, in some aspects of His being at least, God is really related to the world. The old doctrine was true in the older, more restrictive context of Aristotelian metaphysics. But, once the metaphysician has made the option to work within the less restrictive contemporary context in which the order of the person and interpersonal relations have become the prime analogues for the concepts used in his metaphysics, another and "looser" meaning for "real relation" is called for. The free *person*, rather than the impersonal *nature* of Aristotelian physics, has now become the model from which the fundamental concepts of our philosophy are drawn.

In that new context, it is no longer difficult for a Thomist to admit that a mutual giving and receiving of personal love takes place between God and creature, and that God's consciousness becomes contingently and qualitatively different because of it. This difference, however, is restricted to the relational level of God's consciousness. It in no way implies any increase in the ontological perfection of God's intrinsic inner being, or what St. Thomas would call the absolute, as opposed to the relational, aspect of God's being.⁶³ Thomists should have no fear that admitting such contingent relational change in God would jeopardize God's infinite perfection. For, as we understand today, to give and receive love is a sign of perfection rather than of imperfection in a personal agent.⁶⁴ Thomists' admission of conscious relational change

⁶¹See note 21.

⁶² Philosophical Approach to God, p. 90.

⁶³ Philosophical Approach to God, p. 91-92.

⁶⁴Philosophical Approach to God, pp. 91-93.

in God, therefore, no longer implies the compromising of any really essential principles. They can even go so far as to admit that such change is temporal, as long as they understand that "God's time" is of an incomprehensibly different modality than the time of our contingent, moving world.⁶⁵

The whole quarrel over God's immutability can now be laid to rest. All the Thomist need say today is that some kinds of change can be considered appropriate for an infinitely perfect person while other kinds cannot.

Despite these gracious concessions, Father Clarke's position in 1979 did not seem to differ fundamentally from the one which he defended in 1973, except for its willingness to tolerate—without great enthusiasm—some sort of temporal change in God. His fellow Thomists might well observe that both positions still rested upon Father Clarke's distinction between real and intentional being. Although God's conscious relation to the world was now called "real" rather than "personal," its intentional "reality" was of a very different nature from the actual reality of God's absolutely existing essence. Father Clarke's revised metaphysics of God's immutability still seemed to rest on a distinction which many of his fellow Thomists would not permit him to make. Joseph Maréchal most certainly would not. For the reality of intentional being is the foundation on which Maréchal's Transcendental Thomism is built.66

AN ORIGINAL METAPHYSICS OF ACT AND POTENCY

From the early articles, published soon after his return from Europe, Norris Clarke's commitment to the metaphysics of act and potency was clear, and, through the course of his long career, it has been unwavering. In those early articles, limitation of the act of existence by a potential principle was an essential element in his metaphysics of creation and participation, and, in an important article, published after a quarter century of teaching, the dynamic metaphysics of substance and substantial potency was listed among the most relevant elements of St. Thomas' philosophy to-day.⁶⁷

The same article revealed, however, the extent to which Norris Clarke's metaphysics of act and potency had evolved through his own meditation on the text of St. Thomas and his prolonged contact with contemporary philosophy and science. In its developed form, his metaphysics of act and potency had been transformed into an original synthesis. His fellow Thomists might admire it, but not all of them would agree with it.⁶⁸

For one thing, although Father Clarke remains committed to his metaphysics of diverse participation in existence through the varied limiting modes of essence, he has become very reluctant to speak of a real distinction between the act of existence and essence as its limiting principle. Although a real metaphysical distinction between these two principles of being had been considered a hallmark of Neo-Thomism, Father Clarke no longer thinks it wise for Thomists to insist on it. To speak of its "real" distinction from existence implies that essence is in some way a positive principle in its own right. Yet the one source of all positive reality is existence. Granted

⁶⁵ Philosophical Approach to God, pp. 93-95.

⁶⁶ Van Riet, L'Epistémologie Thomiste, pp. 278-79.

^{67&}quot;What Is Most and Least Relevant", 425-30.

⁶⁸See also "What Cannot Be Said in St. Thomas' Essence-Existence Doctrine," New Scholasticism, 48 (1974), 19-39.

that some objective irreducibility is found in the real order between a real perfection and the mode which limits it, Thomists should admit that human concepts cannot grasp more closely what a limit's reality truly is. They would be well advised then simply to speak of a real limited participation in existence through essence as its limiting mode, and abandon the effort to determine more closely in what the "reality" of the "composition" between essence and existence consists.⁶⁹

For many Thomists Father Clarke's proposal is far from a modest one. At first glance, it appears to compromise the reality of the transcendental relation between essence and existence—one of Neo-Thomism's cardinal principles. It was one thing for Father Clarke to deny the reality of intentional being as a requirement of his existential Thomism, as he had done in "What Is Really Real?" But it would be quite another to water down Thomism's real transcendental relation between essence and existence, as he now appeared to be doing. No wonder then that other distinguished Thomists, such as Cornelio Fabro and Joseph Owens, reacted unfavorably to anything like this revised metaphysics of essence and existence.

For Father Clarke the metaphysics of act and potency remains as relevant for the metaphysics of change as it does for a metaphysics of participation. Without a dynamic metaphysics of substance and accident the perduring personal identity of the human agent through the inter-personal process of dialogue would not be intelligible, and, to make sense of the deeper level of change—which Thomists call substantial change—a metaphysics of act and potency is still required.

Physics has shown the inadequacy of Cartesian mechanism which reduced the larger wholes of the physical world to aggregates of discrete atomic actualities, and philosophers, such as Ivor Leclerc, have pointed to potency's indispensible role as a condition of possibility for any complex whole that is not an aggregate. In quantum physics, a potential of some sort is required in order to make sense out of the behavior of sub-atomic particles. In our contemporary world, therefore, a metaphysics of potency as the subject of continuity in change, possessing the real inner aptitude or capacity to take on some new mode of being and to form an intrinsic unity with it, is very much in place. Scientists and philosophers are ready again to recognize the truth of St. Thomas' principle that, in the physical world, an intrinsic unity cannot be made out of two entities in act.⁷¹

That should not be taken to mean, however, that Father Clarke would recommend a return to the Thomistic metaphysics of substantial form and primary matter as Thomists have understood it in the past. The basic structure of that act-potency relationship remains quite sound but, once again, some revision will be required to make it adequate to the data of contemporary science.

The intrinsic unity of complex wholes is of a higher order than the unity of merely accidental aggregates. Complex wholes are genuine una per se. In the living body, for example, lower components, like molecules and cells, although they are not totally destroyed, surrender their normal autonomy of being and action to the body's higher organizing principle, its unitary substantial form. But, Father Clarke observes, they do not disappear completely and, on the dissolution of the complex whole, these

^{69&}quot;What Is Most and Least Relevant," 423-424.

⁷⁰It must be noted, however, that their objections were raised, not against Father Clarke's articles, but against the position of William Carlo which Father Clarke favored with some reservations. See 'What Is Most and Least Relevant,' 424, n. 4.

^{71&}quot;What Is Most and Least Relevant," 426-27.

lower elements re-emerge with the full autonomy of their proper action. St. Thomas himself had to admit that fact, and, under questioning about it, he allowed for a "virtual presence" of these elements in the complex whole.

This means that the unitary substantial form of the complex whole is not the formal act of a wholly undetermined potential principle, the "pure potency" which Aristotle and Thomas called prime matter. What this form unifies is the "substantial potency" of lower organized systems plastic enough to surrender their autonomy of action to its higher organizing influence. At the bottom of the descending scale of systems may well be found the basic energy of our physical world organized by the ascending hierarchy of forms.72

Although, as Father Clarke concedes, some Thomists may have very serious reservations about his metaphysics of unitary substantial form and substantial potency, it does not seem, taken by itself, as radical a revision of Thomism as the one proposed in his metaphysics of essence and existence. He is far from being the first Thomist to admit the virtual presence of lower elements in substantial wholes, and support can be found in the text of St. Thomas himself for that admission. When, however, his revised metaphysics of matter and form is taken together with what he has already said about the partial surrender of a substantial form's autonomy to the higher form of the system in which the individual substance exists and acts, a number of provocative questions arise.

Substantial forms, existing in a system, it would appear, are organized by the form of the higher system, and they, in turn, organize the lower systems which exist "beneath them" in the complex whole. Is there an ascending hierarchy of progressively higher systems, with some resemblance to the series of ascending systems progressively organized by a series of higher forms in Bernard Lonergan's metaphysics of emergent probability? If so, the series of unifications of lower systems by higher forms, however, cannot proceed mechanically in an univocal way. For, in Father Clarke's metaphysics of the acting person, as in Father Lonergan's metaphysics of emergent probability, no subsisting human agent can be subordinated to the form of a higher physical or social system as an organic part is subordinated to the higher form of a living body.

The traditional categories of substance and accident, Father Clarke tells us, can no longer handle the diverse set of relations between forms and systems. A new and more adequate category will be required to deal with their interrelation on the diverse levels of reality.73 Nevertheless, both substance and accident are still required for Father Clarke's metaphysics of change. Yet, how is the category of substance to be defined more precisely, now that the relation of substantial form to subordinate lower systems has been "loosened up" and its relation to the forms of higher systems remains and must enter into its definition? There can be no doubt that, in Father Clarke's metaphysics, substance and substantial form still retain their pride of place. But the status of a formal principle of being, transcendentally related to prime matter, which defined the nature of substantial form for Thomists in the past no longer defines its nature for Father Clarke. In his original philosophy of act and potency, as in the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan, the metaphysics of form and system has emerged as one of the most challenging developments in contemporary Thomism.

A "CREATIVE NEO-THOMIST"

Father Clarke has described himself as a "creative Neo-Thomist." And, as we have seen, in his philosophy of God, his metaphysics of relations and his revised metaphysics of act and potency, there is ample evidence to support his claim. Unflagging intellectual curiosity and a remarkable openness of mind have made him an attentive listener to his colleagues in the philosophical community. Dialogue with them has enabled him to identify the weak spots in his inherited Thomism. A strong metaphysical mind has enabled him to make adjustments in it, required to meet the demands of contemporary experience, and to drop its outmoded elements without regret. For him, Thomism has not been a traditional "intellectual position"; it has been a living philosophy.

Open and creative as his Thomism has been, however, Norris Clarke is no ecclectic. The metaphysics of participation and creation, grounded upon the interpersonal experience of the human agent, with which he began his intellectual career, has provided the backbone of his philosophy since then. He has held firmly to the original synthesis which he had worked out from his own experience of European Thomism, a personalist existential Thomism, enriched by the Transcendental Thomist tradition, but independent of it. In that original synthesis the act of existence, the dynamic ground of being's active self-presence, was the central perfection in which a community of limiting modes participated. Fidelity to its fundamental principles has been the source of the originality and power of his development of them through thirty-five years of teaching and writing. Father Clarke has every right then to claim both titles, "creative" and "Neo-Thomist."

Kant's Ethical Commonwealth: The Highest Good as a Social Goal

Sharon Anderson-Gold

I. INTRODUCTION: THE HIGHEST GOOD AND THE NATURE OF VIRTUE

THE CONCEPT of the Highest Good has been the subject of controversy for many generations of Kant interpreters. It has been defended by John Silber as a "spur" to unlimited moral striving, stimulating and challenging the extent of human freedom. It has been criticized and rejected by Thomas Auxter as beyond human capacities and damaging to serious moral efforts to realize the moral good. In each account what is at stake is the nature of virtue and its relation to individual capacities and powers. Silver stresses the purity and intensity of the motive as measured against "unattainable" ideals. Auxter stresses the intelligibility of specific outcomes that are capable of molding the world at hand. But basic to both accounts is the assumption that virtue is primarily an individual task.

An alternative to this approach is suggested by Gerald Barnes.³ Drawing on the *Religion* Barnes represents the highest good as a social goal which it is the duty of the species to attain "collectively." Fundamental to Barnes' analysis is the concept of a "collective duty" from which individuals derive specific duties as a function of their membership in specific communities. Extending this analogy drawn from the political realm to the concept of an ethical commonwealth presupposes that there is an *obligation* to enter into and maintain a wider form of human community which extends ideally to the entire species. Kant explicitly defends this perspective in the *Religion*.

Now here we have a duty which is *sui generis*, not of men toward men, but of the human race toward itself. For the species of rational beings is objectively, in the idea of reason, destined for a social goal, namely, the promotion of the highest as a social good.⁴

I cannot here adequately deal with the metaphysical objections that might be raised with respect to the idea of a duty which is *sui generis*. I can only indicate that a defense of this idea can be made in keeping with Kant's practical postulate of humanity as an end in itself. The question which must be addressed here, however, is how can a duty of this general description be related to the individual duty to attain virtue? I

¹John Silber, "Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent," *Philosophical Review*, 68 (Oct. 1956), 469-92.

²Thomas Auxter, "The Unimportance of Kant's Highest Good," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, (April 1979), 121–34.

³Gerald Barnes, "In Defense of Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good," *Philosophical Forum*, n.s 2 (1971), 446-58.

⁴Immanuel Kant, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 89.

would suggest, furthering Barnes' interpretation, that the relationship between an idea attainable only by the species (or by means of collective action) and the duty of individual moral perfection is conceivable only by altering traditional conceptions of the "private" or personal nature of virtue. If virtue is, as I shall try to demonstrate, primarily an orientation toward others, then the duty to promote the ideal of social union is *inseparable* from the goal of individual moral perfection.

My fundamental thesis will be that the concept of the highest good is reformulated by Kant in the *Religion* as a social goal *as a consequence* of his introduction in this work of the concept of *radical evil*. Radical evil is defined by Kant as an impediment to virtue infecting the social condition of man, who, regardless of his civil sophistication, remains in an *ethical state of nature* characterized by an ambivalent disposition toward virtue. I will first explicate the relationship between radical evil and the predisposition to humanity which underlies Kant's concept of the ordinary social condition. I will then attempt to demonstrate the problems that the introduction creates for an "individualistic" model of moral perfection. I will claim that the theme that connects the duty of individual moral perfection to the duty to promote a particular kind of social union is the problem of the constancy of the moral disposition in an ethical state of nature. The ethical commonwealth is the ideal which individuals *must* propose to one another as the means for overcoming the ethical state of nature.

Given the Kantian conception of radical evil, the impediments to virtue lie in the imperfect relation of the individual to the species. The resolution of the problem of virtue requires a positive reconstruction of that relationship according to the ideal of an ethical commonwealth. When Kant claims that the highest moral good cannot be attained merely by the exertions of the single individual toward his own perfection he means more than the trivial statement that no one individual can transform the world. He means also that moral perfection cannot be "individualed" so that, even if all individuals simultaneously willed their *own* moral perfection, the highest good would not be attained. This means that the highest good is not an "aggregate" of individual moral perfections (whether this is viewed at the level of motives or outcomes is secondary to my purposes). If the concept of radical evil implies a level of interconnectedness in our moral failure, it is but a consequence of the general theme found throughout Kant's writings of the interconnectedness of our moral destiny and hence "perfection."

II. EVIL AND "HUMANITY"

Kant begins Book III of the *Religion*, the central theme of which is the elucidation of the concept of an ethical commonwealth, with a reintroduction of the concept of radical evil. The discussion of the ethical state of nature prevailing within civil society (Book III) parallels the discussion of the corruption of the predisposition to humanity

⁵Thomas Auxter, "Kant's Conception of the Private Sphere," *The Philosophical Forum*, 9 (Summer, 1981), 295–310. Auxter provides an extensive critical analysis of Kant's concept of a "private" end. He claims that private horizons are not individual possessions but particular aspects of organic social structures. The private sphere, therefore, is not a sacrosanct realm separable from the public sphere. Auxter concludes that the moral ideal of a harmonization of ends entails a continuous transformation of private horizons and the liberation from "self-preoccupation." While Auxter tends to disregard the *Religion* (he claims the highest good is a problematic concept) my interpretation claims that the ethical commonwealth has a significant systematic role in Kant's social philosophy which is compatible with and furthers Auxter's analysis.

in Book I. In both contexts Kant relates the power of "evil," considered as an impediment to virtue (and not its mere absence), to the social condition of mankind. In Book III Kant claims that the obstacles to the attainment of a stable disposition toward virtue do not arise from our physical nature per se (neither from our needs nor our passions). Impediments to virtue arise from our social inclinations, from our very relatedness to others which occasions anxiety and insecurity. Kant's concept of an ethical commonwealth is posited as a necessary ideal in the context of a moral need for a harmonization of dispositions. This moral need arises from Kant's introduction of the propensity to evil as a characteristic of the human will in Book I. That the attainment of virtue must take the form of efforts to create a more perfect social union is a consequence of the relation of this propensity to the predisposition to humanity. Because of the corruption of the original end of our social nature, the task of moral perfection for the individual is inseparable from a reorientation toward others. Thus, the concept of radical evil is not only systematically connected to Kant's general moral philosophy, it is also the only basis from which his concept of the highest good and the ethical commonwealth can be given an intelligible content. In order to make intelligible the claim that the ethical commonwealth represents Kant's model of the highest good, and further to demonstrate the basis of the moral obligation to promote the development of this ideal, it will be necessary to retrace Kant's development of the concept of the propensity to evil in Book I of the Religion.

It is well-known that Kant claims in Book I that the propensity to evil is universally ascribable to man as man. There is little agreement, however, as to how this "universality" is to be understood. Is it merely an empirical generalization from experience useful in guiding our anthropological speculations? Some of Kant's statements support this line of reasoning, others thrust beyond it. Although Kant states that evil is not derivable from the concept of man in general and is hence not formally necessary, he also claims that evil is *subjectively necessary* to every man "even the best." Kant's distinction here between formal necessity and subjective necessity parallels his distinction between the finite rational will as such and the specifically human will which includes reference to specifically human predispositions. Evil is not rooted in the finite rational will as such and is therefore compatible with the faculty of freedom. If however, evil is *subjectively necessary* to every man, it must be bound up with specifically human predispositions and moreover predispositions that can be effected by freedom.

In Book I of the *Religion* Kant outlines three dispositions which he claims are "elements in the fixed character and destiny of man." These are animality, humanity, and personality. All three predispositions are said to be bound up with the exercise of the will and hence presumably can be modified and directed by reason, although none can be "extirpated." The predisposition to animality is bound up with our physical needs and thus arises from characteristics which we may have in common with non-rational beings. The predisposition to personality is simply our receptivity to the

⁶Robert Brown, "The Transcendental Fall in Kant and Schelling," *Idealistic Studies*, 14 (Jan., 1984), 49-66. Brown distinguishes between the "mode" of fallenness (evil as a transcendental concept) and the universality of evil in Kant's *Religion*. He believes that the universality of evil is an unprovable empirical concept and "an inference from Christology" (p. 63). My interpretation links the universality of evil to the human social condition. Individuals are not relieved of responsibility for this condition since the social/cultural realm unlike physical nature is a product of freedom.

⁷Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 27.

⁸ Ibid., p. 23.

moral law, our capacity for respect for reason which, while it may remain unexpressed or suppressed by our preference for other incentives, cannot be used contrary to its purpose. It is the second predisposition, the predisposition to humanity, which is most closely related to Kant's concept of evil.

Kant claims that the propensity to evil is "rooted in humanity itself." Although he does not make the connection between this propensity and the predisposition to humanity explicit, he must have in mind the process whereby this original predisposition is corrupted or used contrary to its purpose. The predisposition to humanity, unlike the predisposition to animality, presupposes the exercice of reason and specifically a reason which compares. The "self-love" which arises from this predisposition is not to be compared with a mechanical self-preservation. The basic desires bound up with this predisposition, desires for equality and esteem, are ascribable only to beings who create a dimension of their nature through interaction. Thus, the predisposition to humanity represents the basis of the social and cultural dimension of human nature, the dimension most clearly expressible through freedom.

The predisposition to humanity appears to be the original basis of the rational principle of self-love. The fundamental desire associated with this predisposition is the desire for equality. This desire clearly springs from our rational nature but from a reason which measures and compares. In its corrupt form this desire becomes an inclination "to acquire worth in the opinion of others." While there is here an implicit recognition of the self and others as moral beings, as rational "subjects" or "ends," the *moral* bond between persons is something to be created, affirmed through specific acts. Insofar as the "self" withholds this identification, we are oriented toward others only insofar as they affirm our worth; we are interested in the ends of others only insofar as they serve our purposes.

The predisposition toward humanity is a predisposition toward the good in that it posits the self as dependent upon others and poses the problem of the integration of ends. But unless the desires for equality and esteem are conditioned by an affirmation of the intrinsic value of others, this predisposition becomes the source of jealousy and rivalry from which arises a multitude of "vices of culture." Thus, while the predisposition to humanity appears to be but the basis of a specific incentive, it is really the "locus" of the general principle of self-love which Kant clearly identifies later with the propensity to evil. But if this interpretation is correct, then Kant's statement that the propensity to evil is "rooted in humanity itself" is somewhat more than a catchy phrase. There is an intrinsic connection between the "social inclinations" and the propensity to evil.

But let us attack this problem from a different direction and look at what Kant says about the propensity to evil. The propensity to evil is in its most essential meaning an impurity in maxims (this is the sense in which it is universally applicable to man as man).¹² The moral law presents itself as a sufficient incentive for the will and as the

⁹Ibid., p. 28. 10Ibid., p. 22

¹¹ Ibid., p. 22.

vickedness is termed "deliberate guilt" (p. 33), even impurity in the maxims adopted by the will is designated as "culpable." This distinction between deliberate and unintentional guilt, while not in keeping with modern usages, does throw some light on Kant's universality theme. It is the inner resistance to the moral law as an all-sufficient incentive that is basic to Kant's analysis of evil at the dispositional level. Absence of vice and conduct in conformity to the moral law is not equivalent to virtue. Virtue is, then, an achievement and a task of self-reformation. Yet if the propensity to evil is linked, as I attempt to demonstrate, to the principle of self-love, then virtue is also "self-overcoming." CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

supreme condition of the acceptability of other ends. The moral law, pure practical reason, dictates that the ends of the self be formed in conformity with the requirements of the categorical imperative and for the sake of the lawfulness that is thus introduced into the system of ends. This dictate commands an orientation toward others whereby our ends are systematically integrated with the ends of others. If the moral law were the supreme incentive for the human will, the human condition would be spontaneously socially integrated as if "by nature."

In forming its highest maxim however the human will naturally incorporates both self-love and the moral law as incentives or motivating grounds. But since either incentive is sufficient to determine the will, the fundamental character of the will depends upon the priority assigned these diverse incentives, i.e., which is made the condition of the other. The propensity to resist the moral law as a sufficient incentive and to rely on the incentive of self-love becomes morally culpable insofar as the incentive of the moral law becomes subordinated to the incentive of self-love.

The supreme act of freedom whereby the moral disposition is formed is possible only because pure reason is practical and is an end in itself. Yet in the process whereby this freedom is exercised, and the highest maxim articulated, reason can be utilized as an instrument for the attainment of the specific and narrowly (privately) conceived ends of the phenomenal self. It is, then, in the manner in which the self is conceived that the corruption of the will takes place and evil arises. Since Kant believes that the moral law is self-legislated, the ontological structure of the self clearly includes the incentives of our rational nature. Traditional accounts of Kant's concept of the "self" stress a dualistic structure divided into physical and rational components. Yet since Kant denies that evil is simply a consequence of the existence of our physical nature per se, the possibility of evil requires that the self include these components yet be essentially "poised" between them. Evil, then, consists in a choice between incentives, an orientation of the self. But the model of evil on this dualistic account is an orientation toward the physical world which makes it difficult to distinguish weakness of the will from physical determination. I believe that Kant's model of evil in the Religion is based on a more complex triadic structure of human nature which recognizes a social dimension that is neither purely physical nor purely rational. The propensity to evil as articulated in the Religion is an orientation toward the social world. The general principle of self-love (which Kant identifies with the propensity to evil) arises from the predisposition to humanity insofar as the self asserts its own ends as the condition of the recognition of the value of others. In withholding identification with the ends of others, we determine other selves as mere means. It is in the "objectification" of others that the debasement of our humanity occurs. It is not the mere force of the external world or the raw attractiveness of objects that underlies the subversion of the moral law. Autonomy, the affirmation of the self as an end, can only be expressed through the kingdom of ends. The moral law as the pure form of reason, operates as an incentive by positing this idea (the kingdom of ends) as the regulative condition of our interaction with others. It is primarily through the detachment of the self from this realm, the assertion of the primacy of the self, that the self degenerates into a private system of desires. But the self can never become a mere object. Since, according to Kant, man is characterized by freedom, even as a natural being man is not immediately subject to mechanical determination. Nature is as it were a "stepmother" who will not immediately accommodate our desires.13 The satisfaction of human desires requires the utilization of reason which is never perfected in the individual. It is reason which bestows upon us our social nature and leads us to "compare" ourselves with others, to judge ourselves happy or unhappy only in relation to others. Insofar as reason is an incentive affecting the human will, it operates to restrict and condition the nature of our desires. Reason is the only power capable of integrating our total nature precisely because that nature is inherently intersubjective. The propensity to evil is identified with the principle of self-love, not insofar as the self is a physical being with material needs, but insofar as the self is a social being who refuses to recognize the intrinsic value of others. One can view this detachment of the self from the incentives of pure reason as a kind of "transcendental fall"14 which individuals re-enact as they assume their social roles and freely enter into the power struggles of everyday life. But one can also view this as the evil innate to the species insofar as the ordinary social condition is the "locus" of a fundamental moral problem.15 Viewed in this latter way, there are no "private" solutions to the problem of evil. Given Kant's analysis of the nature of the corruption of the predisposition to humanity, one would have to conclude that the individual desiring to transform his or her corrupt disposition could not begin this process or attain to moral perfection "alone." What is at stake is not the fulfillment of virtue in the sense of good deeds which can be motivated by a desire to demonstrate our "superiority" (and which Kant claims can often be attributed to mere good fortune). Action in accordance with the moral law, good character, is fully compatible with the continued dominance of the principle of self-love. What is at stake is a reorientation of the self, a positive act of identification with others which moves beyond the ordinary social condition.

III. THE ETHICAL STATE OF NATURE

Kant has termed the ordinary social consition the *ethical state of nature*.¹⁶ The ethical state of nature is inclusive of the civil condition within which we fulfill duties of justice and such obligations of benevolence as follow from our individual conceptions of our personal good. The ethical state of nature, however, is characterized by a systematic distance between its members and by a lack of identification with one another's ends. It is characterized by a state of "inner immorality" whereby concerns for self are narrowly and privately conceived such that the ends of others are viewed as merely the means to our own satisfactions. Such a condition is not necessarily violent or even expressive of great material inequality. It is perfectly conformable to self-interest and prudence to assist those in dire need so that they shall not become disruptive. In such a condition, however, skills, virtues, personal relation-

¹³Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," *On History*, ed. and trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Publishers, 1977), First, Second and Third Theses, pp. 12–14.

14Since the original resistance of the will to the moral law is uncaused, it has no antecedent conditions. The propensity to evil is thus a "transcendental" or a priori concept which Brown (op. cit., Idealistic Studies) refers to as a "fall" to indicate this inner division. My interpretation stresses that the resistance to the moral law is simultaneously a distancing of the self from others. This interpretation is compatible with some contemporary interpretations of Christianity and with the Marxian conception of the alienation of species-being.

¹⁵If one considers Kant's writings on history and his political program as articulated in "Perpetual Peace," human moral development will require fundamental transformations in our traditional concepts of "Community."

¹⁶Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 87.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 89.

ships are viewed thoroughly instrumentally such that the development of shared values is suppressed.

Since the orientation toward virtue is, according to Kant, an orientation toward others as "ends," it is first and foremost the formation of a common bond, a community, a supportive network within which anonymity is overcome and personal relationships established. In discussing the problem of the return to virtue in Book three of the Religion Kant explicitly refers to man's social condition. Kant argues that the inconstancy of the disposition is not occasioned by individual needs and passions nor is it occasioned by extreme examples of evil and depravity. The inconstancy of the disposition and therewith the dominance of the propensity to evil within the human will is occasioned quite simply by the social inclinations as they operate in the ethical state of nature.

He can easily convince himself that he is subject to these not because of his gross nature, so far as he is a separate individual, but because of mankind to whom he is related and bound He is poor (or considers himself so) only in his anxiety lest other men consider him poor and despise him on that account. Envy, the lust for power, greed, and the malignant inclinations bound up with these, besiege his nature content within itself, as soon as he is among men.18

The same litany of social evils first encountered in Book 1 reappears as social inclinations (not necessarily translated into deeds) restrainable by a good will but essentially distancing moral agents from one another and preventing a positive integration of their ends. As long as individuals remain isolated in their endeavors to overcome the propensity to evil and attain to a virtuous disposition their achievements will remain subject to frustration. Kant suggests in Book two of the Religion that the question of moral happiness (contentment) is related to the assurance of the constancy of the disposition to virtue. 19 Given the arguments of Book one of the Religion, each individual must begin the evaluation of his or her moral condition with the assumption of a corrupt disposition. Since human beings according to Kant have no direct insight into their fundamental dispositions the only means whereby to evaluate moral "progress" is the general direction of our acts. Yet no number of good "deeds" per se can guarantee the enduring and stable quality of a good will. Even if attained, the disposition to virtue must be constantly reaffirmed against the continuing influence of the propensity to evil. The faculty of freedom exercised in accordance with the moral law ensures that the propensity to evil is not sovereign and that the attainment of a morally good disposition is possible. Insofar however, as we are not united with others for the purpose of mutually sustaining this disposition, the stability of our disposition is constantly threatened.

...so too is the ethical state of nature one in which the good principle, which resides in each man, is continually attacked by the evil which is found in him and also in everyone else... because they lack a principle which unites them, they recede through their dissensions, from the common goal of goodness.20

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 61. "This difficulty concerns moral happiness. By this I do not mean that assurance of the everlasting possession of contentment with one's physical state. . . I mean rather the reality and constancy of a disposition which ever progresses in goodness (and never falls away from it)."

²⁰ Ibid., p. 88.

Kant concludes that the only remedy for this condition is the abandonment of this form of social relationship, this willful isolation and condition of "inner immorality" whereby the divisions between self and other are reflected within the individual as divisions within his or her will. The act whereby we attempt to heal the breach within our disposition by overcoming the distance between ourselves and others is fundamentally a public and social action. Thus, the abandonment of the ethical state of nature has as its corollary the adoption of the duty to promote a social union whose goal is to support the development of virtue. The ideal which regulates both this duty and the acts which follow from it, is the ideal of an ethical commonwealth.

As far as we can see, therefore, the sovereignty of the good principle is attainable, so far as men can work toward it, only through the establishment and spread of a society in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress these laws in all their scope upon the entire human race.²¹

IV. THE ETHICAL COMMONWEALTH

The ethical commonwealth as presented by Kant in Book three of the *Religion* is the end in terms of which the concept of the highest good can become an object of the human will. The highest good is now understood as a social goal attainable only by the species since it extends to the entire species. This goal specifies an obligation for individuals to contribute what they can through particular forms of moral association insofar as this goal is a condition for the attainment of virtue, a condition arising from our "moral need for social union."²²

Since the ideal of an ethical commonwealth extends ideally to the entire human race, it is specifically different from the concept of a political commonwealth. Civil authority extends only to the conditions under which our innate right to freedom can be translated into a proprietory right in an object. The state, therefore, is primarily concerned with the generation and securing of private property. The Kantian conception of virtue, however, goes beyond the settling of questions of "rights" and aims at the cultivation of talents and benevolent dispositions. Duties of virtues go beyond viewing others as "limits" to our claims and directs us to treat others as "ends" supporting and promoting their legitimate objectives. Since the disposition positively to value others as ends cannot be directly coerced, civil society can do little to promote the attainment of virtue.

The problem of virtue as developed by Kant in the *Religion* is not reducible to the fulfillment of duties of benevolence as characterized by Kant's examples in the *Groundwork*, that is, of providing material assistance to someone in need. Rather, the problem of virtue is here treated at the more fundamental level of our attitudes toward others which precede any specific acts of benevolence and provide the context in which needs are assessed and fulfilled. The provision of material necessities is something that the state can and ought to redress but the development of attitudes which foster positive personal development and interaction is not subject to legislative action.

The development of an ethical community goes beyond questions of the redistribution of material possessions. It entails minimally the abandonment of aggressive and competitive attitudes toward others, and maximally the adoption of cooperative and supportive networks. An ethical community is a context within which members can

²¹ Ibid., p. 86.

²²Ibid., p. 89.

reveal the personal dimensions of their needs in an atmosphere of equality and trust, a context of friendship wherein another's goals can be fostered and supported as part of our own happiness and sense of well-being. The development of an ethical community thus entails a general commitment to others which underlies all duties of virtue and expresses our intention to value persons as ends in themselves. This commitment entails specific acts of benevolence but specific acts of benevolence do not necessarily entail this commitment. Thus, the members of the ethical communities have explicitly extended the nature of their obligations beyond the duties of civil society.

V. THE HIGHEST GOOD AND THE MORAL WORLD ORDER

The ethical commonwealth is distinct from the political commonwealth both with respect to form and purpose. The ideal of the ethical commonwealth, however, is also distinct from the specific forms of moral association which are the historical stages of its development. The Religion (Books 3 and 4) is also a critique of the various culturally based forms of moral association that have been founded upon "ecclesiastical faith,"23 i.e., churches. What these associations (churches) share with the ethical commonwealth is their public commitment to moral development and the derivation of their authority from the concept of a moral rulership which extends beyond any specific subset of human beings (even taken collectively within any historical period). This extension beyond the realm of human will and experience clearly demarcates these forms of association from any political authority.

While the ethical commonwealth and the historically based forms of moral association share a common purpose they also clearly differ. Insofar as historical churches retain doctrinal and authoritative structures based upon historical "revelations" they deviate from the ideal of an ethical commonwealth which presupposes no such "mediation" in the expression of moral purposes.²⁴ In positing the ethical commonwealth as the ideal of moral development Kant is in effect positing an ideal of ecumenical reformation.

Although the duties of virtue apply to the entire human community (derived from an authority encompassing that community and identical to no part of it), individuals as individuals cannot affect the condition of mankind directly. Yet, if the duty to promote the ethical commonwealth is taken seriously, then the fulfillment of the duties of virtue will require more than an individual-to-individual transaction. The duty to promote the ethical commonwealth will require that individuals set goals for group interaction and collaboration (as members of moral associations) to articulate shared purposes. Such group collaborations can reach across cultural and national boundaries to effect the attainment of moral goals in ways not readily available to individuals.

The moral world order generated by the concept of the ethical commonwealth transcends civil society and provides a mean of bridging significant "gaps" in Kant's political philosophy. Clearly if the ideal of Kant's political writings, the federation of peacable republics, is to emerge as a morally practical ideal it can do so only to the extent that the dictates of international law derived from the concept of inalienable

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²⁴Kant holds that the cultural and historical components of ecclesiastical faiths are merely the provisionary means for bringing men into specific forms of moral association. He claims that these empirical determining grounds will be laid aside as men progress in consciousness of the rational ground of their duties to one another.

human rights takes cultural root. According to Kant, inalienable human rights are not transferable to any civil authority; they are directly vested in the human community. The protection and promotion of these rights, therefore, is first and foremost the concern of the citizens of the moral order. The moral ideals of human rights, international justice and peace, presuppose the development of an ethical commonwealth.²⁵ Only insofar as the various moral/religious associations, united under the concept of an ethical commonwealth, form collaborative networks for the attainment of these objectives can the political order be given the direction from which the "highest good possible in this world" will emerge. Throughout his historical and political writings Kant is keenly aware of the power of the *public* pronouncement to change the direction of historical development. So too, in reflecting on the basis of individual moral development, Kant lifts the categorical imperative from the private sphere of discretionary virtue and extends the directive of the moral law to the social realm.

²⁵Ibid., p. 113. "Such, therefore, is the activity of the good principle...regarded as a commonwealth under laws of virtue, a power and kingdom which sustains the victory over evil and, under its own dominion, assures the world of an eternal peace."

Are We in Time?

Charles M. Sherover

RE WE in time? Are we really in time—as our ordinarily casual statements seem to suggest? Consideration of this most ordinary kind of locution quickly shows up the misleading nature of metaphors built into our casual language. More important, this consideration opens us up to the far-reaching philosophic ramifications of the pervasive temporality constituting our human condition. Before these ramifications can be fruitfully examined in detail, it is important to develop a comprehensive over-view within which more detailed inquiries may find their context. Thus, this paper is concerned to spell out a generalized argument touching many areas of concern and issuing in a programmatic orientation suggesting the way in which a metaphysic that 'takes time seriously' might well proceed.

1. 'TIME' IN LANGUAGE

The pervasiveness of our temporal concerns is readily acknowledged. We talk of the fleetingness of time that nullifies all permanence, that makes everything transient. Against its steady beat, we either race or dawdle. We talk of triumphing over it or being subdued by it. Often we curse the inability to stop the clock so as to gain more time for completion of a task. We bemoan the rapidity of its passing when enjoying an activity or trying to beat a deadline; we are buoyed up by its promise as we labor against discouraging odds; we wince at its inexorable pace when pressed by conflicting demands; we complain of its leisurely pace when we are bored by unavoidable delay. We casually refer to clocks and calendars as providing objective demarcation of specific events. We mark out birth dates and death dates as somehow defining the lives that transpired between them.

Yet we casually describe ourselves, things, and events as being *in* time. Somehow we picture our temporal progress along a line, marked out precisely along the way in seconds, hours, days, years. Time is the container within which life's journey is travelled; we are *in* time, we say, and mark out our journey across the time-box in which we travel as journeying up the diagonal across a rectangle. We plot just where we are, from what precise point we started and, in looking ahead, at least can point to a point beyond which we do not expect to be travelling anymore.

Our basic metaphor is that of a box-like container; within it we plot the course of a line clearly marked out by a ruler. When this gross spatial reduction is questioned, we quickly substitute the picture of a perfectly balanced pendulum inexorably and without variation ticking away as we measure our progress against it. Our sequential moments are seemingly announced by a super-celestial clock ticking away in august transcendent splendor as we traverse the spatially marked moments of our journey. Whether time-distance is measured by the analogy of a spatial metric, or is pre-

sumably governed by a precise gear-wheel grinding out its moments, the temporality of our experience is not illuminated.

A container-notion of time does not explain the pervasive temporality we readily acknowledge in all experiences. Merely being in a time-box does not explain why a pervasive temporality inhabits our lives, our thoughts, governs all we do and say. Different people can respond to a common spatial condition—like being earth-bound—in different ways: some crawl and others learn to fly. But crawling or flying, each must take account of the irreversible nature and essential continuity of sequential time. Even the pacing of a governing pendulum does not seem to ring true. Experiential time does not run this evenly paced course: sometimes it seems deep with complex action, sometimes it dissipates into shallow transparent boredom. But the pictured pendulum ticks on without any apparent relation to what it is supposed to be measuring.

And so we substitute a different spatial portrait: time is not a pendulum, it is a stream. Time flows. That accounts for continuity as well as change, for the fact that we cannot really divide one moment from the next. Sometimes it flows deep and sometimes shallow. But it flows. And we see ourselves wafted downstream by the current—and mark our progress by noting regular points along the river-bank, all carefully marked out for us in advance by a thoughtful surveyor just so we can tell how far we have come and how rapidly we are travelling, even if we cannot see around the next bend.

How far may we push these metaphors? If time is a stream, what are its banks? From whence does it come? To where is it going? Our floating boat is moving with and in the stream, in time—but what is the stream? How seriously may we ask, as we may ask about the water, of what substance is this stream of flow composed? And, how shall we explain the contemporaneity of those other boats which have either preceded us downstream or are following in our wake?

When pressed about parallel or simultaneous events, we often seek to objectify the chronological relationship by a cliché commonly used by each of us, by public figures, by philosophers who ought to know better: we seek to pinpoint the precise temporal 'location' with the phrase "at this point in time." What is really meant is a particular network of interacting durational events. But what is pictured is a momentary notion of temporal reality in which past and future are relegated to the netherland of illusion while only the immediate present is portrayed as real. We presume some clearly marked-off surveyor-points along the bank of the time-stream, or the pendulum marking off real moments along a time-line. When either is taken in any literal sense, we are led to Descartes' perplexity about how God manages to get us from one

'Isn't it the spatial metaphor that prompts the question what is *outside* of time? To various forms of this question, the tradition has responded with two different answers encapsuled in the one word 'eternity.' But is either really adequate?

If we accept the platonic answer that eternity is timeless, we can neither give this notion any existential meaning nor can we explain how that which is immune to time itself engenders time and then how such 'descended' time accords with its source; and, despite Augustine's disclaimer, we cannot really help asking about what was *before* it?

If we accept the amending assurance that eternity is but endless time, we face in temporal terms the infinite regress that had been foreclosed in logical terms, a problem only compounded by the contemporary penchant to reduce all explanation to that of efficient (mechanistic) causality, itself a reduction of the present to the past. In any case, a spatially conceived eternal time presents a picture that defies imaginative comprehension: a container without containing boundaries, a continuum without genesis or goal, a rationality devoid of any justificatory teleology.

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sovereign moment to the next.² When pressed, we clearly see that the metaphor of the stream, as of the pendulum, when taken seriously is seriously misleading.

Our experience of time, our time-bound experiencing in its continuities and discontinuities, surges and lapses, and its yet essential coherence, cannot be reduced to geometry; experiential time cannot be squared with such spatial locutions, metaphors, and models. Time is not space; spatial pictures of time collapse just because they subsume time under spatial rubrics, portray it in terms it does not accommodate. "All statements ordinarily made about time," Collingwood noted, "seem to imply that time is something which we know it is not, and make assumptions about it which we know to be untrue." We should be forewarned against looking to the peculiar expressions of our own parochial language for insight into the nature of time and temporal experience. Our everyday metaphors only succeed in distorting our understanding of the temporality we each continually manifest.

2. EXPERIENTIAL CLUES

When faced with serious questioning, when I am cross-examined in a witness-chair, when I am charged to explain a course of events or justify a particular decision, I do not present a neutral photographic report of a spatial panorama. I do seek to recall selected happenings which strike me as related to the particular question I face. I seek to correlate my observational or decisional complex of then-unfolding events which were still open-ended and which I had judged to be intertwined. I find myself explaining, not some 'point in time,' but a spread of durational activities as I now recall seeing and interpreting them to myself, activities that were still openly problematic when observed, specific activities extracted out of all else that was then going on because I now judge them relevant to what I try to explain. My explanation is essentially referential to, and expressive of, my individual perspectival judgments, my comprehension of unresolved and overlapping activities as I now recall having originally taken them in.

When I try to make sense of any experiential events, I am voicing, while unveiling my perspectival outlook onto the world in which I find myself, the perspective that forms the particular selective interpretive experience that is mine. When I try to explain my role in a problematic circumstance, I try to avoid being trapped by the thoughtless clichés, misleading metaphors and ontological imputations built into my language; I do try to explicate the ways in which my experiencing activity, and its experiential judgments, were authentically constituted.

To do this is to begin to understand my own self, my own mode of experiencing my own course of experiential activity, the ways in which I function, the values which guide me, the capabilities I discern, the limitations I must accept. To do this is to begin to make some sense of my experiences of people, things, and events which I distinguish from myself while somehow finding them constitutive of the eventful happenings of the particular integrating experience I call mine. In order to clarify the import of the time references I use when I voice, describe, or justify my experiential

²See René Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Haldane & Ross (Cambridge University Press, 1968), vol. 1, p. 168; and "Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God," (Addendum to Objection II), Axiom II, v. II, p. 56.

³R. G. Collingwood, "Some Perplexities About Time," in my *The Human Experience of Time*, (New York: New York University Press, 1975), p. 561.

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judgments, I turn to some systematic introspection: I try to confront my own self in its experiential activity, to comprehend my own manner of experiencing my own experience. Temporal aspects of such self-examination quickly come to light.

However we probe the various facets of our experiencing activity, we find that temporality is radically pervasive. Our most innocent thinking, John Locke pointed out, is consciousness of a train of ideas, a sequential movement in which any one idea that attracts awareness presents itself as in a sequence of ideas, before some, after others. This first phenomenological discovery of introspective self-examination is that thinking itself is inherently a temporal process.⁴

Locke's discovery raises many issues, two of which are vital here: the continuity of change and the ability to be aware of sequence. Consider each of these two primal aspects of rudimentary thought:

1. Unless we take that 'train of ideas' to be going very rapidly, Locke's metaphor may be misleading. The content of dynamic consciousness does not present each separate idea-in-focus as discernibly distinct from its sequential neighbors (as one rail-road car is independent of the others). Rather we find a continuity of movement: the precise boundary of each experiential idea blurs into the next—as when watching a rapidly moving train. Taken in this way, the train of ideas in consciousness presents a primal experience of the continuity of change—each item of focus seemingly arising out of what is yet to come as it melds into what has just been; each idea presenting no sharp demarcation from those abutting it. Even the most disciplined concentration manifests this continuity as presenting movement, some touch of lastingness, and sequentiality within itself.

2. If we are not to be captivated by each momentary presentation in turn but are to be aware of the sequence, we cannot be blind to all but the immediately present idea. In order to be aware of sequence and change, awareness must retain what was immediately previous as tied into what is immediately present but moving into the past. Presupposed in the experience of sequence is the ability to retain in mind what was but is no longer as tied into what is immediately present but fading into the immediate past, seemingly pushed on by what is just emerging. In order to be aware of sequence, I must be able to hold some lastingness or durational spread in mind as supervening the immediate focus of attention.

When we turn from a specific act of simple introspective thought to a specific act of perception, we again find that any perpetual object is a temporally framed sequentiality within a supervening durational presentation. The simplest perceptual glance is one of minute lasting and minute changing.

Neither sense-awareness nor thought is timeless. "Sense-awareness and thought are themselves processes," Whitehead pointed out, 5 thus joining a conclusion reached by philosophers as various as Kant and James; they are processes that continually and inherently exhibit continuities of dynamism.

Whether we seek to root experiential activity in sense-perception, in thinking, or in a synthesis of the two, temporal activity would seem to be intrinsic to our experiences, to our capacity to engage in experiential activity, intrinsic to any particular experiences we might have. We can find no example of timelessness in experiential consciousness. Time would then seem to be the essential form of any experiential consciousness.

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sciousness, the form in which, or through which, all experiential content comes, the form of even the most passive experience we might imagine.

The truth of this thesis would seem apparent. Since Leibniz, Kant and James, Bergson and Husserl, I do not think it has been seriously challenged. As a foundational truth about human experiencing, one might expect serious thinking to take it seriously -as point of departure and pervasive fact of all human thinking and its cognitive claims. But it is generally and conveniently ignored, even in discussions to which it is crucial. Yet the thesis is not particularly new: Aristotle had already raised it by identifying consciousness of self with consciousness of time.6

3. THE COGNITIVE AND THE PRACTICAL

If we take up this last clue and consider the broader range of personal activities, we find that all activity-cognitive and practical-is temporally structured. I have grave doubts as to the legitimacy of this traditional dichotomy,7 but these doubts notwithstanding, let us look at each in turn.

With regard to the cognitive, we immediately note the central imaginative role played by memory. As perceptual recollection of the immediate present rolls out into the past, memory is invoked in order to maintain awareness of the continuity of process being witnessed. An act of memory is temporally intriguing: it is a temporal act that disengages from the perceptual field in order to place it into a wider context of continuity and meaning. In any act of memory-recall, what is no longer literally present is rendered present to the thinking mind. This capacity for memory-recall, this ability to commit a temporal act that at once disengages the narrow confines of the observational present in order to reengage a broader temporal perspective, betokens our ability to observe the separated 'moments' of the passing parade while reintegrating past with present in order to comprehend continuity.

This ability to disengage and reengage temporal perspective is crucial to the capacity to read meaning into what we see, select objects of attention, direct activity, and hence to engage in freely determined courses of activity. In memory-recall, as in anticipation, we meld the immediately present field with what is not literally present; doing so enables us to broaden out the visual present into a net of continuities and meanings which permit evaluation, discrimination, focus, choice, decision.

"Every serial succession of which we are conscious," Royce pointed out, "has for us some sort of meaning;" it is this meaning that unites discrete elements into one continuity rather than leaving us with a disjointed staccato of myriad pictures.8 To discern a particular event out of the passing flux is a selective perspectival judgment that 'extracts' from a complex of activity in the perceptual field a particular chain of continuity as the object of focus, while relegating the rest of that complex to the status of a 'background' of no particular interest or concern.

See Aristotle, On the Senses, 448a.

⁷Even Kant abandoned it; see, e.g. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, ed. J. Kopper (Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam, 1966), p. 193; cf. Lewis White Beck, trans. Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 224-25: "But if pure reason of itself can be and really is practical, as the consciousness of the moral law shows it to be, it is only one and the same reason which judges a priori by principles, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes."

⁸Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904), Vol. II, p. 123.

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To describe a series of identifiable changes as one process presumes a selective judgment of sequential relations taken as presenting a discernible thread of meaning. Be it noted that the meaning is not merely in the result but in the process itself taken as an integrated series of conceivably discrete stages. A comprehending perception is then an interpretive activity in which one seeks meaning out of an observed presentation. Interpretive activity arises out of selective questioning—and questioning has a guided interest, purpose or concern. Any report of a passing scene thus has built into it the biases and interests of the reporter who has focused on those aspects of that scene which respond to his own questions.

The meaning I read out of an observation is an interpretive report of a durational complex; it is animated by my line of questioning, which animates the selectivity guiding the way I look, focus, and interpret what I am witnessing or investigating. Two observers, facing the same panorama with divergent interests or perspectives, will seek out divergent meanings in what they look at, report disparate continuities, pursue different interrogations. *Questions precede answers*. In the temporal logic of the case, any question looks to future responsive interpretation. Questions, and the animating meanings sought, are thus essentially futural in outlook; their anticipations are what beckon us into those interrogations that direct our selective attention and our interpretive reports.

One can go to two rather different kinds of philosophers for the disclosure of what is involved in this futural bias of human cognitive activity. Its detailed examination in Martin Heidegger's existential analytic is well known. But it was already present in the pioneering essays of Charles Peirce. Let it suffice to point out that, like the existential analytic, all of pragmatism rests on this thesis: human cognitive activity is founded on the capacity to anticipate futurity and bring that anticipation into the constitution of the present activity. Meaning, Peirce had argued, is to be found, not in a 'speciously present' moment, not in present perception, but in expectations, desires, hopes, and fears—which conspire to motivate present investigations, present questionings, present interpretive constructs, present animating meanings.

These strictly non-cognitive but temporally real aspects of present thinking provide the rationale for present selective observation, present criteria for evaluation, present judgments of meaning. In defiance of a long tradition, Peirce had urged that cognition is not the contemplation of currently apprehended information, but intellectually grounded expectation actively seeking out the future presentation of a fulfillment guiding us through an 'extended' present. Cognitive activity is deliberate investigation into selected phenomenal sequences, in response to specific questionings; this activity is neither caused nor bound by the past but freely uses the past; by means of memory-recall and conceptual recollection, those aspects of what has been, which seem relevant to the problematic at hand, are unified with it as a key to development of meaning. Cognitive activity is essentially and pervasively temporal and time-binding in the ways it is constituted.

More dramatically perhaps, practical reasoning exhibits that same pervasive futureoriented temporality. All authentic deliberation regarding possible activity is focused not on what has been, not on what is literally present, but on the future that is not yet but is yet conceived as presently open to alternative development. But again, this is not really new. Aristotle had already made this clear: No one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is not capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is right in saying, 'For this alone is lacking even to God, to make undone things that have once been done.'9

Practical reasoning involves deliberation concerning what is not yet but yet may be; it requires the presumption of the reality of time so that one may plan one's moves. It means organizing a course of action, that is, to commit a 'stretch' of oncoming time in the light of a vision of what is to be accomplished. Practical reasoning is purposive reasoning; its essential temporality is exhibited in at least two ways: (i) it finds its rationale neither in the past nor the literal present, but in a judgment of possibilities for an actualizable future; (ii) it functions by bringing a commitment to a possible real future into defining and directing its activity out of the present decisional moment.

The presumption of the reality of time is requisite for planning; it is acknowledged in any response to a situation posing a dilemma calling for action. For it is time that forces decision and choice upon us. Our temporally structured action commitments are themselves necessitated by our temporal situations. When we find ourselves called upon to act, we face a necessary decisional choice that cannot be refused: for to decide not to decide is itself deciding.

Most of our moral dilemmas do not (as first Rousseau, and then Kant, claimed) arise from a conflict of desire and obligations. Even Kant's man of good will could not, in any temporally defined situation, do all the things he might think he ought to do; his moral dilemma, in strictest rectitude, arises out of a conflict of moral obligations. The pressure of time forces decision between alternatively defensible right actions, alternate claims of moral conscience. Most real moral dilemmas do not present simplistic choices between incarnate good and incarnate evil, but rather between alternate goods. A moral dilemma arises, for the moral individual, just because, at a given temporal juncture, he cannot seek both goods, cannot perform both defensible acts, but must irrevocably choose one to the exclusion of the other. We cannot do all the things we want to do; we cannot, in most human situations, do all the things we think we ought to do; we cannot meet all the demands the most righteous conscience might demand.

Just because of pervasive temporality, every decision must be made as singular, irreversible, irrevocable, unalterable. I may seek to atone for a grievous error but I cannot undo that error. Any decision or act initiates a new sequence of events that closes off all alternate chains of possibility-actualization; any particular act is radically restrictive of the future one can give oneself. Time not only forces decision; it forces the necessity to choose into the dimly seen future. Each temporally forced decision commits the use of time to construct the delineation, definition, and continuing development of the deciding self.

If practical or moral judgments are concerned with possible actions, commitments to the use of time, and the shaping of personal futures, then all decision, commitment, judgment, action is concerned with dilemmas concerning the use of time. The question, 'What should I do?' concerns the use of oncoming time; the judgment or decision 'I should do x instead of y' concerns the use of oncoming time. All moral reasoning would then appear to be concerned with the ontology of the temporal, for time is the concern of its quandries, considerations, resolutions. Time is, then, the form of all

cognition, deliberation, will, decision, commitment, action; it is the form of that self-development in the continuity of selective becoming that is the biography each person is in the process of constructing.

Whether we see ourselves as beings who cognize or decide, whether we focus on the quest for knowledge or the determinations of choices, we find that we are constituted in essentially temporal terms. Our cognitive processes, decisional processes, are pervasively structured qua temporal. Time predicates are not incidental or accidental; they are constitutive of any individual being and of any particular situation in which he may find himself. As Leibniz had urged, time as such is not a thing and that is why it is not perceivable; but time-relations are built into each one of us as essential predicates of his being; time-relations are manifested in every expression of biographical becoming. The relations which are inherent in our thinking, observing, evaluating, deciding, and acting are temporal relations. Without them no reasoning or planning, no choosing or deciding, in short, no experience would be possible.

4. SOCIALITY

With good reason, one might well protest that I have been considering the individual without regard to relations with other beings or with the being of nature itself. None of our experiences, it would be correctly said, is entirely personal. Our temporal biographies are inextricably enmeshed with, and incorporate, relations with other people, other living beings, and the processes of the inanimate things of the natural world.

Even casual observation readily reveals the pervasive extent of the temporal relations investing our sociality. We carry watches and calendars—created to public standards—in order to coordinate temporal activities, make appointments, structure our days. We freely talk of spending time with some, avoiding others. The acute temporality of our social relationships is rapidly evident.

It would, however, be wrong to leave it at that. Merely noting our common dependence on clocks and calendars suggests something too casual and external. These time-organizing instruments and the temporal relations that ensue from their use are not incidental or accidental to our being; they are intrinsic to it. My living activity is not left untouched by a change of appointment, casual as that might seem. My response might be trivial, in which case its triviality is itself an important aspect of my being. Or, it might importantly affect and redirect what I am currently about. In either case, these temporal incidents become new facts in my life and the ensuing repercussions carry on, whether strikingly marked or barely noticed.

We are not self-contained beings who somehow flit untouched and unscathed through a social whirl that does not really matter. Inherently we are social beings. We define ourselves to ourselves, as to others, in terms of our relations with family, friends, school, church, club, employment, nation. The complex of our particular social involvements and isolations defines the grammar of our daily lives, thereby the particular experiences we have—and thereby the preoccupations of our attentions, perceptions, thoughts, concerns, and plans.

We think in and with a particular language, which again is not incidental to who or what we are. It brings into us a particularly prejudiced historic distillation of the development of a particular cultural tradition; it helps to form the ways in which we see the world, the categorial concepts which organize our thinking, the grammatical

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forms and idiomatic expressions and metaphoric short-hands that serve to express and thereby shape our views and judgments and convictions. The grammatical categories, ontological imputations, and conceptual models built into a particular language during a given historic period conspire to reflect an historic cultural outlook; they guide and form and shape the questions we ask, the kinds of answers we seek, the ways in which our own individually peculiar viewpoints are shaped and shared with others.

Each person has grown up within a particular social matrix—of family and friends—who shared certain values as grounding all discussion, certain permissable disagreements as allowable options, certain dogmas beyond question, certain interests, commitments, loyalties. Each has thus been nurtured within an historically developing ideational complex, a way of looking, which he carries with him, even as he may use some of these presumed judgments to criticize, reform, and reformulate his own judgments on his individuated heritage and his still developing relationships with it.

The host of descriptive predicates by which each individual sees himself and by means of which he gives expression to the person he finds himself to be are grounded in the multifarious ways in which the social temporality in which he is nurtured forms and molds the individuality he most prizes. Detailed explication of this grounding sociality would itself contribute to the present argument. But not able to do so here and yet not able to ignore it, let me use a kind of philosophic shorthand by invoking the historical line of thought a more adequate discussion of this special topic would carry forward. Such elucidation would utilize a Greek tradition of thought that, in modern development, comes out of Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel; it is the common tradition of philosophic idealism out of which both pragmatism and phenomenology arose. Its essential thesis here is that the social is more primordial than the individual, that individuality is not a thing but a process, a process that is essentially social in nature, that the process of individuation is a development building out of and feeding back into social temporality. Peirce and Royce (as well as Dewey) have forcefully argued that even the individual "assurance that outer nature exists apart from any[one] man's private experience [is] inseparably bound up with our social consciousness."10 Quite similarly, Heidegger has argued that the individual self is only able to discover itself as already being enmeshed in a world of other people and of things. In quite different language, but to much the same point, they have joined to argue that self-consciousness and the consciousness of time arise together out of that net of relationships which we find built into ourselves and that enables us to become aware of and to develop individual perspectives as elements of the temporal perspective of the social whole. This social temporality is not an accidental accretion to individual being but ingredient to it and foundational to its emergence.

What then of physical nature? Most of us presume to take physical nature as somehow primordial to our own transient experiencing. I do not want to question this belief because I share it. But one must add that physical nature cannot be reasonably seen as the whole of reality, for my ideas and fears and hopes and motives, as the scientific laws I take to be governing the physical things of the world, are as real in my experience within the world of nature as any merely physical entity.

However this may be, precisely how should physical nature as such be understood? It is readily apparent, as Royce forcefully argued, that our current conception of nature is a social conception; it arises less out of untutored individual experience (dependent on what we euphemistically describe as 'common sense') than out of this

specific cultural tradition which has raised us to its standards and outlook which defy 'common sense.'11 This tradition presents us with a developing body of scientific beliefs which we accept as authoritative, even when we cannot understand or explain them; this continued dogmatic acceptance is the more remarkable when we consider the continuity of revolutionary 'break-throughs' in the scientific understanding of nature, each of which sets aside what a previous generation was led to accept as unquestioned dogma of sophisticated knowledge.

It should really occasion no surprise or alarm that scientific conceptions of nature grow and thereby change. For the science that tells us of the nature of nature is itself a human product. Despite its transcendent pretensions, it arises out of human investigatory procedures, which are engendered by human questions, that express the temporal constitution of the human outlook from within the contemporary cultural matrix of its historic situation. It uses a man-made methodology, which is culturally conditioned, for its investigations; and a man-made logic, arising out of the grammar of this particular cultural tradition, for the validation of its reasonings.

The currently changing but currently developing beliefs of the scientific community, which scientific investigation uses as its point of departure, arise out of human questioning, and thereby exhibit the peculiarities and finite competences of the human temporal perspective onto the world as we are able to see that world within which we try to develop sophisticated, reasoned understandings of it. Science is a human interpretive activity and thereby cannot properly present an extra-experiential portrait of the whole of nature; qua human it is bound within the human outlook from within nature: it cannot tell us of the ultimate nature of nature itself as many of its spokesmen too often claim to do. Rather, human science presents answers to sophisticated human questions from within nature which try to comprehend the surrounding developmental phenomena of nature, but always from within a limited human, temporal perspective on its own developing environment. Conceivably another creature with a different time-span of attentive perception would focus on events we do not even suspect. As an imaginative experiment, contrast the outlook of a mosquito with a twenty-four hour life-span, our own outlook, and that of a transcendent and conceivably omniscient deity.

This is not the occasion to face the Kantian question as to whether this essentially biased human outlook can penetrate to the ultimate secrets of nature itself. However revealing or veiling our scientific insights may be, it seems clear that the behavior of nature appears to us as a network of irreversible processes: the acorn may become an oak tree that may produce acorns, but the oak tree cannot revert to its original state and itself become an acorn. At any stage of its life, the potentialities the oak tree carries with it depend for their realization on the environmental presentation of genuine possibilities for incorporation into its perduring being. At any stage of its life the oak tree embodies a living synthesis of its own perduring nature, its individual history, and the proximate future which it incorporates into itself. Natural processes appear as developmental—as inherently durational, irreversibly sequential and time-binding. To use Peirce's term, the 'habitual patterns of nature's behavior' appear to us as pervasive patterns of irreversible process, temporal continuity, and temporal integration. This is to say, in a word, that the behavior of natural phenomena appear to us as inherently time-ordered.

¹¹Certainly the heliocentric picture of the solar system runs counter to naive common sense; so, also, does an electro-atomic theory of physical matter.

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This time-ordered facet of natural processes may once have been seen as completely independent of human experience. And this apparent independence may have been a reason for the belief, most prominent in seventeenth-century western thought, that man is an irrelevant spectator of independently operating courses of nature's systematic working. But the sciences that developed out of that period, incorporating historically developed conceptual tools out of a developing historic culture, are themselves creating an historic revolution in the history of nature itself. The refined techniques of human temporal investigatory procedures are increasingly involving larger areas of physical nature in human history. I do not mean by this merely the human appropriation of increasingly wide areas of nature's being; I do mean that human investigatory activities are increasingly becoming part of nature's own historical development. Human development in Ionic Greece was already able to demonstrate the inherent temporality of nature as manifested in its intrinsic time-ordered processes. Contemporary technological achievements-finally being accorded serious philosophic scrutiny12-are now demonstrating, in our own historic era, that nature itself is amenable to temporal modifications of its processes, as man's increasing interferences in the processes of the natural order are increasingly becoming part of nature's own historical development.

This is to say that William James was not off course when he urged that, after all the differences between the living and the non-living, the mental and the physical, the one common predicate all existents seem to share, the one common tie all have to each other, is the mutuality of temporal structuring.¹³ However different man may be from other living creatures, from the lifeless things of the physical world, this seems to be the one pervasive tie that binds man to nature, enables man to interrelate with nature, allows man to mold nature as nature molds man.

The pervasive reality of time, as intrinsic to the existence of man and nature, Peirce argued, must be presumed if we are to be able to make any sense of either.14 Sharing in the common predicate of internal time-order, Royce concluded, is what is "common to [both] matter and to mind."15 This commonality of being-temporal has been even seen to have a theological reach: for Heidegger has followed Kant in urging that even God may be conceived by us only in inherently temporal terms.16 However this may be, it does seem clear that the only reading we can have of nature, as of ourselves, is that time is the one predicate that appears to be essential, pervasive, ingredient to all experiential being, things, ideas, and entities, to all becoming. Time is, it would seem, the essential predicate of any existent entity of which we may know, the bounding context of any theory we may hold, the essential attribute of any kind of reality of which we may intelligibly speak.17

¹²Prime examples being Martin Heidegger's The Question of Technology, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) & William Barrett's The Illusion of Technique (Garden City: Doubleday, 1978).

¹³See William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890), vol.

¹⁴See, e.g., "The Law of the Mind," esp. par. 127-132; "What Pragmatism Is," esp. par. 422 ff.; "Issues of Pragmaticism," esp. par. 458 ff., in Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, ed. Hartshorne & Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), vol. VI & V.

¹⁵ Royce, op. cit., p. 218.

¹⁶Cf. Immanuel Kant, op. cit., pp. 217-18; cf. Beck (trans.) op. cit., p. 219; & Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 8th ed. (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1957), p. 427, n. 1.

¹⁷If we seek to trace current philosophic outlooks back to originating sources, we might perhaps consider the view expounded here (and especially in arguments by Peirce and Royce) as something of a devel-

5. SOME PROGRAMMATIC CONSEQUENTS

I have suggested some of the ways in which the pervasiveness of time is manifest—in what and who we are, what we may do, how we think, how we may know and act. Time seems to be the form of all consciousness, decision, action. It appears to be the form of nature as well. It appears to be the essential tie binding each individual to the continuity of his own being, to other existent individuals, to the other members of what Leibniz once termed "the common citizenship of this cosmic republic."

Are we then *in* time? I think I have shown that this common locution but voices a misapprehension of our language. The reverse would seem to be closer to the truth: we cannot be in time just because time is *in* us. It permeates every activity of the being of the self; it orders the continuity of change in all the complex relations that constitute a self; it permeates the relations each has with others; it appears to be equally pervasive in that dynamic relational system of nature we inhabit and to which we belong. Time then appears to be *ingredient* to ourselves and to every aspect of our world insofar as we can come to know ourselves and our world. Within the reach of the human outlook, time would appear to be ontologically foundational. Whatever else time itself may conceivably be, it does seem to be just this complex of relations *internal* to the continuity of the self in the continuity of its individual ties to its world of people, ideas, laws, and things; for it is these relations that constitute the social individuality each knows as his own.

If we are to give these considerations systematic philosophic formulation, we find they conspire to urge us to retrieve and reconstruct, in temporalist terms, that central doctrine of the idealist tradition, the theory of internal relations. For time appears to us as that network of developmentally constitutive relations which characterize any entity in its own qualities and characteristics as in its relations with the other entities with which it finds itself; time appears to function as governing rules of existent entities, for time-relations do make an essential difference to the variegated ways in which such overarching laws become ontically manifest.

A retrieve of the theory of internal relations—as the network of temporal constitution (not in the usual terms of logical entailment)—in its speculative reach finds more in common with the metaphysical visions of Leibniz and James than with that commonly associated with the name of Hegel. Avoiding the universalizing identity of a monistic system, it would build on the fact that temporal perspectives are individually unique while time-relations are yet uniquely integrated in the ongoing becoming of individual entities. Its speculative hypothesis would then be a conception of reality as an interconnected time-order that is itself pluralistically constituted; it would recognize that individual perspectives and relations are yet related in a common time-system which appears to be individuating in its operative functioning.

opment of the pre-Socratic doctrine of Empedocles and Anaxagoras that 'like knows like;' i.e., if all our cognizing and acting are temporally constituted, then the only legitimate referential objects of our thinking must be conceived by us as somehow temporally constituted.

¹⁸In its hard form, a theory of internal relations must insist (regarding formulations by means of symbolic logic) that, in the two propositions taken as true, 'p & p' and 'if p, then not q', the 'p' cannot be the same 'p'—just because its particular relation with 'q' enters into it as part of its definition, i.e., its relations are not separable from but internal to it. Perhaps needless to add, whatever criticisms of the traditional logic one might have, on this score, its foundation in a theory of definition by genus-and-difference rather than arbitrary stipulation at least suggests something of a theory of internalized predicates in terms of its presumption of the hierarchy of being.

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A temporalist retrieve of the theory of internal relations could well commence from clues already to be found in Kant's Postulates of Empirical Thought. If we rethink his three modal principles in terms more explicitly temporal than those in which he presented them, we find that 'necessity' is effectively offered as our understanding of what is conceived to be trans-temporal condition; 'actuality' as the content of the perceptual present; and 'possibility' as temporally governing ground of whatever may transpire within human experience.¹⁹

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Such a temporalist retrieve would utilize Peirce's own retrieve of what he seems to have taken as a Scotist distinction between 'existence' and 'reality'—as temporally distinct categorial concepts: whereby 'existence' refers to particular individuals incorporating specific temporal predicates; and 'reality', as more inclusive, refers as well to what is conceived to be that system of over-arching laws, trans-temporal predicates, and principles governing (and thereby manifested in or by) all temporally existent particulars. It would bring into development from Heidegger's analytic his own undeveloped distinction of those most traditionally confounded of metaphysical concepts, the "possible" and the "potential." It is the former, the "possible," in its continuing temporal offerings of viable contextual options that permits the latter, the defining capabilities we carry with us that we term the 'potential,' to achieve temporal development and embodiment by selective appropriations.

Working from such ground, we should be able to avoid the usual rationalistic reduction of sequential change to logical entailment and the consequent logicization of reality; likewise, we would avoid the empiric reduction of all sequential change to a mechanical chain of efficient causalities which by a projection of retrogressive sequentiality only succeeds in reducing the present to the past. If time is real in a dynamic world, the reduction of all sequential change, either to a first premise or to a necessary connection to a temporally first cause, effectively obliterates the efficacy of time-relations by portraying all causal links as reducible to either logical entailment or historical simultaneity. If this suggestion should prove to hold, then freedom, and perhaps also the notion of 'chance' (which we find in both Aristotle and Peirce) would appear, not as deficient forms of necessitarian reason, but as authentic functions of temporal becoming.

A temporalist theory of internal relations would reformulate moral theory in ways accordant with the temporality intrinsic to all quandries, situations, dilemmas, judgments, decisions. In method, as in doctrine, it would insist on taking seriously the historicity of human thinking in its forward-looking stance. Recognizing the sociality of individuality, it would comprehend the history of human polity as an ongoing development whose history is still before it; we could then face the contemporary need for a reconstruction of the theory of civil society that is consonant with the temporal continuity of human development, the import of freedom that any thesis of an open future demands, and the essentially *pro*-spective historicity of our living together in free individuating community.

This programmatic sketch is offered here only to indicate the far-reaching significance that ensues from a rethinking of the pervasiveness of time as an internally constitutive relational complex. Doing so would systematically work from the realization that we find time so compelling, so encompassing, so pervasive, just because it is the animating force and form of what we do and who we are. Philosophic thinking might

¹⁹This kind of use seems suggested by Heidegger in *What Is a Thing?*, trans. Barton & Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery & Co., 1967), pp. 232-42.

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then finally come to terms with the experiential integrity of that experiencing activity out of which it arises and which it seeks to understand, to explain, and even to guide.

Does Disagreement Imply Relativism?

William J. Wainwright

1

IT IS NOT altogether clear why agreement or disagreement should be thought to be relevant to the question of cognitive relativism for, clearly, even if standards of rationality and criteria of truth vary, it does not follow that no standards of rationality are objectively valid or that truth itself is not objective. It is only slightly less obvious that even if there were no objective truth or objectively valid standards of rationality, human beings might nevertheless share the same standards and accept the same criteria. But, if this is true, why should disputes over the existence of shared standards and criteria play such a large role in the debates between cognitive relativists and their opponents? That they do so is undeniable. As Gardiner has pointed out, modern relativism has two principal roots: Kant's Copernican revolution which insists upon the human contribution to knowledge, and Herder's recognition of the "irreducibility" of cultures and the diversity of a human nature which is formed and shaped by those cultures.

But why should this diversity be important? Why should one think that agreement or the lack of it has an important bearing on questions of truth and validity? It is fairly easy to explain why it should *seem* important:

1. A recognition of the diversity of cultures and intellectual systems is not new. But what is new is a widely diffused appreciation of their depth and richness (or, at least, of the depth and richness of some of them). For example, a widespread appreciation of Islam or Buddhism, a sympathetic grasp of what it is like to be an intelligent and sensitive Muslim or Buddhist, is a quite recent phenomenon in Western history. But it is a truism that one's confidence in one's own opinions and assumptions is often shaken when one finds informed, sensitive, and intelligent people who fail to share them. One's doubts are likely to deepen when one finds that one's intellectual adversaries are not convinced by the arguments one introduces to establish the superiority of one's own insights. In these circumstances, a pervasive though not always fully articulated doubt concerning the objective validity of one's fundamental assumptions and habitual ways of thinking is only to be expected.

2. Although cognitive relativism is perhaps more widely diffused in the modern west than in any previous culture, it remains a minority position. While frequently espoused by intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences, cognitive relativism is not endorsed by most humanists and social scientists and is even less common in

¹Cf. Ernest Gellner, "Relativism and Universals," *Rationality and Realtivism*, ed. by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 181–200.

²Patrick Gardiner, "German Philosophy and the Rise of Relativism," *The Monist* 64 (April 1981), 138-54.

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other disciplines. What is more common, and by no means restricted to the intelligentsia, is what might be called "restricted" cognitive relativism.

Science has enormous prestige in our culture. Its successes are many and obvious. In these circumstances people find it difficult to believe that science is not objective—that its procedures are not objectively valid, and that the truths which it progressively discovers are not reflections of objective reality. By contrast, the realm of value or culture ("Geist")—religion, morality, art, philosophy, etc.—is not clearly progressive nor are its successes so striking or obvious. It is hardly surprising that many have drawn the conclusion that the rules for thinking in these realms are defective—that in these areas there are no objectively valid standards of rationality and thus no truths which are independent of the cultural systems which constitute them.

Now one of the most striking differences between science and the realms of culture and value is the (apparent) fact that there is a fair amount of agreement in the former and nothing but endless disputes and disagreements in the latter. Scientists seem to be able to resolve their disputes by applying their criteria, and to arrive at a rough consensus. By contrast, disputes between philosophers or religious believers, or between the spokesmen of different cultures and ways of life, appear to be no nearer a resolution than at any time in the past. Objectivity and agreement, on the one hand, and subjectivity or relativity and disagreement, on the other, thus appear to be correlated. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that attacks on the objectivity of science typically attempt to show that the apparent consensus is an illusion, and that defenses of the objectivity of philosophy, morality, etc., often involve attempts to show that a rough agreement on fundamental assumptions and procedures underlies the appearance of diversity.

But none of this amounts to an argument. Although the association of agreement and objectivity, and of disagreement and subjectivity or relativity, is intelligible enough, it is not yet clear why the existence of disagreement should be a good (if not sufficient) *reason* for adopting cognitive relativism.

II

The relativistic response to diversity often seems to implicitly rest upon one or both of two assumptions, viz., that (1) the purpose or function of modes of argument or methods of investigation is to resolve disputes concerning the truth or falsity of propositions, and that (2) no rationally adequate method leads to inconsistent results.

It seems patent that the methods used in religion, morality, the humanities, social sciences, etc., fail to resolve fundamental disputes and, indeed, lead their practitioners to inconsistent conclusions. It would appear to follow that the methods which guide thinking in these areas do not achieve their purpose and are thus rationally inadequate. It is a short step to the conclusion that they are not objectively valid.

Sometimes it also appears to be assumed that (3) truth is to be defined in terms of rational warrantability. If this assumption is correct, and if there are no objectively valid methods for arriving at truth in these areas, then it is meaningless to suppose that there is an objective religious, or moral, or metaphysical (etc.) truth.

This third assumption of course, is not clearly true. Belief in a false proposition may be rationally warranted in certain circumstances and, similarly, there can be circumstances in which belief in a proposition is not rationally warranted even though the proposition is true. Perhaps these difficulties can be overcome by defining truth in terms of what one would be rationally warranted in believing in certain ideal circum-

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stances.³ But whether or not this is the case is perhaps less important than one might think. For even if 3 above is false, and even if the argument does not show that truth is subjective or relative, it might show that our methods of inquiry are subjective and/or relative. And that would be sufficient to establish a significant version of (restricted) cognitive relativism.

The first assumption is ambiguous.⁴ It could mean (la) the purpose or function of a mode of argument or method of investigation is to determine whether the propositions which it is used to establish or discover are true or false, or it could mean (lb) the purpose or function of mode of argument or method of investigation is to produce agreement with respect to the truth or falsity of the propositions which it is used to establish or discover. But while (la) is clearly true, (lb) is not. And yet disagreements among those who employ the relevant procedures will clearly indicate some sort of functional failure only if (lb) is true.

The second assumption is also ambiguous. It could mean (2a) no method is rationally adequate which generates inconsistent results, or it could mean (2b) no method is rationally adequate if those who use it arrive at results which are inconsistent with one another.

A method *generates* inconsistent results if one cannot, without error, apply the method to a problem and avoid inconsistency. (An example of such a method would be provided by a set of deductive rules based upon a version of first order predicate logic with inconsistent axioms.) Methods of this sort should be distinguished from methods which are coherent but such that the application of their criteria requires judgment. There is nothing in the nature of these procedures which compels a person who uses them to embrace an inconsistency. On the other hand, because good judgment admits of degrees, different people may employ the criteria, and do so without making egregious mistakes, and yet arrive at different (and incompatible) results.

With this distinction in mind, I would suggest that while (2a) is clearly true, (2b) is not. But if so, then the fact that different practitioners of a mode of argument or method of investigation sometimes arrive at incompatible results is inconclusive.

Two further points should be made.

First, the distinction between (la) and (lb), and between (2a) and (2b), is likely to go unnoticed if one assumes that rationally adequate methods must be algorithms. Truth tables can be effectively used not only to ascertain the truth value of compound propositions, but also they conclusively to resolve disagreements. And because their employment requires no judgment, a pattern of inconsistent results among those who are proficient in their use would lead one to suspect the presence of some sort of deficiency in the methods themselves.

Second, the argument we are examining implicitly assumes that there *are* modes of reasoning peculiar to the realms of culture and value, and that there is some sort of rough consensus (at least at a general level) with respect to criteria, standards of relevance, etc. In other words, it implicitly assumes that there are criteria and standards and that the problem lies in their application.

³Of course, if one defines truth as what one would be rationally warranted in believing to be *true* in certain ideal circumstances, one's definition would be circular. Circular definitions, however, can sometimes be illuminating. (Cf., for example, the definition of "necessarily true" [i.e., "not possibly false"] as "true in all possible worlds.")

⁴As Roger Trigg has pointed out in *Reason and Commitment* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973), p. 126.

If these points are sound, our argument is seriously defective. Unless one is committed to (lb), it is by no means clear why anyone should think that rationally adequate methods must be algorithms. Indeed, there are good reasons for thinking that they should not be. The criteria for determining whether someone really loves another, or whether a war is justified, or whether a painting is a good piece of work, are complex and imprecise. But this very imprecision is a virtue. For if the criteria were more precise, they would be less flexible, less useful for dealing with complex or novel situations. Whether imprecision is a structural fault depends upon the nature of the subject matter. But if methods need not be algorithms, the fact that those who more or less judiciously employ a method frequently differ with respect to its application does not clearly indicate a lack of objectivity in the method itself.

Another widely employed argument must be taken more seriously. I earlier called attention to Gardiner's claim that modern relativism is rooted in Kant as well as in Herder. Kant's contribution is the claim that knowledge and perception are not simply reflections of a world which impinges upon us but are, at least in part, reflections of concepts, categories, principles and ways of thinking which the subject brings to his experience. This claim has been generally accepted by the modern western intelligentsia. Adoption of the claim does not commit one to either subjectivism or relativism. But suppose that, pace Kant, it should prove to be the case that different persons or cultures or schools of thought approach experience with different and incompatible principles and categories and, suppose further, that there should prove to be no nonarbitrary way of adjudicating between them. Both suppositions are widely believed to be true. Neither subjectivism nor relativism strictly follows (for it is logically possible that one of these sets of principles and categories is, in fact, objectively true or valid). But it does seem to follow that one's claim for the (objective) truth of any given principle or the (objective) validity of any particular mode of reasoning is arbitrary. And if it is, then, it seem to me, the core of subjectivism or relativism has been established. In discussing the first argument, I suggested that to the extent to which the long standing and unresolved disagreements which characterize philosophy, the social sciences, the humanities, etc., are reflections of the imprecision of the standards of reasoning which are employed in those areas, their existence provides little support for either subjectivism or relativism. But it must, I think, be conceded that if these disagreements provide evidence for thinking that different persons or cultures or schools of thought bring different (and incompatible) principles, categories and modes of thinking to bear upon experience, and thus construct or interpret experience in different ways, and if there is no adequate or non-arbitrary way of adjudicating the issues between them, then subjectivist or relativist conclusions may be called for.

The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations seems to be this. Disagreement is relevant to the dispute between subjectivists or relativists and their adversaries, if and only if there is reason to think that it satisfies the following two conditions:

- 1. The disagreements are over principles and modes of reasoning, not over how these principles and modes of reasoning are to be applied to the cases which fall under them. Principled differences of judgment in the application of criteria are, in areas that call for judgment, fully compatible with objectivism and non-relativism. To suppose that they are not is mistakenly to suppose that the objectivist or non-relativist is committed to the existence of algorithms for determining (objective) truth and falsity.
- 2. The nature of the disagreements is such that there appears to be no nonarbitrary way of resolving them.

These two conditions imply a further condition, viz.,

3. Disagreements over principles and the appropriate modes of reasoning must be fundamental, i.e., they must not be due to the imprecision of yet more basic principles and procedures to which the parties implicitly or explicitly appeal in the course of their dispute. If this is correct, scientific disputes between advocates of rival paradigms, or disputes between cognitive psychologists and behaviorists, etc., may have less bearing on the question of relativism than is sometimes supposed. Insofar as these disputes can be traced to different applications of such imprecise criteria as coherence, simplicity, scope, explanatory adequacy, etc., relativism cannot be read off their face.

A lack of attention to this point vitiates some arguments for relativism. For example, in attempting to show that competing theories and standards are often incommensurable, Richard Rorty appeals to the controversy between Galileo and Bellarmine.5 The latter argued that while Copernican astronomy is perhaps "an ingenious heuristic device for, say, navigational purposes," scripture shows that Ptolemaic astronomy is roughly correct. Defenders of the new astronomy argued that scripture is irrelevant to the points at issue. According to Rorty, the dispute involved fundamentally different understandings of such apparently common values as "rationality," "disinterestedness," "consideration of all relevant evidence," etc. But his example does not show this. What it shows is that the question of relevance often depends upon other questions. For example, whether Ptolemaic astronomy and Aristotelian science is embedded in scripture or is simply an interpretation of it, whether Christianity, and therefore its books, are the work of "priestcraft," etc. And there is no indication of the existence of any substantive disagreement with respect to what is relevant to these issues, what arguments and objections would have a serious bearing on these questions. This example, and others like it, pose a threat to the non-relativist only if it can be shown that disagreements over what counts as "true," "rational," "good evidence," etc., appear at the most basic level. The only relevant diversity, then, is a diversity of fundamental standards, of basic categories and principles, and, at this level, there may in fact be less diversity than is sometimes supposed. The case for such diversity is, at least, inconclusive.7

But at this point, an important difficulty must be faced. Relativists frequently argue that whether or not this sort of diversity actually obtains is not really important. All that is needed for their argument, they maintain, is that it be possible.8 It is not even necessary that it be possible for human beings. For, as Husserl pointed out,9 the spectre of relativism is raised by the bare possibility of beings differently constituted from ourselves, beings with different and incommensurable notions of truth and rationality.

I would submit that this contention must be viewed with caution. If cognitive relativism is to be made plausible, if it is to be more than a mere possibility of thought, then alternative standards must be capable of being adopted, i.e., it must be possible

⁵Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 322-33.

⁶The first was a seventeenth century response (for the authority of scripture was generally admitted on both sides). The second was an eighteenth century response.

⁷Cf. in this connection Robin Horton, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited," Rationality and Relativism, pp. 201-60.

⁸Cf. Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowlegde," Rationality and Relativism, pp. 21-43. ⁹Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. 1. (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), Chap. 7.

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for them to be incorporated into a way of life. The importance of actual disagreement is that the fact that alternative standards actually are accepted would show that this condition is met.

Consider, in this connection, Madyamika's (and Zen's) repudiation of logic. In the first place, it is a conscious and deliberate rejection of a way of thinking which they admit is natural or normal. In the second place, even those who are enlightened continue to use ordinary canons of reasoning when they do science or engage in everyday affairs; that is, the canons of logic are regarded as appropriate in those realms (though not at the level of deep truth). Finally, their repudiation of logic is (at least in the case of Madyamika, though not clearly in the case of Zen) based upon arguments which allegedly show that the canons of logic are incoherent. The importance of these facts is this. To the best of my knowledge, this strand of Buddhism provides the only clear example of a group of sane people who systematically repudiate fundamental principles of reasoning. If their arguments are defective, as I believe them to be, then the most that this example shows is that by a process of auto-conditioning (various techniques of meditation) some people can at certain moments (or at a certain level) adopt alternative standards of thinking or (perhaps more accurately) no standards at all. It is not clear why this should any more cast doubt on these principles than the fact that I can systematically derange my senses10 casts (real) doubt on the validity of sense perception.

Consider two further points:

- 1. Surely the fact that an alternative can be described is not sufficient to create a real difficulty. For example, I can easily describe a logical system the axioms of which incorporate a denial of the axioms of arithmetic and first order logic, or a mode of empirical reasoning based on counter-induction. But why should the non-relativist be bothered by that? The mere fact that such a system can be described would not even show that commonly accepted axioms and principles are not self-evident.
- 2. Furthermore, as has often been pointed out, the claim that there are, or could be, a variety of standards of truth and rational validity presupposes some sort of generic understanding of what counts as a (good) reason, truth claim, etc. (for otherwise, there would be no reason to call these standards standards of truth and rational validity). But the claim thus seems to presuppose precisely what extreme relativists like Barnes and Bloor wish to deny, viz., the existence of more or less system-neutral notions of (good) reason, truth, validity, etc.

The fact that we can describe *outré* systems of thought and, at least in a general way, conceive of the possibility of beings whose faculties are systematically different from our own, appears to me to be relevant only if the non-relativist must successfully refute skepticism.

The core of skepticism is its insistence that there is no more reason to believe that a particular way of thinking enables us to get a handle on the real nature of things than to suppose that some quite different and incompatible way of thinking does so, and its power lies in the impossibility of providing non-circular demonstrations of the superiority of any particular system, i.e., on the impossibility of excluding Cartesian doubts. If the non-relativist must silence Cartesian doubts, then the bare possibility of alternative systems is sufficient to raise the spectre of relativism. But if, as it seems to me, it is not incumbent upon him to do so, then what must be shown is not simply that

¹⁰And for certain purposes might wish to do so.

^{11&}quot;Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge," Rationality and Relativism, passim.

there are alternative and incompatible standards but that there are alternative and incompatible standards which could be employed by beings who are in many ways like ourselves, and whose notions of truth, good reason, and so on, are not that different from our own. For if there are, then it is incumbent on the non-relativist either to show that one of these sets of standards is (rationally) superior to the others, or (at least) to say something about how the superiority of one of these sets of principles might be established. It appears to me, however, that the only reasonably conclusive way of showing that this possibility is real, is by actually discovering human beings who employ different and incompatible standards. It is true that merely possible systems of thought would be relevant if they could be adopted. The problem, however, is that the only way one could be sure that they could be adopted would be by placing them in the context of a whole way of life and tracing their implications and ramifications for that way of life. I doubt that this could be done in enough detail to warrant confidence in any conclusions which might be drawn from such an account.

I conclude, then, that either the case for relativism depends on a radical skepticism which insists upon the exclusion of Cartesian doubts (in which case at least some of those who now find relativism appealing might wish to reconsider their position), or that only actual disagreements are clearly relevant.

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But even if one is prepared to grant that the disagreements which have to be taken seriously are those which actually obtain and that, at the most general level, there is more agreement than is sometimes supposed, the non-relativist must, I think, concede that, at this level, there are real disagreements. These disagreements appear to be of three kinds.

In the first place, different weights are sometimes assigned to shared criteria. For example, one may assign more weight to the demand for consistency or coherence than to the demand for explanatory adequacy, or vice versa. There is some reason to think that modern western science and philosophy assign more weight to consistency and coherence than do traditional societies, though the differences should not be exaggerated. As Horton points out, 12 members of traditional societies are bothered by contradiction "when it is thrust under their noses," and a certain amount of incoherence (though not inconsistency) appears to be tolerated in science when this seems to be the price of explanatory adequacy. (The use of both wave and particle models of light may provide an example of this sort of incoherence.)

On the other hand, it would probably be a mistake to suppose that there is a complete lack of consensus concerning the relative weights of our criteria. To the best of my knowledge everyone regards inconsistency or explanatory inadequacy as a more serious flaw than undue complexity.

In the second place, there appear to be real differences in the way in which at least some shared criteria are interpreted. This is perhaps most obvious with respect to the demand for explanatory adequacy. A good theory, for example, must "illuminate" the facts which it is designed to explain, deepen our "understanding" of the subject matter, "satisfactorily" answer "relevant" questions. But precisely what this involves is not as clear as it might be.

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As Lorraine Code points out¹³ "knowing about" must be distinguished from knowing how and knowing that. For example, knowing about impressionism must be distinguished from knowing how to paint (even knowing how to paint an impressionist picture), and from knowing that a particular painting is impressionist or that Pissaro was an impressionist. "Knowing about" involves *understanding* and what counts as understanding appears to be an aspect of the concept of knowledge which is clearly affected by historical context.

Foucault has argued that what counts as knowledge varies from century to century. The sixteenth century believed that knowledge was largely constituted by a grasp of analogies, correspondances, and similitudes. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries construed knowledge as the mastery of tables, lists, taxonomies and classifications, and as the analysis of "representations" or "ideas." The nineteenth century thought that genuine knowledge was provided by functional explanations, developmental theories, and historical accounts. Although Foucault may be accused of both exaggeration and oversimplification, the phenomenon to which he has called our attention is a real one.

I would suggest, however, that it would be more accurate to describe these changes, not as changes in what is counted as knowledge, but as changes in what is counted as *significant* knowledge or "grasp."

The problem may be approached from another angle. As Gary Gutting points out, the type of consensus which exists in the natural sciences is different from the type of consensus which is found in the social sciences and the humanities. During periods of normal inquiry, certain solutions are regarded as paradigmatic in the natural sciences. And paradigmatic not simply in the sense that "everyone in their fields would agree" that they are "good pieces of work," but in the sense that there is general agreement that these solutions "should be the guide to all further work," that they "eliminate the need for foundational discussions of how inquiry in the relevant domain should be conducted." This sort of consensus does not exist in the social sciences and the humanities. (Compare, for example, Newton's solutions of certain problems in mechanics with Freud's solution of certain problems in abnormal psychology or Cleanth Brooks' analyses of certain poetic texts.) ¹⁵ I would suggest that the lack of consensus reflects differences with respect to what is counted as understanding or grasp.

Or finally, consider the fact that paradigms differ with respect to the problems which are regarded as important and the data which are thought to require explanation. Pre-Daltonian chemistry, for example, was concerned with explaining "the observable qualities of chemical substances" and "the qualitative changes they undergo during chemical reactions." Daltonian chemistry, on the other hand, was concerned with "weight relations and proportions in chemical reactions." Each type of chemistry was quite successful in solving its own problems but much less successful in solving those of its rival. The important point, however, is that the two approaches had different ideas concerning which problems were important and which data most

¹³Lorraine Code, "The Importance of Historicism for a Theory of Knowledge," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 22 (June 1982), 157-74.

¹⁴Michel Foucault, *The Ordering of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1970).

¹⁵Gary Gutting, "Paradigms and Hermeneutics: A Dialogue on Kuhn, Rorty and the Social Sciences," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 21 (January, 1984), 1-15.

¹⁶Gerald Doppelt, "Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense," *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral*, ed. by Michael Krausz and Jack W. Meiland (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1982), p. 122. The original version of this paper appeared in *Inquiry* 21 (1978).

needed explanation, and thus incorporated different standards of explanatory adequacy. Similar differences are reflected in metaphysical and religious disputes. For example, Christianity appears to believe that it is more important to provide an illuminating account of sin and guilt than to explain suffering (though it tries to do both). Buddhists, on the other hand, think that suffering is what primarily requires explanation (though, again, it also offers explanations of guilt and moral failure). Certain forms of empiricism, materialism, and positivism believe that the primary data for metaphysics are provided by the sciences, while idealisms are struck more by the nature and achievements of art, morality, and religion.

If I am correct, differences with respect to what counts as knowledge or knowledge about, differences with respect to the sorts of things which are regarded as paradigmatic solutions, and differences with respect to the identification of problems and salient data, are differences concerning the proper interpretation of the demand for explanatory adequacy, not conflicts between different and incommensurable criteria. There is admittedly more disagreement with respect to what counts as "understanding" or "grasp" than with respect to what counts as coherence or simplicity but, of course, the *criterion* is vaguer. Nevertheless, I do not wish to press the point, for, however they are understood, the non-relativist must, I think, concede that these disagreements are genuine.

In the third place, there are also, I think, differences with respect to certain epistemic virtues. The distinction between criteria like scope, consistency, explanatory adequacy, etc. and these values is roughly analogous to the distinction between the rules governing a game and the skills and virtues ideally possessed by its players. I have in mind such virtues as intellectual honesty, commitment to the presentation of a reasoned case, a willingness to submit one's views to scrutiny, fairness to one's intellectual opponents, etc. There is some reason to think that a respect for these virtues is confined to the intellectual elites of non-traditional cultures.

If the argument of this section is sound, there are real differences at the most fundamental level—differences with respect to the weight which should be assigned to various criteria, differences in the interpretation of shared criteria, and differences with respect to the appropriate epistemic virtues. The question which will be addressed in the next section is whether these disagreements provide evidence for relativism.

IV

The fact that certain epistemic virtues are not prized in traditional socieites provides little support for relativism.

Horton has pointed to a significant difference between modern western society and traditional African societies. Theories, world views, and explanatory schemes are not static in traditional societies. New problems and experiences arise in the life of both societies and individuals, and accepted theories and beliefs are altered to deal with them. But in traditional societies, these alterations typically consist of adjustments within, and modifications of, an inherited framework. There is little evidence of any tendency to construct and consider "a plurality of competing theoretical frameworks." What is lacking is not so much an *awareness* of competing frameworks as the presence of alternatives which "are being aggressively projected into" the thinker's mind "by other thinkers who wish to obliterate his own preferred theory." And Horton goes on to argue that this feature of traditional societies explains other differences between these societies and modern western society. For example, without a plurality of theories, "there is little to promote the sort of continuous critical monitoring of the

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theoretical framework which we associate with cognitive "modernism." While members of traditional societies are bothered by a contradiction "when it is thrust under the noses," the absence of "critical assaults of other thinkers committed to rival frameworks" (together with the fact that theory is essentially "applied theory" which "tends to be developed and mobilized piecemeal, as particular kinds of practical exigency arise") tends to produce a certain obliviousness to contradictions or incoherences which may seem obvious to a critical outsider. Again, criteria such as "simplicity, scope, degree of dependence on *ad hoc* assumptions, predictive power," etc., are not explicitly formulated or clearly developed, for they are essentially comparative criteria and there is "nothing to apply them to." (Pp. 223, 227, 241–42.)

Let us suppose that Horton is right and that non-traditional societies are distinguished from traditional societies by (among other things) the presence of competing theories and aggressive partisans of those theories who actively promote them. The fact that there is little or no recognition of certain epistemic virtues in traditional societies can then be easily explained. Where there is no competition, there is no need for fair play, and thus no need for the norms which define it and the virtues which internalize those norms and render them effective.

Now it is simply not clear why this should have any tendency to support relativism. In the first place, the fact that these values are not recognized in traditional societies does not imply that members of those societies *reject* them or advocate *incompatible* values. In the second place, the fact that these norms are not formulated in conditions in which the need for them is not pressing, and is therefore not recognized, has no more tendency to show that these norms are only valid from a certain point of view than the fact that norms of civil justice are not formulated before the emergence of civil society has any tendency to show that the latter are merely relative.

The other differences are more disturbing. How are we to explain the different and incompatible weights assigned to criteria by equally fairminded, intelligent and informed people? How are we to explain preferences for different types of explanation? Are we not in fact faced, at the most general level, with a residue of sheer subjectivity?

William James argued that basic metaphysical pictures such as determinism or indeterminism, or monism or pluralism, appeal to different temperaments.¹⁷ Charles Taylor contends that classical theories were expressions of a desire for "attunement" to the cosmos while modern theories are not.¹⁸ It is, of course, true that James believed that it is not irrational to take the demands of our "passional" or "willing" nature into account in constructing our theories. But given that people's passional or willing natures take different forms, that they desire or want different things, can any sense be made of the notion of a correct or best judgment on fundamental issues, and if it cannot, is not some form of relativism the only reasonable position?

It is worth observing that James himself did not think that the promptings of our passional nature should be uncritically accepted, or that decisions on issues which cannot be decided on purely evidential grounds should be, or can only be, groundless or non-rational. Furthermore, James clearly thought that there are better reasons for adopting indeterminism and pluralism than for adopting determinism and monism even though the "objective evidence" or "facts" are compatible with either of the op-

¹⁷Cf. especially "The Dilemma of Determinism," "The Sentiment of Rationality," and "The Will to Believe."

¹⁸Charles Taylor, "Rationality," Rationality and Relativism, pp. 87-105.

posed hypotheses, and that subjective or biographical factors are themselves subject to rational scrutiny. And this seems right.

Consider disagreements over the weights which should be assigned various criteria. Specific weightings are themselves subject to criticism which makes use of the same or related criteria. For example, it is sometimes suggested that a relevant criterion for the valuation of a world view is its "efficacy in the life process of mankind." 19 It must, according to Frederick Ferre, be "capable of 'coming to life' for individuals, becoming ...a usable instrument for our coping with the total environment." That is, a worldview must have a "capacity for ringing true with respect to" those who use it, enabling them to "cope successfully with the challenges of life."20 James, of course, said something similar. And there seems to be something right about this.21 But suppose that this criterion is weighted more heavily than other relevant criteria. One may then argue that an undue deference to this criterion is likely to lead to a tolerance for inconsistency and incoherence and that this, for various reasons, is itself "inefficacious" for human life. Or, to consider another example, one might argue that an undue emphasis on simplicity is likely to result in systems which are explanatorily inadequate, and attempt to show this by examples.

Or consider disputes over the proper interpretation of explanatory adequacy. Doppelt makes an important point in this connection. Aristotelian physics assumed that an adequate physical theory must explain the nature of gravitational forces. Nineteenth century Newtonian physics did not, but, of course, did employ its own standards of explanatory adequacy, in particular, the ability of a theory to provide precise and accurate predictions of the quantitative aspects of physical phenomena. Each school of thought, employing its own standards, would thus arrive at incompatible judgments concerning the relative adequacy of the two types of physics. Their standards of explanatory adequacy are, in this sense, incommensurable. But as Doppelt points out, it does not follow that the two standards are incommensurable in the strong sense that a theory could not satisfy both.²² Nor, I would add, does it follow that a theory would not be better if it did satisfy both,23 or that the parties to the dispute could not be persuaded that it would. What I am tentatively suggesting is that rival interpretations of explanatory adequacy are (at least in many cases) not clearly incompatible, and that each interpretation may succeed in isolating an aspect of the demand for explanatory adequacy which ideally should be met by a comprehensive theory. Furthermore, an interpretation's claim to do so can, in principal, be supported by argument. That a particular type of explanation or mode of understanding is illuminating, and should therefore play a role in a comprehensive theory, might be supported, for example, by arguments designed to show that other types or modes neglect certain aspects of the explicandum or are unable to account for certain types of phenomena, that is, by an appeal to the criterion of scope. If something like this is correct, then it is not clear that conflicts over the proper interpretation of explanatory adequacy should unduly bother the non-relativist.

¹⁹Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 105.

²⁰Kent Bendell and Frederick Ferre, Exploring the Logic of Faith (New York: Association Press, 1962), p. 171.

²¹The pressure of this demand may partly explain why only some alternative principles and standards pose a real problem to the non-relativist.

²²Doppelt, op. cit., p. 131f. ²³In fact, Kuhn has argued that Einsteinian physics pretty well meets the explanatory demands of both Aristotelian and ninetenth century physics.

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But is this at all plausible with respect to the notion that an adequate explanatory account will provide a grasp of analogies and correspondences? Perhaps not, although it should be noted that this demand is not peculiar to the sixteenth century but surfaces again in such figures as Coleridge, Emerson, and Thoreau, who were concerned with our relation to the cosmos, and that it is by no means clear but that a comprehensive theory would be better if it not only provided accurate and precise explanations of the quantitative aspects of natural phenomena and a plausible account of the nature of natural forces, but also provided the sort of illumination associated with attunement. Nor is it entirely clear that this is impossible. Physical theory, as we know it, would furnish only part of a theory of his kind; but that is beside the point.

What I wish to suggest is that general criteria, their weighting and interpretation can be assessed, and that the process of assessment is essentially similar to the process of applying our general criteria to particular theories. Both the assessment and application of our general criteria call for judgment. The same sorts of considerations are appealed to in both cases, and no factor in the process is irreducibly subjective in the sense that it is beyond the scope of reason—that its claim upon our assent cannot be called into question, attacked or defended by arguments which ultimately involve some appeal to the same or related criteria.

But if the process has any claim to objective validity, then surely its judicious use must lead, or have some significant likelihood of leading, to a best (truer, sounder) answer. Is there any assurance that this is the case? While a decisive answer is impossible, two points appear to me to have an important bearing on our question.

The first is a negative point. Nothing in the *nature* of the procedures justifies the belief that their judicious use will not lead, or has no significant likelihood of leading, to a best answer. As I have already argued, the fact that a set of criteria will not always yield clear-cut answers or that its use may lead to several good answers²⁴ is irrelevant. There is no reason to think that objectively valid standards must be algorithms. That is, there is nothing inherently suspect about imprecision.

In the second place, the criteria are self-certifying in the sense that they are, or can be, validated by a process of inquiry which observes them. Mill and the utilitarians appear to me to have been right in thinking that (1) there is good reason to think that an opinion is sound only if it has withstood searching criticism, and that (2) if those who have thought deeply about a matter agree under conditions of free and untrammeled inquiry, there is good reason to suppose that the opinions on which they agree have successfully withstood criticism. To the extent to which our general criteria satisfy these conditions, we have reason to think that they are sound. This form of validation is admittedly circular in the sense that some of these criteria will themselves be appealed to in the course of the debate over their weight, adequacy, and proper interpretation. But at least in this respect, our use of these criteria is no more suspect than our reliance on deduction or perception, for they too cannot be justified without some sort of circularity.

But does not this come down to saying that our ultimate appeal must be to consensus, and is not this to give the game away? There is a sense in which I am saying this, but a more important sense in which I am not. I am not saying that truth or validity is (means, is constituted by) consensus. That is surely false. Or, at least, it is false that this is what we ordinarily *mean* by "truth" or "validity." Nor am I saying either that

²⁴Which, of course, does not imply that there is no best answer, or that a judicious use of these criteria will not produce that answer.

"Every (relevant) person accepts so and so" is regarded as the ultimate appeal, or that (whether or not it is so regarded) it is in fact the ultimate appeal. Both of these claims appear to be false. Although it may sometimes look as if they were true, the appearances are suspect. As Horton argues, even in traditional societies, what appears to be no more than an appeal to consensus ("The elders say, . . ." "We believe . . .") may in fact be an appeal, not merely to consensus, but to the apparent success over generations of the "theory" which incorporates those beliefs. Furthermore, the fact that the consensus must be among relevant persons (the elders, our group, etc.) suggests that more than just consensus is appealed to-that somehow the persons in question are believed to be favorably situated with respect to the truth. And, of course, I am not saying that mere consensus should be regarded as ultimate. My point is rather that the ultimate appeal must be to a consensus which is reached in a certain way, viz., by a no-holds-barred discussion which is guided by our general criteria and in which the participants display such epistemic virtues as intellectual honesty, respect for one's intellectual opponents and the like. It is these standards and virtues which are ultimately authoritative, not the consensus as such. The standards and virtues themselves rest on consensus only in the sense that they are, or can be, certified by a consensus which is reached by a process of inquiry which respects them.

Is this really unsatisfactory? The deepest worries about these criteria are, I think, generated by the suspicion that the demands of foundationalism are reasonable. What I mean by foundationalism, in this context, is the claim that we can only be said to know, or to be rationally justified in confidently believing, propositions which are either self-evident or indubitable, or can be deduced (or, on certain versions of foundationalism, inferred by some sort of probabilistic reasoning) from self-evident or indubitable propositions. Modern (as distinguished from medieval) versions of foundationalism are a response to skepticism. The response appears to me to be inadequate since Cartesian doubts can be directed against both self-evident or indubitable propositions and deduction. The point I wish to make is that the belief that knowledge claims must be certified in that way is historically connected with a fear of skepticism. Now the validity of our most general criteria can certainly be doubted. Furthermore, there is no non-circular way of conclusively justifying these criteria. I suggest, however, that if there are no plausible alternative criteria which are clearly incompatible with the ones we employ (and, at the most general level, there is little evidence that there are). then the fact that our general criteria are neither self-evident nor such that they can be validated without circularity is irrelevant unless foundationalism's demands are reasonable. But foundationalism's demands are reasonable only if Cartesian doubts must be eliminated before we are entitled to say that we know (or are rationally justified in confidently believing) something, and that this is the case is highly disputable.

V

If I am correct, relativism poses no new or special threat to those who are committed to the objective reality of truth and validity. The essential issue is skepticism. This paper has concentrated on one aspect of the case for relativism, viz., the existence of disagreement. A recognition of the existence or even the possibility of disagreement may weaken our confidence in our epistemic practices but this is itself merely a fact about human psychology. Disagreement becomes *relevant* only when it appears to point to a lack of foundations for our ultimate standards. I have concentrated on general criteria used in theory selection rather than on deduction or perceptual prac-

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tice since fundamental and apparently unresolvable disagreements seem most clearly to occur in connection with them. I have argued that (1) these disagreements do not show that the practices which employ these criteria are in disorder, that (2) a kind of justification can be provided for them, and that (3) the only *clear* reason for rejecting their claim to objective validity is the impossibility of decisively dispelling Cartesian doubts. In short, the arguments for relativism become formidable only when buttressed by the argument for skepticism, viz., that one is entitled to claim that one knows (or is rationally justified in confidently believing) something only if one has dispelled any Cartesian doubts which may arise with respect to it, and that these doubts cannot be dispelled. If I am right, relativism is a side issue.

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The Claims of Perfection: A Revisionary Defence of Kant's Theory of Dependent Beauty¹

Paul Crowther

1. INTRODUCTION

THROUGH ITS combination of the cognitive and the sensuous, beauty was once thought to be a less distinct form of perfection. In the late eighteenth-century, however, Kant (amongst others) drew a very clear distinction between the two. Indeed, his characterization of beauty in terms of pleasure that is disinterested and free (through its grounding in the appreciation of formal qualities alone) is one which many—the present writer included—would still regard as definitive of aesthetic experience. Where, however, does this leave the notion of perfection? Is it simply a concept that was once used as a crude model for comprehending aesthetic experience, but which is now outmoded; or, is the very fact that it could be used this way, symptomatic of the fact that perfection actually *does* play a role in the aesthetic domain?

Now it is interesting in this respect, that whilst in the Critique of Judgement, and its (subsequently shelved) First Introduction, Kant is at great pains to separate judgements of beauty and perfection, he does, nevertheless, in §16 of the Critique, introduce a distinction between free and dependent beauty-the latter of which involves concepts of perfection. In this paper, therefore, I shall, in Part I, analyze the nature of Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty, and will show that, whilst not compelling, his structure of argument is at least consistent, and, indeed, contains two crucial insights, namely, that beauty must sometimes take second place to perfection, and is thence of conditional rather than absolute value; and that judgements of perfection can themselves be aesthetic in character. Now after offering an argument in defence of this first claim, I will go on to suggest that there is a rather better way than Kant's of grounding the second claim. In Part II, accordingly, I will show this by arguing that the disinterestedness and freedom whereby Kant defines the pure aesthetic judgement, can also hold, in a modified way for some judgements of perfection. I will then suggest that Kant himself indirectly recognizes this fact, through his account in §16, of how the experience of dependent beauty involves a harmony of reason and cognition.

I

Kant introduces his distinction between free and dependent beauty respectively, in the following terms:

¹This is a slightly revised version of a paper of the same title, presented to the Nottingham University Philosophical Aesthetics Society in October 1984. I am grateful to those who attended for their comments; and also to Mr. P. L. Gardiner for his criticisms of an earlier draft.

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The first presupposes no concept of what the object should be, the second does presuppose such a concept and, with it, an answering perfection of the object. Those of the first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) beauties of this thing or that thing; the other kind of beauty, being attached to a concept (conditioned beauty) is ascribed to objects which come under the concept of a particular end.²

Kant goes on to develop this distinction through the use of examples. Specifically, we are told that flowers, some kinds of birds and crustacea, designs à la Greque, and musical fantasies are amongst those things which "... have no intrinsic meaning; they represent nothing—no Object under a definite concept—and are free beauties." Now as Donald Crawford has pointed out,4 whilst Kant treats free beauty here, as though it were a property of certain kinds of objects, it is clear from points elsewhere in §16 of the Critique of Judgement, that, in principle, any object can be judged in terms of free beauty, so long as we "make abstraction" from the "concept of its end" (i.e., that set of properties which defines the kind of thing it is). Why, then, does Kant conduct his exposition primarily in terms of examples? The answer is, I would suggest, a straightforward one, namely, that in some objects, formal qualities are simply more manifest (and thence more accessible to pure aesthetic judgements) than in others. Most people, for example, would be inclined to enjoy the formal intricacy of a flower, or bird's plumage for its own sake rather than because it shows the flower or bird to be perfect instances of their respective species. It is, in other words, just more natural to appreciate their formal qualities in subjective and aesthetic, rather than objective and intellectual terms. In the case of those examples of dependent beauty which Kant goes on to provide, however, the reverse is true. Such things as human beings, horses, or buildings, do not usually possess the luxuriant and intricate formal qualities which would dispose us to respond to them in fundamentally subjective terms. Indeed (in the case of these specific examples at least) such objects play an important and familar role in the practical vicissitudes of everyday existence. Now it is at this point, that Kant's exposition becomes extremely problematic. In relation to the examples just mentioned, he informs us that their "beauty" presupposes a concept of the end which defines what the thing has to be, and consequently "a concept of its perfection." As Geoffrey Scarré, however, has forcefully observed:

After he has told us so insistently that judgements of beauty are determined by feeling and not by concepts, can he really be saying now that there is another kind of beauty whose recognition requires not feelings but concepts? If so, it is a remarkable *volte-face* and to all appearances a purposeless one, for it is obscure what Kant would want to say the two views have in common to justify the common label.⁶

Scarré's own solution to the problem is to claim that, for Kant, dependent beauty has no connection with the concept of perfection. It is, rather, free beauty whose apprehension is restricted by a judgement as to whether it is "decorous" (i.e. morally

²Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford University Press, 1973). §16 p. 72.

³Kant, Ibid, §16 p. 72.

⁴In his Kant's Aesthetic Theory, (University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), p. 116.

⁵Kant, Ibid, §16 p. 73.

Geoffrey Scarré, "Kant on Free and Dependent Beauty," British Journal of Aesthetics 21 (1981), 351-62. This reference, p. 358.

appropriate) for the object in question to be freely beautiful. In the case of paradigm free beauties, such as flowers and crustacea, the question does not arise; in the case of humans, horses, and buildings, in contrast, it does, and, insofar as there is nothing indecorous about such objects being regarded as beautiful, they are, therefore, to be classed as dependently so. Now the major problem with Scarre's interpretation is that not only does Kant himself make no mention of "decorum" in his exposition, but, indeed, he asserts the link between perfection and dependent beauty so often, that it is scarcely conceivable that perfection should not play some role here. The question is what role? The answer is, I would suggest, that whilst from a modern viewpoint, the phrase "presupposes a concept of perfection" suggests a relation of logical dependence (thus leading to the problem noted by Scarré), this, however, may not be Kant's meaning. There is, rather, an alternative interpretation which not only fits in well with Kant's example-oriented approach at the start of §16, but which also allows the overall structure of argument in that section to read consistently. It is instructive here, first to consider a precedent in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785). In this work, Kant suggests, "the dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (that is, moral necessitation) is obligation."7

Now, in the broadest terms, for Kant, will is a capacity for inaugurating rational activity. Whilst, however, a wholly rational being (i.e. an absolutely good, or, as Kant sometimes puts it, a "holy will") can, by definition, do the rational thing as a matter of course, an imperfectly rational *finite* creature, in contrast, is beset by distracting sensuous impulses, and, in consequence, can only conceive rational or moral action in terms of obligation; i.e. if I want x, then I ought to do y, or, in the case of moral action, (simply) I ought to do x.

The point to gather from this is that a will is made dependent by the empirical fact that its rational being is combined with, and inhibited by sensuous impulses. Hence, whilst having a rational will does not presuppose sensuous impulses, and whilst having sensuous impulses does not presuppose having a rational will, to be a dependent will presupposes the possession of both features. Now working from this model, something can be characterized as dependent, if it consists of two logically independent elements, which are empirically combined in a way that allows one of the elements to inhibit the operations of the other. This, I would suggest, is exactly the case with dependent beauty. Consider the following contrast. In the case of a bird of paradise, we have an animal whose plumage is overwhelmingly striking and complex at a purely perceptual level, and which (unless one happens to be an ornithologist) is of little interest apart from this. Here, in other words, because of the nature of the object involved, our appreciation of its beauty is wholly free and unrestricted. In the case of a horse, however, whilst we could, in principle, appreciate its beauty alone, we will find, in practice, that we are preoccupied by all sorts of other interests: What kind of horse is it? Is it old or young? Is it healthy? Can it pull a cart or clear a fence? Here, because the animal strikes us primarily in terms of intellectual and practical considerations, reason demands, in consequence, that we give priority to judgements of how perfectly it satisfies such ends. Its beauty, in other words, is a secondary consideration, a kind of pleasing "extra," whose appreciation, indeed, will tend to be inhibited by our interest in the object's perfection.

⁷Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. Paton, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1955), p. 107.

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This interpretation of dependent beauty is given a strikingly general plausibility by the fact that all the terms which Kant uses to describe the dependent relation, namely, "adherent," "attached to," "appendant," and "conditioned by," are ones which connote empirical conjunction, or secondariness, or both. Indeed, immediately after introducing his first examples of dependent beauty, Kant goes on to say:

Just as it is a clog on the judgement of taste to have the agreeable (of sensation) joined with beauty to which only the form is relevant, so to combine the good [i.e. the perfection of the object in relation to the end which defines what kind of thing it is]...mars its purity.8

Hence, as my interpretation would lead us to expect, Kant is suggesting that if a thing is such that it leads us to judge it in terms of its perfection, then we can expect our appreciation of its beauty to be inhibited. This, indeed, is why Kant further suggests, in a famous passage:

Much might be added to a building that would immediately please the eye were it not intended for a church. A figure might be beautified with all manner of flourishes and light but regular lines, as is done by New Zealanders with their tatooing, were we dealing with anything but the figure of a human being.9

In these cases, we are dealing with things whose significance for us is so predominantly intellectual or moral, that any beautiful embellishments of the sort mentioned, are entirely superfluous, insofar as our appreciation of them would be totally inhibited and spoilt.

Given, then, that Kant's distinction is not between two logically independent kinds of beauty, but between contrasting conditions (determined by the nature of the object involved) in which beauty is encountered, the question arises as to why we should need a term such as dependent beauty, at all. One can, of course, understand why in his moral philosophy, Kant needs the notion of a dependent will-insofar as with human beings, rational intention and sensuous impulse are always and inescapably conjoined. But surely the conjunction between perfection and beauty is not of this inescapable empirical order. Indeed, does not Kant himself admit that we can abstract away from an object's end, and appreciate its beauty alone? Why, then, do we need a special term to pick out the conjunction of perfection and beauty? It is perhaps salutary in this respect to consider the example of gunpowder. Here we have a mixture of different chemicals, all of which we value individually for reasons other than their role in gunpowder. We need gunpowder as a term, however, because, in combination, its constituents have an effect that we find valuable, and which cannot be attained from them individually. It is considerations similar to these which, in the second half of §16, Kant uses to justify the notion of dependent beauty.

Taste [we are told] stands to gain from this combination of intellectual delight with the aesthetic. For it becomes fixed, and...enables rules to be prescribed for it.¹⁰

^{*}Kant, Critique of Judgement, §16 p. 73.

⁹Kant, Ibid, §16 p. 73.

¹⁰Kant, Ibid, §16 p. 73.

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Kant then goes on to offer a rather difficult description of how this comes about:

...strictly speaking, perfection neither gains by beauty, nor beauty by perfection. The truth is rather this, when we compare the representation through which an object is given to us with the Object (in respect of what it is meant to be) by means of a concept, we cannot help reviewing it also in respect of the sensation of the Subject. Hence there results a gain to the entire faculty of our representative power when harmony prevails between both states of mind.¹¹

Now, as I interpret him here, whilst Kant holds that a perfect object is not made more perfect by being beautiful (or vice versa) there is, nevertheless, a strong empirical tendency to move from judging an object's perfection, to judging its beauty (i.e. simply estimating it on the basis of sensations of pleasure or displeasure). Indeed, if an object should have both qualities, it will produce a complex state of mind that combines intellect and sensation in a manner conducive to the whole province of mental activity. Kant's reasoning here is based on the fact that, for him, mental activity comprises both reason (i.e. judging and/or acting in relation to the concept of an end or ideas of totality) and cognition (whose formal conditions involve the co-operation of imagination and understanding). Now earlier or in the Critique of Judgement, Kant has already argued that the pure experience of beauty is grounded on a harmony of imagination and understanding, that is recognized only by means of a sensation12 of pleasure in the judging subject. Hence, if we combine a judgement of perfection (which involves appraising an object in relation to the end which defines what kind of thing it is) with a judgement of beauty (where a sensation of pleasure shows our cognitive faculties to be in accord), then we are, psychologically speaking, harmonizing reason and cognition-the two definitive features of our mental life. Indeed, the very fact that a rational judgement is accompanied by aesthetic pleasure will be conducive to further such intellectual endeavours on our part. This is why Kant talks of taste becoming "fixed," and subject to rules. Whereas the pure experience of beauty is free and governed only by an "inherent causality"13 that tends to prolong and reproduce itself for its own sake, the experience of beauty in the context of perfection, in contrast, fixes it in a secondary role, but one which enables it to function as a means or incentive to the higher ends of reason, as well as something that can be enjoyed for its own sake.

I am arguing, then, that for Kant, dependent beauty is essentially beauty experienced in the wake of perfection, and, that whilst Kant regards this as a restriction of aesthetic experience, he eventually shows it to have some positive consequences. Now there are, I think, some interesting points, both particular and general, to be raised about the scope of this theory. For example, in what way, if any, does it apply in the particular case of fine art? In this context, Kant tells us that because it is the product of human artifice, the fine artwork must be produced in accordance with the concept of an end,

¹¹Kant, Ibid, §16 p. 74.

¹²Of course, Kant generally uses the term "feeling" rather than "sensation" in relation to our pleasure in the beautiful. There are, however, precedents in the third *Critique* for him opting for the latter usage. For example, §9 p. 60, where he suggests that there is "...no other way [for the harmony of imagination and understanding] to make itself known than by sensation."

¹³Kant, Ibid, §12 p. 64.

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And, since the agreement of the manifold in a thing with an inner character belonging to it as its end constitutes the perfection of the thing, it follows that in estimating beauty of art the perfection of the thing must also be taken into account....¹⁴

Now whilst the obvious inference to be drawn from this, is that fine art is most appropriately regarded as dependently beautiful, Kant, interestingly, never does explicitly describe it in such terms. The reason for this, I would suggest, is his claim that, through its grounding in genius, the fine artwork does not look like the product of rule-governed artifice, but has, rather, the uncontrived and spontaneous appearance of an object of nature.15 This means, of course, that in the case of the successful artwork, it is so easy and natural to make abstraction from its antifactual origins, that (like some other artifacts, such as wallpaper and designs à la Greque) it can be appropriately regarded as a free beauty. Now as I have argued elsewhere,16 the very fact that this approach does place fine art in such insipid company is a good reason to stay clear of it. Indeed, there is an altogether more plausible reason why we should think twice about regarding the fine artwork as simply dependently beautiful. It consists in the following. As was shown earlier, the experience of dependent beauty involves the combination of judgements of perfection and judgements of beauty which, whilst logically distinct, are phenomenologically combined and bring about a psychological harmony of reason and cognition. Now since in the case of fine art, Kant informs us that its definitive end is the production of an aesthetically delightful "beautiful representation,"17 it follows that to judge its perfection involves judging how beautiful it is, and to judge its beauty is (implicitly) to judge its perfection. Here, in other words, we have not only a psychological harmony of reason and cognition but also a logical connection between perfection and beauty. I would suggest, therefore, that the beauty of art is properly regarded as sui generis-a fact which Kant himself tacitly acknowledges through his subsequent attempts to articulate artistic meaning in terms of the distinctive notion of the "aesthetic idea." 18 To explore this topic in the requisite detail, however, would take me well beyond the scope of this paper.19

Let me return, then, to some of the more general points concerning the scope of Kant's theory of dependent beauty. First, whilst it is clear that for Kant, some things are most appropriately regarded as dependent beauties, and others as free beauties, his position allows, nevertheless, for some flexibility in the way these terms are applied. For example, Kant's claim that judgements of perfection tend to invite judgements of beauty does not commit him to the view that *all* perfect objects are always dependently beautiful. The reason for this (a fact not noted by Kant, but one which is consistent with his overall position) is that it is always possible that the judgement of beauty which trains in the wake of our estimating an object as perfect might issue in wholly negative results. In this case, of course, our pleasure would be purely intellec-

¹⁴Kant, Ibid, §48 p. 173.

¹⁵Kant, Ibid, §46 p. 168.

¹⁶In part II of my "Fundamental Ontology and Transcendent Beauty: An Approach to Kant's Aesthetics," Kant-Studien 76 (January, 1985), 55-71. It should be noted that whilst, in that paper, I offer a somewhat different interpretation of dependent beauty (from the one offered in the present study) its main points of argument are, nevertheless, substantially unaffected by my revised position. Similar considerations hold in respect of my "Kant and Greenberg's Varieties of Aesthetic Formalism," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 42 (Summer, 1984), 442-45.

¹⁷See Kant, Ibid, §48 p. 172.

¹⁸See Kant, Ibid, §49 pp. 175-80.

¹⁹I do, however, explore this topic more in Part III of "Fundamental Ontology and Transcendent Beauty."

tual, and not at all aesthetic. It is also worth pointing out (though again Kant does not do so himself) that even if an object strikes us primarily in terms of its free beauty, Kant can quite consistently hold that this need not always be the case. The object may be such that, on occasion, we are disposed to make abstraction from its free beauty, and appraise it in purely intellectual terms as a perfection; or alternatively, to combine this intellectual appreciation with that of its aesthetic qualities, thus treating it as a dependent beauty.

Having, then, outlined the substance and scope of Kant's theory of dependent beauty, I shall now briefly summarize, and review it. First, Kant's argument is constructed on the basis of the following four points: i) with some objects, reason demands that judgements of perfection must take precedence over judgements of beauty; ii) the fact that this is so, means that our experience of beauty in such objects, will be psychologically inhibited; iii) despite this, however, there is an empirical tendency to move from making judgements of perfection into making judgements of beauty; iv) indeed, when an object is judged to possess both perfection and beauty, the combination of the two will produce a positive experience wherein reason and cognition are in harmony. Now whilst these points provide a consistent (though hardly compelling) structure of argument, I shall not consider points ii and iii, since, if true, they express at best contingent facts about the psychological context in which judgements of beauty sometimes arise. Point i), and point iv), however, are of considerable philosophical interest. Through i), for example, Kant is indirectly claiming that, whilst beauty is a logically distinct form of value, and pursuable for its own sake, it is, nevertheless, not of absolute and unconditional worth.20 In relation to some objects, our need for intellectual and practical perfection—the demands of reason in its broadest sense—must take precedence over aesthetic considerations. Now although Kant asserts rather than argues his claim, his position can be defended on the following (though not particularly Kantian) grounds. In our everyday lives, the need for perfection (in the broadest sense) is intrinsic to our goal-oriented cognitive and practical activities. Indeed, the pursuit and achievement of such excellence enriches our general cognitive stock in a way that both equips us for, and impels us towards, the search for an even greater perfection still. Let us suppose, however, that the craving for beauty overtook perfection as the focus of such goal-oriented activity, i.e., that aesthetic considerations (however small) were always given precedence over perfection. Now if this were the case, the world would, initially, be transformed; things that were hitherto only of mundane significance, might now appear in a wholly new light. And yet, the very fact that aesthetic contemplation had become the norm rather than the exception, would eventually make beauty all-pervasive, and the source of a merely routine and commonplace pleasure. Rather than liberating us from the mundane, beauty would itself become an expression of mundanity. Indeed, should the pre-eminence of the aesthetic attitude lead us to neglect our interest in cognitive and practical perfection, and thence denude our general cognitive stock, then it might be expected that our capacity for searching out and discriminating the higher, or more subtle and elusive, forms of beauty, would likewise be coarsened. We would eventually be satisfied by the merely pretty, and the picturesque. I am arguing, then, that perfection must sometimes take precedence over beauty, otherwise the experience of beauty would lack those exceptional, liberating, yet refined phenomenological qualities, which lead us to value it in

²⁰This, of course, complements the well-known argument in Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (op. cit., pp. 61-64) that only a good will is of absolute worth.

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the way we do. The very features, in other words, which might seem to make beauty of absolute and unconditional worth, are dependent on the very fact of its not being of absolute and unconditional worth. Now in relation to Kant's second point of substance (namely, iv) matters are equally interesting. Through his talk of a state of mind wherein reason and cognition are in harmony, Kant recognizes that at the psychological level, our experience of perfection sometimes has something of the aesthetic about it. Because he so rigidly separates the logical grounds of perfection and beauty, however, the only way he can account for this link with the aesthetic, is by positing dependent beauty as a logical hybrid involving both judgements of perfection and judgements of beauty. The problem with this, however, is the question of how these judgements are phenomenologically "combined." Kant, unfortunately, is not only ambiguous on this issue, but indeed, the two alternative approaches which constitute the ambiguity, are both unacceptable. On the one hand, if Kant is saying that in the experience of dependent beauty, regard for perfection and regard for beauty are co-extensive in the very same act of judgement, then his claim is incoherent, since (as he presents them) the logical grounds of judgements of perfection and beauty are wholly exclusive of one another. On the other hand, if he is simply saying that a judgement of beauty's immediately following on a judgement of perfection is the mode of combination involved, then it is left unexplained as to why this mutual proximity should not (as in the case of the tatooed Maori) be a source of conflict and incongruity, rather than one of harmony. Now despite these problems, I would suggest that Kant is not only right to posit a connection between perfection and the aesthetic, but that he is also, broadly speaking, right to characterize it in terms of a harmony of reason and cognition. To establish this, I shall abandon Kant's logically hybrid notion of dependent beauty, and will show instead, that some judgements of perfection are logically akin to judgements of beauty, through their embodying (in a modified way) the disinterestedness and freedom, in terms of which Kant defines the pure aesthetic judgement. It is to this task I now turn, in Part II of my paper.

II

Let me start with the notion of disinterestedness. First, it will be remembered that, for Kant, judgements of perfection are judgements of an object's "goodness" in relation to the concept of its end. Now when pleasure arises from judgements of the good, Kant claims that "...such delight is determined not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the represented bond of connection between the subject and the real existence of the object."²¹

Kant's reasoning here is complex, but he *at least* means that if an object's goodness (in whatever respect) causes us pleasure, then the grounds of our pleasure logically presuppose that the object is real. If it turned out, for example, that the object was an optical illusion of some sort, then its goodness would also be illusory, and we would have, therefore, no grounds for taking pleasure in it. In the case of our aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful, however, matters are entirely different. Here our appreciation is focussed exclusively upon the object's formal qualities, *i.e.* upon its mere structure in the way it appears to the senses. This means, of course, that from the viewpoint of the pure aesthetic judgement, it simply does not matter whether the ob-

ject is real or illusory. Our judgement, in other words, is wholly disinterested as to questions of real existence.

Now it is clear that at least one kind of judgement of perfection can satisfy criteria of absolute disinterest, insofar as to take pleasure in an object's simply looking how a perfect object of that kind should look, is to appreciate it at the level of appearance alone. In this case (as in that of the pure aesthetic judgement) the object's ontological status as real or illusory has absolutely no logical bearing on the grounds of our pleasure. Now this narrow mode of appreciation is, of course, very much the exception rather than the rule, insofar as normally, when we call an object perfect, we expect it to possess all the definitive dispositional properties of its kind, as well as the strictly phenomenal ones. In this respect, the discovery, say, that an oak tree initially judged as perfect is, in fact, rotten to the core, would of course, oblige us to revise our original judgement. There are, nevertheless, two senses in which judgements of more than simple phenomenal perfection can count as relatively disinterested. For example, whilst perfection in roses and quartz crystals is a property which could (through its respective selling power and theoretical significance) give special pleasure to the florist and mineralogist, in the case of most people such perfection will tend to please for its own sake. In the latter case, therefore, our pleasure could be characterised as relatively disinterested, in an instrumental sense. Indeed, this line of approach can even be extended to encompass (in a modified way) objects that are of intrinsic instrumental significance. For example, suppose we take pleasure in a Bauhaus chair's perfect combination of form and function. Now in the case of most artifacts, our pleasure in their perfection arises from our actually using them, or, if we have not had the opportunity to do so yet, from the anticipation of optimum performance. Yet, whilst our pleasure in the Bauhaus chair presupposes reference to a context of potential use, i.e. someone must be able, in principle, to sit on the chair, it does not presuppose reference to a context of actual use, i.e. the anticipation that we or some other person will, in practice, sit on the chair. (Indeed, if the chair is in a museum, it is very likely that no one will ever sit on it again—but this in no way diminishes our pleasure in its perfection). In cases such as these, therefore, our pleasure might be characterized as relatively disinterested in a practical sense.

Having, then, suggested that pure aesthetic judgements and judgements of perfection have affinity in terms of various sorts of disinterestedness, the question now arises as to how such disinterested pleasure is possible. In relation to the pure aesthetic judgement of free beauty, Kant informs us that

The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are here engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this representation must be one of a free play of the powers of representation...for ...cognition in general.²²

On these terms, to experience an object's formal qualities does not involve objective determination, *i.e.* reference to what kind of thing the object actually is. Rather we are free to conceptualize the relation between its formal qualities in different ways. One might, for example, attend to the overall balance of phenomenal masses in the object, or to the structural effect created by the way its colours "sit" upon one another; one might, alternatively, trace the development of individual linear elements, or note the

²² Ibid., §9p.58.

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changing effects produced by the light source upon the total configuration. Now to conceptualize the object in this unrestricted way, means that the two elements in our faculty of cognition—imagination and understanding—are in a harmonious and leisurely relation, that issues in, and is recognized through, a feeling of pleasure. For Kant, in other words, the aesthetic character of the experience of beauty lies not simply in the fact that we feel pleasure, but in the fact that our pleasure is subjectively determined—through a free exercise of our capacity for concept application.

The question which must now be asked is whether there is anything in common between this experience and our application of the concept "perfection." I shall argue as follows. First, whilst our judging an object to be perfect is objectively determined in the sense of logically presupposing reference to what kind (using "kind" here in a very broad sense) of thing the object is, such simple objective determination is, nevertheless, not a sufficient condition of our judgement. It is implied, in addition, that the object manifests the properties which define the kind of thing it is in an exemplary way, i.e. more completely than most other instances of the kind. Now "more completely" entails, I would suggest, the satisfaction of two further conditions. First, the object must be free from both distracting blemishes and impurities due to the presence of foreign elements, and any inessential properties which might be unrepresentative of the kind. For example, we would not usually judge something to be a perfect rose if it showed evidence of being diseased or crossed with another species; or if it was of inordinate size, or coloured in a hue extremely uncharacteristic of roses generally. Second, the perfect object should not simply embody all the definitive properties of its kind, but should do so in a well-balanced way. The perfect elephant, for example, doubtless needs a trunk, but not one that is exaggeratedly large or small in relation to the rest of its frame. Now the interesting question is, how are these very general criteria applied in practice? There are, I would suggest, two ways. First, suppose we describe a quartz crystal as perfect, on the grounds that spectroscopic analysis shows it to be free from impurities, statistics show it to be of average (and thence representative) size, and that comparison with visual data in a textbook shows that its facets are of the right geometric shapes, distributed at exactly the right angles, and in exactly the right ratios of proportion. In this case, we would be applying our critreia of perfection in a technical sense, insofar as the presence or absence of relevant properties could be determined by measurement. In practice, of course, judgements of perfection are rarely made in this exact manner. Not only, in most situations, do we simply lack the relevant data, devices, and technical competence, but indeed many kinds of things (especially artifacts) have definitive properties or functions which admit of such immense variety in their instantiations that purely technical standards of judgement are entirely out of the question.23 We rely, rather, on standards constructed

[&]quot;speculatively" conjectures that it may be (somewhat like) this very fact which underlies Kant's theory of dependent beauty. In relation to certain kinds of object, such as churches, "The concept of purpose imposes some constraint on the freedom of imagination with respect to the appearance of a church, but still leaves that faculty such latitude within this constraint that pleasure may yet be produced by its free harmony with the understanding's demand for unity." (Guyer, pp. 246–47.) However, whilst an approach on broadly these lines is (as I am at present trying to show), a viable basis for linking perfection and the aesthetic, it should not be taken as reflecting Kant's actual strategy in §16. As Guyer himself admits, it might not do justice to the stipulation that dependent beauty presupposes a concept of the object's end. Neither, it should be noted, would it do justice to Kant's characterisation of such beauty as secondary (i.e. "appendent") or his very extensive discussion of it as a combination of the "good" and the beautiful (i.e. as a logical hybrid).

from both general knowledge, and personal acquaintance with the kind of object in question. Now it is crucial to note that this introduces a significant element of freedom into our judgements of perfection. For whilst an object's possession of minor impurities, slightly unrepresentative inessential properties, or slight disproportion amongst its essential features, may disqualify it from strictly technical perfection, these may not be so striking as to disappoint our personal expectations of what a perfect object of that kind should be like. On these terms, then, the practical applications of our technical criteria of perfection will tend to involve a crucial element of subjective determination. Now it is important to note that this subjective dimension to judgements of technical perfection is of a provisional and empirical nature only. For example, it is logically possible that, in the future, computer technology and data may furnish us with devices that will enable us to measure with objective precision whether any given object is a technically perfect instance of its kind. We are simply waiting, as it were, for the right computer to come along. Let us suppose, then, that the said computer comes along, is plugged into the "Aesthetic Problems Solution" terminal, and promptly informs us that the rose it has just scanned is, in fact, a technically perfect specimen. Let us suppose also that whilst the rose in question strikes us as an admittedly good specimen, it seems something of a stereotype, and not really what we would want to call perfect. Is our unease justified? Or is it just a foolish refusal of technological inevitability? The answer is, I would suggest, the former, insofar as what I shall call judgements of phenomenological perfection have a subjective element that is logically irreducible. One might argue this as follows: Technical computerapplied standards can certainly do justice to the definitive properties of kinds, but, in the final analysis, such properties are only abstracted from our experience of their particular instances. Any natural kind is subject to the exigencies of its origins in natural causality, and its instances will always have some impurities, inessential properties, and disproportion amongst its essential features. Contingency, in other words, is a distinctive feature of kinds at the level of their natural being. Similar considerations hold in relation to the production of artifacts. We do not demand that every phenomenal and dispositional property of a specific instance of some kind of artifact, must play an essential role in fulfilling the function or functions which are definitive of artifacts of that kind; neither, indeed, are we capable of producing artifacts of such a superhuman order of efficiency. There will, in other words, always be some phenomenal and/or dispositional property which is wholly contingent; neither facilitating nor inhibiting the artifact's function. Given these considerations, then, I would suggest that, phenomenologically speaking, contingent features are just as essential to a kind in its totality of being, as are its definitive properties. It is, therefore, reasonable to demand that if an object is to be a perfect instance of its kind in the fullest sense, i.e. concretely as well as abstractly, it must manifest this contingent dimension in a positive way. Now this does not contradict the general criteria of perfection noted earlier, because, on the one hand, not all impurities necessarily distract us from essential properties, and not all inessential properties are unrepresentative of the kind; on the other hand, being well-balanced does not necessarily entail strictly proportionate individual phenomenal parts. In relation to the first of these, for example, dew on a rose, or a certain alightment of impurities in a quartz crystal, may be such as to give added phenomenal definition to their respective essential structural features. Similarly, inessential properties such as the uniform redness of a rose, or the above average size of a quartz crystal might serve to make essential structural features more 72 CROWTHER

accessible to cognition. In the case of being "well-balanced," matters are more interesting still. Suppose, for example, that our computer tells us that a certain man we know would have bodily parts in perfect proportion with one another (for a man of his age and ethnic origins) were it not for a slightly overpronounced forehead. It may be that for us, however, this very disproportion is highly affecting, in that it powerfully suggests a definitive property of human kind, namely its rationality. Similarly, a particular oak tree may have a trunk that is slightly too broad in relation to the size of its branches but which, by its very girth, suggests the oak's general qualities of strength and sturdiness. Now if, in such cases, there were also evidence to suggest that the thing actually did possess the essential and highly desirable properties it looks to have, then the total effect would rightly incline us to regard it as a fuller, more complete instance of its kind, than a merely technically perfect specimen. The contingent element of (slight) phenomenal disproportion, in other words, would be balanced out by the essential dispositional properties it served to disclose. Similar considerations, indeed, can apply at the strictly phenomenal level. Whilst, for example, the pronounced forehead may be slightly disproportionate in relation to other bodily parts individually considered, the manner of its disproportion may, nevertheless, introduce an interesting complexity into the balance of the whole, that leads us, in turn, to attend more closely and appreciatively to both individual parts and the way they relate to each other. I am suggesting, then, that sometimes an object's contingent features are in a state of disclosive harmony with its essential properties, and that in such cases, we have perfect exemplars of the kind in its totality of being. Now when we judge perfection on the basis of concept-guided personal experience, rather than concept-determined technical standards, we are embracing the phenomena in question at a much fuller level of their being. True, we may be familiar with specimens which satisfy textbook criteria of technical perfeciton, but equally our judgements will be informed by experience of kinds in their natural setting, i.e. will tend (even though we may not be explicitly aware of it) to take account of disclosive contingency. Indeed, when this sort of contingency does inform our judgement, we will have a mode of estimating perfection that fully justifies our reluctance to accept computer based appraisals. The reason for this is that the recognition of whether or not some contingent feature of an object is in disclosive harmony with the properties that define what kind of thing it is, is logically dependent upon a context of cultural and subjective interpretation. In some cultures, for example, dew upon roses, or the size of quartz crystals and foreheads, may be of immense ritualistic significance in themselves, and would thus tend to distract from, rather than disclose, the essential properties of their bearers. Again, at the personal level, if one lacks imagination or is interested in phenomenal perfection alone, the broadness of an oak tree's trunk might not suggest its sturdiness; and if one lacks perceptual sensitivity, a pronounced forehead will remain just that, and its possible contribution to the phenomenal and dispositional balance of the whole will remain unnoticed. Indeed, whether or not a property counts as disclosive may even change during the life of a particular person and culture -on the basis of new knowledge, experience, and interests acquired, and old values discarded. On these terms, the only way a computer could cope with phenomenological perfection grounded upon total being would be to invest it with the total cultural values and personal identity of its owner, or to give it cultural values and a personal identity of its own. But then, of course, it would no longer be just a computer. . .

KANT'S DEPENDENT BEAUTY

I am arguing, then, that judgements of perfection are of two sorts: the technical, and the phenomenological. The first of these has both an objective element, and (until the right computer comes along) an empirical dimension of subjective determination. The second has, again, both these features, but this time with a subjective factor that is necessary and irreducible. Now, although neither sort of judgement of perfection is wholly free in the way that pure aesthetic judgements are, the presence of subjective determination enables us to characterize them as relatively free, insofar as, through them, our capacity for concept application is exercized not simply by following a rule determined by the nature of the object, but on the basis of standards constructed, in part, from personal experience. In the case of perfection, in other words, we are dealing with an objective or rational cognitive content whose conceptualization involves a harmonious rather than determinative interaction with cognition's creative and subjective aspects. Now, if such a a judgement is also disinterested in any of the senses noted earlier, then any pleasure we take in it will be explicable only in terms of this harmonious relation. Our judgement, in other words, will be aptly characterized as neo-aesthetic (and its object as dependently beautiful) insofar as, through it, the task of rational comprehension attains a zest and vitality of its own. Indeed, the very fact that our rational activity has such pleasurable consequences will tend to dispose us towards further activity of that kind. This, I would suggest, is what Kant implicitly recognized and was trying to articulate through his account of how the experience of dependent beauty involves a harmony of reason and cognition that brings a gain "... to the entire faculty of our representative power." The theory of dependent beauty contains, in other words, broadly, the right characterization of perfection's link with the aesthetic, but it arrives at that characterization by the wrong route.

In conclusion, the following two points are in order. First, Kant's claim (noted in Part I) that beauty must sometimes take second place to perfection, still applies, even in the present context. If our judgements of perfection were always neo-aesthetic and their instrumental and practical significance always downplayed, then the intensity of our aesthetic pleasure in perfection, and our capacity to discriminate its more subtle forms, might, in the long run, be expected to suffer. The second point concerns the more general validity of the arguments broached in this paper. I have tried to account for the neo-aesthetic character of some judgements of perfection in specifically Kantian terms. What, however, if one is not prepared to accept Kantian criteria of the aesthetic in the first place? Now whilst considering the full ramifications of this issue would require at least another paper, I would, nevertheless, suggest that, since on occasion we clearly do appreciate the purely formal qualities of objects in (roughly) the way Kant describes, the more appropriate question to ask is whether there is any good reason why we should not, in general terms, accept his criteria of the aesthetic? One such reason is, perhaps, the frequently asserted claim that Kant's criteria are too narrowly formalist, and are especially inadequate in relation to art. Since in this paper I have shown, however, that Kant's criteria are flexible and can be modified to give a very plausible explanation of the connections between the purely aesthetic realm and a cognate area of experience (i.e. perfection), I see no reason why his criteria could not be likewise modified to encompass the experience of art.24 Of course, it might be objected that this would involve treating the experience of art as a logically modified,

²⁴I have already done this in a modest way (in relation to the notion of disinterestedness) in Part II of my paper "The Experience of Art: Some Problems and Possibilities of Hermeneutical Analysis," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 43 (1983), 347–62.

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rather than a pure form of aesthetic experience, but as Kant's account of dependent beauty and my revision of it show, the modification of the aesthetic by other considerations can be considered a gain rather than a loss.

I would suggest finally, then, that the very flexibility of Kant's criteria of the aesthetic is a good reason for accepting them. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any criteria other than his which would be flexible to do full justice to the variety and complexity of the aesthetic domain to both its center and periphery. This, however, is a topic I shall return to elsewhere.

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Appearance and the Laws of Logic in Advaita Vedānta

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T IS WELL KNOWN among Vedānta scholars that Śaṅkara maintains that Appearance, or $N\bar{a}ma$ and $R\bar{u}pa$ (name and form), is neither Real nor Unreal. This position of Śaṅkara has been criticized by a number of his opponents, most notably Rāmānuja, on the grounds that he has violated both the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle. The task we have undertaken in this paper is to explicate the process of reasoning by which Śaṅkara is led to the conclusion that Appearance is neither Real nor Unreal and also to examine the validity of the charges against him. This will require first understanding sublation and superimposition. From there we will go on to present Śaṅkara's concepts of Reality, Appearance, and Unreality. We will then show why he is led to his unique characterization of Appearance and examine the charges of violating the laws of logic. Finally, we will note what we find to be the mistakes behind the charges brought against Śaṅkara—the mistakes of thinking that Śaōkara is a logician-ontologist rather than a phenomenologist.

SUBLATION AND SUPERIMPOSITION

The central concept in Śańkara's Advaita Vedānta is that of sublation. Sublation is the process of judgment by which any particular state of consciousness may be reappraised and replaced by another state as the result of the knower's attainment of an intellectually and emotionally more satisfying point of view. Of course the stock example in Advaita Vedanta for this process is that of the rope taken for a snake in the darkness. An experience of a rope as a snake can be generated by a combination of the presence of a rope on the floor in a dark room and the presence of a certain state of consciousness in the person encountering the rope (e.g. the person must be ignorant of the presence of the rope before encountering it, he must have had experience of snakes in similar situations in the past, he must have a fear of snakes, etc.). When these conditions are met, the rope-as-snake experience may arise when the person enters the darkened room, steps on the rope, and as a result of his state of consciousness, superimposes upon the rope "snake-nature." A more contemporary example of this would be the superimposition of "burglar-nature" on the creaking noises of the boards in one's house when one hears those noises in the night, not long after a neighbor has been burglarized. In either case, the rope-as-snake or creaking-as-burglar experience is sublated when it is contradicted by the point of view obtained after lights are turned on and the rope is seen as a rope or the creaking noise as due to the settling of the house. The person re-evaluates his previous experience from the "enlightened" point of view, and judges the experience in the darkness to be erroneous in light of the 76

wider range of evidence available with the aid of the lights, and less valuable in that the former state was one of anxiety and doubt.

Superimposition (adhyāsa) we have already mentioned; to clarify, according to Śaṅkara, it is "the apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing." Superimposition again is what the person in the dark does when he experiences the rope-snake. That is, he superimposes on the rope the qualities he remembers as characteristic of snakes: thus, he apparently has had presented to consciousness a snake. It is his (erroneous) superimposition of snake-qualities upon the rope that was sublated in the subsequent experience with the lights on. Thus, as we shall see in more detail below, sublation and superimposition are intimately related to appearances.

REALITY

With this understanding of sublation and superimposition we can now proceed to examine Śańkara's conception of the Real. Nirguṇa Brahman, that is, Brahman without distinctions, is the Real. In fact, Brahman without distinctions alone is qualified for the title "Reality," according to Śańkara, because it alone is in principle unsublatable; that is, one can neither disvalue Brahman nor replace Brahman by another. Given the fact that sublation is an axiological and epistemological process, Brahman can only be made intelligible as a state of consciousness. And thus it is, according to Śańkara. Brahman is identical with the inner-most Self of man, pure consciousness without an object, and knowledge of Brahman is the "experience" of consciousness without an object, that is, without distinctions, or non-dual (advaita).

Since in this state of consciousness even the subject-object distinction is lacking, the knowledge of Brahman is the identification of the knower with Reality, and thus it is that Brahman is in principle unsublatable. As Śańkara says:

[Vedic] passages such as, 'Thou are that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired [known] because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman.²

This state, which Śaṅkara calls Real, has neither temporal nor spatial horizons, no things-as-yet-unknown, because it is non-dual, without another. Hence there can be about it no judgments of relative value; there is nothing beside "It" by which to evaluate "It."

Beside this negative designation of Reality as that which is unsublatable, Śańkara does offer a positive characterization of the nature of Brahman. In his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, Brahman is "defined" as pure intelligence (consciousness)³ and pure bliss,⁴ as well as the material cause of the world.⁵ But Śankara also warns that this positive characterization is not ultimately true. Rather, it is given solely for its pragmatic value:

^{&#}x27;Śankara, The Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, with the Commentary by Śankara (hereafter cited as VS, tr. by George Thibaut (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), I, 1.

²VS II, 1, 14.

³VS I, 1, 5-11.

⁴VS I, 1, 12-19.

⁵VS I, 4, 23-26.

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Those qualities are attributed to the highest Brahman merely as a means of fixing one's mind on it, not as themselves being objects of contemplation...6

Eliot Deutsch comments on this:

Experientially, the role of a positive characterization or definition of Brahman is to direct the mind towards Brahman by affirming essential qualities that are really only denials of their opposites. To say "Brahman is truth" negates the quality of untruth—and this negation, it is believed, serves pragmatically to orient the mind toward Brahman.⁷

Thus, the favored way of characterizing Brahman is via negativa, i.e. by negation of all that is thinkable. What has both $n\bar{a}ma$ and $r\bar{u}pa$ (name and form) can be an object both of perception and of discursive thought. But

Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions & c. might be based) inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it.8

Reality is the unseen, the unheard, and the unthought, and best characterized, as in the *Brhadāranyaka Upanisad*, as *neti*, *neti* (not this, not this).

We see then that Reality, Nirguṇa Brahman, is to be identified as that state of consciousness available to man which is unsublatable and that, because it is totally devoid of $n\bar{a}ma$ and $r\bar{u}pa$. The lack of $n\bar{a}ma$ and $r\bar{u}pa$ in turn makes Brahman-knowledge a way of knowing which is had only by means other than perception and discursive thought. In fact, the state of objectless consciousness is intuitive knowledge of Reality, according to Śaṅkara; it is knowledge by identity, wherein the knower (Self) melts into the known (Reality). This is, of course, obtained when one ceases to superimpose upon Reality the limiting adjuncts ($up\bar{a}dhis$) of $n\bar{a}ma$ and $r\bar{u}pa$; just as knowledge of the rope is obtained when one ceases imposing snake-nature upon it. The unsublatable state of consciousness is thus a result, not of a movement from one ontological realm to another, but rather of a purification of knowing itself. For Śaṅkara, to rid oneself of the ignorance ($avidy\bar{a}$) which is superimposition, is to gain immediate insight into Reality. In the insublatable state of consciousness is thus a result, not of a movement from one ontological realm to another, but rather of a purification of knowing itself. For Śaṅkara, to rid oneself of the ignorance ($avidy\bar{a}$) which is superimposition, is to gain immediate insight into Reality. In the constant of the ignorance ($avidy\bar{a}$) which is superimposition, is to gain immediate insight into Reality.

APPEARANCE

Any state of consciousness other than that symbolized by Brahman is one in which there is an apparent distinction between the knower and the known, and one which can be sublated by the non-dual state of knowledge. Appearance is the range of states of consciousness characterized by both the capacity for sublation and the subject-object distinction. In this range Śańkara recognizes three general types ranked by affective and cognitive value (to the apparent subject), determined by the quality of the

⁶VS III, 3, 13.

⁷Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969), p. 11.

⁸VS II, 1, 6.

⁹Sankara's intuitive knowledge thus closely resembles Henri Bergson's intuition; for Bergson, intuition is the act of knowledge wherein the knower enters into the known. See *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1955).

¹⁰VSI, 1.

apparent object and the nature of the subject-object relation. These can somewhat loosely be referred to as "domains" of plural existents; they are more accurately referred to as: "states of consciousness with varying qualities and quantities of objects and subjects." The first type, which comprises all those states of consciousness which can only be sublated by the state symbolized by Brahman, is that of the "real existent." Examples of real existents are: experience of oneself in dependency on and in devotion to one's Creator (Saguna Brahman), which is sublated only by Nirguna Brahman;11 and the laws of Logic, such as non-contradiction and excluded middle. which are indispensable to discursive thought, which thought is in turn the drawer of the distinctions of name and form and thus the foundation of Appearance. The "real existent" is also characterized by an intimate relation between subject and object; there is no Creator without the created, and the subject-object distinction depends upon the laws of discursive thought. The second type of Appearance is the "existent" which can be sublated by both real existents and by Reality. This type includes all states of ordinary, conventional knowledge wherein the objects are many, of varying degrees of cognitive and affective value, and related to the subject in a more or less external, conventional manner. Examples are common sense knowledge, scientific knowledge, and so on. The third type of Appearance is the "illusory existent"; this type is sublated by all other types. It comprises dreams, hallucinations, mistaken sense perceptions, fantasy, and so on. These generally lack significantly enduring cognitive and affective value, and this because they are so obviously mere constructions of the mind—the subject-object relation is devoid of all substance and thus easily devalued.

What all of these types of Appearance share is the limitations of $n\bar{a}ma$ and $r\bar{u}pa$. Every "existent" has a definite name and form. Appearance is characterized by horizons and limitations, spatial and temporal. It is generated by the superimposition of $n\bar{a}ma$ and $r\bar{u}pa$ upon Reality;¹² the immediately given Real is thus distorted by the attribution to it of the mediately given. In a word, Appearance is generated when the mind tries to grasp reality by means of percepts and concepts.¹³ Appearance, then, is nothing more than a reflection of the structure of the discursive intellect and perceptual organs; it is Reality viewed through the limiting adjuncts of the Self. Like Reality, Appearance is a particular epistemological orientation, not an ontological realm; Appearance is knowledge by means of the finite instruments of concepts $(n\bar{a}ma)$ and percepts $(r\bar{u}pa)$.

UNREALITY

With Unreality the criterion of sublation breaks down entirely: that which is unreal, according to Śańkara, is neither sublatable nor unsublatable. The sublatable, Appearance, is that which has some degree of, although not ultimate, cognitive and affective value. The unsublatable, Reality, has ultimate cognitive and affective value. The reality of any state of consciousness, including that symbolized by

¹¹VS IV, 3, 15. We prefer not to refer to these types of appearance as "domains" because that term tends to suggest that some area on an ontological map of Reality corresponds to each domain.

¹² VS I, 1.

¹³VS I, 3, 42: "The entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms."

¹⁴Ramakrishna Puligandla, Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy (New York: Abingdon Press, 1975), p. 214.

Brahman, is determined by the degree of understanding of the world and thus the tranquility (at-one-ment) it affords the apparent subject of knowledge. ¹⁵ But Unreality is that which has no cognitive value and no affective value; since it can neither be cognized nor produce satisfaction, it lies outside of the range of the concept of sublation.

What is unreal? Something is unreal, according to Śańkara, if its concept is self-contradictory.

If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Purnavarman,' the declaration of a limit in time in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of a barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will be king.¹⁶

Like western philosophers, Śańkara maintains that anything which is only characterizable by a self-contradictory concept is a logical impossibility, and that logical impossibility entails empirical impossibility. In a word, according to Śańkara, any state of consciousness is impossible, and thus unreal, if the elements of that state contradict one another; experience of either square-circles, married bachelors, or sons of barren women is self-contradictory and never to be attained. Hence it would be misleading to say that it was either sublatable or unsublatable.

Whereas Reality is nameless and formless, and Appearance has both name and form, Unreality is best referred to as that which has empty name and hence no form. Although the words can be put together, they contradict themselves and thus the name is empty of all significance; and a $n\bar{a}ma$ (concept) without significance cannot be related to any form (percept).

APPEARANCES: NEITHER REAL NOR UNREAL

We now come to a discussion of the charges brought against Śaṅkara, which are seemingly supported by some straightforward statements of the man himself. Those charges are that the system of Vedānta is in violation of at least the Law of Excluded Middle, in that Śaṅkara explicitly asserts that Appearance is neither real nor unreal.

That element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterized by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved,... is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing.¹⁷

Name and form, we reply, . . .can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman [Reality] nor as different from it [Unreality]. 18

The Law of Excluded Middle, of course, maintains that a term and its complement exhaust the universe, and since nothing lies outside the universe, nothing can be described as lying outside both of the sets denoted by complementary terms. In this case, the violation seems to take the form of asserting that Appearance lies outside both of the complementary sets, Real and Unreal. Since Śańkara clearly does not place Appearance outside of the universe of possible cognitive states, either he has

¹⁵ VS I, 2, 21.

¹⁶ VS II, 1, 18.

¹⁷ VS II, 1, 27.

¹⁸ VS I, 1, 5.

violated the Law of Excluded Middle, or "Real" and "Unreal" are not complementary sets of Advaita Vedānta.

We submit that the latter is actually the case. A close examination of the sets symbolized by each of the terms Real and Unreal supports this conclusion. "Real" is Śaṅkara's symbol for the set of all "things" which are in principle and in fact unsublatable, and that set includes only the state of objectless (non-dual) consciousness. Appearance does not belong to this set because it is both in principle and in fact sublatable; in principle, because it is characterized by the subject-object distinction and the attendant limits and horizons to knowledge and satisfaction; and in fact, when knowledge is obtained through specific disciplines and procedures. (Regarding this latter, we are not in a position to doubt Śaṅkara unless we can show that the procedures do not produce evidence confirming his claims.) Śankara thus must conclude that Appearance is not Real.

"Unreal," on the other hand, is a symbol denoting the set of everything which is self-contradictory and hence impossible of existence. This set is, of course, the Null Set, and can be here illuminatingly referred to as "the set of all existents not possible of existence." It is obvious that Appearance cannot belong to this set. There is no contradiction in the concepts of duality and plurality, nor does subject contradict object. In fact, Appearance is constituted by complements, not by contradictories; that is a fact which will be significant in our discussion below. And Appearance certainly is not impossible of existence; Śaṅkara himself recognizes it as the ordinary state of cognition, which indeed cannot be denied at all until one has realized Brahman (objectless consciousness). Hence Śaṅkara is forced to conclude that Appearance is not Unreal.

The Law of Excluded Middle is not violated because Real and Unreal in Śańkara's system are not complementary sets. Unreality is actually the Null Set; it is the set of all that which, by virtue of its self-contradictoriness, exists in non-existing. That set is, of course, nothing at all; and nothing is not the complement but the contradictory of Reality. For a complementary set "is the collection of all things that do not belong to the original class."20 Since for Śankara Reality is ultimately all there is (Appearance is in fact a modification of Reality by name and form), there is nothing (ultimately) which does not belong to the set, Reality, and hence (ultimately) Reality does not have a complement. The Null Set (Unreality) is not a collection of things not belonging to the set symbolized by Reality; it is in fact not a collection of things at all, but is mere nothing, sheer non-existence. That the Null Set is Unreality is also clear from the fact that the Null Set is the only set which has no cognitive and no affective value; hence the Null Set is neither sublatable nor unsublatable, since without existence and value it cannot in principle have any connection with the essentially cognitiveaxiological process of sublation. The domain of consciousness is the domain of existence and values, absolute or relative and apparent—the absolute value being Reality (non-dual consciousness) and the relative values being Appearance (dualistic consciousness)—and the Null Set is nowhere in this domain. In fact, it is nowhere at all. Thus Appearance is not claimed by Śańkara to be the middle between two complements, exhaustive of the contents of the universe. Ultimately, Reality alone is exhaustive of the universe; it is all that there is.

¹⁹ VS II, 1, 14.

²⁰Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, Sixth Edition (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 191.

But Reality alone is not exhaustive of *possible states of consciousness*. From a phenomenological perspective, Śaṅkara does in fact recognize a set complementary to Reality. That set is Appearance, as is evident in his distinguishing Reality from Appearance by the phenomenological criterion of sublation, the former being 'the unsublatable' and the latter being 'the sublatable.' Together, these two sets exhaust the universe of possible states of consciousness. It is worthy of note that for Śaṅkara human existence is constituted of realizable states of consciousness. Hence Reality and Appearance exhaust *all possible modes of existence*, for they jointly include *all realizable states of consciousness*. Thus we see that, phenomenologically, Śaṅkara clearly upholds the Law of Excluded Middle, the complementary and exhaustive sets of modes of consciousness being Reality and Neither-Reality-nor-Unreality, identified by the phenomenological criterion of sublation.

Śańkara's designation of Appearance as neither real nor unreal is also in full conformity with the Law of Contradiction. The charges that he violates this Law of Logic are generated only when those of us trained in two-valued logics routinely translate

Śańkara's statement as:

1. It is not the case that Appearance is real or that Appearance is unreal.

Symbolization of this, substituting R & not R for the two disjuncts respectively, takes the form:

2. not (R v not R)

And application of DeMorgan's law generates:

3. not R & R

This, when transformed once again into an English language statement, becomes:

4. Appearance is unreal and Appearance is real.

Needless to say, this is a flagrant violation of the Law of Contradiction. The question is, however, is this last statement logically equivalent to Śańkara's original statement? More generally, is Śańkara's tripartite distinction easily amenable to two-valued logic? The answer, we believe, is no.

Let us first note that in generating sentence (2) above the assumption was made that Śaṅkara recognizes Real and Unreal as contradictories, i.e. as mutually exclusive sets. But this is not an assumption that can be supported by any means, as should be evident from the discussion above concerning the Law of Excluded Middle. In fact, the criteria Śaṅkara uses for identifying the members of these sets are of radically different orders, prohibiting the symbolic translation we have made in sentence number (2). Śaṅkara's original statement is made with the intention of having the symbol "Real" be understood as "that which is unsublatable" and the symbol "Unreal" understood as "that which is self-contradictory in concept"; the former is a possible mode of consciousness identified by a phenomenological criterion, while the latter is not a possible mode of consciousness and is 'identified' by a logical criterion. In light of this recognition, sentence (1) above becomes:

5. It is not the case that Appearance is that which is unsublatable or that Appearance is that which is self-contradictory in concept.

Symbolization of this, by substituting not S and C for the two disjuncts respectively, produces:

6. not (not S v C)

This, by De Morgan's law, becomes:

7.(S & not C)

which in English does accurately represent Śańkara's position on Appearance:

8. Appearance is that which is sublatable and that which is not self-contradictory in concept.

And indeed this is not in violation of the Law of Contradiction; on the contrary, it is in full conformity with the Law of Contradiction.

One mistake made in the process of coming to the conclusion that Śaṅkara violates the Law of Contradiction is thus revealed. It is the error of thinking that Śaṅkara uses the symbols "Real" and "Unreal" to designate mutually exclusive sets simply because the symbols appear to be logically contradictory, when in actuality "Real" is a symbol for the set comprised of the ultimately fulfilling cognitive and affective state of consciousness, while "Unreal" is a symbol for the Null Set which is not a mode of consciousness. In fact, Reality is the all-inclusive set in the sense that the objectless state of consciousness, having no boundaries, comprehends and *consumes* all possible limits to consciousness (existence). On the other hand, Unreality is ultimately a non-existent set, simply because nothing (i.e. no state of consciousness) belongs to it; and, needless to say, a non-existent set cannot contradict (or complement) an all-inclusive set. It is worth mentioning here that De Morgan's Law presupposes the Law of Excluded Middle and it is therefore no surprise that its application to Śaṅkara's teaching concerning Appearance is both uncritical and absurd.

Again, it can be shown that Śaṅkara actually does his best to uphold the Law of Contradiction. First of all, according to him, that which violates the Law of Contradiction is the non-existent, Unreality. Secondly, he maintains that Reality and Appearance are, *phenomenologically*, contradictory modes of consciousness. Nowhere does he claim that there exists a mode of being that is *both* Real and Apparent. This is quite simply because he would then be saying that there was a state of consciousness which could be termed both unsublatable and sublatable—at once, both 'nameless and formless' and 'characterizable by name and form'; in a word, he would then be in the position of maintaining that there exists a self-contradictory (i.e. Unreal) state of consciousness, a position according to which something exists which in principle cannot exist. Śaṅkara quite carefully avoids this difficulty, even to a point where it seems as though he might be forced to deny Brahman altogether:

The entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered true [real] as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen...as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity non-duality of the Self, so long does it not enter his mind

that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge is untrue...he is forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all.21

How indeed is Śańkara to convince those whose knowledge ends at Appearance that Brahman is possible? For them the Real is Appearance, because they as yet know of nothing else, and in principle cannot be given knowledge of anything else as long as they are ensconced in Appearance, for Reality is incompatible with and contradicts Appearance; non-duality is the contradictory of duality, phenomenologically as well as logically.

We submit in passing that Śaṅkara's technique is to present to the unconvinced an analysis of what is universally meant by the concept "Real" in phenomenological terms, and then to demonstrate to his opponents that their own concept of Real is inapplicable to Appearance on phenomenological grounds. That is, Śaṅkara points out that Real, for all types and shades of metaphysicians as well as for 'ordinary' people, means "that which is ultimately satisfying cognitively and affectively." He then proceeds to show that Appearance, as a state of dualistic consciousness, is in principle incapable of being ultimately satisfying either cognitively or affectively. He then proceeds to adduce the everyday phenomenological facts of sublation and superimposition to support his contention that Appearance is not Reality, but rather a mere construct of nāma and rūpa, through and through dependent upon consciousness and in fact consumed in objectless consciousness.

LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE

Our discussion thus far amply shows that two-valued logic is not straightforwardly applicable to Śankara's tripartite distinction of Reality, Appearance, and Unreality. In fact, this should have been obvious upon obtaining sentence (4) above, for that directly contradicts the original Statement of Śankara that Appearance is neither Real nor Unreal. Now, there is, we noted, a naive and unfounded assumption that lies behind the uncritical application of the laws of two-valued logic to this statement-i.e. the assumption that simply because the symbols "Real" and "Unreal" are in two-valued logic complements and contradictories that therefore that which Śankara means to symbolize by them are so. We have amply shown above the error of this assumption. There also seems to be behind this criticism of Śańkara the belief that symbols in general accurately divide the elements of our experience into well demarcated sets that can be manipulated by the laws of two-valued logic to produce truths about experience. In short, this is the assumption that experience has a structure which is accurately reflected by the formal structure of our systems of knowledge, and hence that any system appearing to violate the formal laws of logic cannot provide a truthful and accurate account of experience.

The plain fact is that experience has no such structure; Śaṅkara's intention was to use the symbols "Real" and "Unreal" to point to aspects of experience discovered not by symbolic manipulations but by phenomenological investigations. Such investigations provide ample evidence that experience has not the structure of two-valued logics. For example, consider the statement "x is living" and "x is non-living." The laws of Excluded Middle and Contradiction require that one of these be true, the other

²¹ VS II, 1, 14.

false, for any value of x. If, however, x is a virus, or a person on a heart-lung machine who has measurable brain activity, we are quite unsure, despite the laws of logic, what truth-value either of the two statements has.22 In these situations, we begin to doubt that "living" and "non-living" are exhaustive and/or contradictory concepts. Even seemingly clean and uncomplicated concepts like "red" and "non-red" suffer when subjected to the weight of phenomenological evidence; consider that red is in fact an ingredient in every other color of the spectrum, which of course means that nothing is ultimately non-red. Indeed, it would be quite impossible to identify non-red objects without red objects, and vice versa; thus "red" and "non-red" are interdependent and complementary, rather than mutually exclusive and contradictory. In fact, ruthless phenomenological investigation will demonstrate that all elements of experience, in both concept and percept, are interdependent and complementary.²³ Under the strain of phenomenological data, our own conceptual-perceptual systems begin to resemble Śankara's. After all, "Viruses are neither living nor non-living" is about as close as we can get to expressing conceptually some of the phenomenological data disclosed by microbiological research. Since Śańkara is primarily interested in giving a satisfactory account of the structure of experience—i.e. in doing phenomenology—his use of logic is confined to assuring internal consistency among the elements of his account, a consistency of meanings rather than simply of symbols, as was displayed above. He does not share with his opponents the belief that logic is a tool superordinate to phenomenology; his symbols are only symbols, not to be mistaken for that which they symbolize. Only by failing to see what "Real" and "Unreal" symbolize for Śankara can one be led into the trap of accusing him of violating laws of logic. In a word, Śankara is a phenomenologist before he is a logician.

ONE REALITY—TWO EPISTEMOLOGICAL MODES

There is one other major presupposition which seems to guide the attack on Śańkara's characterization of Appearance. That is, that Śańkara is a metaphysician-ontologist rather than an epistemologist. This view, clearly the property of naive realists, leads one to suppose that Śańkara wishes to offer an ontological map of the universe. Reality, Appearance, and Unreality are by this view considered tiers like Heaven, Earth, and Hell. The three-level universe view has Reality as "the place where things actually exist" and Unreality is vaguely conceived as some sort of "Fantasyland." Appearance then becomes an insoluble problem. For the naive realist will admit only the two realms of 'imaginary' and 'actual' being, while Śańkara seems to claim that something has the strange habit of being in neither realm. The realist can only suppose that Śańkara's Appearance is no more than fantasy, duly belonging to his (the realist's) Unreality. Interpreting Śańkara's tripartite distinction as one of areas and segments on an ontological map, one is forced to conclude that he is making no sense at all.

But it should be clear from the discussion above that Reality, Appearance, and Unreality are *not* spots on an ontological map of the universe, each identified by

²²It is to the point here to note that the famous Schrödinger cat-paradox could not be resolved by Quantum theory, in which it originated; see Ilya Prigogine's From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1980).

²³For an excellent discussion of this claim, see Bruce Holbrook's *The Stone Monkey* (New York: Wm. Morrow & Co., 1981).

Śankara the metaphysical cartographer. Unreality is not a place where things with self-contradictory concepts exist, nor is it a fantasyland; Unreality is the Null Set. Fantasyland is unmistakably a type of Appearance, the illusory existent, and Appearance is not a place but a state of consciousness, characterized by duality, namely consciousness—versus its intentionality. We do not go from fantasyland to Appearance in order to find a plurality of subjects and objects. Appearance is the state wherein there are subject-object distinctions. Finally, Reality is not a place, a location, where we find 'real things' (Dr. Johnson's rock collection). Reality is objectless consciousness, and vice versa.

Śaṅkara's great interest is to point out that there are two basic epistemological modes available. First, there is knowledge of Reality through $n\bar{a}ma$ and $r\bar{u}pa$. This conceptual-perceptual knowledge has practical and conventional value and is not to be belittled.²⁴ But it is not ultimately satisfying, for it both satisfies and creates desires, never allowing the knower to have the foundational knowledge of his objects, but only knowledge from this or that point of view or with this or that purpose in mind. Only the second mode of knowledge, pure, unsublatably, direct, and intuitive knowledge of Reality without the aid of names and forms, is ultimately satisfying. Appearance is the first mentioned mode of knowing; Reality is the latter.

Ultimately, even these two modes are non-different, insofar as each is a state of consciousness. Put pointedly, consciousness is the ultimate principle, according to Śankara. Only it cannot be done away with, for it proves its own existence, being as it is, the ground for all proof.²⁵ Appearance and Reality are consciousness in the two possible modes—dualistic (dvaita) and non-dualistic (advaita). The latter is the ultimately true and satisfying knowledge without the aid of $n\bar{a}ma$ and $r\bar{u}pa$, the former the ultimately dissatisfying knowledge via nāma and rūpa. Thus it is that the method prescribed by Śańkara for the realization of Reality is not one involving travels from one landscape to another, but rather one designed to purify consciousness of the distorting factors of nama and rupa, i.e. of all that can, in principle, be doubted and discarded (sublated). This reveals the ultimacy-necessity and unriddability-of consciousness and its complete freedom from limits (its unsublatability). The knowledge gained is that Appearance is not, as we believe when ensconced in Avidyā (ignorance), all that there is; alternatively, it is a method by which the pernicious belief in the allcomprehensive and ultimate nature of any dualistic, finite view of Reality is discarded via the realization of the truly all-comprehensive, non-dualistic cognitive state. Reality is knowledge without any particular point of view; in keen contrast, Appearance is always (and inevitably) knowledge from some point of view or other generated by manas (mind, intellect). Thus, Reality, unlike Appearance, is knowledge that is its own witness. We wish to acknowledge in this context that some clarification is needed concerning the ontological status of Appearance as well as its relation to pure consciousness as ultimate reality. Put pointedly, the question is: why should Brahman, ultimate reality, be subject to the deceptions produced by superimposition? This is a legitimate and important question and deserves a clear answer. Limitations of space, however, do not permit us adequately to answer it here; consequently, we leave a fulllength treatment of this problem for another occasion.

²⁴ VS II, 1, 14.

²⁵VS I, 1, 1; II, 2, 28. Here we might notice that Husserl makes a similar claim about Transcendental Subjectivity. See the *Cartesian Meditations*, tr. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).

To conclude, any interpretation of Śańkara which makes him a cartographer of the universe apart from consciousness is bound to find him in violation of the laws of logic, for under such interpretation, it will appear that he is claiming that some things called "appearances" inhabit neither of the two possible regions of the universe, reality and unreality (fantasy), and that he nevertheless claims they are knowable. Such an interpretation is fundamentally at fault, in that it begins by assuming that Śańkara constructed his system not as an epistemologist but as a doctrinaire ontologist and metaphysician. Needless to say, Śańkara will certainly have regarded such an interpretation of his teaching as the very height of folly—avidyā.

BRIEFER BOOK REVIEWS

Imagery. By Ned Block. Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 1981. *Mental Images and their Transformations*. By Roger N. Shepard and Lynn A. Cooper. Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 1982.

For some time now, there has been a very fruitful interchange, collaborational as well as confrontational, between philosophy and psychology on the topic of mental imagery. These two books assemble articles by some of the main participants in the debate and bring forward both conceptual and experimental considerations that are claimed to advance our understanding of the nature, activities and processes of the imagination. Though each book is concerned with theory as well as with data, it is nonetheless not inaccurate to say that, by comparison, the volume co-authored by Roger Shepard and Lynn Cooper (and their co-researchers) gives more concrete detail on specific experiments, whereas the volume edited by Ned Block is more oriented to clarifying the central theoretical terms used in coming to an understanding of the empirical data.

In the first chapter of *Imagery*, Roger Brown and Richard Herrnstein review the experimental literature which gives evidence for the existence of "icons," or nearly photographic copies of perceptual stimuli occurring in immediate short term memory. This leads them to the issue of "internally generated icons," i.e., icons generated not by an external stimulus, but on the basis of long term memory. The question as to how these latter icons represent the original stimuli is then answered by an appeal to Roger Shepard's notion of second-order isomorphism. It is not that such an icon shares properties with the original stimulus (which on reflection is itself seen to be a kind of icon), but rather that it shares properties with other icons (internally generated icons, that is), which are icons of stimuli which share properties with the original stimulus.

The question of how it is that mental images represent, which we find posed in this initial chapter, is one which runs throughout the *Imagery* volume. In fact, these papers are so judiciously chosen that not only do they all orient themselves around this particular *issue*, but they are also explicitly oriented to *one another*. We find an extended debate between Stephen Kosslyn (*et al.*) and Zenon Pylyshyn on the conditions and possibilities of formulating a scientific theory of mental images, and a detailed discussion between Jerry Fodor and Daniel Dennett on the conceptual differentiation between modes of representation. This direct and on-going dialogue lends to the collection a liveliness and verve often missing from more casually organized anthologies.

Yet to say that all the articles in this book are concerned with the problem of how mental images represent, does not mean that there are no variations in terminology or in the formulation of the problem. On the contrary, many points stand in need of clarification, and this demand is filled to a great extent by Block's introductory essay. This essay goes beyond a mere summary of the papers in the volume to analyze and criticize some of their most basic conceptual categories. In adjudicating the debate, Block is contributing to its advance. One of the first points he makes is that there are several false or badly formulated issues, which can be either (a) reduced to a terminological ambiguity or (b) reduced to something about which there is no real disagreement or (c) reduced to the basic issue itself.

This basic issue, that of how mental images represent, is phrased more precisely as: do they represent the way pictures represent or the way descriptions represent? Pylyshyn and Dennett come out on the side of the descriptionalists, and Fodor and Kosslyn on the side of the pictorialists. Both sides agree, it seems, that there are such things as mental (or internal) representations. But whereas the descriptionalists would claim that all mental representations (not just

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images) are descriptional, pictorialists would claim that at least some are non-descriptional and pictorial (viz., mental images).

One element that brings confusion to this controversy, as Block points out, is that the term "mental image" is ambiguous, being used to refer now to experiences, now to logical or intentional objects, now to "internal (neural) representations" (p. 8). Block's solution is "...we can avoid confusion by simply adopting the convention of using "mental image" to denote the internal [i.e., neural] representations involved in mental imagery" (p. 9). There are three objections to this.

First, if it makes the term "mental image" clear, it nevertheless leaves undefined the term "mental imagery." Does this latter term refer to lived experience, to the intentional object of that experience, or to something distinct from both of them? Second, the structure of the definition itself is logically odd, somewhat as if we defined physical caterers as people involved in physical "catery." Is this kind of definition illuminating? It could be answered, of course, that the main point of the definition was not interpretive elaboration but denotative specification. This the definition does. It says that we are to restrict the application of the term "mental image" to precisely one domain, that of the nervous system. It is exactly this point, however, which leads to the third objection. By simply choosing one of three possible *denotata* for the term "mental image," Block does provide a way of avoiding confusion, but only at the cost of closing off automatically other means of access to the problem. In something so controversial as the nature of the mental image, it is necessary to establish the meaning of the term, not by stipulation, but by argumentation. The other two candidates (experience and intentional objects) have a long and complicated history, and the other contributors to the volume speak of both.

A similar ambiguity running through the discussion, one which Block does not pinpoint, but which in fact causes as many confusions as the term "mental image," is evident in the use of the term "mental representation." In Block's own usage, the term does not appear to be referentially ambiguous. He applies it to the nervous system. In this case, the locus of an internal representation is taken to be purely physical, somewhere inside the boundaries of a person's skin, so that a representation is internal in the way that a ring in a jewel box is internal or, to use the more common analogy, in the way the wiring in a computer is internal. In the usage of the other authors, however, the denotation of the term shifts, just as does that of "mental image." Sometimes it is used to refer to experiences, sometimes to intentional objects, and sometimes to states of the nervous system. Thus the problems which arise with the term "mental image" are not solved by appealing to "internal representations," if that term itself is subject to the same ambiguity. On the other hand, if Block were to answer that he, at any rate, had resolved the ambiguity by using the term consistently to refer to neural conditions, then the same objection would hold as before: it is not stipulation that is required, but clarification and evidence. It seems to me that the central obligation to be met by any theory of imagination is that of holding on to all three spheres of denotation (and perhaps others as well) in order to specify, with as much clarity and rigor as possible, the relations among them.

Some progress along this route is made in the perspicuous chapter by Robert Schwartz. Schwartz goes a long way toward bringing good sense to certain muddles that arise again and again, as if they would perpetuate themselves indefinitely. His overarching task is quite basic, and his conclusions are devastating. He does nothing less than demolish the pictorialist/descriptionalist controversy itself, showing not only that it is based on a false dichotomy, but that taken without further clarification, it is unintelligible.

He performs this feat by distinguishing clearly between two of the three denotational spheres mentioned above, neural conditions and conscious experiences. He then directs his attention to the latter. But he does not do this simply in order to eliminate the former domain, but rather to put it aside for a moment in order to explore considerations in another sphere which will, in the end, come back to illuminate it. In short, he claims that by an analysis of the way in which "the image itself" (as a conscious experience) represents other things, we can gain some understanding of what the significance must be, if any, of positing internal representations of images (or of anything else). Schwartz's program is to specify the conditions for representation as such.

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One of the central distinctions which Schwartz makes is between an imagery mode and an imagery medium. He notes that while visual imagery is usually taken as the paradigm case for research into the imagination, the other senses form bases for imagining as well, some experiences being "sound-like," or "smell-like," for example, rather than "vision-like." On this account, image type is a function of the phenomenal quality of the image experience" (p. 111). The phenomenal quality of the experience, based on one or the other of the five senses, determines the *medium* of a given image. Thus, certain representations can be formed in the visual medium, others in the auditory, and so forth. The *mode* of a representation is determined by "...how the image relates to what it purports to characterize" (p. 113). The common view is that there are basically two modes of representation, the pictorial and the descriptional (or linguistic), and that imagining must involve either the one or the other.

Schwartz argues, convincingly, that this distinction of modes cannot be made just by examining various representations in themselves, as both sides of the controversy tend to assume. "Whether a state or an item is functioning as a symbol, what it symbolizes, and the mode of symbolization it exhibits are all dependent on and relative to what if any system of interpretation is employed" (p. 115). Taking as an example the three marks, S O N, Schwartz observes that, considered in and of themselves, they are no more symbolic than random ink blots. In order to represent anything at all, these marks must find a place within a given system of meaning, for instance, the English language. Moreover, it is possible in principle that the same sequence of marks might be incorporated into more than one system, and with quite different results, as can be seen by remembering that S O N is also a representation of the French language. But even more radically, this sequence of marks, in spite of what our presuppositions might tend to lead us to believe, has nothing at all intrinsically linguistic or descriptional about it. Given another context, its mode of representation could be pictorial. "It may be my sketched depiction of the pattern of cracks found in the sidewalk; I may be totally unaware that the shape is a character in a language" (p. 115). Likewise, a given spatial display that we would tend to assume must be pictorial does not have to function that way at all. A rectangle with a triangle inscribed inside could pictorially represent a mountain-or it could function as a letter or word in a language, or even as a graph of car sales. "Determining if a given spatial display is functioning pictorially or not is thus a matter of how it is being interpreted" (p. 116). Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that there are only two modes of representation, the pictorial and the descriptional. The very individuation of modes itself depends upon a given interpretive orientation, for this individuation depends on ". . . which properties of symbolization are found significant and which differences in function are taken as sufficient to determine distinctive modes" (p. 116). If this is so, then other ways of characterizing the representational issue (as the alternative between analog and digital representation, for example) are also suspect (see Schwartz' discussion, pp. 117-121).

It is the analog-digital formulation of the problem that provides the conceptual framework for the extensive experimental work of Shepard and Cooper. Starting out from the perspective of biological evolution, their basic thesis is that our ability to simulate mentally the structure-preserving and yet transformative processes which objects undergo in space "...originally evolved in the service of the concrete perceptual discrimination of positions and motions of objects when those objects were perceptually given" (p. 3). From this original grounding in perceptual experience, there developed a "faculty," or in more up to date terminology, a "prewired neural circuitry," which both internalized the constraints operative in actual perception and yet eventually made possible their autonomous operation even in the absence of the relevant physical objects. This autonomy, Shepard and Cooper observe, is suggested by the notable eminence that visual imagery has had in accounts of revolutionary scientific discoveries, such as relativity theory or DNA. (It should be noted, however, that the exact cognitive significance of such reports of mental imagery in discovery is one of the most debated issues in the theory of scientific creativity.)

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But it is not primarily from reports of scientific discoveries that Shepard and Cooper draw their conclusions about mental transformations, but rather from their own on-going experimentation. Their book collects papers on the research that they and their co-researchers have been engaged in since 1968. The book is divided into three parts (Mental Rotation, Other Transformations, and Apparent Motion), each preceded by a helpful introduction which acts as an overview, and followed by an epilogue chapter which surveys work done since the papers were first published. This volume is indispensable for anyone concerned with the topic of mental imagery, and it is impossible here to do justice to the richness of the experimental data which are presented. The epilogue chapter to Part III, for instance, where parallel experiments in the auditory medium are discussed, is especially fascinating.

What I would like to focus on is the basic theoretical distinction employed for understanding those data, viz., the distinction between analog and digital representational processes. Noting that their research must keep in mind two parameters, the internal representations and the transformations it undergoes, Shepard and Cooper point out that for both of these, the most fundamental problem is "...the type and degree of correspondence or isomorphism between the representational processes and their external referents" (p. 12). They state further "...the single most basic distinction that we draw in this connection is between analog representational processes in which the relational structure of the external events is essentially preserved in the corresponding relational structure of the internal representations, and nonanalog (i.e., categorical, symbolically recoded, or logical) representational processes, in which it is not" (p. 12f). They then continue to define analog representation more precisely: "We classify an internal process as the analog of a particular external transformation if and only if the intermediate stages of the internal process have a demonstrable one-to-one relation to the intermediate stages of the corresponding external process—if that external process were to take place" (p. 13). They want to make no claims, however, as to the exact nature of these internal processes. To say that an internal process occurring during mental rotation is an analog representation is not to claim that there is actually something rotating in the brain. The representational relation holds at a higher level of abstraction. This is the "second order isomorphism" mentioned by Brown and Herrnstein. As formulated here, this notion is taken to mean "...the brain is passing through a series of states that (whatever their physiological nature) have much in common with the perceptual states that would occur if the appropriate physical object were presented in successively rotated orientations in the external world" (p. 14). Two observations can be made at this point.

First, it is evident that a denotational shift has occurred in the course of this exposition, something which, as was noted earlier, is common in talk of mental imagery and representation. It was first said that the problem of representation was to correlate internal representations with "external referents." In the last passage quoted, internal representations are correlated with other internal states, viz., those that occur in perception. Thus the problem is (at least) three-fold, demanding a specification of the relations among (a) external objects, (b) neural conditions occurring in the presence of external objects, and (c) neural conditions occuring in the absence of external objects. But of course, in order to do this, one must explain how it is possible to know objects at all, whether internal or external. But the problem is somewhat streamlined for this particular case, since from the point of view of knowledge, both physical objects and physical states of the nervous system are external. What is passed over, in short, is the very traditional, and very difficult, philosophical problem of the knowledge of external objects. It is not my task here to suggest a given way of handling the problem, whether Lockean or Husserlian, but rather to make note of the paradox which seems always to haunt scientific investigation. It is that the requirements of "objective verification," on the one hand, posit a world of physical objects and processes from which the subjective experiences of the experimental subjects are excluded, and on the other hand, must constantly make use of the subjective (observational) experiences of the experimental researchers in constructing a picture of things from which all such "intervening variables" are absent.

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Second, it might be questioned whether the proposed definition of an analog process is sufficient to distinguish it from types of representation usually classified as non-analog. There are two central elements in Shepard and Cooper's definition: (1) that the two processes concerned (the representing process and the represented process) have intermediate stages between two extremes and (2) that the intermediate stages of one exhibit a one-to-one correspondence to the intermediate stages of the other. But suppose, for example, that I set as my task to get from point A to point B. I can of course achieve that goal by walking continuously from A to B-or I can walk to A', stop awhile, then walk to A'', stop again, as many times as I like (just as long as it is not infintely many) before arriving at B. Let us suppose I stop at eight points, all intermediate between A and B. Now suppose that between breakfast and lunch, I decide that I will go through an octave on the piano. Clearly we have two processes, both with intermediate stages, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the intermediate stages of the one and the intermediate stages of the two. Yet surely no one (not even Shepard and Cooper, as one infers on the basis of their illustrative examples) would count this as a case of analog representation. Yet the definition itself does not exclude such a case. A more adequate definition, perhaps, is that offered by Nelson Goodman, which Schwartz adopts in his critique of the whole analog-digital issue. But an even more fundamental question than that of an adequate definition of analog and non-analog processes, is the question of representation itself. Granted that there is a structural isomorphism (of whatever kind) in the example presented above, does it follow automatically that there is also a representation? Does the interrupted walk represent the octave or vice versa? Surely, this is an unintelligible question, if framed without qualification. Neither represents the other in and of itself, but either could represent the other, given an appropriate context and system of interpretation.

Once representation as such is seen to be dependent on and relative to a given system of interpretation, one can ask, as Schwartz does, about the significance of the claim that the nervous system must contain representations, whether pictorial or linguistic, analog or digital. Schwartz objects that it does not follow from the fact that we can comprehend different symbol systems that there must be an underlying code into which they can all be decoded. Nor does the fact that we can "translate" pictures into words, or words into pictures, show that pictures are reducible to propositions as the descriptionalists would have it (or that language itself may have evolved from the spatial-perceptual system as Shepard and Cooper suggest). If we are to talk about internal (neural) representations, Schwartz contends, we must be bound by the conditions that hold for representations in general. "Just as the mode classification of the spatial display S O N depends on how it is read, categorizing neural or internal codes will depend on the syntactic and semantic properties of their systems of interpretation" (p. 127).

Given this conclusion, it is evident that before any adequate account of "mental images" can be established, for whataver denotative sphere, we must trace out a coherent theory of interpretation. One especially urgent propadeutic to this is the task of assessing the various ways in which the word "interpretation" and its derivatives are used in the literature on imagination. Take, for instance, the commonly occurring sentence-form, "x interprets y." We find, often in one and the same article, several different kinds of things being substituted for x: a person, a sentence, a conscious act, a formula, computer wiring, a neural state. What is the significance of these denotational shifts? Is there a unique sense in which all these things may be said to "interpret" something? If not, how are the various senses related to one another? Is "interpretation" a pros hen equivocal, as Aristotle claimed was the case for "being"? What is really being said when these spheres of denotation are mixed, as when Shepard and Cooper refer to the "interpretive machinery" (p. 5) of the nervous system? Both philosophical hermeneutics and literary theory have long been engaged in reflection on the nature and principles of interpretation. The moment has come to widen even further the reach of interdisciplinary investigation. Nothing less will suffice for dealing with such a subtle and complex phenomenon as the imagination.

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The Mystery of Life's Origins: Reassessing Current Theories. By Charles B. Thaxton, Walter L. Bradley, and Roger L. Olson. With a Foreword by Dean H. Kenyon. New York: Philosophical Library, 1984. Pp. 228. \$14.95

The stated purpose of this book is to provide a critical assessment of contemporary theories of chemical evolution. Its real purpose, which becomes evident only upon reaching the final chapter, is to justify a creationist view of life's origin. There are two distinct parts to this book: eleven chapters written to discredit chemical explanations of the spontaneous origins of life and an epilogue promoting the authors' belief in Special Creation.

Only the epilogue is of philosophical interest; nevertheless, a few words are in order concerning the authors' negative account of the theories of chemical evolution. The authors try to create an impression of fairness; however, their creationism makes it impossible for them to accept the slightest possibility that life arose spontaneously from nonliving matter. Their discussion of work done on chemical evolution is incomplete and also superficial; they are so anxious to protect their creationist position that they ignore and oversimplify many important issues. Their discussion of the possible prebiotic origin of DNA and RNA is particularly weak.

While the authors' discussion of chemical evolution cannot be recommended, they do make a few points in the epilogue that should interest anyone concerned with the philosophical aspects of evolution.

One such point is the suggested distinction between operation science and origin science. Operation science is the science of recurring natural phenomena; its principles are subject to falsification by experimental means. Any introduction of the supernatural into operation science would, the authors concede, be totally inappropriate. Origin science, on the other hand, deals with specific historical events such as the origin of life on earth. The principles of origin science are not subject to the same rigorous standards of falsification as in operation science; all origin science can do is offer a plausible account of how some originating event may have occurred. Such an account should be consistent with available evidence; however, it cannot be falsified experimentally in the same way that theories about recurring events can be falsified.

Of course, what the authors claim for origin science could be claimed for any historical study, whether or not it pertains to origins. The stress on origins, however, leads the authors into a discussion of the role of metaphysics in science. They point out that all science functions within some metaphysical framework, whether explicit or implicit. Origin science in particular involves very specific metaphysical commitments: "the origin perspective of metaphysical naturalism is spontaneous generation (abiogenesis) and of theism it is Special Creation" (p. 208). From their standpoint, any theory of gradual evolution of living systems from non-living matter is atheistic, while theism calls for belief in the supernatural origin of life.

This dichotomy clearly ignores another position that can be both theistic and, at the same time, allow for spontaneous generation. This view, which might be called General Creation, assumes that God created a universe that operates in accordance with certain natural laws and that these laws allow for the spontaneous development of living systems whenever chemical conditions are suitable. God's creative activity is effected through the natural laws, and there is no need to believe in the miraculous insertion of life into nature.

Someone holding a general creationist position has no quarrel with contemporary theories of chemical evolution. On the other hand, the special creationist position advocated by the authors of *The Mystery of Life's Origin* not only opts for the supernatural insertion of life into the world but, since the world must have been ready to receive life full-formed, also makes some very questionable assertions about the prebiotic world (such as the assumption that the earth's early atmosphere was oxidizing instead of reducing).

While this book does have many weaknesses, it does manage to be thought-provoking, and thus makes a modest contribution to the current philosophical debate over evolution.

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Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment. By Lewis Hinchman. Gainesville, FA: University Presses of Florida, 1984. Pp. xvi + 299.

There should be no question in anyone's mind that we can come to grips with the philosophical enterprise of Hegel's system only if we are aware of the extent to which it both finds its roots in and is critical of "Enlightenment" rationalism. As Lewis Hinchman sees it, Hegel very clearly saw the need of an antidote to Enlightenment individualism and very deliberately set out to provide such an antidote. "Hegel wanted the Enlightenment to put back together the whole which it had disassembled, perhaps an impossible demand of it" (p. 80)—and perhaps it is the impossibility of the demand which makes Hegel's attempt at reconstruction indispensable even today—rationalism cannot cure itself. One has to wonder, after all, if Enlightenment rationalism with its monopoly on rationality, logically culminating in Humean scepticism, has not outlasted transcendental philosophy (in the Anglo-Saxon world at least), thus making Hegelian reconstruction all the more necessary.

Hinchman has provided us with a study of Hegel which is at once readable and profound. For the most part what Hinchman has to say is quite favorable to Hegel and to the Hegelian enterprise. He does, it is true, occasionally engage in criticism of Hegel particularly of some aspects of Hegel's political thought, but that does no more than indicate that no one is above criticism-including Hegel. More to the point he presents us with a Hegel who is recognizable as Hegel, the philosopher who "forces us to think in new ways that often defy expression in the language of common sense or even of traditional philosophy" (p. 10). There is no question in my mind that Hinchman has gone a long way toward enabling us to think in these "new" Hegelian ways. It is impossible, of course, within the confines of a relatively brief review to detail all the ways in which the author has done this. I shall confine myself, therefore, to four unquestionably significant headings-to which I shall then add a rather negative heading. The headings are the following: (1) The significance of the consciousness of self for an awareness of the meaning of reality; (2) the inevitability of conceptual structure if reality is to be accessible to the human mind at all; (3) the unfolding of human freedom as the indispensable character of the human; (4) the necessity of political society—the state—for the very possibility of this unfolding of freedom. (5) The quasi-negative heading we can simply call "ambiguity"-more often than not ambiguity of language, but sometimes it shades over into ambiguity of the thought the language is seeking to express.

(1) Precisely because for Enlightenment rationalism the model of rational knowing was to be found in knowledge of the non-self, it never succeeded in coming to grips with self-knowledge, never really went beyond an empty Cartesian "I." Hegel's system is a gigantic effort to remedy precisely that—and the remedy is a long, arduous process, "through which the 'I' comes to comprehend itself in the other" (p. 45). Hegel saw more clearly than did any of his predecessors that selfhood is more truly the result of human relationships than the precondition for them, and this realization came from what Hinchman calls Hegel's "great discovery," the concept whose process embraces both thought and reality in a dynamic identity.

(2) "For Hegel, the concept is the essence not only of all thought but of being itself" (p. 47). In this the distinction between the subjectivity of the concept and the objectivity of the idea disappears; the idea is the concept realized, or it is the concept in reality, without which reality would not be conceivable—hence not knowable. It is for this very reason that empiricism, the darling of the Enlightenment, refutes itself; it leads inevitably to the concept, with which it cannot cope. Conceptual thinking simply is not an expression of mechanical causation. If reality is to be accessible to thought at all, it will be so only in that non-causal process which is concept. Hinchman is, of course, not the first to have recognized this, but he very penetratingly links it to Hegel's recognition that Enlightenment rationalism leads nowhere.

(3) Because Enlightenment rationalism had a very narrow and rigid conception of what it is to be scientific, confusing as it did the scientific and the deterministic, it was condemned to make no sense out of what is so authentically human, i.e., will, freedom, spirit. In Hegelian

terms there can-indeed must-be a Phenomenology of Spirit, which is a "science of the experience of consciousness," a "science" which could make no sense in Enlightenment terms. Although it is customary for historians of philosophy to distinguish between "continental rationalism" and "British empiricism," Hinchman credits Hegel, and rightly, with having seen that the spirit of both is the same, the empirical, which simply cannot come to terms with will, freedom, and spirit. What Hegel does recognize in empiricism, however, is the conviction that "experience is amenable to rational explanation" (p. 75), but he also, as Hinchman points out, "ascribes virtues to the empiricists that they almost certainly did not possess" (p. 76). In any event, there simply is no empirical way of comprehending the essence of freedom, which is authentic freedom only as not "absolute." It may very well violate our ordinary way of thinking to claim that concrete freedom is authentic precisely because it is limited by the universal will which suppresses particular will. "Free will," Hinchman remarks, "is essentially a continuum of free wills, not an expression of private idiosyncratic desire" (pp. 203-204). It may be paradoxical to say that the more ethical one is, the more bound one is, and that the more bound one is ethically, the more authentically free one is, but it does make eminently good sense-not, however, "empirical" sense at all.

(4) This last leads to what may be the most significant difference between Hegel and the Enlightenment, between a theory of the immanent rationality of the state and the "socialcontract" theory of political structure. The question of human rights, highlighted as it was by Enlightenment thought, is one which cannot be bypassed by any consistent theory of rational thought. How the question is answered, however, will depend to a very large extent on the image of the human which animates it. Without going into the many possible images of the human and the many theories arising from them, there would seem to be certain basic presuppositions which any theory would have to take into consideration: (a) only individuals have rights; (b) only within the framework of structured society can individuals exercise these rights; (c) conflicts of rights cannot be adjudicated, even in structured society, if the only available criteria of rights are abstract. Within these areas of agreement, however, there are enormous possibilities of disagreement. Extreme individualism, on the one hand, will claim that rights inhere in individual human beings, simply by virtue of their nature as human, not by virtue of their relations to each other in structured society, and the exercise of rights is specified by agreement or convention. Extreme collectivism, on the other hand, will see all rights as existing only because conferred upon individuals by the society they have no right to question. Between these two extremes there stand the infinite variety of positions which come under the heading of liberal democracy, whatever be the particular form of government in which this is expressed. Here we can situate those who, like Hegel, see socio-political relations as constitutive of the very nature of the human over against those who, with the thinkers of the Enlightenment, see rights as integral to the human individual qua individual and socio-political structures as a sort of pis aller, like association for the harmonious regulation of economic relations. In short, we have on the one hand constitutive interaction and on the other "enlightened self-interest."

There can be no question here of adjudicating the conflict of Hegelian and Enlightenment political thinking; there can be question only of recognizing the conflict and of understanding both Hegel's position and his critique of the Enlightenment position in light of it. Hinchman has masterfully spelled out the lines of such an understanding which can be summed up in his contention "that it is simply impossible to apply Enlightenment standards of rationality to the political, precisely because the Enlightenment has no concept of the 'state'—at the very most only one of 'civil society'" (p. 94).

(5) With regard to the not infrequent ambiguity of Hinchman's language, since this review is already too long, I shall only indicate briefly how this comes into play. There can be no question that Hinchman, like Hegel, is trying to get at the essence of religious experience, which has been distorted by Enlightenment's so-called "insight," but in so doing he does not always make clear—a mistake Hegel does not make—that there is a sharp distinction between genuine faith and the Enlightenment's caricature thereof, which applies only to "pietism." Such expres-

sions as "faith or superstition," as though they are in apposition (p. 124), or "the essential character of faith stripped of its supernatural trappings" (p. 125), simply do not capture the thought of Hegel. By the same token to imply that, for Hegel, the "absolute" (or the "divine") is only immanent and not at all transcendent (pp. 128–29) is just not true to Hegel's thought. Perhaps the parade example of ambiguity is the very title of Chapter 7, "The Transcendence of Liberalism." It is not clear in either the title or the chapter whether "of liberalism" is an objective or subjective genitive—is Hegel's thought transcending liberalism, or is liberalism transcending the thought of the Enlightenment? There are, of course, other ambiguities, most of them due to the fact that the expression is insufficiently nuanced. Despite the ambiguities, however, I want to insist that Hinchman's book is eminently worth reading.

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Ouentin Lauer, S.J.

Derrida on the Mend. By Robert Magliola. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1984. Pp. 238 + xiv.

"Derridean constructivism" may sound like a contradiction in terms, but there are currently about a number of volumes which attempt to retrieve the notion of différance as a methodological principle (in the traditional sense) rather than a strategy (in the deconstructive sense). One more such study is Robert Magliola's Derrida on the Mend, which seeks to synthesize Heideggerian and Derridean maneuvers with contemporary literary theory, Nagajunist Buddhism, and Catholic trinitarian theology while trying all the while to restore organic and logocentric thinking to the deconstructive project. If this sounds like too much to be doing over the course of what is no more than a monograph, it is.

Magliola tries to locate the loose suture running throughout the Derridean corpus in order to argue that Derrida cannot proceed without reference to, and employment of, logocentric principles. The "thread" which Magliola isolates as constituting something of an internal contradiction or self-referential inconsistency in Derrida's program is lived experience, and argues that because Derrida answers his front door everytime he hears a knock (hence reinscribing himself in the everyday system of signs and bowing to the demands of sense), he "manifests a phenomenological behavior of sorts" (42). Deconstruction, then, becomes phenomenology, albeit phenomenology gone awry, and this conclusion allows Magliola to synthesize the Nagarjunist interpretation of the Buddhist "two truths" and Magisterial pronouncements on the Trinity with his reworked principle of différance. Three problems arise at this juncture. First, in attempting to locate the fissure of contradiction in the Derridean text, Magliola completely overlooks the critique of truth as correspondence implicit in the Continental tradition since Nietzsche. Without reference to, for example, Being and Time (I. 6. 44), the tautological can be construed as problematic and appear to undermine a project which, however, never claims to be total. Second, it appears that Magliola's definition of phenomenology in Derrida on the Mend is so broad as to be inclusive of anything which appeals to experience in order to establish its claims. I would refer Magliola to Derrida's "Sending: On Representation," in which the confusion of everyday language and experience with philosophical discourse is eschewed: "If I read, if I hear on the radio that the diplomatic or parliamentary representatives of some country have been received by the Chief of State, that representatives of striking workers... have gone to the Ministry in delegation, if I read in the paper that this evening there will be a representation of some play. . . I do not put my head into my hands to take in what it means. It is clearly enough for me to have the competence usually required in a certain state of society and of its educational system." Third and finally, as Derrida has noted, différance eludes all attempts at conceptualization and, in fact, only functions as operative with regard to a specific constellation of texts. As Derrida himself has elaborated in Of Grammatology and his letter to Professor Izutsu, it is the context which determines the inscription of such substitutions as "trace," "écriture," "pharmakon," "hymen," and "deconstruction," as well as the placement

of "différance." Différance is not, as Derrida contends, a method, but rather "takes place," which allows deconstruction to deconstruct itself (Ça se déconstruit).

Theologically, Magliola's attempt to read Rahner's trinitarianism through *effacement* is a failed one and, in speaking about the Trinity semiologically (i.e., in terms of negative reference), he completely bypasses the fundamental issues at stake—soteriology and ontology. Also, it is difficult to accept the author's contention that the Magisterium is, somehow, the ideal institutional instantiation of *différance*. Rather, it remains a social ensemble subject to deconstructive critique. This is, overall, much too easy a book, fraught with caricatures and emphatic statements and written in a quasi-Derridean style which only serves to distract, but in an unproductive manner (unlike the dis-tracting textual strategies of *Glas* and "Tympani").

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Gerry O'Sullivan

Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market. By Allen Buchanan. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allenheld, 1985. Pp. xi + 135. \$24.50.

Capitalism or Worker Control? An Ethical and Economic Appraisal. By David Schweickart. New York: Praeger, 1980. Pp. xii + 250. \$15.95 paper.

The capitalist economic system has been praised by its supporters, and condemned by its detractors, on two grounds: justice and efficiency. Exactly these grounds are addressed by the two works under review here. Professor Buchanan's book, which by its clarity, incisiveness, and balanced approach deserves to become a standard textbook for courses in ethics, returns on capitalism a mixed verdict. Professor Schweickart, by contrast, writes as a committed partisan of market socialism. His vigorously composed volume shows capitalism no mercy; and, I regret to say, he seems to me often carried away by an excess of polemical ardor.

Ethics, in the view of many, cannot surmount the problem of relativism. Instead, capitalism and its rivals should be measured against the value neutral criterion of economic efficiency. Buchanan subjects this frequently heard view to a highly original critique. Economic efficiency, he maintains, is very far from being value neutral. In particular, to compare one social system with another, even were we to assume that the same individuals exist in both,

rests upon two dubious assumptions. The first is that the transformation from one type of social system to another does not radically alter the interests of the individuals in question. The second assumption is that we can determine in some reliable way whether or not an individual is better off in one state than in another even though his interests in the two states are radically different (p. 38).

Surely, though, comparison need depend only on the truth of one assumption or the other, rather than both. More importantly, though the possibility of radically incommensurable differences of interest between those living in diverse social systems must be acknowledged, Buchanan has not shown that this situation in any case obtains. Not everything that is possible is actual.

Among the highlights of Buchanan's discussion of efficiency is an effective criticism of the view that an efficient economic system must fully employ all productive resources (p. 5). Also, he offers a succinct and clear presentation of Friedrich Hayek's contention that the capitalist market economizes the use of information (pp. 16ff.).

Buchanan's contribution is by no means confined to his discussion of economic efficiency. He also discusses the main ethical arguments in favor and against the capitalist market economy. I found especially interesting his criticisms of libertarianism. Against Robert Nozick's now famous Wilt Chamberlain example, Buchanan objects that the transfer of money may have unintended consequences of vast magnitude. What if, under a regime of pure capitalism, a few people acquire sufficient power to oppress everyone else? But what does oppression

mean in this context? Buchanan does not tell us nor does he make clear why a libertarian society could not deal adequately with threats to liberty (pp. 68ff.).

Buchanan's articles on the provision of medical care have aroused great attention among philosophers, and he here uses his earlier work to mount an intriguing criticism of libertarianism. Libertarians, it is well known, deny that basic needs such as medical care suffice to ground rights. Medical care should be provided to the indigent through charity, not through state compulsion. Buchanan attacks this argument on the flank: even if people have no right to medical care, society should not rely on the market and private charity. It should not do so because of "familiar barriers to collective action" (p. 72). The provision of medical care on a technologically large scale is a public good, and the market handles the provision of such public goods with difficulty. But why should the fact, if indeed it is one, that a system is more efficient than the market in providing medical care be sufficient grounds to adopt it? Unless such efficiency gaps are of very great extent, which Buchanan nowhere shows or even claims, he has not offered even a *prima facie* reason to think that coercive interference with the market is justifiable.

But what of the problem of public goods? I venture to suggest that Buchanan, owing to his incomplete statement of the features of a public good (p. 22), has overestimated the difficulty these pose for a market economy. He omits to mention that for a good to be public, it must not pay any individual or group of individuals to assume the cost of producing the good. It seems to me that this requirement serves radically to reduce the number of public goods; but whether or not I am correct, he ought to have confronted this issue.

Buchanan does not confine his book to a discussion of the capitalist market economy. He devotes an informative chapter to market socialism, which in his view has not been shown on grounds of efficiency to be inferior to its capitalist rival. He is enabled to arrive at this optimistic assessment in part through his rejection of Ludwig von Mises' argument that economic calculation is impossible under socialism. He argues that von Mises had before he wrote already been refuted by the mathematical economists Barone and Pareto. With the technical details of the calculation argument I am ill-equipped to deal; but I cannot forbear from suggesting that Buchanan's discussion suffers from its inadequate attention to the literature of the Austrian school, not least von Mises' reply to the critics of his argument in *Human Action*.

Turning now to Professor Schweickart, we leave aside all doubt as to the desirability of capitalism: though he makes considerable efforts in his book to present the case for the opposition, the reader cannot avoid noticing that the atmosphere is here one of *écrasez l'infâme*!

Schweickart begins by criticizing an argument often employed by economists favorable to capitalism. According to this argument, capitalism is a just system because everyone receives payment according to his contribution. Schweickart explains with crystal clarity (p. 5ff) the essentials of marginal productivity theory which underlie this argument. He rejects the argument on the ground that capitalists do not really contribute to the process of production. Instead, they merely allow resources to be used by workers; they have the right to do so only because in the capitalist system they own the resources in question. In other systems no resort to their permission is required and workers can produce without the need for anyone to "provide capital." But, as an anticapitalist argument, this seems weak. What is relevant is capitalists' contribution in the capitalist system, not in some system "that never was, on sea or land."

Schweickart comes not merely to bury capitalism, but to replace it. He favors a form of socialism in which

(1) each productive enterprise is managed democratically by its workers; (2) the economy is essentially a market economy; raw materials and consumer goods are bought and sold at prices determined by the forces of supply and demand; (3) the government controls all new investment (pp. 49-50).

Most of the book consists of a comparison of laissez-faire capitalism with this system of "worker control." (The book also includes a valuable criticism of the positions of John Rawls and J. K. Gailbraith.)

Into the details of that comparison, in which, as one might expect, the merits of worker control are not underestimated, we cannot enter. But I note with some interest that Schweickart admits that worker-controlled firms have no economic incentive to increase production in response to rising demand (pp. 72–73). He relies on education in social responsibility to overcome this problem.

Like J. K. Gailbraith, Schweickart places great stress on the large expenditures for advertising in developed capitalist economies. But he offers no argument that if consumers are influenced by the emotional appeals of such advertising, they act in an anti-rational way (pp. 81ff). Also, he maintains, on Keynesian grounds more disputable than he allows for, that a laissez-faire economy *need not* result in full employment, but thinks worker control does better because the government *may* secure full employment by following the familiar Keynesian nostrums (pp. 78ff). Note the double standard: capitalism must, to escape condemnation, guarantee full employment; socialism need only allow its possibility.

Schweickart believes that workers will be unable to establish his system of worker control through transactions on the free market. Should they do so, the result would of course not be socialism, but a type of capitalism. Our author does not lack the courage of his convictions and solves this difficulty by advocating a law forbidding work for wages during the establishment of his plan. After "the basic structure is in place" (p. 145) perhaps such compulsion might be dispensed with. 'They must be forced to be free' sounds no more convincing in Professor Schweickart's voice than it did in that of his great Genevan predecessor two centuries ago.

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Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. By Bernard Williams. London: Fontana, 1985. Pp. 230.

Professor Williams' starting point in this work is that we should as philosophers reconsider our outlook on moral philosophy. It is a closely argued work which represents a movement gathering pace in contemporary ethics. For Williams, the key questions of morality are not those relating to the meaning of ethical terms or the logic of ethical discourse or discussions of duty and obligations, but rather issues posed by the following question: what sort of life should I lead? This line of approach which is now called 'virtue ethics' is, of course, Greek in origin and specifically Williams suggests that it is the Aristotelian model of investigation into moral questions that should set the framework for discussion.

It is undeniable, though not necessarily obvious, that consideration of questions like 'what life should one lead?' or 'what life is in our best interest to pursue?' lead to substantial philosophical issues. This fact has certainly not been obvious to a large number of twentieth century moral philosophers who have tended to treat ethical inquiry as a second order discipline, and have shied away from engaging practical moral issues.

Williams' treatise, then, is an attempt to relocate our thinking along the track of the Greeks and simultaneously to engage in a philosophical assessment of the orthodox ethical systems and their limitations. His conclusions for these latter theories are negative. He finds Kantian inspired moral systems and consequentialist schools of thought equally incapable of meeting the challenge of an important version of ethical skepticism. The problem of ethical skepticism posed by a 'virtue' foundation for ethics is this: Why should one want to lead an ethical life? The ethical life is taken broadly to mean one whose features are marked by the agent's other-regarding concerns in contrast to a life of pure self-interest. The task of engaging the moral skeptic is, then, one of showing him why the *force* of moral considerations makes for a better life than other alternative lifestyles available to him.

Attempts to defeat the skeptic have tried the following sort of tactic. If we can locate some point of agreement between the moral skeptic and the moral man, then that shared value might lead, by argument, to the conclusion that the moral skeptic has some interest in pursuing a

moral life. Williams calls such a point, if it can be found, an Archimedian point. Theories attempting to defeat moral skepticism have taken as their point of departure the concept of rationality.

Ethical theories have settled into two broad concepts of rationality, one derived from Kant which is abstract and based upon reason lying within the agent himself, and the other Aristotelian and practical. From both points of view the ethical life has been argued as being superior.

Williams does a competent job of dispatching the pretensions of Kantian moral theory, but there is nothing essentially new in his criticism. Schopenhauer in his *On the basis of Morality* provides for me the most effective counter to Kant. But what is valuable in Williams' book is his sustained attack in chapters 5, 6 and 7 on the gamut of twentieth century philosophical theories of ethics and presuppositions, often Kantian, that underlie them. Thus neo-Kantian theories in the form presented by R. M. Hare, J. J. C. Harsanyi, and John Rawls' attempt to derive just rules for a moral community based upon the preferences of idealized individuals behind a veil of ignorance, are well treated and criticized severely. The fact that the positions of some of these neo-Kantians, e.g. Hare and Harsanyi, lead to utilitarian recommendations are grist for Williams' mill, since the latter's views against utilitarian moral philosophy are well known (e.g. B. Williams and J. J. C. Smart, *Utilitarianism: For and against*, (1973)).

These theories for all their ingenuity fail because, like Kant's, they suppose that agents want their freedom and preferences to be rational, and so they cannot account for those who want initially to have irrational or anti-social preferences.

Williams does not stop at these influential theories but also attacks those moral philosophers who pin their hopes on linguistic analysis, on Moore's analysis of good, and the 'is-ought' distinction. Their inclusion for discussion is justified by Williams on the grounds that the legacy of these styles of thinking still command more attention than they deserve.

There are two comments to be made about Williams' negative analysis of contemporary ethical thought. Many of the arguments he presents are not really new. The author, however, presents in a compact form as erudite a survey as one will find anywhere, and hits these theories at the level of their key foundational claims.

I now turn to the more novel aspects of Williams' book and venture some criticism. Having rejected the modern moralists, Williams turns to Aristotle's ideas. This embracing of Aristotle cannot be wholehearted, for, despite Aristotle's genius in the construction of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, no serious philosopher today could embrace uncritically theses which were taken as evident by him. Aristotle's position is teleological. He identifies an end to which all humans strive, namely, *eudaimonia* (well being, blessedness) and his position assumes that agents have the ability to discover this end. Aristotle's theory rules out the possibility of moral skepticism because his functionalist perspective entails that we are just the sort of beings 'designed' to live in communities. Aristotle's good man is virtuous through habit, and Aristotle supplies us with the required list of virtues.

From this brief characterization, it is not difficult to see the basis of many criticisms of Aristotle's doctrines. Williams provides a few. Among other things, the distance in space and time of Aristotle's small and relatively isolated Greek *polis* from cultures like our own means that some virtues dear to him may not be viable in our own, and some desirable set of virtues may not form a coherent whole.

Williams' own positive theory is rendered a little opaque because, while it is inspired by Aristotle, it is not explicitly stated where precisely key features of Aristotle's work are preserved under his reworking of them. This, in part, is work for the reader based on clues provided in the text.

One way of keeping track might be to consider a number of salient features of Aristotle's views and see if they are preserved, at all, in Williams' position. I take it as uncontroversial that Aristotle thought that there was ethical knowledge; that he repudiated ethical relativism and skepticism; and thought that morality was in part about good judgement.

Williams says there can be ethical knowledge. This view raises a host of questions. For example, is ethical knowledge like scientific knowledge in its objectivity? A major thrust of

Williams' point is that it is not, and to make this case Williams must show that ethical knowledge is not objective on any useful analogy with scientific knowledge. Anyone who believes in the objectivity of scientific knowledge is likely to defend some form of scientific realism. Philosophers of science know only too well how difficult it is to nail down the essentials of the content of such a claim. Objectivity in that domain often amounts to a hope of convergence of our theories with the way things really are. It assumes that terms in our scientific theory typically 'refer'; and convergence, if it occurs, is explainable on that basis. Williams aims to show that, even when ethical knowledge seems to converge, it does not share in an objectivity analagous to scientific objectivity.

The sort of 'world' that Williams considers as that representing the scientific world is one which he dubs the 'absolute conception', that is, one which is to a maximum degree independent of our perspective and its peculiarities. Whether this sort of reality, to which Williams alludes, can be correctly characterized, I do not know, and Williams does not give this matter as much discussion as it surely needs. But assuming that we can cope with the notion, Williams attempts, by way of a discussion of perceptual judgements, to discredit any idea that there could be objective ethical values.

Suppose there is agreement by differently placed observers that something is 'white'. The objectivity of this is backed by the fact that disagreements about color can be explained by reference to a theory of perception which, presumably, can tell us that such-and-such is white by virtue of the fact that the molecules in the paper and the radiation onto the retina of a standard observer has a wavelength of 3970 A. Here the deeper theory explains the ordinary linguistic claims by reference to facts that are about things in the world.

Williams now contrasts this unfavourably with surface ethical agreement; for even if there is consensus, Williams says there is asymmetry because any attempts to show how local groups may differ in their understanding and use of ethical concepts can only make reference to differences which at the explanatory level will refer to anthropological and social-science theories about practices, and not about anything in the world in that 'absolute' sense to which Williams takes the scientific truths to refer. How powerful is this disanalogy, and does it constitute grounds for denying the objectivity of any ethical values? It depends, of course, on whether one sees the disanalogy as relevant to destroying the analogy which advocates of ethical objectivity wish to draw with scientific knowledge.

A reply to Williams might be to point out that, if his objection rests on the view that ethical values are not in the world in exactly the same way as the absolute conception demands, then this merely begs the question in favor of the 'absolute conception'. For ethical values might not be part of the furniture of the world in exactly the same way as 'electrons' might be construed. If the thrust of Williams' objection lies in the fact that the explanation of divergence on ethical judgement is inadequate and not in the world; then it may well be that features of the local conditions in which ethical concepts are employed are the explanation of the failure of some locally placed agents to apprehend ethical truths; for the conditions may serve to distort ethical reality.

Thus it seems to me that what Williams does establish is that it might be possible to describe the world in a way which avoids reference to any ethical values; but this does not show that there can be no objective ethical values.

Ultimately then, what is the effect of Williams' return to Aristotelian thinking? The rejection of the possibility of any objective knowledge in ethics renders any Aristotelian hope of showing what is good for man in general, as impossible. Preserved from Aristotle is the view that moral relativism is not an option for us. Coming into contact with other cultures and gaining knowledge of other ways of living may cause us to reflect, but in many cases these alternative ways do not represent any real option for us. We have, however, a vested interest in promoting an ethical life in contradistinction to one outside the values of the way of life we have come to inhabit.

If these sort of results seem less than spectacular, it may be because we have, through exposure to much of modern moral philosophy, come to expect philosophical theories of ethics to tell us much more. If Williams is right, then his own preferred starting point paradoxically

leads to yet another lowering of expectations and some very definite non-Aristotelian conclusions. I applaud the return to Aristotle and Williams' attempt to modernize him.

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Howard Harriott

Philosophy and Atheism. By Kai Nielsen. Buffalo NY: Prometheus Books, 1985. Pp. 231. \$18.95

In this book's last essay, Kai Nielsen asks "Why is the philosophy of religion so boring?" The answer offered is that "the case for atheism is so strong that it is difficult to work up any enthusiasm for the topic" (224), leaving the reader to wonder why one so unenthused has favored us with yet another airing of his views. Regardless, a better explanation of Nielsen's ennui may be that he has little more to say on matters religious than he did ten and even twenty years ago. This book presents Flew's Challenge early and unabashedly (38), and repeatedly presses closely allied just-short-of-verificationist doubts of the "empirical significance" of theistic talk. Despite its heavy use of such arguments, Religion and Atheism does not discuss recent work of Schlesinger and Swinburne which rebuts them (more on this below). The book treats fideism in its basically dead Wittgensteinian and Barthian forms; the sophisticated discussion of the proper basicality of theistic belief recently instigated by Platinga gets no mention. Nielsen thinks it obvious that Hume and Kant have overwhelmed rational theology (18, 37, 43, 224) and "contemporary atheistic arguments... are mopping up operations after the Enlightenment" (224). But his cursory treatment of the ontological argument speaks of "logical necessity" and "logically necessary beings" in ways which ignore twenty years' work in modal logic and its metaphysics (84, 119-120). Recent theistic arguments which apply these results are dismissed without discussion as "backward looking rear-guard operations of little cultural or intellectual significance" (29, n. 6). (Reliance on arguments of the Enlightenment and the 1950's is of course forward-looking.) Nielsen ignores recent debates over the coherence of various supposed divine attributes. He does, however offer at least one distinctively unimpressive foray into this field, informing us that talk of creation ex nihilo is unintelligible because creation is a form of final causality (85-86), that "the world" does not denote any thing, entity or aggregate which might be brought into existence (ibid.) and that "we have no idea of what it would be like for something to be done... for an action (e.g. creation) to occur without there being a body in motion" (86) (evidently I "logically" cannot think of thinking as something that I do without manipulating my brain). In short, not philosophy of religion but Nielsen is in the doldrums. One wonders at what audience this book aims. Its contents will be no news to philosophers. But it would be dubious reading for the general public, not just because of its lacunae and datedness but also because it devotes the bulk of its time to "philosophers' issues" and frequently backs substantive points by mere reference to arguments given in other works.

Nielsen's main lines of argument may be summarized as follows: "God" is a referring expression whose referent cannot be pointed out and so can only be taught via definite descriptions (16, 38, 48-49, 72, 83-84). These, however, give "no empirical foundation for what we are talking about" and so are "unintelligible" (16). Concepts of God, then, either are or are not concepts of possible objects of direct ostension. If they are, they are too anthropomorphic for it to be rational or unsuperstitious to believe that they are instanced; an anthropomorphic God is a "cosmic Mickey Mouse" (20, 27, 48). If they are not, they are concepts of a transcendent deity. But whatever is transcendent is necessarily incapable of being experienced (15-16, 45, 84, 92). Talk of experience-transcendent realities is in a strong sense incomprehensible (15-16, 20, 21, 26-27, 37, 41, 48-49, 70, 82, 116-117). As one cannot believe what one cannot understand, theism so construed is literally incredible (23-24, 41, 72, 94). (I give this welter of references to illustrate a further flaw of this book: it is repetitive). Given all this, the burden of proof in

the debate over theism is on the theist, who must justify remaining a theist (217–221). Attempts to dodge this burden by appeal to revelation are illicit. For there are many competing candidates for revelatory status, and the concept of revelation itself excludes the possibility of rational choice between them: to subject a body of belief to rational standards of appraisal is precisely to treat it as non-revealed (18, 47, 71, 225 and esp. 151–157).

These arguments are familiar. Still, let me offer some thoughts they inspire. The problems Nielsen raises about reference to God are quite like difficulties which some philosophers of mathematics find in reference to numbers (taken as abstract entities); much work touched off by Paul Benacerraf's 1973 essay "Mathematical Truth" suggests ways to allay Nielsen's doubts. Despite Nielsen's insistence, I just do not see any need so to construe God's transcendence of the world as to make of it a "logical ban" (19) on experience of God. Many articulations of the concept are available which have no such implications. To adapt a point of Thomas Morris', the concept of transcendence is open-textured. That is, if one reading of it has unwelcome entailments, the theist is free to try others.

In questioning the empirical significance of theistic talk, Nielsen wants to stop short of fullblown verificationism by confining his meaning-theoretic premises to a general "criterion of factual significance" for statements, namely its being "logically possible to state evidence for or against (a statement's) truth" (95). This given, it is surprising that Nielsen feels no need to dispute the attempts of Schlesinger and Swinburne to apply confirmation theory to theism. Granted, theists are not fond of specifying in advance something which they would consider able decisively to falsify statements like "God exists" or "God loves us." But it seems possible to follow Schelsinger and Swinburne and say that certain sorts of universe and features of universes are more in accord or less in accord with the empirical expectations which theism raises. If this is granted, then, even if theists do not hold to theism as to a decisively falsifiable hypothesis, they still hold it to be confirmable and discomfirmable. If so, theism is empirically significant by Nielsen's own criterion-unless, of course, by "confirmability" he means decisive falsifiability. If he does, we must note that it is far from clear that isolated statements of any sort, and even whole cosmological theories, are "decisively falsifiable" in this manner. The pictures of science, scientific method, and rational empirical inquiry with which such a "criterion of factual significance" would work, are at best crude, and indeed Nielsen seems uneasily aware that he will be too verificationist even for many who hold no brief for theism at all (8, 142).

Nielsen's burden of proof argument seems to me to ignore a crucial distinction, that between arguments that one should *become* a theist and arguments that one may *remain* a theist. For the former, the burden of proof clearly is on the theist. But this is because all assessments of where this burden falls rely (I think) on the notion of a starting point of *reflective equilibrium*, the possession of a more or less stable system of beliefs brought to the discussion. It seems reasonable to say that the burden of proof is on any party who seeks to disturb this equilibrium. If this is so, then even if Nielsen's case against theism were completely successful, he would still retain the burden of proof; the claim that the burden of proof lies on one who would retain his prior reflective equilibrium seems to me to be incoherent. (This is not to say that someone presented with arguments against his position is not bound on pain of irrationality either to rebut them or shift his ground.)

The concept of revelation which Nielsen attacks is basically Barth's. Barthians have indeed argued that to treat something as a revelation entails taking it as in some sense beyond rational critique. But almost any non-Barthian theologian would either reject this claim altogether or accept it only against the backdrop of a freedom which a recipient of revelation cannot but have when faced with a text taken to record revelation. The interpreting of even an authoritative text is an act in which human beings make of it what they will, guided by canons including those of philosophical reason. Barth has few disciples on the contemporary scene; many who once marched beneath his banner have moved into hermeneutical theology, precisely because they have realized that appeal to revelation cannot obviate the need for interpretation, and therefore

for critical reason. It is either naive or disingenuous to take one particular, extreme, and largely rejected view of revelation to "show" that accepting any belief as revealed must involve an abdication of rationality. Again, beliefs accepted qua revealed are a species of beliefs acquired on the basis of testimony. If there are rational standards for the winnowing of conflicting testimony which may or may not be about the same subject, it is far from clear that reason can do nothing with the clamor of competing religions which today's pluralistic culture presents.

Religion and Atheism also treats of divine command and Thomistic natural law theories of morality. Nielsen travesties the latter, in my opinion, but unfortunately so do many of the contemporary Thomists he cites. On the former, Nielsen argues at length that since being good is one of the requisites a candidate for the title "God" must satisfy, knowledge of, and ability to judge of the morally good must be logically prior to knowledge of God and God's will (110-114. 171-182). While the theological authors whom Nielsen cites do seem to have missed this obvious point, recent philosphical work on divine command theories grants it at the outset (cf. for instance Paul Helm's anthology on divine command theory and Philip Quinn's Divine Commands and Moral Requirements [Oxford, 1978]). Nielsen's arguments leave untouched the thesis that whatever one may hold of knowledge of God vis-à-vis knowledge of morality, still God is the ontological foundation of moral goodness-which is arguably most of what traditional divine command theorists have wanted to maintain. Nor does Nielsen explore the efforts of authors like Brody and Swinburne to show that even if knowledge of God is not the foundation of knowledge of morality tout court, still God's commands may be the foundation of a wide range of particular moral obligations, and knowledge of God's commands may be the foundation of our knowledge of these obligations.

To be fair, Nielsen's arguments raise important issues, and if the positions Nielsen discusses are often dead letters, often enough Nielsen has helped to make them so. But this book makes little or no new contribution to the philosophy of religion, and the older ones it records are well known. In addition, it is marred by numerous typos and lacks an index. This is, in short, a book without which almost any library will be complete.

Fordham University

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Summary of Integral Metaphysics

Frithjof Schuon

TO UNDERTAKE a survey of integral metaphysics is either a Herculean task or child's play. One thing is certain, and it is that universal Truth can be expounded in different ways, and diversity is even unavoidable, so long as one is situated in the world of forms, which is the world as such. This fact, however, cannot affect the doctrinal message as a whole, given that the purpose of a doctrine is not to reveal total knowledge by means of words, as profane philosophers think, but simply to offer points of reference providing access to this knowledge, with Heaven's help. Moreover—be it said in passing—an idea is not true because it can be proved, rather it can be proved because it is true; thus it is not possible to prove it except to those who are a priori receptive to its evidentness and hence to its signs, and who, therefore, are in harmony with their own substance. To know what transcends the senses is to remember something that one bears within oneself, according to Plato.

However that may be, it could rightly be asked what the use is of a new text summarizing things that have been said in many books by the same author; for one must not "kill the patient on account of the medicine." The answer is that the very need to write such a summary indicates its right to exist: that is, metaphysical truths are expressed dialectically so that they may be assimilated—not merely thought—and this interest or concern can make opportune formulations that, if not novel in every respect—which in any case would be impossible—nonetheless offer new keys for an in-depth assimilation. And it is for the reader to evaluate the subjective usefulness of these points of reference.

I. INITIAL DIMENSIONS

To begin with, it is necessary to start from the idea that the Supreme Reality is absolute, and being absolute, it is infinite. That is absolute which allows of no augmentation or diminution, or of no repetition or division; it is, therefore, that which is at once solely itself and totally itself. And that is infinite which is not determined by any limiting factor and which therefore does not end at any frontier; it is in the first place Potentiality or Possibility as such, and *ipso facto* the Possibility of things, hence Virtuality. Without All-Possibility, there would be neither Creator nor creation, neither *Maya* or *Samsara*.

The Infinite is, so to speak, the intrinsic dimension of plenitude, proper to the Absolute; to say Absolute is to say Infinite, the one being inconceivable without the other. We can symbolize the relation between these two aspects of Supreme Reality by the following images: in space, the absolute is the point, and the infinite is extension; in time, the absolute is the moment, and the infinite is duration. On the plane of matter, the absolute is ether—the primordial, underlying, and omnipresent substance—whereas the infinite is the indefinite series of substances; on the plane of form, the absolute is the

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sphere—the simple, perfect and primordial form—and the infinite is the indefinite series of more or less complex forms; finally, on the plane of number, the absolute will be unity or unicity, and the infinite will be the unlimited series of numbers or possible quantities, or totality.

The distinction between the Absolute and the Infinite expresses the two fundamental aspects of the Real, that of essentiality and that of potentiality; this is the highest principal prefiguration of the masculine and feminine poles. It is from the second aspect, the Infinite—which coincides with All-Possibility—that springs universal Radiation, thus both divine and cosmic *Maya*.

II. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD

The "Sovereign Good" is the First Cause inasmuch as it is revealed by phenomena that, precisely, we term "good," which is to say that the real and the good coincide. In effect, it is positive phenomena that attest to the Supreme Reality, and not negative, privative or subversive phenomena, which would be manifestations of nothingness, "if it existed," and yet which are its manifestations in a certain indirect and paradoxical respect in the sense that nothingness corresponds to a goal that is unrealizable but none-theless tending to be realized. Evil is the "possibility of the impossible," lacking which the Infinite would not be the Infinite; to ask why All-Possibility includes the possibility of its own negation—a possibility always begun anew but never fully actualized—is like asking why Existence is Existence, or why Being is Being.

If we, therefore, call the Supreme Principle the Good, *Agathon*, or if we say that it is the Sovereign Good that is the Absolute and hence the Infinite, it is not because we paradoxically limit the Real, but because we know that every good stems from it and manifests it essentially, and thus reveals its Nature. Assuredly it can be said that the Divinity is "beyond good and evil," but on condition of adding that this "beyond" is in its turn a "good" in the sense that it testifies to an Essence in which there could be no shadow of limitation or privation, and which consequently cannot but be the absolute Good or absolute Plenitude; all of which is perhaps difficult to explain, but not impossible to conceive.

The diversity of goods manifested in the world clearly has its source in a principial and archetypal diversity, the root of which is situated in the Supreme Principle itself; it is a question not only of the Divine Qualities, from which our virtues are derived, but also—in another respect—of aspects of the Divine Personality, from which our faculties are derived; we shall speak of this again below.

Still in connection with the reverberations of the aspects or modes of the Sovereign Good, there are also the relationships of Transcendence and Immanence to be considered, the first being connected more to the aspect of Absoluteness, and the second to that of Infinitude. According to the first relationship, God alone is the Good; He alone possesses, for example, the quality of beauty; compared to the divine Beauty, the beauty of a creature is nothing, just as existence itself is nothing next to Divine Being; all this from the point of view of Transcendence. The perspective of Immanence also starts from the axiom that God alone possesses both the qualities and reality; but its conclusion is positive and participative, and thus it will be said that the beauty of a creature—being beauty and not its contrary—is necessarily that of God, since there is no other; and the same is true for all the other qualities, without forgetting, at their basis, the miracle of existence. The perspective of Immanence does not nullify creaturely quali-

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ties, as does that of Transcendence, but on the contrary it divinizes them, if one may express it thus.

III. MYSTERY OF PROJECTION

All our preceding considerations evoke the question of the "why" of universal Manifestation, and secondarily, as a result of this question, the problem of evil. To answer the question of why there is a relativity, hence a *Maya*, and consequently a Manifestion, we may refer in the first place to an idea of Saint Augustine which we have mentioned more than once, namely that it is in the nature of the Good to want to communicate itself: to say Good is to say radiation, projection, unfolding, gift of self. But at the same time, to say radiation is to say becoming distant, hence alienation or impoverishment; the solar rays dim and become lost in the night of space. From this arises, at the end of the trajectory, the paradoxical phenomenon that is evil, which nonetheless has the positive function of highlighting the good *a contrario*, and of contributing in its fashion to equilibrium in the phenomenal order.

A remark concerning the divergence between the Aryan or Greco-Hindu idea of "universal Manifestation" and the Semitic or montheistic idea of "Creation" is called for here. The first idea refers to the world inasmuch as it results from an ontological necessity, that of radiation or of communication of the good, precisely; in other words, Maya springs from the Infinitude of the Supreme Principle; and to say Maya is to say samsara, the world of "transmigration." As for the Semitic idea of Creation, it refers to the world, considered not in its totality, but reduced to a single cycle and conceived as the effect of a single "free" act of God. In reality, the creation to which we belong is one cycle of universal manifestation, this manifestation being composed of an indefinite number of cycles that are "necessary" as regards their existence but "free" as regards their particularity. The Universe is a fabric woven of necessity and freedom, of mathematical rigor and musical play; every phenomenon participates in these two principles.

IV. UNIVERSAL DISTINCTIONS

The first distinction to be made in a complete doctrine is that between the Absolute and the relative, or between the Infinite and the finite; between Atma and Maya. The first term expresses a priori the single Essence, the Eckhartian "Godhead" (Gottheit), Beyond-Being; the "personal God" already pertains to Maya, of which He is the "relatively Absolute" summit, and in a certain sense He embraces the entire reign of relativity down to the extreme limit of the cosmogonic projection.

The second "qualitative" and "descending" distinction to be made is that between the Principle and Manifestation, God and the world. The Principle includes the Absolute and its reflection within relativity, Being or the personal God, precisely; the distinction here is that between the "pure Absolute" and the "relative Absolute," the latter being relative in relation to the Absolute as such, but absolute in relation to the world. As for Manifestation, it extends from the central reflection of the Principle—the Logos, the celestial, angelic and avataric world—to the peripheral, infra-celestial, purely "natural" and samsaric world.

A third distinction-synthesis to be made is that between "Heaven" and "earth," the latter word having to be taken in a symbolic or analogical sense: the celestial order includes, on the one hand the two "degrees" of the Principle itself, namely the "pure Ab-

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solute" and the Absolute colored by relativity, and on the other hand the Principle manifested at the center of the cosmos, the *Logos*; whereas the "earthly" order—whether it is a question of our earth or of other analogous worlds that necessarily remain unknown to us—is this purely "natural" world that we have mentioned above.

A fourth fundamental distinction situates the *Logos* at the center: on the one hand it is situated below the pure Absolute and above the "natural" and "profane" world, and on the other hand it combines the "celestial" and the "earthly"—or the "divine" and the "human"—owing to the fact that it includes the already relative dimension of the Principle as well as the manifestation of this Principle at the cosmic center. The *Logos* is the "uncreated Word"; it is "true man and true God."

All of this means that the total Universe comprises four fundamental degrees: the Principle as such, which is the "pure Absolute"; the Principle already included in Maya, which is God the Creator, Legislator and Savior; the Principle reflected in the created order, which is the "celestial" order, and also the Avatara; and the peripheral creation, which is purely "horizontal" and "natural." In other words: firstly, the Principle in itself; secondly, the prefiguration of Manifestation in the Principle; thirdly, the projection of the Principle in Manifestation; and fourthly, Manifestation in itself. This is to say that the line of demarcation changes place or level according to the perspective.

V. STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE

The relation between the Absolute and the relative—between *Atma* and *Maya* implies three situations or tendencies: firstly, conformity to the Principle, or the "upward" tendency; secondly, the expansive affirmation of possibilities, hence "horizontal"—or, if one prefers, "passional"—existence; and thirdly, non-conformity to the Principle, and thus the "downward" tendency, the illusory movement in the direction of a "nothingness" that is inexistent, obviously, but that is possible as a negative and subversive point of reference. These are the three *gunas* of the Hindu doctrine, which penetrate and regulate all that is created.

But there is not only this hierarchy of situations or tendencies, there is also in the Universe the diversifying manifestation of the positive possibilities included in the divine Potentiality: thus there is the complementarity between the active and passive functions, the masculine and feminine poles, as well as the faculties and qualities that we encounter everywhere in the world and that we ourselves possess to one degree or another. All the cosmic possibilities derive from these principles and their indefinitely diverse combinations.

To be more explicit, we will say: there is first of all, on "this" side of the one Substance—and in a sense as a reflection of the aspects "Absolute" and "Infinite"—the duality of the creative functions, or of the masculine and feminine poles; this is the duality "Activity-Passivity" from which are derived all the analogous functions at all levels of the Universe. Next, and also at all the universal levels—including the divine summit of Maya—there is the trinity of the divine and universal faculties: "Consciousness-Power-Love"; all the capacities of knowing, willing and loving derive from this trinity. After this trinity, in this series of numerical conceptualizations, comes the quaternity of the fundamental qualities, namely "Purity" or "Rigor," "Life" or "Gentleness," "Strength" or "Act," "Beauty" or "Goodness" or "Peace" or "Beatitude"; it is, analogically, the quaternity "Cold-Heat-Dryness-Humidity," to which correspond, moveover, the cardinal points.

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As we have seen, the trinity includes the faculties that are at once divine and creaturely: the capacities to know, to will and to love. In the Masonic ternary "Wisdom-Strength-Beauty," these faculties are expressed by their qualitative aspects: Wisdom is the content of knowledge; Strength is the virtue of will; Beauty is the ideal object of love. In the Vedantic trinity "Being-Consciousness-Bliss," the faculties are reduced to their ontologic essences; in a certain sense it is the ternary "Object-Subject-Union," the first element evoking will, the second, knowledge, and the third, love; the pole "Being," Sat, potentially contains "Power," whence its connection with will.1 Another Hindu Trinity-less fundamental than the preceding-is the Trimurti, the "Triple Manifestation": on the one hand, it is placed in relation with the three cosmic tendencies-the ascending, the expansive and the descending-in which case it represents a hierarchy or a "verticality"; on the other hand, and more directly, it pertains to the point of view of "horizontality," owing to the fact that it represents a system of quasi-equivalent and complementary terms. Shiva is comparable to the dark and descending tendency inasmuch as he negates and destroys; but he also pertains to the divine aspect Chit, "Consciousness"-or "Knowledge"-inasmuch as he reduces to ashes the "Great Illusion." Maha-Moha, and this represents an intrinsically positive function.

Let us summarize: the principial numbers—or the numerical symbols—are either "horizontal" or "vertical," according to whether they indicate either a differentiation, which is reflected at every universal level, or a projection, which penetrates into relativity. When the duality is horizontal, it expresses the "active" and "passive" poles; when it is vertical, it expresses the "absolute" and "relative" degrees, firstly in the Divine Order, and then in the cosmic order. When the trinity is horizontal it expresses the faculties, which *a priori* are divine; when it is vertical, it expresses the cosmic tendencies. Finally, when the quaternity is horizontal, it refers to the universal qualities; when it is vertical, it indicates the degrees of the Universe—the penetration into relativity—which we have described above.

Perfection and Projection; the whole structure of the Universe is expressed by these two words. The "horizontal" numbers relate to the polarizations of the Divine Perfection, and the "vertical" numbers to the degrees of the cosmogonic Projection.

A specification is called for here regarding the aspects of the Sovereign Good: there is no need to consider a trinity formed by the aspects "Good," "Absolute," "Infinite"; instead, what it is necessary to say is that the Sovereign Good is absolute and, therefore, that it is infinite. The Divine Good, by its very nature, "wills to communicate itself" or "to radiate," and this "will" is necessarily prefigured, if one may say so, in its intrinsic nature.

VI. TRUTH EQUALS WAY

According to a German proverb, "he who says A must say B" (Wer A sagt, muss B sagen), and this applies also, and even above all, to knowledge. The unicity of the Divine Object requires the totality of the human subject; this is the principle and the key of Sacred Doctrine, and it is what distinguishes it from profane philosophy, which may ask man to inflate himself, but will never ask him to surpass himself.

¹Let us note at this juncture that the Trinity which the Koran attributes to Christianity—the Father, the Son, the Virgin—is altogether logical in its way and corresponds to what we have just expounded; as for the Christian Trinity properly so called, the Holy Ghost represents, as does the Virgin, the mystery of Divine Love.

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The total exigency of Sacred Doctrine—of "theosophy" in the proper sense of the word—results from the fact that the specifically human intelligence is by definition capable of objectivity and transcendence and implies *ipso facto* the same capacity for the will and for the feeling soul; whence the freedom of our will and the moral instinct of our soul. And just as our intelligence is not fully human except through truths concerning God and our last ends, so too is our will not fully human except by its operative participation in these truths; and similarly, our soul is human only by its morality, its detachment and its magnanimity, hence also by its love of the Truth and the Way. To say that free will and moral sensibility are part of the intelligence of *homo sapiens*, means that there is no consequential and plenary metaphysical knowledge without the participation of these two faculties, the volitive and the affective; to know completely is to be. The circle of knowledge closes in our personality, in its death in God and in its life in God. And "where your treasure is, there will your heart be also."

Subject, Object, and Representation: A Critique of Hegel's Dialectic of Perception

Carl G. Vaught

TN THE PAST three decades, two radically different ways of interpreting Hegel's philosophical intentions have emerged in the critical literature. The first is selfconsciously conservative and is concerned primarily with the implications of Hegel's logic,1 while the second is implicitly revolutionary and is committed to the thesis that Hegel is an open-ended thinker who willingly embraces contingency as a fundamental dimension of the human situation.2 According to the first approach, the real Hegel is engaged in a quest for complete comprehension and produces the Science of the Experience of Consciousness as the first step in framing a comprehensive philosophical system.3 In addition, he is the one who asserts that the true is the Whole and that this Whole is to be identified with the structured process of its own articulation;4 who claims that the necessary progression and interconnection of the forms of consciousness will by themselves bring to pass the completion of the series;5 who insists that the goal of this process is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression;6 and who suggests that the logic which forms the dialectical superstructure of this process of development is what God himself was doing prior to the creation of the world.7 By contrast, the other Hegel is a finite thinker who places a romantic conception of Spirit at the center of his system;8 who acknowledges the limitations of any philosophical framework that comes upon the scene only at the falling of dusk;9 who speaks of the cunning of Reason and of a dialectical process that sometimes does its work behind our backs;10 and who makes his own "logical" intentions clear by including the category of contingency as an inescapable dimension of any dialectical articulation of the structure of thought or experience.11 If the first Hegel is a dialectical logician, I am tempted to claim that the second is a romantic existentialist, who prefers power to structure, and who

'Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. and ed. Allen Bloom (New York and London: Basic Books, 1969) and Stanley Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1974).

²J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 17, 79, 213-16, 309-10.

³Hegel's original description of the *Phenomenology* is instructive in this respect, for in his own account of the book he refers to it as the first volume in the *System of Science*. See Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: Reinterpretation*, *Texts*, and *Commentary* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 366.

⁴G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 11.

51bid., p. 50.

6Ibid., p. 51.

⁷Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 50.

⁸For a view of this sort, see John Burbridge's review of my recent book, *The Quest for Wholeness* (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1982) in *Man and World*, Vol. XVI (1983), 407-13.

⁹Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952), p. 13.

¹⁰Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 746 and Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 56.

¹¹Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, pp. 213-16, 309-10.

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could never be accused of attempting to bring the Western tradition to completion in philosophical terms.

It is not my intention in this paper to choose between these two versions of the Hegelian enterprise or to discuss some of the ways in which this distinction between the traditional and the revolutionary Hegel is related to the more familiar contrast between his right and left wing interpreters.¹² Instead, I want to focus on the central thesis which all these interpretations have in common, despite the radical differences that otherwise divide them. I have in mind the claim that Hegel's system transcends the subject-object opposition and that he attempts to move beyond representational discourse to a new way of thinking in which the subject and the object are subordinate elements in the larger process of dialectical reflection.13 The more traditional interpreters of Hegel are committed to this thesis, for the goal of complete comprehension can only be achieved if the opposition between subject and object, which defines preliminary stages of the process of cognition, can be transcended in the absolute standpoint. But those who defend an open-ended Hegel are committed to this position as well, for the willingness of Hegel to confront contingency presupposes a flexibility of categorial structure that undermines the structural rigidity of the subject-object opposition. In the first case, the quest for completeness drives us beyond the subject-object opposition toward dialectical unity, while in the second, the open-endedness of consciousness explodes the sheer externality of the subject-object relation as a structural matrix. In either case, the Hegelian transformation of Vorstellung into Denken attempts to move us beyond the subjectobject opposition to a new way of thinking. According to both views, the process of reflection is more fundamental than its terms, and this process requires the use of nonrepresentational discourse, whether it leads us to complete comprehension or simply to a way of knowing that can deal successfully with the unexpected contents it encounters.

There can be little doubt that Hegel attempts to transcend both the subject-object opposition and the representational discourse that expresses this external relation. As he says himself in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*,

The disparity which exists in consciousness between the 'I' and the substance which is its object is the distinction between them, the *negative* in general. This can be regarded as the *defect* of both, though it is their soul, or that which moves them. That is why some of the ancients conceived the *void* as the principle of motion, for they rightly saw the moving principle as the *negative*, though they did not as yet grasp that the negative is the self. Now, although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the 'I' and its object, it is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside of it, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. When it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of knowing and truth is overcome. Being is then absolutely mediated; it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the property of the 'I', it is self-like or the Notion.¹⁴

However, the crucial question about the status of the subject-object relation in Hegel and about the representational discourse that gives us access to it is not whether Hegel

¹²See Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought, trans. David E. Green (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967) for the classic study of Hegel's successors.

¹³Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 46-56.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

attempts to move beyond them, but whether he in fact succeeds in doing so. It is this crucial question, which is at once so fundamental for the Hegelian enterprise and so central for many strands of the contemporary philosophical situation, upon which I wish to focus my attention.

I

The best place to turn in order to discuss Hegel's attempt to transcend the subjectobject opposition is the perception section of the Phenomenology, for it is here that he focuses most clearly upon the subject's attempt to represent the object from an external point of view. Unfortunately, this section of the phenomenological odyssey, placed as it is between the well-known discussions of sense-certainty and understanding, has not received the attention it deserves. The dialectical transformation of particularity into universality in sense-certainty and the even more dramatic inversion of the world in Hegel's treatment of the understanding has perhaps obscured the importance of the dialectic of perception for the task at hand. However, we must not overlook the fact that the problem of perception constitutes the middle term in the development of consciousness. It is the place where universalilty and particularity meet explicitly for the first time, and it is the context where all the elements are first at hand for a detailed discussion of the problem of representation as an epistemic relation between subject and object. Thus, a careful consideration of this section will not only supplement the already familiar discussions of sense-certainty and the understanding, but will also allow us to focus upon what Hegel himself regards as the pivotal term upon which the entire examination of the development of consciousness depends.15 More fundamentally, an examination of this section will allow us to raise the central questions about Hegel's attempt to transcend the subject-object opposition and will provide the framework in which we can begin to develop a critique of Hegel's entire dialectical enterprise.

At the beginning of his analysis of perceptual consciousness, Hegel assumes that to perceive an object means to apprehend it truly. However, since truth is impossible apart from the presence of universality, he also assumes that universality is the essence of perception as a cognitive activity. Unlike sense-certainty, which attempts to begin with the particularity of what is given, perception begins with the apprehension of the given as an intelligible unity. Yet Hegel also claims that what is most important about perception is that the subject and the object belong together in cognitive interaction and that as a consequence, these two poles are merely abstractable aspects of the process of perception understood as a unified activity. As he formulates the point in characterizing his phenomenological method:

Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists for consciousness; and the determinate aspect of this relating, or of the being of something for consciousness, is knowing.

...Consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. Since both are *for* the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison; it is for this same consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object cor-

16Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 67.

¹⁵For Hegel's discussion of the central role of the syllogism and the importance of the middle term in it, see *lbid*, p. 145 and *Hegel's Science of Logic*, p. 165.

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responds to the object or not. The object, it is true, seems only to be for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it; it seems that consciousness cannot, as it were, get behind the object as it exists for consciousness so as to examine what the object is *in itself*, and hence, too, cannot test its own knowledge by that standard. But the distinction between the in-itself and knowledge is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is *for it* the *in-itself*; and knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is, *for it*, another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination rests.¹⁷

Having suggested, however, that the activity of consciousness is the fundamental term and that both the knower and the known are merely abstractable elements of it, Hegel begins his analysis of perception from the standpoint of the object, for as he says on more than one occasion, consciousness always assumes that the object of knowledge is more fundamental than knowing itself. Thus, the first step in Hegel's analysis of perceptual consciousness can apparently be assimilated to the familiar view that perception is an intentional act and that it ultimately depends upon the object of consciousness that stands in contrast with it.

Beginning from the standpoint of the object, Hegel claims that the object of perception is a thing with many properties. Yet he quickly reminds us that though these properties are sensuously given, they are also to be understood as a cluster of universal characteristics. As a result, the object of perception displays from the outset the universality required to make it intelligible to the cognitive consciousness. Hegel says that each of these universals is self-identical and indifferent to all the others, but he also says that each exists together with the others in a universal medium that comprises the intelligible dimension of things understood as particular entities. An object is what it is because it presupposes a cluster of abstract characteristics which constitutes a realm of its own, bound together by the fact that they are the intelligible ground in terms of which things within the world are to be understood. Of course, each universal characteristic can be sensuously given in the real order, and as such, it will become the intersection of a plurality of universal properties. For example, salt located at a particular place is white and tart and also cubical. However, these properties that overlap experientially remain distinct in conceptual content, suggesting once more that they have a place in an abstract universal medium in which they constitute the intelligible nature of the thing in which they all converge. Any property upon which we focus our attention is thus a sensuously given element that is also intelligible, and this dimension of intelligibility is mediated by the abstract universals it presupposes as the ground of perceptual consciousness.19

Yet Hegel also insists that there is a second dimension of the issue that must be understood if we are to give a satisfactory account of the determinate unity of an object of consciousness. He says that if properties are to be the ground of sensuously given contents, each of which is distinct from all the others, they must not only exist together in an abstract, universal medium, but must also differentiate themselves from one another as a cluster of abstract entities. As Hegel formulates the point in his own baroque and sometimes paralyzing style, the abstract medium in which properties exist as universal characteristics is not:

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 52-54.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 59, 67.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 67-69.

an indifferent unity, but a *One* as well, a unity which *excludes* an other. The One is the *moment of negation*; it is itself quite simply a relation of self to self and it excludes an other; and it is that by which 'thinghood' is determined as a thing. Negation is inherent in a property as a *determinateness* which is immediately one with the immediacy of being, an immediacy which, through this unity with negation, is universality. As a One, however, the determinateness is set free from this unity with its opposite, and exists in and for itself.²⁰

In a somewhat more straightforward formulation, the universals that make objects intelligible are not merely universal, but individual as well, standing out from the larger context in which they are embedded as a set of individuated elements. Thus Hegel claims that objects not only exist as individuated things in contrast with the universals that make them intelligible, but that these universals are also individuated as elements of the universal medium in which they occur.

Having made this distinction between two dimensions of the universal medium that make objects intelligible, Hegel summarizes the stages of the development of perceptual consciousness as it comes to focus on an object of cognition. First, he claims that perceptual objects presuppose a domain of universal characteristics in terms of which particular things are to be understood. It is this cluster of abstract universals that allows perception to grasp the truth about an object and that permits it to be defined as an act that takes things truly. Hegel insists, however, that objects of consciousness would not exist unless they were determinate, and that this in turn presupposes that their determinate characteristics are both distinct and distinguishable from all the others with which they can be compared. Thus, a property displayed by a particular thing must exclude all others if it is to present itself as an intelligible unity. Finally, Hegel suggests that the many properties that can be distinguished may be regarded as determinate unifications of universality and particularity, for each property is both universal and sensuous at the same time. As a result, he concludes that sensuous universality is a synthesis of the first two stages and that it binds universality and particularity together in the object of perception. Hegel also claims that the analysis of the object is completed in this series of stages and that consciousness should simply observe what is given in this three-fold form without adding any contribution of its own. In fact, if the observer added anything, he would introduce a distortion in the object that would disrupt the natural development of consciousness as dependent upon it. Hegel therefore expects the perceptual consciousness to conclude that its object is a dialectical unity and that any errors introduced in the process of perception will be of its own making.21

II

At a number of places in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel distinguishes between two perspectives from which his dialectical discussion of the experience of consciousness can be understood. The first is the point of view of the philosopher who simply observes the phenomenological process, knowing in advance that both the subject and the object of experience are abstractable aspects of a more fundamental process of development. This is the point of view of the phenomenological "we," whose participation in the inquiry Hegel characterizes in some detail at the beginning of his introduction.²² How-

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²⁰ Ibid., p. 69.

²¹Ibid., pp. 69-70.

²²Ibid., pp. 55-56.

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ever, there is a second perspective on the discussion which the nonphilosophical consciousness adopts and in which the subject assumes that a radical distinction obtains between subject and object.²³ In order to approach the problem of perception from both perspectives, Hegel therefore turns to the standpoint of the natural consciousness and begins to examine the dialectic of perception from this second point of view. At the beginning of this stage of his argument, however, Hegel tells us explicitly that contradictions will arise in the course of the discussion which will finally drive the natural consciousness to embrace the analysis of perception given already from the philosophical perspective of his earlier analysis. This second stage of the argument is therefore intended to make it clear that the contrast between subject and object cannot ultimately be maintained and that both poles of the subject-object relation must be reinterpreted as aspects of a larger dialectical unity. Given our own intention to develop a critique of Hegel's attempt to move beyond the subject-object opposition, this is therefore the most important section of his presentation for appraising the validity of his dialectical procedure.

In developing the contradictions between subject and object as the experiencing consciousness undergoes them, Hegel claims that the object of consciousness first presents itself as a unity and that it appears as an individuated thing in contrast with the knower. However, since this unified object is intelligible only in terms of properties that transcend the individual, he also says that consciousness is apparently mistaken in taking this object as a unique individual. Instead, the universality of its properties, which have meaning only in relation to others, suggests that the thing itself is a community of general features bound together in a universal nexus. In this way, the original individuality of the object is displaced by a thing understood as a cluster of abstract characteristics. On the other hand, since each property that this cluster displays is determinate and is thus opposed to all the others, it is tempting to conclude that what is really fundamental about a set of properties is not the community that binds them together, but the differences that hold them apart. As a result, the unified cluster of general features breaks up into a plurality of properties that exist in contrast with one another. When we focus on these properties, we find that they are mutually indifferent to one another and that they constitute a universal medium of elements that are both universal and determinate at the same time. Yet this means that what I perceive is neither a purely universal medium nor a determinate set of properties that stand in contrast with one another, but merely a property as such which is neither purely universal nor purely individual. In fact, Hegel concludes that because the content of our apprehension is neither merely universal nor absolutely particular, what we apprehend is sensuous being as such, prior to its articulation into universal and particular dimensions. But this implies that the properties which were embedded originally within the object and were subsequently distinguished both from it and from one another now collapse into the unity of an undifferentiated continuum. As a result, Hegel claims that the dialectical transition from the original unity of the object to a plurality of properties that are both universal and individual finally leads us back to the object of perception understood as an unarticulated totality.²⁴

At this stage of his discussion, Hegel tells us that if the contradictions of perception are to be overcome, the subject of the perceptual process must now take the responsibility for drawing the distinction between simple apprehension and perceptual consciousness. Moreover, he says that since diversity can no longer be found in the object as a

²³Ibid., pp. 55-56, 70.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 70-71.

sensuous being prior to conceptual articulation, consciousness quite naturally assumes that it is the source of differences and that the properties of the object are to be found in the subject as distinct perceptual qualities. In this way, consciousness takes the dimension of difference that was once attributed to the object to be an aspect of its own activity. On the other hand, Hegel reminds us that if the objects which the subject encounters are to be really distinct from one another, they must be determinate, and that as a result, the properties which make them determinate must be found in these objects after all. But if diversity is to be attributed once more to the object, where is the unity it displaces to be located? Presumably, the subject must now become the source of unity, which in Kantian terms simply means that it becomes the transcendental ego, while the transcendental unity of apperception is the unifying factor for a set of determinate properties that would otherwise split apart into a fragmented plurality. For example, consciousness claims that the object is white, tart, and cubical, but that in so far as it is white, it is not tart, and in so far as it is tart, it is not cubical. In this way, the synthetic activity of consciousness introduces the "in so far as" as a device for binding the diversity of the object together into a transcendental unity.

When the philosophical observer reflects upon the experience of consciousness as it is entangled in this web of dialectical transitions, he can see that consciousness alternately makes itself and the object it confronts into a one and a many. This, however, means that unity and diversity are to be found in both the subject and the object and that as a result, the object does not simply stand in contrast with the subject as a merely apprehended unity. Quite to the contrary, the object proves itself to be just as dialectical as consciousness, leading us from unity to diversity to unity again, while the subject moves from diversity to unity in the attempt to bind a real plurality of properties together into a transcendental synthesis. Yet the philosophical importance of this dialectical complexity emerges only when Hegel tells us that it collapses the original distinction between the subject and the object and that the true object is the entire dialectical development that has previously been parceled out between the subject and the object respectively. Hegel claims that if both the subject and the object display the same dialectical development, they cannot be distinguished from one another as separate entities that stand in contrast in perceptual experience. Instead, he says that the real truth of the dialectic of perception is to be found in the dialectical interplay between subject and object, and that these terms are merely abstractable aspects of the experience of consciousness understood as a larger, more inclusive unity.25

Before he concludes his analysis of the dialectic of perception, Hegel tells us that the perceptual consciousness has one last device to employ in attempting to preserve the subject-object distinction as the natural, unphilosophical consciousness understands it. He says that in seeking to avoid a dialectical characterization of the object, consciousness once more assumes responsibility for the dimension of diversity to be found in the thing and says that in so far as the object displays a dimension of difference, it is not a unity. Since oneness, however, is also to be found in the object, and since it differs from diversity, Hegel claims that these elements must be distinguished and that consciousness attempts to make this distinction by distributing the dimensions of diversity and unity to different things. Consciousness itself then asserts that this concrete plurality of things displays both unity and difference, and that both these dimensions fall outside consciousness in a real plurality of things taken in themselves.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 71-74.

In giving an analysis of this cluster of independent entities, Hegel first suggests that each of these objects is essentially different from every other, and that its simple unity is necessary for the object in question to be just the thing it is. Of course, Hegel admits that there is a manifold of differences internal to the object, but he says that this manifold is inessential in comparison with the more important fact that the object differs in principle from all other things. Thus, he claims that unity is essential to a thing; that its absolute uniqueness keeps its apart from other things; and that though internal differences are to be found within the thing, these differences are merely secondary and inessential aspects of its existence as a unified being. Hgel also insists that even here contradictions arise, for as an individual thing attempts to maintain its independence, it can be an absolute unity only if it remains unrelated to other things. And if it is related after all, as it clearly must be if it is to be intelligible, it ceases to exist simply on its own. Yet this fact finally negates the independence of the thing, suggesting that its essential being is not to be found in separation from others, but precisely in the relations that bind them together. However, this means that the dialectical dimension has now reasserted itself, and that relation to others which was first regarded as inessential is now an essential dimension of the thing, while the independence of the thing has vanished into the tissue of relations in which it stands to other things. Thus, the last attempt of perceptual consciousness to preserve the independence of the object collapses,26 leaving the natural consciousness with only two alternatives. On the one hand, it can return to the beginning of its dialectical development and simply repeat the process, emphasizing now one and then another dimension of its fruitless quest for unity. In this way, perception would remain imprisoned in its contradictions, simply recapitulating them as symptoms of its incapacity to understand its own nature. On the other hand, it can disavow what Hegel calls this "whirling circle" of abstractions and attempt to move beyond the inferno of perceptual consciousness to the dialectical stability of philosophy where these abstractions can be mastered.27 It is this quest for mastery that finally defines Hegel's project and that drives him beyond the opposition of consciousness which is to be found at the center of the dialectic of perception.

III

As many of Hegel's recent interpreters have insisted, his version of the dialectical process is a rich and powerful account of human experience and is not to be reduced to the abstract structure that was so often embraced by his British and American successors.²⁸ However, it is also true that at a number of places in both the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* Hegel uses arguments that are typically idealistic in structure to make possible some of his most important dialectical transitions. This is indeed the case in the discussion of the perceptual consciousness we have just undertaken, for in the course of his argument Hegel tacitly employs the principle of the identity of indiscernibles and the doctrine of internal relations in order to establish his claim that the subject-object opposition can be transcended.²⁹ It is these arguments as Hegel employs them that I shall focus on in this concluding section, for unless he is justified in employing them at the crucial junctures in which they occur, the dialectic of perception will collapse and

²⁶Ibid., pp. 74-76.

²⁷Ibid., p. 79.

²⁸See, e.g., J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, pp. 17-18.

²⁹Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 74-76.

will make it necessary for us to reappraise the subject-object relation as definitive of the nature of perceptual consciousness. Thus, in what follows the crucial question that must be considered is this: "Is Hegel correct in claiming that the contradictions to be found in perceptual consciousness drive us beyond the subject-object opposition to a new way of thinking, or are Hegel's own arguments that this is the case subject to a refutation of their own?"

Before we turn directly to this question, one important fact to notice about the dialectic of perception is that it leads us through a series of theoretical positions about the nature of perception that are a familiar part of the philosophical tradition, however unfamiliar Hegel's dialectical examination of these views might be. Naive realism, Platonism, Lockeanism, and Kantianism all appear as moments of Hegel's systematic account, bound together in the larger unity of his own dialectical discussion of the perceptual consciousness. But in appraising Hegel's philosophical account of the dialectic of perception, the most important point to notice is the mistaken conclusions to which he comes by using arguments that are characteristic of his idealistic predecessors. At a crucial stage in his discussion of the nature of perception, Hegel claims that because the subject and the object undergo the same dialectical development, they are indiscernible, and as a result, he collapses both subject and object into one another as merely different ways of expressing an identical dialectical process. The identity of indiscernibles therefore lies at the foundation of Hegel's attempt to transcend the subject-object opposition and is the typical idealistic presupposition upon which this crucial stage of his own dialectical position depends. Moreover, when Hegel turns to a consideration of the objects of perception as a plurality of objective contents that are both separate and related, he suggests that the relations in which they stand cancel their autonomy and that the relation of difference by which separate things are distinguished in fact binds them together into a universal nexus. Of course, this familiar argument is again typical of the idealistic tradition and is the ground in terms of which the separation between one object and another is cancelled in larger unity of a system of merely internal relations.

But what precisely is mistaken about these arguments, and how does a rejection of them serve to undermine Hegel's account of the dialectic of perception? More fundamentally, if these arguments are rejected, what is the form of the subject-object relation that must be embraced, and how is it to be related to the dialectical attempt to move us beyond it to a new and more powerful way of thinking? Perhaps the clearest way to respond to these questions as they first pertain to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is to indicate that in his discussion of the perceptual consciousness, Hegel ignores the order in which the dialectical transitions occur within the subject and the object respectively. As a result, he conflates these two poles at the level of conceptual content, while failing to acknowledge the crucial difference of vector directionality that distinguishes them and that will always hold these two dimensions of perceptual experience apart. In the particular dialectical transitions we have considered, the object moves from its original unity into a plurality of properties before it collapses into the original sensuous unity with which it begins, while the subject moves from its original diversity into a unity of properties before it collapses into the undifferentiated unity which Hegel then identifies with the unity to be found in the object. Yet this means that the subject and the object traverse different paths in their dialectical development, one beginning with unity and the other beginning with difference, while the object moves toward difference as the subject moves toward unity. As a result, however much these two poles

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might be identical in conceptual content, they are not identical in directional orientation, and it is this vector difference that finally holds them apart as really distinct dimensions of the perceptual process. In collapsing subject and object into one another, Hegel ignores the directional differences displayed by the development of the subject and the object, overriding in this fashion the irreducible moment of difference that lies at the center of perception as a process of cognition. Formulated in somewhat different terms, Hegel uses the identity of indiscernibles to argue for the identity of subject and object at the level of conceptual content, but in doing so, he ignores the irreducible moment of difference to which the equally important concept of vector directionality calls our attention.

At one juncture Hegel himself seems to acknowledge the crucial distinction, for having pointed out that the act of perceiving and the object perceived are the same, he says:

In essence the object is the same as the movement: the movement is the unfolding and differentiation of the two moments, and the object is the apprehended togetherness of the moments.³⁰

Of course, this is to suggest once more that the conceptual content of the two poles is identical and to imply that the subject and the object can therefore be collapsed into one another as an undifferentiated unity. However, this same passage suggests that the analytic moment of unfolding and differentiation is clearly to be distinguished from the synthetic moment of apprehended togetherness with respect to directional orientation. But if this is so, and unless it can be shown that vector directionality is reducible to structural content, Hegel will never be able to demonstrate that the subject and the object ultimately dissolve into one another in the process of cognition. In fact, just the opposite is the case, since the vector differences displayed by the development of subject and object hold them apart in a mirror-image relation that can never be canceled out by structural considerations alone. The development of the object from unity to diversity (analysis) and the corresponding development of the subject from diversity to unity (synthesis) are similarities that bind the knower and the known together, but they are also differences that allow these terms to remain separate as really distinct terms in the unfolding process of cognition. Thus, even if an appeal to the identity of indiscernibles can succeed in reducing two terms to one another with respect to conceptual content, this principle can never override the vector differences displayed by the subject and the object in the developmnt of perceptual consciousness. As a result, these two terms reemerge in contrast with one another, and the opposition of consciousness which Hegel so persistently attempted to transcend must therefore be reinstated.

But if Hegel is mistaken in his application of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, what can be said about his use of internal relations to override the differences between two objects of consciousness that attempt to preserve their own integrity as unique individuals? This question shifts the discussion from the subject-object relation to the relation between two or more independent objects of consciousness, and in doing so, it confronts us with the problem of the One and the Many in one of its most traditional forms. As Hegel formulates this familiar problem, the first object is a One in contrast with a Many, but since it is what it is only by contrast with the others, the One is not simply an independent entity, but also depends for its integrity upon the relations in which it stands with whatever else there is. As a result, these relations are definitive of

the thing, and what began as an independent entity ends as a term in a relational network of other terms which define the very being of the thing in question. Once more Hegel attempts to override the externality of dualistic opposition, this time by employing a set of internal relations to undermine the apparent externality that holds a pair of objects apart as independent entities. In the course of his argument, however, Hegel overlooks once more the crucial distinction between conceptual content and vector directionality, mistakenly suggesting that they collapse into one another as terms on the same logical level. In order to discuss this issue in the most perspicuous fashion, let us return to Hegel's own presentation, noting in particular the *order* in which the dialectical transitions unfold as an interplay between two or more objects of consciousness.

If we begin with an initial object, what is essential to it is its own independence, and this independence can first be expressed by the vector orientation of the thing within the real order as a spatio-temporal continuum. At the outset, a thing is what it is because it occupies a determinate region in which it is oriented both spatially and temporally. In addition, the thing displays a set of properties in terms of which its structure can be articulated, but these properties are inessential when they are compared with the original vector orientation that allows the thing to be what it is. Of course, as oriented in space and time, the original individual is related to other things, not only in sharing properties with them, but also by being at a different but connected spatio-temporal region. As a result, there are two levels of relation that a thing bears to other individuals: first, it is related to them by the nexus of properties it displays; and in the second place, it is related as well by the spatio-temporal framework that binds the thing together with others as elements of the real order. But since both are relations, and since Hegel assumes that the thing could not be what it is apart from relations of both kinds, he concludes that both are essential to the thing and that the original entity thus dissolves into a tissue of interconnections that cancels its alleged independence. The One with which we began disappears into the Many upon which it depends, and the truth of perception becomes once more the dialectical interplay between two or more elements that were originally held apart in absolute opposition.31 In this way, the opposition of consciousness is cancelled again, and the truth of perception becomes accessible only to a way of thinking that moves beyond the externality of representation to the larger unity of dialectical articulation.

There is of course a sense in which the spatio-temporal network in which individuals stand is just as relational as the network of abstract characteristics that a thing displays in contrast with others. And if this were all that could be said about the matter, Hegel would have succeeded in moving beyond the externality that might first appear to hold the objects of consciousness apart. However, it is important to notice that an object of consciousness is *first* oriented in space and time, and *then* related to other things, and that unless these two moments could be distinguished, there would be no object in the first instance with respect to which we could raise the problem of the One and the Many which leads to its typically dialectical results. But if this is so, *order* once more proves to be an essential ingredient in the discussion, and an ingredient that must not be overriden if the problem of the One and the Many is to be posed for reflective consideration. The importance of the concept of order in this context becomes clear when we notice that when a second object is related to the first, what is *first* for it is its own vector orientation, and what is *second* is the relational network in which it stands in interconnection with others. This means, however, that what is *first* for object₂ is *second* for


³¹ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

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
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object₁ and what is *first* for object₁ is *second* for object₂. Thus, it is again the dimension of order that serves to keep these terms apart, even though they also stand together in a larger spatio-temporal framework. The classical example of this kind of situation is expressed most clearly in the case of asymmetrical relations. The relations, aRb and bRa, contain the same constituents from an abstract point of view, but these relations can nevertheless be distinguished from one another when the order of their terms is taken into account.³² Thus, aRb and bRa are identical with one another in conceptual content, but are also different in the order of their terms, and it is once more this crucial difference of orientation that holds them apart as really distinct elements of the real order.

In summary, then, we can draw the following conclusions about Hegel's dialectic of perception and about the validity of the typically idealistic arguments upon which it rests. First, Hegel is mistaken in collapsing the subject and the object of perceptual consciousness into one another, and this mistake hinges on a mistaken application of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles which ignores the order of development displayed by the subject and the object in the course of dialectical reflection. The object moves from unity to diversity, while the subject moves from diversity to unity. In doing so, they are bound together by conceptual content, but are held apart by directional difference. In the second place, Hegel is also mistaken in using the argument from internal relations to collapse two distinguishable objects into terms in a larger relational network. This argument assimilates spatio-temporal differences to abstractly conceptual differences, and having done so, reduces an independent entity to a function of the relational network in which it stands. What Hegel fails to acknowledge, however, is that the thing with many properties is first oriented in space and time and then related to other elements within a spatio-temporal nexus, and that this order in the thing is essential for preserving its integrity in its encounters with others, and even for posing the problem of the One and the Many for reflective consideration. Finally, the subject-object matrix as a mirroring relation, which can be pictured in the following way,



is reflected at the level of two or more objects in the fact that what is one for a given object is many for another, and that what is one for another is many for the first. Thus, the original subject-object relation can be ramified to display an even more complex universe, where the subject is related to two or more objects of perceptual consciousness at the same time.



In both cases, the key for drawing the relevant distinctions is the difference between conceptual content and vector directionality as this difference is expressed in a set of mirroring relations that are non-dialectical in character.

Yet before we turn away from Hegel altogether, it is important to acknowledge the fact that he is correct in pointing out the dialectical complexity of the subject, the object, and a plurality of objects, and in insisting that the content of these terms is identical from an abstract point of view. This is the permanent truth in absolute idealism and the ground from which its recurrent fascination springs. In its own terms, an object is not simply a one, but also a many, and in this respect, it is a perfect reflection of the dialectical complexity of the corresponding subject. Once more, however, the crucial point to notice is the dimension of vector difference that serves to hold both the subject and the object apart as distinct entities in the real order. This single fact re-introduces the truth of philosophical realism into an original idealistic framework; stops the flow of the dialectical process to give each term in the subject-object relation an independent place to stand; and is the framework in terms of which the entire Hegelian enterprise ought to be re-evaluated. And this is true, whether one stands on the left or on the right, and whether one embraces the traditional interpretation of Hegel as a dialectical logician, or the more open-ended account of Hegel's intentions that is becoming an increasingly dominant dimension of the contemporary philosophical situation.

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Scriptural Pragmatism: Jewish Philosophy's Concept of Truth¹

Peter Ochs

In HEBREW SCRIPTURES, in rabbinic literature and for most Jewish thinkers, "truth" (emet) is a character of personal relationships. Truth is fidelity to one's word, keeping promises, saying with the lips what one says in one's heart, bearing witness to what one has seen. Truth is the bond of trust between persons and between God and Humanity. In Western philosophic tradition, however, truth is a character of the claims people make about the world they experience: the correspondence between a statement and the object it describes, or the coherence of a statement with what we already know about the world.

As if divided by their dual allegiance to the traditions of Jerusalem and of Athens, Jewish philosophers often believe themselves forced to choose between the two meanings of truth, producing what we may call objectivist and personalist trends in Jewish thought.

Before the time of Descartes, the objectivists tend to be Aristotelians. They identify the created world of Scripture with the finite cosmos of Hellenistic philosophy and the spoken-words of Creation with the natural laws of the cosmos (logoi). They argue that the laws of personal relationship, revealed in the Torah, are particular instances of natural law and that, therefore, the religious conception of truth as fidelity is derivative of the philosophic conception of truth as correspondence to the natural world. Saadia Gaon exemplifies this approach, arguing that prophecy was necessary only to specify how Israel would enact the rational laws of the Torah.2 While the greatest of the Aristotelians, Maimonides, so emphasizes the dichotomy between moral and natural laws that he prefigures some of the argumentation of the modern, or post-Cartesian objectivists. In his Guide, Maimonides claims that Adam's original intellect gave him the power to distinguish truth and falsehood (scientific knowledge), which degenerated, through his corporeal inclinations, into a power to distinguish good and evil (merely moral knowledge).3 This suggests that the revealed laws of personal relationship may serve conventional, moral functions which the philosopher considers secondary to the task of uncovering cosmic truths. Pushing this dichotomy one crucial step further, Spinoza introduces modernity into Jewish thought: identifying the Torah with religion and thereby separating the conventional functions of Torah from the pursuit of scientific knowledge

¹Originally prepared for *A Handbook of Jewish Theology*, edd. A. Cohan and P. Mendes-Flohr (New York: Scribner's), forthcoming.

²See Saadia Gaon, *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions*, S. Rosenblatt, trans. (New Haven: Yale Univ., 1948) passim.

³The Guide of the Perplexed, Part I. Ch. 2, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969): Pp. 24-5.

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of the natural world.⁴ Modernity imposes on modern Jewish thinkers the burden of proving that Judaism, as a distinct faith, offers anything more than a collection of particular, conventional rules of behavior.

Personalists tend to defend the faiths of Israel against what they consider the corrosive effects of philosophic criticism. Their arguments are often political as well as philosophic: grounded in the observation that philosophers may condemn Jewish particularity in favor of a professed universalism that actually serves the political or economic interests of competing social groups. They argue that truth is not correspondence between a statement and the world, but between a statement and the intentions of the person who uttered it. Yehuda Halevi, for example, argues that the truths of philosophic reasoning are merely hypothetical, or relative to the conditions of knowing which give rise to them.⁵ They are reliable only when the philosopher controls those conditions: for example, in mathematics. In natural science and for moral knowledge, however, certainty is acquired only through experience: the experience of the senses and, ultimately, direct experience of God, in mystical life and prophecy. These experiences appear only within the particularity of Jewish history and are recorded only within Jewish tradition.

In appearance a traditionalist, the personalist draws on neo-Platonic sources which eventually exert a radicalizing influence. From Al-Ghazali to Bruno and Descartes, the neo-Platonic tradition exhibits increasing distrust of mediated knowledge and a pre-occupation with cognition and epistemology, as opposed to tradition and hermeneutic. For Western and Jewish philosophers, the effect is to unite personalists and objectivists in the vain search for non-traditional foundations which has characterized modern thought until the twentieth century.

For students of Wittgenstein, "foundationalism" is the attempt to discover rational foundations for rational inquiry. In practice, that definition is too restrictive. Since humans always seek reliable premises for action, foundationalism may be defined more broadly as the human response to a loss of trust in traditional systems of behavior. The Athenian philosophers mistrusted mythological traditions, but soon replaced them with traditions of rational inquiry grounded in the moral universe of the Athenian polis. On certain issues, the Jewish Aristotelians and neo-Platonists replaced trust in rabbinic authority with trust in the Athenian traditions. The technological revolutions of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, however, and the socio-political revolutions of the Reformation and the new industrial age, encouraged mistrust of all finite systems of knowledge and behavior, Athenian as well as rabbinic or Scriptural. If most Jews were insulated from that mistrust until Emancipation, Jewish philosophers knew it even before Spinoza. Cresca's personalism and Luria's kabbalah may be seen as attempts to protect Israel's faith against the corrosions of European skepticism.

⁴Benedict de Spinoza, *A Theological-Political Treatise*, trans. R. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1951) passim, esp. Ch. XIII-XV.

⁵Judah Halevi, *The Kuzari*, trans. H. Hirshfeld (New York: Schocken, 1964).

⁶As Richard Bernstein puts it, "Descartes' *Meditations* is the *locus classicus* in modern philosophy for the metaphor of the 'foundation' and for the conviction that the philosopher's quest is to search for an Archimedean point upon which we can ground our knowledge" (from *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1983) p. 16.

⁷See Hasdai Crescas, *Or Adonai* ("Light of the Lord") described in H.A. Wolfson, *Cresca's Critique of Aristotle* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ., 1971); and, for introduction to the Kabbalah of Isaac Luria (Ha-Ari), Gershom Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, Ch. 7 (New York: Schocken, 1954).

In the context of modernity, neither personalism nor objectivism offers lasting protection against skepticism. Each contributes to an untenable dichotomy between world and personhood and, thus, a confusion of the *object* and *ground* of truth.

Truth is not an everyday concern. We go about our daily business trusting that whatever the past has taught us about the world will continue to work in the future. If curiosity stimulates our investigating things in the world we have not yet seen, it is not because we seek to "know the truth." We simply want to discover more instances of what we already know, reconfirming and deepening our convictions. The pursuit of truth is a signal that something has gone wrong: that the world is not behaving according to our expectations. We find ourselves unable to conduct daily affairs and, at least momentarily, have lost faith in our ability to act in the world. The pursuit of truth is an effort to recover that faith. The simple object of this pursuit, the *object of truth*, is the world. We want to recover knowledge of an environment that suddenly seems beyond our control. Certainty about the world, however, is always grounded in a prior trust of the persons who have taught us what the world is and how to act in it. We want first, therefore, to recover the *ground of truth*, which is trust in persons and in the knowledge they provide us. The pursuit of truth is the effort to recover ground and unite it with object.

Personalists and objectivists err by devoting exclusive attention to either ground or object. Objectivists declare that truth lies in the world, that is, that we may solve our problems by examining our environments. The world is mute, however, until interpreted by a system of knowledge, and we have no interest in such systems until we gain trust in the persons who teach it. Personalists declare that truth lies in fidelity to such persons and trust in what they teach. We would not care about truth, however, if we did not have reason to doubt our teachers; knowledge is meaningless independent of its application to experience.

Since the nineteenth century, Jewish thinkers have looked to the critical philosophy of Immanual Kant as a way out of the dialectic of personalism and objectivism. Kant is aware that the dialectic is ill-founded and devotes his work to overcoming the separation of the ground and object of truth. Unfortunately, his efforts remain within the framework of a neo-Platonic personalism. No matter how earnestly his disciples desire contact with the objective world, they understand that world only as a modality of human personality: an object of intention and desire, instead of a source of new experience. Hermann Cohen, for example, declares that "truth is the accord of theoretical causality (cognition) with ethical teleology (ethics)." Both cognition and ethics, however, belong to the activity of the human mind, which means that Cohen identifies ground with object rather than seeking their resolution by way of human interaction with an external world. Cohen's truth belongs neither to the world nor to traditional knowledge, but only to the cogito. Buber seeks to bring the Kantian tradition into the world: Rosenzweig seeks to reconnect it, as well, to traditional knowledge. Neither succeeds fully, because Kant's restrictive premises betray their efforts.

Generated out of an appreciative critique of Kant, Charles Peirce's pragmatism offers Jewish thinkers a theory of truth more faithful to Jewish practice: that is, to the methods

⁸See Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (New York: St. Martin's, 1965); see "Introduction," and "Antinomy or Pure Reason."

⁹Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, trans. S. Kaplan (New York: Ungar, 1972), p. 410.

 ¹⁰See, e.g. Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Scribner's, 1970).
 ¹¹See, e.g., Franz Rosenzweig. *The Star of Redemption*, trans. W. Hallo (Boston: Beacon, 1964).

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of problem solving most emphasized in rabbinic tradition.¹² For the pragmatist, the pursuit of truth is a three-stage process of inquiry, stimulated by the experience of behavioral failure and completed only through the successful correction of that failure.

The first stage of inquiry is the attempt to recover the ground of truth. This means that the inquirers seek to recover lost trust in some tradition of knowledge and in the persons who present that tradition. For Emmanuel Levinas, this stage finds its paradigm in the Israelites' relation to God at Mt. Sinai. According to the midrash in *Tractate Shabbat* (88a-b), the Israelites were forced into accepting a Torah whose benefits they could not appreciate. Like the angels who declared "we do and *then* we understand" (*naaseh V'nishmah*: Exodus 24.7), the Israelites had to enact the commandments before comprehending them, trusting God before trusting themselves.¹³

In Scriptures, the first stage of inquiry is indicated by two uses of the term "truth" (emet). The first is truth as trust: as in "the laws of truth" (torot emet) (Neh. 9.13). This means laws in which the people Israel could trust (following Ibn Ezra on Gen. 24.49: that truth used in this way displays its derivation from the term "faith" (emunah)¹⁵). The second is truth as fidelity to one's word: as in "these are the things you shall do: speak truth, each man to his neighbor" (Zech. 7.9) which means to say what one means (Radak)¹⁶ and, thereby, to inspire confidence (Rashi on "men of Truth," Ex. 18.21). But confidence requires testing against experience.

The second stage is the attempt to recover the object of truth. This means that the inquirers examine their problematic experience, to make as much sense as they can of it within the limits of their present knowledge. Philosophers call this examination descriptive science; for rabbinic tradition, it is *mada*, an aspect of "knowledge of the ways of the world" (*derekh erets*). Since the Enlightenment, objectivists and personalists have vied for control of this activity: the one arguing that rabbinical authorities have no business interfering with the procedures of science; the other arguing that natural science threatens the autonomy and sanctity of Jewish life. Again, the argument rests on a confusion of ground and object of truth.

By definition, the object of truth lies beyond the ken of traditional knowledge: inquiry is seeded in the failures of extant knowledge to anticipate this object. Descriptive science is, therefore, a tool of discovery: a means of presenting the inquirers' data—patterns of sense perceptions—they have not previously encountered. For traditional Judaism, recognition that the Lord is God signals the inquirers' conviction that no knowledge is complete in itself and that, therefore, new discovery is always possible. Problematic experience is the inquirers' encounter with the finitude of creaturely knowledge and, therefore, with the majesty of the Lord God. Behavioral failure is the means through which God shows His creatures that they do not fully understand His

¹²See *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. V*, eds. C. Harteshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ., 1934–5), as interpreted by John E. Smith, *Purpose and Thought, The Meaning of Pragmatism* (New Haven: Yale Univ., 1978).

¹³Emmanuel Levinas, *Quatres Lectures Talmudiques* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1968), pp. 69ff.
14"good laws," in the Jewish Publication Society edition of *The Writings, Ktuvim, A New Translation of the Holy Scriptures* (Philadelpha, 1978). All future references are to this edition.

¹⁵The Biblical commentaries of Abraham Ibn Ezra (1089–1164) appear in the traditional Hebrew volumes of Mikraot G'dolot.

¹⁶Radak is the acronym for the Biblical commentator Rabbi David Kimkhi (1160?-1235?).

¹⁷Rashi is the acronym for the most famous traditional Biblical commentator, Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac (1040–1105). A translation of his commentaries appears in *Pentateuch*, M. Rosenbaum and A.M. Silberman, trans. (New York: Hebrew Pub.).

word. On the other hand, descriptive science cannot in itself provide knowledge of the problematic object of truth. Knowledge of the object means knowledge of how to interact with the object, or how to act in the world. The data offered by science are mere generalities, which delimit the ways in which the inquirers may interact with the object, but which cannot themselves legislate specific choices of action. Such choices are defined by principles available only in the inquirers' tradition of knowledge.

In Scriptures, the second stage of inquiry is indicated by references to *truth as correspondence to object:* as in "you shall investigate and inquire and interrogate thoroughly. If it is true, the fact established..." (Deut. 13.15). In testifying to the truth of a matter, witnesses offer data whose significance is disclosed through authoritative interpretation: "if the charge proves true, the girl was found not to have been a virgin, then..." (Deut. 22.20, cf. Rashi). The consequences of this evidence are disclosed only in a third stage of inquiry.

The third stage is the attempt to reapply object to ground. This means that the inquirers at once define the problematic experience in the language of traditional knowledge and modify that tradition to accommodate the new object. Contemporary philosophers call this stage hermeneutic or interpretation; in rabbinic tradition, it is *midrash*. Midrash is a mediating activity, which perfects tradition by putting it to the test of experience, reuniting object and ground as matter and form.

Midrash is what objectivists like Saadia call rational verification of traditional faith, except that reason is practical, not abstractive, and the meaning of faith is not disclosed prior to the activity of verification. Midrash reveals the truth which traditional knowledge receives from its original source but does not reveal until the completion of particular acts of inquiry. Truth is the response traditional knowledge offers to particular crises of knowledge. Immanent in the tradition, it does not make itself known until behavioral failures signal the need for previously revealed truths to be modified.

In Scriptures, the third stage of inquiry is indicated by references to truth as the final result of inquiry: "The Lord, The Lord, a God merciful and gracious, slow to anger and abundant in mercy and truth' "(Ex. 34.6). "In truth" means "faithfully rewarding those who perform His will" (Rashi), "in truth" fulfilling His word (Ibn Ezra). "The Lord is a true God, a living God and king of the world" (Jer. 10.10): the true God can fulfill His word, because He lives, while humans die (Rashi) and because He fulfills promises, while the stars remain mute (Radak).

Truth, say the rabbis, is the seal of God. But to declare that God is truth is not yet to have received God's truth, which comes, ultimately, in the end of time, or piecemeal, at the end of each act of inquiry. It is, rather, to declare one's conviction that the failures we suffer are God's means of correcting our incomplete knowledge of His word and that by repairing our failures we come to know His word more deeply.

THE WORKS OF DAVID HUME

The General Editors of the forthcoming Princeton University Press edition of *The Philosophical*, *Political and Literary Works of David Hume* would welcome information on any printed or manuscript material which may have a bearing on the work of this edition. They are particularly interested in information regarding unpublished letters concerned with Hume's writings; any hitherto unreported mansuscripts; autograph marginalia or proofs; bibliographic anomalies not recorded by Jessop or Todd; notable copies of lifetime editions of works by Hume; and copies of works by any author bearing the bookplate of Hume or his nephew, David (later Baron) Hume. They would also like to learn the location of all copies of works known to exist in variant states (as do first edition copies of *A Treatise of Human Nature*).

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Sustained Causation and the Substantial Theory of the Self

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ETAPHYSICAL THEORIES of the person are generally divided into two classes. The first class embraces views which take the person to be essentially a single unitary something; the second is the class of views treating the person as a composite of various elements. Traditionally they have been called, respectively, the Substantial and the Bundle theories of the person/self. Substantial theories of the person are usually pro-free-will and pro-real-persistence over time. Bundle theories are generally allied to deterministic conceptions of action, and to rather complex and conventional theories of identity over time. Substantial theories are out of fashion in philosophy, in part because they tend to be ontologically committed to an entity perceived to be epistemically suspect and metaphysically or logically superfluous. Its adherents are often viewed as being captive of some (linguistically engendered) "picture." I, however, regard the strength of their position as underrated. This is not to deny the difficulties faced by Substantial theories. I am simply not convinced that such difficulties are unsurmountable. Moreover-and this constitutes the particular focus of this paper-I find that certain central aspects of human experience are most naturally accounted for by these theories of the person. Hence, whatever the ultimate truth-value of such theories, it pays to pay closer attention to these apparent grounds for Substantial theories.

Perennially one such apparent ground has been our experience of agency. In particular, the felt freedom of our acts has often provided a basis for the substantial "picture" of the self. Less common has been the appeal to the experience of *sustained control* over some of our activities. In this essay this latter phenomenon will be examined, with an eye to its evidential connection vis-à-vis the Substantial theory.

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The connection between the person/self, on one side, and human, conscious, intentional actions, on the other, is, pre-theoretically, very intimate—such actions, it would seem, require the participation of the person. In fact, from a subjective point of view one could offer the following as a non-partisan incomplete definition of the person/self: "the occurrent source of physical/psychic conscious-intentional actions" (whatever that source turns out to be). Given, then, our individual acquaintance with human actions, should we not be able to draw some significant ontological conclusions regarding the agent-person? Perhaps not, given the perilous nature of the leap from phenomenology to ontology. Yet, the possibility is worth investigating.

Do certain experientially known features of actions argue for the substantiality of the agent? It seems so. In what follows, however, it will not be argued on pragmatic,

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ethical, or political grounds, that one definite conceptual picture of the person—one which allows for the possibility of notions like moral responsibility, pride, guilt, remorse, freedom, etc.—is all in all preferable to any other picture (for example, preferable to one conforming to Sellars' "scientific image"). The aim of this paper is purely theoretical or metaphysical. It will be argued that there simply are strong phenomenological grounds connected with human agency which, I believe, invite a reconsideration of the substantialist view.

Philosophers who have used the platform of action to argue for some form of the substantialist theory (what has been called in action-theory "agent-causality") have generally relied on choice- or decision-making phenomena. Their locus of interest has been "free choice." They point to the powerful and undeniable experience that it is we, qua persons/selves, who determine which action we do in many circumstances; and argue that this experience cannot be captured by any non-entitative, event-causal (deterministic) explanation. They also point out that this experience cannot be adequately explained on any simple indeterministic model. Hence the need to postulate some sort of self-moving entity. Such an entity is the person/self/agent.

This line of argument, whatever its value, is not the one followed in this paper. I want to focus on separate, generally neglected, grounds for the adoption of an agent-causal (deterministic or not) type of view. The locus of this examination will be the *doing* of actions, not merely their choice.

* * *

Many actions require concentration and effort, but not necessarily explicit decisions. Take, for example, A's attentively trying to remember the name of an old schoolmate; or A's concentrated juggling of a soccer ball. In each of these cases we have either a continuous event or a series of events that can be considered paradigmatic "active events"-events with respect to which A is active, in which A plays an active role. If A's activity were confined to this event's causal origination from some belief/desire set; or if it were confined to its originating in a Nozickian indeterministic fashion;2 then something central to A's agency vis-à-vis this event would be left out. This something would be A's experience of doing it. For, on event-causal or otherwise non-entitative theories, A can only be said to be active with respect to this event if A, via some psychological occurrent state or via some undetermined event, initiates or triggers its occurrence (or series of occurrences). Once this has been accomplished, A, so to say, washes her hands of its subsequent unraveling. But A experiences her "causal contribution" as continuing during the entire duration of the event. It is not the case that A triggers this event(s) and then it goes on its own, or according to natural laws. The causation involved, by A, is temporally coextensive with the whole caused-event(s). So, whatever it is that A is, A must be something capable of exercising lasting continuous causation.

Contrast the causation by A, involved in her trying to remember a name, or in the movements involved in her juggling a soccer ball, with the causation, still by A, of another event(s) also within A and involving A (in the sense of calling her attention and concern to it). A takes a deep breath immediately after a very hard physical workout,

¹I am thinking here of at least the following: C.A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood (New York: Macmillan, 1957); R. Chisholm, "Freedom and Action," included in K. Lehrer (ed.) Freedom and Determinism (New York: Random House, 1966); R. Taylor, Metaphysics, sec. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974); Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, esp. Ch. on Freedom, tr. by H. Barnes (New York: Pocket Books, 1956); R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981).

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which act triggers and initiates, as A knew it would, a coughing fit entirely outside A's control. Here we have an event (the coughing fit) which, despite being deliberately and consciously caused by A to occur, and despite its engaging A's concern as it unravels, is yet independent of, and external to, A—it is an occurrence suffered by A. Unlike A's juggling the soccer ball, it is caused by A in a fundamentally different and more limited manner. It is indeed triggered, even intentionally let us say, by A; but it then proceeds on its own. The juggling of the ball is both triggered by A and sustained causally by A. A retains a dynamic kind of control over it. A continues to do it. A could, after all, stop at any time. The kind of causation involved in this latter event, on A's part, does not end with the event's beginning.

It should be clear, moreover, that this causation is distinct from that exercized by what are called "standing causal conditions," for the latter are static, passive states. The causation to which we are referring is dynamic, living, energetic (and, in short, one wants to say, agent-like!).

The attentive juggling of the ball is an action in a primitive, non-derivative sense. In contrast, the above coughing fit simply partakes of, or results from, A's activity, and so can at most be said to be an action derivatively. What it takes for an event to be a primitive action seems to require *more* than simple 'external' (vis-à-vis the event in question) triggering or event-causation. Event-causation seems unequipped to capture the sense in which A's juggling is more of an act than is the above-mentioned coughing fit, though *both* are causally triggered by A, and *both* involve A's body and attention. In other words, if A could only causally affect the (mental or physical) world by means of occurrent event-like states (like beliefs, desires, intentions, tryings, and what not)—either on the assumption that A is, qua person or self, an inert, passive substance-bearer (of states), or on the assumption that A is, qua person, a totality of these states—then A's causal participation in any two events, each caused by A, could not manifest itself in different degrees. But apparently it can so manifest itself. It would appear, therefore, that our agency is of a different sort.

The event-causal theorist might reply that the reason why A's causal participation seems to accompany the entire duration of, say, the juggling event, is because the latter is actually composed of a large number of short events, each of which is event-caused by a series of momentary psychological events. This multiple event-causation naturally gives the impression of continuous causation. In the coughing fit case, on the other hand, only one psychological event is necessary to trigger a whole train of events; which train sustains itself through reflex-type automatic causal ties. That explains the correct impression of my remaining causally outside the unraveling of this "event."

This seems to me to be a desperate, albeit not an altogether dismissable, attempt at salvaging the event-causal theory. It brings to mind Ryle's amusing rhetorical requests for the exact number of volitions involved in producing simple body movements. The number of events involved in A's juggling is, it seems to me, rather arbitrary. This kind of issue lures one to discard talk of events altogether, if one understands by them real, discrete phenomena (as opposed to theoretical abstractions). And if one lets oneself go in this direction, event-causal theories may have trouble getting off the ground. This larger issue, however, shall be bypassed.

What does seem to be the case is that as A juggles the ball, A (normally) need not experience any desire whatever (especially if A is concentrated, fresh and vigorous); nor must A experience a series of miniscule tryings, or occurrent intentions, or what not. In the case at hand, A's causation is simply not fragmentary. Why A shows up at the

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soccer field may be explainable (in some sense) through recourse to the desire to play, etc. But once A decides to start juggling (in order to warm up, let us say), desire and intention no longer seem to play an occurrent role. It is true that as A juggles, A reacts to a whole stream of sensory input, and, hence, new beliefs are constantly being formed. Beliefs, however, are not by themselves causes of action (or reaction). And it is the causal force behind these reactions—that which eventually brings it to an end; the intelligent, active force—that appears to be continuous, non-segmented, non-event-like. To say that there must be a series of miniscule psychological events each of which causes a miniscule segment of A's juggling movements, is to appeal to entities which one would presume to find in experience, but one does not. Perhaps they are present subconsciously—and this possibility cannot be excluded—but it is rather doubtful.

It cannot, moreover, be held that A's juggling is a mechanical unwinding of some habit-like skill, which need only be triggered by, say, a desire-intention occurrent expression for it to take effect. It is true that acquired (bodily) skills involve conjoined series of motions happening, or being performed, "naturally," without the need to focus attention upon each constitutive part. Having a bodily skill, however, also implies having control over various movements—it implies, for example, being able to retain one's balance when a leg is kicked upwards; being able to direct the leg movement rather precisely, etc. Such control is exercised in displaying the skill in using it. The skill does not exercise itself.

* * *

Let us now examine an interesting "mental" counterpart of the phenomenon of continuous causation of a "physical" ongoing process. This examination, aside from elaborating further on the strange experience of sustained causation, will emphasize a number of additional points. It will focus on what will be called mental "self-direction." In doing so it will discourage attempts to account for sustained causation through appeals to successions of causally efficacious mental states; for the phenomenon of sustained causation is present at the mental level as well.

The psychic life of persons does not consist exclusively in an uncontrolled stream; nor is our mental activity confined to assenting to, discarding, rejecting, and affirming items like thoughts, images, propositions, etc., that occur to us. We also actively "grope for" and conjure up words, ideas, memories; we direct attention to this or that; we carry our logical or mathematical operations "in our head," etc. Our mental life can display a peculiar self-direction.

Consider this situation: B sits in her silent room in a semi-lotus position, and tries simply to follow the rhythm of her breathing. In and out...B fastens her complete attention on the breathing; and every time it wanders B brings it back. The process requires unrelenting vigilance. B, however, is very adept at this; consequently, after a few minutes B succeeds at keeping her attention focused simply on her breathing for fifteen minutes.

Let us call the phenomenon just illustrated through this example that of "controlled attention." The B of the example may have had any number of reasons (desires, beliefs, goals, intentions, and what not) for engaging in this exercise. These may explain why she did it, and even why she did it at that approximate time; but it is, again, her doing it itself that interests us. What B experiences is not simply a succession of psychic states.

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If it is appropriate to speak of such a succession here, then something seems to operate from behind and beyond this succession of states. It seems to influence or to create this succession (even D. Dennett, an able and convinced enemy of substantial selves, appeals to an "agent" or "subject" who "chooses," "decides," and "selects," at various junctures during a decision-process.³) Moreover, it is this transcending something that appears to guide attention (whatever attention is) in light of what has come before and in anticipation of what is to come subsequently.

A Humean, again, may claim that what we have here are (a) a coherent series of states (or of attention fastenings/shiftings) accompanied by (b) a single, lasting, false impression of control; (c) a lasting impression of effort (perhaps b and c are one and the same impression); and (d) a lasting "informative" memory-impression that provides the background for the more fleeting succession of states. The impression of control is false because it plays no causal role vis-à-vis the path of attention.

Here, as in the case of sustained causation of a "physical" activity, there are no knock-down arguments against this Humean, atomistic analysis. But here too this type of analysis seems highly unfaithful to our experience of sustained attention. The felt unity, guidance, sustainment seem to elude such analyses.

Perhaps the feature of such experiences most resistant to this atomistic-passive analysis is our feeling of being the cause and guide of attention-movements. It seems that with regard to this aspect we simply cannot be mistaken. For, the content of one's awareness in these circumstances is not limited to a feeling of effort, a feeling of control, and so on. This awareness seems to be of oneself moving and guiding attention this way or that. One seems aware of oneself as a cause (contra Hume). One is not aware of just any effort or any control, but of one's own effort and one's own control. Furthermore, to be aware of one's own effort and control is not to feel some energy emanating from one's body or mind. It is, rather, to be aware of oneself as the source of this energy.

Being aware of effort and control is in fact very different from being aware of a throbbing toothache, or of a recurrent image. The latter are, for the most part, "mere experiences." They are things that one feels; and they may even be things that one cannot help feeling. They are, in addition, events toward which one possesses some sort of privileged access. Furthermore, awareness of pains and images must be awareness of one's own pains and images. In these respects, pains and images resemble feelings of effort and control. Effort and control, however, are distinctive in the following ways: (a) experiences of effort-control contain the awareness of some peculiar power being exerted; (b) this power-exertion is necessarily person-implicative; that is, one experiences one-self as immersed in the exertion; one does not experience oneself as neutral towards it or as detached from it; (c) this person-immersion in inner exertion of power is originative and active; one is not overwhelmed by this power, or oppressed by it; one feels one-self merged with it as its source, not as a receiver.

Obviously, then, the phenomenological character of the experience of "controlled attention"—were it reliable—testifies to the presence of a *something* relatively lasting,

³D. Dennett, "On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want" included in *Brainstorms* (Montgomery, Vermont: Bradford Books, 1978).

⁴G. Watson, "Free Agency", included in Free Will ed. by G. Watson (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982).

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continuous, and causal or will-like. If reliable, it points at a something not identifiable with the sum of beliefs, desires, values, etc., which totality is often viewed as forming the core of the person. Rather, this something functions much like the transcendent sources of those *judgments* which, according to Gary Watson, are the key to a person's *identification* with certain desires, goals, and courses of action.⁴ In other words, the phenomenology of "controlled attention," if reliable, points at some kind of substantial self—at ourselves as such selves.

Now, our opponent will no doubt remind us that phenomenology is tricky. Simply because in some circumstances we experience ourselves as being causal, persisting, and continuous—in short, as being will-like entities—does not ensure that we in fact are so. Could we not experience ourselves-exerting-power in a sustained manner without in fact doing so? Let us see.

* * *

What are the relevant phenomenological features of the attention-phenomenon at issue? They are: continuity, sustainnment, and will-like personal causation. These features qualify the "beam" or "flow" of attention. Are there any "objective" reasons for skepticism about any of these traits? That is, are there skeptical reasons not based on some pre-existing general attitude or theory such as epiphenomenalism? I am not convinced that there are.

First of all, the experience we are considering is fairly common. It is not some rare, esoteric—hence questionable—phenomenon. If it is deceptive, therefore, the deception is of the deep, metaphysical variety.

Secondly, most of us are aware of attention-phenomena which manifest features opposite to the ones under consideration; we are, therefore, epistemically positioned to be able to distinguish (in the ordinary, non-metaphysical way) between the two. For example, we all know what it is like for our attention to be *discontinuous* (as in the extreme case of its being interrupted by sleep); we know when it is fragmented, non-sustained, and non-focused (as it jumps around "on its own" due to fatigue, anxiety, or relaxation); and we know what it feels like for attention to operate independently of the peculiar "will-like personal causation" featured in our example (this occurs, for instance, when, upon "letting go" just prior to falling asleep, the most disparate, disjointed mental contents occur to us).

Thirdly, I, for one, cannot coherently imagine situations wherein we genuinely think that our attention is focused, continuous, and sustained when in fact at the time it is not; or cases where we think that we, qua persons, are being will-like causative (we think we are exerting effort) in directing the "flow" of attention when in fact (at the time) we are not.

There are, of course, cases where we are *supposed* to pay attention to x, but our attention wanders away from x to other things, without our realizing at the time that it has done so. What happens in such cases is that while this digression occurs, *we* (whatever we are) unwittingly "let go" (we "go with the flow"). That is, our reflexive vigilance over what we are attending dissipates, and we slip to the pre-reflective level (to use Sartrean enemy terms). Clearly, however, it is not the case that *while* the wandering oc-

⁵H. Frankfurt, "Identification and Externality," included in A. O. Rorty, ed., *The Identities of Persons* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1976).

curs we *think* we are paying attention to x (when in fact we are not). During such time we are simply attending to other things; hence, we have no thought whatever of what our attention is doing. Hence, we are not fooled. Later in retrospect we realize not that we were fooled, but that at the time we lost control of our attention (and, naturally, that we have suffered this without realizing it, for to have realized it would have meant *not* having lost control), and thereby failed in our project of attending exclusively to x.

I am not aware of other coherent ways in which our genuine impression of sustained, controlled attention can be deceptive in some relevant way. Perhaps this only reflects my imaginative limitations. I, therefore, invite the reader to come up with some relevant counterexample.

The reason, perhaps, why this imaginative exercise is bound to fail lies in the fact that attention is not divorceable from the person-agent. It is not an organ or instrument that could function independently or through a foreign operator. One's attention could not operate behind one's back, as it were (whereas, for example, beliefs and desires can manifest themselves as peculiarly "external" to the self-person—as Frankfurt and others have noticed.)⁵ Attending to something (or doing something attentively) is a volitional phenomenon, and the person-qua-substance being hypothesized here is (essentially) will-like. Hence, the intimate connection.

Two natural, closely related objections at this point need to be considered. First of all, a Sartrean may argue that the phenomenology of attention exhibits no evidence of substantial selves; that all that it displays are various levels of consciousness; that there is no evidence of an "I," subject, or person, at the pre-reflective level; and that, in fact, there is no "I" in the phenomenological field of the fully concentrated soccer-juggler—the "I" (the sense of "I-ness") being an inhabitant of the reflective level.

I would agree with the claim that there is no self-consciousness (by definition) at the pre-reflective level, and that, therefore, the phenomenology of these states does not directly exhibit an "I" or a subject. That, however, does not mean that there is no *evidence* of one. Sustained causation is, I submit, such evidence; and this is all that is being claimed here.

In addition, it would appear that the categories of consciousness and reflective consciousness cannot possibly account for the phenomenon of "controlled attention." After all, they are primarily epistemic categories, whereas the phenomenon under consideration seems to exhibit a crucial causal-volitional aspect. Consciousness is a "field" on which, or towards which, one can act, as happens when one controls one's attention. That one does so from the standpoint of a "higher level" of consciousness does not mean that one is identical with, or that one resides at, this higher level. After all, when one analogously controls a "physical" activity like juggling, one need not (and, indeed, one normally does not) "reside" at the reflective level. Moreover, conscious phenomena like images, thoughts, and desires-whatever their "level" or "order"-can be felt by the person as foreign and oppressive. On the other hand, volitional phenomenawhatever their level-cannot be so felt. This not only shows that the self of person cannot be reduced to the interplay of levels of consciousness; it suggests, in addition, that the will is not merely a faculty, or trait, of the self, but that it is essentially self-inmotion. Thus, to say, as is sometimes done, "My will held my attention fixed on x" seems to me to be more obscure and misleading than the simpler "I held my attention fixed on x." The former, unlike the latter, suggests the possibility of a gulf between a person and her will; which possibility seems inconceivable.

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A Sartrean (or a Buddhist) might continue—and I will treat this as a second, distinct objection—by pointing out that certain spontaneous things simply get done; that they are not done by one. Often, in fact, great things are done this way, as happens when one becomes "inspired." It does it, the Buddhist might say, not I. If, thus, no self is required to perform (some) important actions, why would one be required in the case of trivial ones?

To this we can respond that claims like the above need only mean that some acts take place without advance planning, spontaneously, catching one by surprise. One can feel astonishment at having been able to do some (great) performance, work, creation These things are done un-self-consciously, pre-reflectively. All of this, however, only shows that there are things that we do without being able to explain how we can do them. It shows that we can exude more than we have absorbed; that we can reach beyond our learning. But the self-forgetfulness experienced during such times does not imply that the self-qua-agent plays no active role in such occurrences. The self may have been fully absorbed in its performance. This can ordinarily take place during one's playing soccer, or tennis, or chess, or while actively listening to music, reading a book. or having a conversation. All these "activities" may be done with detachment (selfconsciously), or in an absorbed manner. Doing them, however, in the latter manner need not involve the absence of, or lack of participation by, the self/person. Person A may feel as much a doer in her absorbed soccer-playing as A is in her self-conscious speech in front of a group. Her causal contribution may be as protracted and continuous during the former as it is during the latter activity (though A may only be explicitly aware of it in retrospect). As a matter of fact, in most cases A's un-self-conscious, protracted causation of a complicated series of movements (think of a dance) is far more effective than its self-conscious counterpart would be. Why should this be?

The reason, I suggest, is simply that in un-self-conscious cases one's "causal power" is unified, focused, and undivided. One, in effect, tries to do one thing instead of at least two. Self-conscious activities are by nature dual: they involve one's doing x (e.g., the dance), and, simultaneously, one's paying attention to oneself-doing-x. Because of this divisiveness, the performance of the primary activity generally suffers. Imagine, for example, what would happen to one's speech (or dance), were one to play only the observer-role, and thereby focus all of one's attention to "one's-speech-being-delivered." The speech would either cease, or become incoherent—it would cease to be causally sustained by one, through directed attention, and hence would no longer be one's action. One might, on the opposite extreme, become a total participant in (and focus all of one's attention on) one's delivery of the speech. One becomes, that is, totally absorbed in it. Here one's "causal power" is focused, and unified; and is thereby more likely to produce a better performance.

It would appear that this postulated "causal power" which manifests itself in the form of paying attention, observationally, to one's speech being delivered (to various motions, sounds, etc.), is one and the same "causal power" that in another occasion participates in one's delivering the speech. And if, as I suggest, one is at the source of this power, then one is as much present in one's un-self-conscious activities as one is in those which are self-conscious, unfocused, and, consequently, inefficient.

It is reasonable to believe that our lives would be much more productive and satisfying, were each of our activities to be of the focused sort; and it is likewise reasonable to believe that becoming disposed always to be so absorbed and focused is a goal worth seeking. This may be, in part, what the Buddhist is after in attempting to strip himself/

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herself of the delusion of selfhood, I-ness, or Ego—and thereby achieve Enlightenment. The worth and attractiveness of such modes of being-in-the-world, however, seem irrelevant vis-à-vis the metaphysical issue of whether action (of whatever type) requires the presence of an "entitative" self.

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I do not presume to have established the Substantial theory of the self/person. Such a project would require immense labor. I hope, however, this paper has succeeded in exposing how difficult it is for alternative metaphysical theories of the self/person to account for the pervasive phenomenon of sustained causation. Others may not be as disturbed by this as I am. If, at any rate, the preceding discussion serves only to stimulate further analysis of this topic, it will have been worth-while. One might take note that nothing has been said in this paper either about the free will-determinism controversy, or about the materialism-dualism issue. The substance-person discussed here could turn out to be a brain-part or an immaterial mind. Nothing has been said regarding its mode of origin and of nullification; and no diachronic identity conditions for such a substance have been suggested.

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The Moral Ideal of the Person¹

James N. Loughran, S.J.

Socrates: For I say, Polus, that both the rhetors and the tyrants have least power in the cities, as I was saying just now; for they do practically nothing, I say, that they want to, but do whatever they think is best.

Plato, Gorgias, 446 d, e2

OST PEOPLE, who have experienced moral struggle, will find truth in Iris Murdoch's words: "In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego." This is not only because they feel driven by selfish inclinations or assaulted by unruly desires. The conflict goes deeper. They know quite well what Sidgwick meant by "the dualism of practical reason": on the one hand, they should be just and benevolent to all; on the other, they should protect and promote their own good. The evidence is impressive that these two concerns frequently collide. And when they do, self-interest seems to generate more compelling reasons and motivation. Morality often looks like a self-defeating, clenched-teeth act of the will.

Much of recent moral philospophy contributes unwittingly to morality's unappealing image. At least, it offers very little to help people understand and ease this fundamental tension in their lives. My aim in this paper is no less than an attempt to re-present morality as a desirable way of life, to suggest, equivalently, an approach for dealing with Sidgwick's dilemma. By way of introduction, I use Alan Gewirth's argument in Reason and Morality⁴ (a version of the familiar "treat like cases alike" strategy) as an illustration of what I think is wrong with contemporary ethical theory. Because his starting point is so unnecessarily limited, the only motivating reason Gewirth can provide for commitment to moral principles is the desire to be logical. It is (unfortunately?) a fact of life, I contend, that most people need more than sheer logic, working with weak premisses, to persuade them to be moral. My concern, then, is to identify a more adequate starting point for thinking through moral questions. As a first step, I outline, approvingly, Lawrence Becker's proposal in On Justifying Moral Judgments, with particular attention to what he offers, very tentatively, as final "presumptive" criteria—

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²Plato, Gorgias, translated by Terence Irwin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 35.

³Iris Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 52.

Alan Gewirth, *Reason and Morality* (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978). Page references to this book will be given in parentheses in the text.

⁵Lawrence C. Becker, On Justifying Moral Judgments (New York: Humanities Press, 1973). Page references to this book will be gievn in parentheses in the text.

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certain unchallenged, all-pervading features and dispositions of human life. In the final main section of the paper, I move far beyond Becker's account and argue that an examination of these commonly shared orientations discloses within human life a "presumptive" ideal of the person. Not only is it in light of this ideal that moral judgments are evaluated and justified; the ideal also provides, to use a term of Francis Hutcheson, an "exciting reason" to be moral.⁶

I

In Reason and Morality, Alan Gewirth attempts to show us how to derive and apply a supreme, substantial, normative moral principle. This task, he says, is "of first importance for the guidance of human life" (p. ix). It is not a distortion to hear Gewirth promise us this: reader, whoever you are—egoist, altruist, skeptic, intuitionist, confused plain man, utilitarian, tentative, tortured philosopher (or any combination of these)—as long as you respect undeniable facts and what these facts logically entail, the argument of Reason and Morality will demonstrate both what the content of morality really is and why morality, understood as categorically binding and other-directed, is rational. My suggestion then is this: let us be enticed by Gewirth's come-on, but with Iris Murdoch's words in mind, let us hear his argument as addressed to the prudent egoist in us all.

Here is how Gewirth's argument goes.7 Surely you recognize that "in real life" you are, or at least aspire to be, an agent with control over your choices and with purposes you regard as good and want to fulfill. Surely you admit these obvious facts. Surely, as rational, you are willing to explore what logically follows from these facts; in other words, you are willing to employ the "dialectically necessary method." Now surely you regard your own freedom and well-being, the necessary conditions of the successful pursuit of your purposes, as necessary goods. Thus you would and do insist on your rights to freedom and well-being. Your claim to these rights is based on the fact that you are a (prospective) purposive agent. Next, as rational, you have to admit that all (prospective) purposive agents have these same generic rights; for they make the same claims on the same bases as you. Thus you are logically forced to enuntiate this supreme moral principle: Every agent ought to act in accord with the generic rights [to freedom and well-being] of his recipients as well as of himself. If you ask: granted I am logically forced to accept this principle, it is true, is it really my duty?; the answer: well, surely "agents ought to do what they logically must accept they ought to do"that's "obvious"; "what stronger ground can be given for someone's having a duty than that he logically must accept that he has the duty?" (p. 153) Having derived this principle, we are ready to apply it to particular moral issues.

Now this has to be a troublesome conclusion for us—the prudent, purposive egoists who began the inquiry—even if we allow Gewirth (temporarily?) the moves that got us there. We are startled to find ourselves, still with the instincts of prudent egoists, but now saddled with an overriding rule for conduct that imposes severe restrictions on the pursuit of our purposes and even on our choice of purposes themselves. In fact, having gotten the hang of the "dialectically necessary method," wouldn't we be driven inex-

⁶Francis Hutcheson, *Illustrations upon the Moral Sense* in D. D. Raphael, *British Moralists*, 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 308 ff.

⁷Perhaps the most useful of Gewirth's own all-too-frequent summary statements of his argument is on p. 171. This is the one my outline follows.

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orably to this next logical derivation: Recognizing the fundamental principle to be overriding and categorically binding, we must admit as rational purposive agents that our chief concern in life, that purpose in light of which particular purposes (and means of realizing them) are to be judged, is allegiance to this principle? Fellow egoists, however unappealing or inconvenient it be, logic, apparently, requires that we give a completely new direction to our lives; the situation looks grim!

But we recalcitrant egoists may have a way, even sticking with Gewirth, to cheer ourselves up. It is suggested by many of the things in the second half of Reason and Morality on the applications of his fundamental principle. I propose this: instead of talking of "applications" of the fundamental principle, why not boldly continue with the dialectically necessary method? I see two additional moves that would seem to follow by the same logic from the fact that we are rational purposive agents. (1) Having recognized the obligation to guide our choices by the fundamental moral principle, we also began to recognize the kind of person we should strive to become in order to live out the requirements of that principle wisely and faithfully. (Here it would be possible, as Gewirth in part does, to work out in general terms, not only a list of the virtues, but also their relationship with other features to be included in a general conception of human well-being.) (2) Similarly, and perhaps this step should accompany, not come after, the previous one, having acknowledged our obligation to respect and assure the generic rights of others, as well as ourselves, it follows that we should explicitly commit ourselves to creating, maintaining, and strengthening a certain social mileu with specifiable characteristics, the community of morally purposive agents. (Here it would also be possible, as Gewirth in part does, to outline in broad normative strokes what such a community would be like.) In other words, underlying (and logically derivable from?) the Principle of Generic Consistency (I mention just once the principle's pedantic, official name) are an ideal conception of what a human being should become in his or her own person as well as an ideal conception of the moral community such persons should strive to build together. These two ideals, on reflection, are not really separate, nor are they merely fanciful conceptions. They merge together to claim privileged status for purposive agents as they determine how to shape and give direction to their lives, how to become, now, effective moral agents. As Philippa Foot would say, "these are the kinds of ends that arouse devotion."8

Nevertheless, the difficulty remains; and it is a difficulty even if we stop where Gewirth did, finding my derivations needless or misconstrued. Let us become again red-blooded, hard-headed, rational egoists set on fulfilling our purposes, as Gewirth allowed us to be at the outset of the inquiry. Our life-plans have to be completely reversed. We have discovered that our purposes must yield, probably often, to the wants and needs of others. Indeed the fundamental moral principle, because of its scope and overriding character, equivalently says that the purposiveness of others, no less than our own, must become our purpose, our first concern in life. This result is paradox of the highest order. Even the most logical, the most "rational" among us must feel that something is wrong with the argument. I for one, or at least the egoist in me, feel tricked. But I think I know where to locate the fundamental weakness of the argument: not at its derivations, conclusion, or applications; but at its starting point. For it is surely not enough to take the human agent merely as free and purposive—not if the goal is to present morality as categorically binding and other-directed. The conclusion will be

⁸Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p. 166.

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too much at odds with the first premise. Something else must be included as essential to the initial description of human agency. As to what that might be, Lawrence Becker, I think, provides a clue.

II

In On Justifying Moral Arguments, Becker states that his purpose is "to destroy the plausibility of moral skepticism" (p. 1). The skeptic claims that any reasoned attempt to justify a moral argument as incontestably true or false falls into one of three possible traps: infinite regress, logical circularity, or reliance on an arbitrary initial premise. Becker confronts the skeptic head-on; his aim is to demonstrate that it is indeed possible to put "a non-arbitatry stop to the process of reason-giving in the justification of moral judgments" (p. 4).9

The main elements of Becker's strategy are remarkably simple. He contends that not all arguments are based on assumptions or conclusions drawn from prior reasoning or evidence. We often rely on principles which we have neither chosen nor proved beforehand. These principles express the "built-ins'" (p. 64), the "'givens' of our lives" (p. 126). For example, our ability to reason at all depends on the validity of certain logical principles which simply are "parts of the normally-formed human's conceptual apparatus" (p. 64). (Becker is quick to add that it is possible, though not the ordinary thing, to challenge such principles; they are 'given,' but not self-evident.) Likewise, in the area of morality, certain values, standards, prescriptions, *etc.* express or can be derived from the permanent features of human life. There exist norms of morality which simply are "parts of the equipment all normally-formed human beings have" (p. 65). By "normally formed," Becker means "statistically normal among the offspring of human beings" (p. 65).

Becker holds that such 'built-ins' or 'givens' can function as "presumptive criteria" (p. 65) for deciding on the truth or falsity of the various kinds of moral judgment. The force of the word 'presumptive' is twofold: first, such criteria are not assumed or chosen, but 'presumed' by all in the very living of life; second, as long as there is no reason to question their use as criteria, there is every reason to consider them as valid. Such criteria serve as the final stopping-place for the reason-giving process involved in the attempt to justify moral judgments. And this terminus is not arbitrary since, in the absence of any significant doubt or challenge regarding their validity, there is no reason to go on looking for further reasons. To make explicit the legal analogy: a criterion is presumed ultimate until proven false or doubtful or questionable. In sum, Becker's strategy is to turn the tables on the moral skeptic, to make the skeptic the one who has to answer the questions and do the proving. Becker wants to make us skeptical of moral skepticism.

To give content to his theory, Becker points to three permanent and persistent features of human life which might serve as presumptive criteria for the justification of moral

Becker distinguishes specifically *moral* judgments, problems, issues, *etc.* from nonmoral ones in the following manner. Whenever a situation or decision might provoke from a reflective person the demand for a 'ground,' a stop to the reason-giving process, then one is confronted with what are properly called *moral* issues. As Becker expresses it, "Contexts that *do* raise the impulse—in thoughtful people—to ask for more than 'some reason' to believe a value judgment (*i.e.*, which raise the question of grounding those judgments) are ones in which we would say we were morally concerned, in which moral issues were involved, in which moral values were at stake" (p. 91). Becker has more of interest to say on this topic in his article, "The Finality of Moral Judgments: A Reply to Mrs. Foot," *Philosophical Review*, 82 (July, 1973), 364-70.

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judgments; he calls them "purposiveness" (p. 66), "personalness" (p. 67), and "the aesthetic nature of life" (p. 69). By purposiveness Becker means that every human being has interests and goals which give direction to his life and measure the success of his choices and achievements. Every human being will naturally try to fulfill as many of his purposes as possible. He learns, more or less automatically, to settle conflicts between purposes in favor of those which are more 'fecund,' 'long-lived,' 'intense.' Personalness refers to every human being's awareness of herself as a 'self' over against the whole range of the 'other.' A boundary exists between the two which is constantly being crossed from both directions. Some of these incursions are acceptable; some are not. The aesthetic nature of life expresses a human being's propensity to seek satisfaction and equilibrium as opposed to their opposites. Beckers stresses that "this disposition is prior to and much more subtle and pervasive than conscious, purposive pleasure-seeking" (p. 69).

According to this analysis, human beings do not choose to be purposful, selves, or seekers of satisfaction. They simply are this way as long as they are alive and do not decide on something drastic to alter their lot (drugs or suicide, for example). Becker claims, moreover, that these features are already operative in out lives and have much to do with determining our conduct. As a philosopher, his aim is simply to give them conceptual expression, arguing that there is no reason for preventing these concepts or propositions from serving as final 'presumptive criteria' for grounding moral judgments.10 Thus, Becker believes, he has disarmed the moral skeptic. An action or choice or institution or disposition will be justified if it can be shown to be consistent with these 'built-in' features, orientations, and priorities of human life. As long as there is no reason to doubt or change this description of human nature, there is no reason not to 'presume' that such a description is normative for human conduct. As long as a moral judgment is consistent with the features, orientations, and priorities 'given' to and shared by all human beings, no reasons of any cogency could be brought forward to falsify or raise doubts about the validity and truth of that judgment. Moral reasoning can, therefore, be brought to a halt, and non-arbitrarily, once this connection between a moral judgments and such presumptive criteria has been established.

Ш

I wish now critically to examine the three "built-in" features—purposiveness, the aesthetic nature of human life, and, especially, personalness—identified by Becker as presumptive criteria for the justification of moral judgments.¹¹ I have two proposals for

¹⁰Becker emphasizes that his argument depends on the distinction "between *grounding* a judgment, defined as putting a non-arbitrary stop to reason-giving, and *proving* a judgment, which is an offer of reasons" (p. 64).

Orrect ways to justify moral judgments. Thus he insists that he need not be entirely accurate or complete in his identification of the normative characteristics of human life. He writes: "It should be noted, however, that it is the validity of the *procedure* which is primarily in question here—not the adequacy of the three criteria used as examples of the procedure" (p. 62). Indeed he devotes only small portions of his book to the explication of the three "built-ins," and he goes out of his way to stress that he has purposely presented the criteria in as unobjectionable a way as possible, that his analyses of them are admittedly superficial and unsophisticated. In short, Becker does not want his theory "on justifying moral judgments" to stand or fall by reason of the measure of acceptability to be accorded his characterizations of human nature. Despite these disclaimers, it seems to be that Becker's discussion of the three presumptive criteria merits further scrutiny and development. For one thing, the persuasiveness of his argument against the moral skeptic depends on

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improving on Becker's account; by no means do I pretend to complete the project he has initiated (nor even the one I am initiating!).

- (1) I have no particular quarrel with Becker's identification and account of the "purposive" and "aesthetic" charcater of human life. But I do find his description of "personalness" unduly minimalistic. Take a sentence like this one: "An awareness of personhood includes an operative definition, vague though it may be, of boundaries, an incursion into which under certain circumstances is taken as a prima facie offence and generative of a defensive response" (p. 68). Becker seems to think of the self chiefly as a kind of walled territory manned by sentries on the look-out for friend or foe. But is this all our "awareness of personhood" involves? It seems to me that when we think of ourselves as persons, we refer to what is distinctively human about ourselves-not simply our self-awareness, independence, self-interestedness, rights, etc. but primarily our rationality, freedom, capacities for creativity and love, unique ability to use language and communicate, desires for respect and self-respect, passion for fair and equal treatment, sense of respinsibility and accountability, etc. If this be correct, it does not seem objectionable to me to group such characteristics under the term "personalness" and, as I intend to argue, continue it as a trans-cultural, trans-historical "built-in" or "given" of human life.
 - (2) Becker leaves us with three separate and diverse fundamental criteria—universally shared dispositions which generate sets of operating priorities for determining the relative importance of our valuations, obligations, even charcater traits. He has nothing further to say on questions of priority and unity among his criteria. He counsels us that, when his procedures arrive at conflicting results, all we can do is be patient and hope that the "weight" of the various assessments falls in favor of one conclusion over the others. Here, I feel, Becker himself comes to an "arbitrary stop"; for I think I see a way, even taking them as identified by Becker, to bring the three into single focus, to reduce them to one fundamental, if multi-faceted, interest which all human beings share. My claim is that, once we grasp the "personalness" feature of our lives along lines I have proposed, we simultaneously become aware that our "purposiveness" and "aesthetic nature" are subordinate to it. "Personalness" is the fundamental "built-in" of human life; thus, presumptively, it qualifies as ground for a substantive moral theory, as norm for moral deliberation, and as source of reasons for the justification of moral judgments. In the remainder of this section, I shall explain and defend these claims.

That human beings are purposive no one would deny. It is not something one chooses to be—indeed, that choice would itself display purposiveness; it is something one becomes automatically, just in living life. Human beings have all sorts of desires, concerns, needs, which they are disposed to fulfill as best they can in the course of their lives. But not all purposes are of equal weight. Human beings find some kinds of purpose to be more important, others less so. Some are good, others bad. Human beings are called on to decide between conflicting purposes, at first glance of equal significance and value. At this point we recognize the presence of a second "built-in" in our lives, what Becker calls the "aesthetic nature of human life." Experiencing the conflicts that purposiveness generates, we notice our inherent disposition to seek what gives pleasure, or satisfaction, and equilibrium, or some perduring sense of well-being. It is

the reasonableness of holding that there do in fact exist such universally shared features of human life. Indeed a more extensive treatment of the three presumptive criteria would make it easier to understand and, in my opinion, to sympathize with Becker's argument and position. In any case, Becker surely considers his descriptions of purposiveness, personalness, and the aesthetic nature of life as at least a tentative beginning toward a fuller, more accurate characterization of human existence.

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this universally shared orientation that, at least in part, determines which purposes get priority. In other words, "purposiveness" and "the aesthetic nature of life" need not be regarded as separate and distinct features of human life—something Becker, apparently, would have us do.

So, we can safely, it seems to me, "presume" all men and women to be purposive seekers of satisfaction and a sense of well-being. These purposive seekers, however, are also characterized by "personalness," that is, as I would have it, capacities and dispositions for rationality, freedom, creativity, communication, love, self-respect, etc. Now my contention is that, already within our lives, personalness absorbs and transforms the other two "built-ins" (and any others as well?) and thus best identifies the fundamental interest of human beings. For personalness already disposes human beings to seek only that satisfaction and well-being connected with and befitting one aware, self-conscious, rational, free, creative, capable of love and self-respect, etc. By way of summary, against, or beyond, the analysis of Becker, I propose (i) that the "purposive," "aesthetic," and "personal" features of human life manifest a discernible unity and harmony, and (ii) that, compared with the other two, "personalness" takes priority in that it expresses more comprehensively and exactly what it is to be and fluorish as a human being.

I realize of course that my now my own neck is fully exposed. For I am claiming that all "normally-fomed" human beings, in virtue of their "personalness," have dispositions for rationality, freedom, love, self-respect, and the rest; these are the capacities they want to activate and exercise; these are the goods they want to realize. Not "should want"; "want"! My claim is a factual claim. And my evidence is the same sort of evidence offered by Becker (and, indeed, Gewirth) in his starker, to say the least, description of species-wide features of human beings: my knowledge of myself and others around me as well as what I have learned in general—from literature, the arts, history, the social and natural sciences—of the aspirations, motivations, evaluations, successes, failures, etc., etc. of men and women. Clearly I am not claiming privileged knowledge or evidence available only to me; rather I claim that you too already have this knowledge, based on similar evidence. Since moral philosophers undoubtedly will object, I shall try to develop and defend my position by anticipating several possible challenges and giving my responses.

Before I begin, however, I wish to propose a shift in terminology. In the imaginary dialogue that follows, I shall for the most part disgard the inelegant word, "personalness," and use instead the more commodiuos and accurate expression, "ideal of the person." I do so with the words of R. M. Hare in mind: "for an ideal is a kind of desire or liking." I have another reason for this change in terminology. I deliberately use the phrase, "the ideal of the person," in order to echo John Rawls' "model-conception" of a "moral person." For Rawls, such a "model-conception" articulates our shared

¹²R. M. Hare, "Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism," included in *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, edited by Amaryta Sen & Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), p. 29. My entire argument, of course, is opposed to Hare's.

¹³See John Rawls' Dewey Lectures, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 77 (September 1980), 520 ff. But see also Rawls' "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, *III*, (Salt Lake City: Univ. of Utah Press, 1982), pp. 3–87; on p. 14 Rawls says: "This conception (of the person) is not to be mistaken for an ideal of personal life (for example, an ideal of friendship) or as an ideal for members of some association, much less as a moral ideal such as the Stoic ideal of a wise man." I still have to figure out both precisely what Rawls is saying and then what I want to say back. I save that for another paper.

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moral convictions and specifies the "highest-order" interests that are to be our bases for moral deliberation and decision. I would assign a similar twofold role to my "ideal of the person." I shall make some reference to Rawls in what follows, but, for the time being, I leave it to the reader to decide to what extent my account diverges from his. Right now my concern is to defend the following position: human beings are at least implicitly aware of and drawn to a multi-faceted ideal of the person; they recognize its authoritative status and want to realize it in their lives.

(1) Challenge: If human beings are the way you say they are and want the things you say they do, why so frequently do they behave irrationally, surrender their freedom, botch up opportunities for creativity, communication, love, self-respect?

Response:14 It is because they make mistakes—for a number of reasons. Sometimes they misjudge or miscalculate (lack or prudence or attentiveness or information). Sometimes they fail to restrain contrary passions and appetites (lack of temperance or self-control). Sometimes they are "weak of will" and fearful in the face of adversity and struggle (lack of courage or fortitude); sometimes they are simply shy and timid. Sometimes they are influenced by the bad example of those around them; infidelity to the ideal of the person is contagious (so, too, is infidelity). Sometimes they "give up," temporarily or permanently, convinced that what they really want, as persons, is beyond their grasp-due either to their own weakness or to their inability to trust or rely on others (people or institutions) whose non-interference and/or cooperation is required. Sometimes they fail to regognize that the goods defined by the ideal of the person are achieved by means of the opposite of selfishness. Sometimes they lose sight of this ideal or are confused about what, say, freedom, love, or self-respect really mean. Sometimes-and this is the most serious "mistake" of all and, perhaps, to a degree mixed in with all the others-they deliberately choose and act against their own persons. (Why do contemporary philosphers pay scant attention to this aspect of moral experience?) There are, undoubtedly, additional ways to account for the mistakes we make. But far from feeling challenged by the fact of their frequency and variety, I offer mistakes themselves as evidence of our awareness of the ideal of the person. The sense of self-diminishment, of being at odds with ourselves, of distress and guilt which accompanies or follows such mistakes discloses the overriding demands of this ideal within our lives.15

(2) *Challenge*: Isn't it a matter of fact that people value as ends all kinds of things? Different people have different ideals that they pursue. As John Rawls insists, "Human good is heterogenous because the aims of the self are heterogenous." ¹⁶

Response: In view of their very different backgrounds, educations, social situations, talents, tastes, preferences, etc., people obviously and legitimately aspire to shape their lives in an infinite variety of ways. They frequently revise and at times radically alter their goals. It makes sense to ask, however, how individuals are to decide what goals

¹⁴I had already composed this "response" when I came upon a passage written by Richard Hooker which is a remarkable match with what I say here. See his *Of the Laws of Eccelsiastical Polity*, edited by Georges Edelen (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1977) pp. 79–81.

"sins," when repentant, we often regard and refer to as "mistakes." We do this not necessarily to deny responsibility, but because in hindsight at least we recognize them to be against our best interests, self-defeating—in this sense, mistakes, even if intentional ones. I am grateful to J. B. Schneewind for pushing me on this point.

¹⁶John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), p. 554.

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are generally worth pursuing.17 I am claiming that underlying and, as it were, pressing to direct these aspirations and choices is the consciousness of a more fundamental ideal or purpose. To argue this, I can only appeal to the ordinary human experience of deliberation, our awareness of ourselves as we weigh possible choices of means to ends or of ends themselves. My claim is that we know, within deliberative inquiry, that the situation calls for more than simply naked existential choice, or following whim or inclination, or staying within the bounds of some previously accepted rule, or making sure the choice fits in with the purposes, the projects and life-plans, we have already adopted. We are aware that in our choices we shape ourselves. It is not enough that a choice be objectively right-that is, consistent with some "determinate end"; it must be subjectively right as well-that is, consistent with the ideal of the person, prior to all choice. In this sense, "the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it." When the ideal of the person is neglected, "the self is disfigured"; it is not living true to form.18 And one further remark: the preceding does not imply that perfect fidelity (if it were conceivable) to the ideal of the person would result in loss of individuality. Quite the opposite. In virtue of our marvelous (as it is surely fitting to describe them) differences, there would obviously have to be as many unique embodiments of this ideal as there were human beings. Fidelity to the ideal of the person is progress towards authentic individuality.

(3) Challenge: All of us are conscious of, what might be called from the point of view of your "ideal of the person." neutral or negative dispositions. Why disqualify these as not "worthy" of inclusion as natural norms? Aren't you begging the question?

Response: I yield to the temptation to remark sarcastically that I find it difficult to imagine that anyone would seriously raise this question without sensing its absurdity. Philosophy has lost its bearings once again! (And if we do sense its absurdity, that sense itself provides another "window" through which the ideal of the person present within human experience might be glimpsed.) But something more than Thomas Reid's strategy of "ridicule" is appropriate here. The question might be re-posed (and then answered) in terms reminiscent of Bishop Butler: granted, the personal ideal is or could be one motivating principle in our lives; but we are also conscious of other conflicting and powerful springs of action; why assign greatest authority to the demands of this ideal? This brings us to a crucial moment for any account of the moral life. Utilitarians prepare to welcome a new defector to their camp; non-utilitarians prepare to burn another heretic at the stake. I do think that an impressive case can be (and frequently has been) made for the superior satisfaction-producing potential of fidelity to

¹⁷Confer E. J. Bond, *Reason and Value* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983). The entire book is devoted to this question.

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¹⁸The three preceding phrases in quotations are the words of John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice*. The first two are from p. 560, the last from p. 554. Rawls rejects explicitly what I am arguing here. But his own words, I would contend, implicitly support my argument. Confer Robert Johann, "Rationality, Justice, and Dominant Ends," included in *The Value of Justice*, edited by Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 11–27.

¹⁹Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1969). "We may observe…to discountenance absurdity, nature has given us a particular emotion, to wit, that of ridicule, which seems intended for this very purpose of putting out of countenance what is absurd, either in opinion or practice" (p. 606).

²⁰Confer, in D. D. Raphael, (*British Moralists*, *II*), especially Butler's Sermon II of *Fifteen Sermons*, pp. 346–355, and his "Dissertation of the Nature of Virtue," pp. 378–386. In both passages, Butler argues the distinction between the power and authority of conscience.

the ideal of the person, and, to the extent it can, such considerations might assist appreciation of and commitment to the personal thrust of our lives. But these considerations are not decisive, not really relevant. The ideal of the person is normative not because it shows the way to greatest satisfaction. Nor is it normative because it is in fact the strongest influence in our lives; that it is at least sometimes out-muscled by other propensities and desires is obvious to us all. To make evident the authority of the ideal of the person, I point to three features of our shared experience of the moral life. (a) However powerful our drives in their direction, we see, in a "cool hour," with the same immediacy as sense perception, that things like murder, torture, rape, lying, breaking promises, etc. are wrong. (b) We have spontaneous and firm feelings of approval for men and women who are benevolent, fair, honest, faithful, etc.; we have feelings of disapproval for those who are malevolent, unfair, dishonest, unfaithful, etc. (c) Aware of our moral deficiencies, we most often try to disguise them and present ourselves in a way that will gain this approval of others or, at a minimum, avoid their disapproval. How else account for these experiences except that some ideal standard for us as persons is already operative within our lives? Our indisputable moral judgments flow from the simultaneous and deeper recognition that certain actions which are condemned in the light of this standard, are not worthy of persons. Our moral approvals and disapprovals are our felt response to evaluations of character traits and intentions against this same standard. Our concern to show a particular public image reveals that we know already the ideal according to which our character and conduct as persons are rightly judged. And finally is not what we call conscience our more or less lively sense of what, in our character and conduct, is and is not proportionate to the ideal that measures us as persons?

(4) Challenge: What about "moral monsters" whose words, actions, and way of life indicate absolutely no understanding or experience of what you call "the ideal of the person"?

Response: I have three brief remarks before addressing this issue directly. (a) Even in imagining the "moral monster," we are simultaneously aware of an ideal of the person whose qualities the "monster" lacks. (b) Earlier I stressed that people are prone to back away from this ideal and to make "mistakes"; the cumulative effect of such mistakes is a deadening of the consciousness of the ideal itself, and so it could, I suppose, fade completely away. (c) When examining a thesis like mine, which attempts to find substantial moral agreement at the outset of inquiry, philosophers, I feel, are too anxious to rush off to scour the annals of crime, mental illness, and anthropological research in order to find the exception that confutes the theory. We would do better first to ponder our own experience. I for one have never met anyone of whom it could be said conclusively that he or she had no awareness at all of the ideal of the person; on the contrary, I testify, people in general have a lively sense of this ideal despite, at times, much evil in their lives. Even the seemingly worst among us resist and resent not being treated "as persons." These comments made, theoretically I handle the "moral monster" objection as Becker would: such individuals are not "normally-formed." They are

²¹In A Discourse of Natural Religion, Samuel Clarke offers six clever examples to show that even the thoroughly wicked, who display no sense of self-condemnation, nevertheless "cannot avoid making a discovery of it sometimes when they are not aware of it." Confer D. D. Raphael (British Moralists, I), pp. 204–206.

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like someone who either never learned a langauge, any language, or, if it is possible beyond some uncontrollable physical or psychological explanation, forgot the language(s) he or she once knew. If "moral monsters" exist, they pose a practical problem for moral community, but not a theoretical problem for moral philosophy. As the eminently sensible Bishop Butler wrote: "The nature of man is...to be judged...by what appears in the common world, in the bulk of mankind."²²

(5) Challenge: You realize, of course, that you have strayed far from Becker's proposed "procedures." His recommendation was to use as "presumptive" criteria for moral judgments non-controversial, species-wide characteristics of human beings. Your reworking of "personalness" is controversial at best. And even if one is drawn toward your way of identifying and handling fundamental moral questions, would it not be more correct to regard your "ideal of the person" as specifying not what human beings want in fact, but what human beings should want, or would want if they better understood their nature?

Response: First of all, to repeat, I do present my amplified version of "personalness" as a "presumptive" criterion, for it is, I claim, "in no ordinary sense chosen, adopted, or assumed" (Becker, p. 64); it is a "built-in," the way we are. My contention is that, if we stop and look, we can find at the center of human existence a commonly shared ideal of the person. I can only speculate why this assertion is "controversial": sometimes what is most obvious is most difficult to see; or it is too good to be true; or such an ideal, given human weakness and social conditions, is too demanding; or such an ideal, if acknowledged, would entail the painful recognition and admission of one's own inadequacies and failings; or we screen out the authoritative challenge of this ideal because, in our sluggishness, we realize that to follow its promptings will require reformation of character and way of life, will be inconvenient and costly; or, finally, the ideal, even if it receives our attention and commitment, does not automatically solve life's problems, and thus we search futilely for some more precise criterion, for example, one that might serve as major premiss in moral reasoning. My supposition, of course, is that the ideal of the person specifies what people would want if they better understood their nature, although human motivations are complex, and all of us are more or less ornery, lazy, and weak-willed. The ideal of the person also specifies what people should want; in Becker's terms, this basic orientation is "given" a "built-in" disposition of human life and so is "presumptively valid" as a criterion for moral choice. Commitment to the ideal of the person is not itself a matter for deliberation in light of some more fundamental interest; it is, rather, a matter of self-appropriation.

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(6) Challenge: You have admitted in passing, but with no sign of concern, that your "ideal of the person" conception is vague. Isn't it blurred, unfocused, and thus of little worth? It is hard to see how such a vague ideal would function effectively as a criterion for deciding what is right, good, or virtuous.

Response: This paper, I admit, pretends to be little more than a reminder that, despite distractions and confusions, we know already, in broad outline, what we genuinely want, and that our task is creatively to realize that ideal as best we can in the tangle of daily life. A tradition in philosophy that is at least as ancient as Socrates and Plato regards the effort to know as the effort to make the vague less vague. Becker has given good advice on how to deal, in general, with moral questions. I have followed up on

that advice with my efforts to revise and deepen his account of the "personalness" which we all share. I have tried, in other words, to make the vague less vague. Much more needs to be done to give the ideal of the person fuller conceptual expression; and, no doubt, this should be an ongoing interdisciplinary enterprise. (Incidentally, from a somewhat different angle, isn't the traditional understanding of humanistic education as inherently moral founded on convictions very like the ones I am defending? The liberal arts and sciences aim to give a more sensitive and subtle appreciation of what it is to exist, struggle, and flourish as human persons.) Still, I think, with this ideal and its authoritative status in mind, we are equipped to move on to moral questions of principle and practice, even if, often, we find it necessary, as a result of philosophical debate or "real-life" dilemmas and disagreements, to return and re-examine, to appreciate anew, our underlying conception of the person. That should be the dialectic of all moral inquiry. The ideal of the person may be vague and ambiguous, but it is not vacuous or amorphous; and through reflection and experience it can become less vague and ambiguous. Our formulations of what it means to be a person, it is safe to predict, will always be inadequate, at best "rough and ready." This might trouble someone who wants to reason, deductively, from some supreme moral principle in order to settle particular moral issues. I would insist, however, that moral judgment is just that-judgment, not sheer application of rules. Our conception of the personal should guide our moral judgments and our choice of moral principles; in deliberating over these, we check to see if they are consistent, in harmony with, this understanding of ourselves. But more than that, we talk about the moral point of view and moral sensibilities. My claim is that, when these things are correctly viewed, we see that it is the awareness of the ideal of the person, already present, that informs and shapes the moral point of view and enlivens and fine-tunes moral sensibilities.

(7) Challenge: You have stressed that moral theory must deal with the egoist at its starting point. Do you claim that your account has successfully met the egoist's challenge?

Response: Not entirely, although my conception of the personal obviously implies the interpersonal. My next move then would be to draw this out. I would not rely on some "dialectically necessary" argument such as this: the egoist, forced to admit his own personalness and its exigencies for the conduct of his life, logically must acknowledge and affirm the personalness of others like him. How odd! Rather I would argue that the genesis and maintenance of personal life, as I have described it, take place in community. An individual becomes and develops as rational, free, creative, loving, communicative, etc.—he gains self-respect—through his interactions and relationships with others. In other words, human beings exist and flourish as persons in relation to other persons, by their membership and participation in community. To talk about human beings as persons is to talk about them as persons-in-community; to talk about the personal life of human beings is to talk about their communal life. Thus to propose the ideal of the person as a final criterion for the justification of moral judgment is to claim that morality is grounded in the "interpersonal structure of human existence."23 I note, without full discussion, that John Rawls, in constructing his theory of justice as fairness, posits, alongside that of "a moral person," a companion "model conception" of "a well-ordered society."24 Together these "model conceptions," which are meant to formulate what is

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latent in ordinary experience, provide a framework for moral deliberation and reasoning. As I interpret him, the two conceptions of person and society are not separate and discrete; they are complementary and overlapping. In any case, that would be my position on the relationship between the ideals of the person and community, a position which I have only begun to sketch here.

CONCLUSION

We should return to where we started. The last words of Becker's book are these:

In summary, then, what has been accomplished in these pages—if the arguments in them are substantially valid—is no more and no less than what can be expected of a prolegomenon to moral theory: a demonstration that a rational moral theory is both possible and worthwhile, and a schema for beginning its construction. To demand more is to demand a substantive moral theory. If the arguments of this book are correct, that step has been made substantially easier. (Pp. 193–194).

Clearly Alan Gewirth is one philosopher who endorses the main element in Becker's justification procedures. For he attempts to develop a "substantive moral theory" which is grounded in the "built-ins," the "givens" of human existence. He starts with the facts of human voluntariness and purposiveness, and claims to derive from them a fundamental moral principle. But by ignoring at his starting point the "personal" dimension of human life, Gewirth unfolds a conception of morality which, in both its derivation and application, is unappealing and even oppressive, hardly inspires commitment, is not very convincing to the egoist—at least, not to the egoist in me.

This paper has urged three main theses. (1) In working out a moral theory, we should follow Becker's proposal (and even, in a way, Gewirth's example) and begin with a description of the "givens" of human existence. (2) An accurate description includes and gives priority to what I have called the ideal of the person. (3) Inquiry concerning moral value, duty, or virtue is the effort (in partnership and dialogue) to determine and create what fits in with our mutual interest as persons; for the moral is to be understood not as that which restricts or contravenes our desires and purposes, but as that which transforms, orders, and fulfills them. Underlying all three theses is this conviction about the rationality of the moral life: to ignore moral demands is not merely to contradict oneself logically; it is to contradict oneself.

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²³Robert O. Johann, "Person, Community and Moral Commitment," included in *Person and Community*, edited by Robert J. Roth (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1975), p. 172.

²⁴See "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," pp. 520.

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The Dharma in Jainism

Bijayananda Kar

JAINISM has a long established tradition. It is said that Jainism is older than the Vedic and Upandishadic tradition. From the earliest times till today it has undergone a number of changes and ramifications probably taking into consideration the changing social requirements. Jainism can be viewed from two principal standpoints, viz, as dharma and as darshana. As a dharma at least it has a firm basis in the Indian context. Some of its cardinal principles like self-effort (atma cesta), adherence to truth (satya), and non-violence (ahimsa) are highly relevant in the social plane of any age. As a darshana its advocacy of relativism in the sphere of both epistemology and metaphysics has been regarded as a powerful antidote for all types of absolutistic doctrines. To make a review of Jainism in both these aspects is not possible in the present paper. That is why I have restricted my study here to the Jaina concept of dharma alone. In the course of my disussion, however, I shall have to refer to other related concepts like religion, God, and morality.

I DHARMA AND RELIGION

Though the terms 'dharma' and 'religion' have been used interchangeably, it is also true that there is a distinct difference between them. Traditionally, 'dharma' means the sustaining principle which is meant to bind or unite men (dharmah dharayati prajah). In certain circles the principle of unification has been further extended from the human social plane to the entire natural living plane, and then to the supernatural realm in which all the spiritual entities or souls are supposed to exist. It may be noted here that dharma is primarily understood as a social principle for cohesion, integration, and solidarity in the worldly (laukika) context; though later on some extensions are made to the supra-social (alaukika or atijagatika) sphere.

'Religion,' on the other hand, means a human recognition of super-human controlling power and especially of a personal God entitled to obedience. In this sense religion without the sense of suprasensuous or supernatural divine power as creating and controlling the world is obviously inadmissible. In this context the cognate relation between the concepts of religion and theology can easily be noted. For theology too stands for the study of God and man's duty to Him. In putting the whole matter in a broader perspective one can say that religion stands for the belief in a transcendental divine power, and theology, accepting the religious stand, seeks to find out a rational justification for this belief. Of course in modern times many have preferred to use the term 'religion' rather more widely so as to include within its compass atheism.

Once this concession is admitted, even theoretically, such very different approaches as Buddhism and Marxism are designated as religions. Marxism is avowedly anti-theistic, unspiritualistic, and is based upon a radical materialistic foundation. Bud-

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dhism, on the other side, is clearly spiritualistic and does not advocate an iconoclastic attitude. But since it does not propagate the doctrine of a theistic God, it also is regarded as atheistic. Now it may be a point of discussion as to how far the extension of the term 'religion' is valid in regard to atheistic formulations. At least it seems quite clear that the same principle is not consistently honoured when one maintains, for example, Buddhism, Islam, and Marxism all to be religions.

II THE IDEA OF GOD AND THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA

Having made these brief preliminary observations about *dharma* and religion, let me now embark upon some of the foundational principles of Jaina *dharma*. In this *dharma* there is no scope for belief in God. It is not that Jainism is silent about the existence of God but rather is found to be outspoken in finding difficulties in different theistic arguments. Both Prabhacandra¹ and Mallisena² have advanced the view that no argument based either on perception or on inference can prove the existence of God. The Naiyayikas' inferential arguments for the existence of God have been shown by them in this connection to be invalid. I need not go to the details of the Jaina anti-theistic arguments since that is not my purpose here. My interest is to take note of the fact that Jaina *dharma* is explicitly atheistic in the sense that it repudiates the idea of God in its framework.

Of course this does not necessitate the remark that the Jaina conception of dharma is untraditional. Though in an ordinary popular sense dharma seems to have stood for offering devotion to some supernatural agency, Jainism has built up a tradition since antiquity according to which man is independent, with a sense of self-control, and he does not feel the need of acknowledging any outer agent in determining his destiny.3 No God, or any such mystical transcendental power, has been conceived within the framework of this dharma to whom one is to surrender to seek for His grace. This, therefore, is termed adhyatma or atmika dharma in which independence and freedom to the individual is fully guaranteed.4 This dharma is, of course, spiritual in its fervour in so far as it acknowledges the independence of the individual person (jiva). Here it should be marked that a distinct emphasis has been laid down on the rational discriminative aspect of the individual personality by means of which the person can choose, decide, and intellectually commit himself to a certain course of thought, as well as of action, that is solely conducive to the dharmic principle. No external agency is conceived here to give direction or command. And as such, all sorts of devotion (bhakti), quite meaningful within the theistic plane, are simply set aside in the Jaina framework.

This observation has led me to note another significant aspect of Jaina *dharma*, i.e. its adherence to *karma*, "doctrine." The acceptance of karmic principle is made in so far as it effectively challenges the idea of blind fatalism and the helplessness of the individual person at the hands of an unseen mystical God or such other agency. Jaina *dharma* insists that *karma* by itself and without the interference of any supernatural power of divinity is quite sufficient to account for the whole of experience; and a sound

¹Prabhacandra, *Prameyakamalamartanda* (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1912). Chapter II. ²Mallisena, *Syadvada-mañjari*, A.B. Dhruva, ed. (Bombay: Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. 83, 1933), verse VI.

³C. S. K. Jain, *Jainism in Orissa* (Fatehpur-Sekhawati: Chandi Prasad Jain, 1984), p. 2. ⁴Pandit Nilakantha Das, *Śrimad Bhagabadgita* (in Oriva), 2nd edition. (Cuttack: New Students *pithika*, 1963), p. 82.

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moral responsibility is well recognised in the case of each individual so far as his thought and action are concerned. Probably, in the context of Jainism, it has been effectively noted for the first time that the idea of *karma* and the theistic idea of God are logically independent of each other and any kind of intermingling of the two brings nothing but conceptual obscurities. It is not, of course, the purpose here to go into the details of Jaina account of *karma*. Whether *karma*-doctrine as a retributive theory of justice is itself sound within a moral dimension is not pursued here. My interest is to remark that within Jaina dharmic framework, the doctrine of *karma* is quite consistently maintained without any theistic foundation.

III THEOLOGY AND GOD-HEAD

Now, even accepting that Jaina *dharma* is opposed to the admittance of theistic God, an attempt has been made in many spheres to accommodate somehow this *dharma* within the theological framework by pointing out that it, in spite of its disbelief in God, puts faith in god-head. Hiriyanna, for instance, writes:

If, on the other hand, we take 'atheistic' as not 'believing in God,' which is its sense in English, a doubt may well arise regarding the character of Jainism. For it believes in no God, though it does in god-head.⁵

A practice in vogue in Jaina *dharma* is to meditate on, and even to worship, the liberated ones. It is thought that they possess the God-like perfections. Offering of prayers or *pañca-paramesti*⁶ is a common practice among the Jainas. This has led to suppose that Jaina *dharma* is not averse to theology. On account of this, perhaps, Hopkins holds that it is "a theological mean between Brahmanism and Buddhism."

But if one takes up the issue warily, one may find that belief in god-head is entirely a different move and need not put this dharma in a theological setting. Once God, who is supposed to be the creator in theological literature, is found as not admissible, it is futile to entertain the idea of god-head. Because how can the idea of god-head be formed in the system without the admissibility of the idea of God? Moreover, theology which is grounded on the conception of a theistic divine power as the creator of the world cannot significantly make a move for substituting the idea of god-head in place of God. Again, what can at all be the implication of god-head within the Jaina dharmic framework? The so-called god-head is said to have been applicable to the Tirthankaras who were men but obtained moksa through personal efforts. Out of the pañca-paramestis, the first one is Arhat or the ideal dharmic man who attains this ideal within the limits of his life on earth. Even Siddhas etc. are supposed to be originally men and have been said to have attained the ideal goal through their own efforts. No God or other such mystical agent is required for the enlightenment of the seeker. It is man who has been claimed as capable of attaining the dharmic excellence without any aid from theistic source. If Tirthankaras are respected and some prayers are offered to them, it need not be construed that they are treated as supernatural divine powers or agents but rather they are

⁵M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), p. 170.

⁶The pañca-paramestis are the Arhats, the Siddhas, the Acaryas, the Upadhyayas and the Sadhus. See Nemicandra, Drayva-sangraha, ed., with English translation, by S. C. Ghoshal (Arrah: The Central Jaina Publishing House, 1917), verse XLIX.

⁷E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1902), p. 283.

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honoured as victors and leaders of humanity whose noble thought and action continue to inspire their followers.

Furthermore it may be marked here that in the sphere of theology there is a definite chasm between the idea of God and that of man. However perfect man may be, he can never attain the status of God. Conceptually God is placed in an altogether seperate citadel to which man can never aspire to reach. Man at best can look for His compassion and grace. That is why the Indian Vaisnavite belief, which is clearly theological in its basic formulation, maintains quite consistently a distinction between *jiva* and *Iswara* and never suggests that *jiva* attains the status of God as such. This shows that the Jaina account of Tirthankara is precisely untheological. Because there is no scope on the part of the enlightened ones to seek grace from God or some such other mystical agency. On the very absence of a theistic concept of God it seems almost irrelevant to picture Jaina *dharma* in the theological setting.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the idea of God, or even deification, has never been encouraged in the Jaina tradition so far as the attainment of the highest is concerned. It is said:

In the popular practices of the Jaina cult the usual Hindu gods are implored for minor favors. However, all attachment to gods should cease, but weak men are obliged to develop a sort of devotion towards the great Tirthankaras, who have passed beyond the godly estate of the natural order.⁸

This clarifies that the idea of God has never been entertained within the conceptual framework of Jaina *dharma*. Only as a concession to the weaker and non-discriminative individuals of society who cannot all at once move to the difficult path of *dharma* and are somehow tuned with the mystical theistic set-up, a provisional concession has been sanctioned, as it were, to pray and worship the *Tirthankaras* for guidance and inspiration. But finally these, as noted above, do not really count. For the individual is to move higher in the dharmic procedure only through his own self-effort and self-reliance. It has been thus rightly pointed out in this context that worship is not seeking for mercy and pardon. It is merely meant for purification of mind and proper concentration. If one can attain self-confidence without all these, so much the better. It is the attitude of self-help which characterizes the Jaina dharmic framework.

All this shows that this dharma is distinctly against any form of theism. In this connection Zimmer's remark that Jainism "is not atheistic; it is transtheistic" seems to be wholly unacceptable. For what does transtheism mean? Does it not suggest a sense of "beyond"? And, in that sense, if depicted as beyond theism, what does become the distinguishing mark between atheism and transtheism? If the celebrated author thinks that atheism has a negative tone while transtheism has no such implication then it can be said that Jaina dharma is rather atheistic than transtheistic. Because it is not simply silent about theistic claims but, as already pointed out before, is openly against all sorts of theism by advancing clearly anti-theistic arguments. Probably the difficulty lies with such oriental scholars in trying to read the Indian conception of dharma, particularly the Jaina conception, through the background of the western ideas of religion and theology.

*Ruth Reyna, Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Bombay: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. Ltd., 1971),

⁹S. Chatterjee and D. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 6th edition (Calcutta: the Univ. of Calcutta, 1960), p. 111.

¹⁰Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of India (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953), p. 182.

IV JAINA DHARMA AS SPIRITUALISTIC HUMANISM

Now, it may be pointed out that though the Jaina dharmic framework is independent of any version of theism, it is still rooted in some form of supernaturalism and transcendentalism. The Jaina Tirthankaras who are taken as the enlightened ones are supposed to be eternally remaining in a state of fourfold perfection (ananta catustaya). After their ordinary mortal state of existence, they do not cease to exist; they are supposed to stay forever. Death of a jiva is inconceivable. Obviously their eternal state of existence cannot be accounted for naturally and a supernatural explanation is called for. To put it differently, Jainism admits the survival of jiva. Though a hope is allowed within this dharmic framework that each man is capable of attaining the highest and that, too, during one's own lifetime, the survival of the person in a disembodied state is perhaps not ruled out. A free or mukta jiva does not have an ephemeral but an eternal state of existence. This suggests that that dharma, in so far as its fundamentals are concerned, is not this-worldy but other-worldy, not social but supra-social. Though it differs from a theistic conception of religion, it is somewhat close to that by accommodating within its bosom spiritualism based on transcendentalism and supernaturalism. Moreover the strict austere practices prescribed for the Jainas reveal the radical ascetic character of this dharma and for that, this attitude is repudiated as extremely negativistic. This has facilitated the remark that Jainism is "a philosophy of the profoundest pessimism."11

Now, let me review this estimation. Though it is the case that Jainism admits the distinctive significance of spirit or jiva, it is to be noted that the description of the same which this dharma offers, is somewhat peculiar. Unlike the general orthodox conception of jiva (i.e., mostly found in several forms of Brahmanic faith) here in Jainism one finds jiva as changing (paranamin) and it is conceived as equal in extent to its body.12 That means here there is no conception of spirit as unchanging substance devoid of body. Though jiva and ajiva are admitted as distinct categories (tattvas) in the system and the dharmic goal consists in complete freedom of jiva from the karmic particles (pudgalas), and in that context one comes across such descriptions as bhava-moksa and dravya-moksa, the very acceptance of jiva as equal in extent to its own body puts Jaina formulation in an entirely different set-up. Even it is said that the emancipated jiva maintains the form of its last physique forever.13 This, if granted, reveals that in Jainism there is no conception of disembodied spirit. The present mortal physical embodiment is, of course, transitory. But the survival of spirit is conceived here not in an absolutely disembodied manner. This shows that jiva and ajiva, though conceived as distinguishable, are inseparable according to the followers of Jainism. "Each, according to them, implies the other, for they assert that nothing is wholly independent and can be understood by itself."14 And this is found to be quite consistent with their general metaphysical standpoint of Anekantavada.

But here a question may be raised. Even if *jiva* is conceived as inseparable from *ajiva* and this supposition supports the idea of survival of spirit not in a disembodied but in an embodied manner (though much different from the ordinary mortal formulation), this point of explanation does not seem to exonerate this *dharma* from the charge of

¹¹ Ibid., p. 227.

¹²Mohan Lal Meheta, Jaina Philosophy (Varanasi: P. V. Research Institute, 1971), pp. 98-102.

¹³ Ibid., p. 110.

¹⁴Balbir Singh, Foundations of Indian Philosophy (New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd., 1971), p. 223.

supernaturalism, negativism, and supra-socialism. Rather by prescribing an ordeal of austerities and self-abnegation, 15 this *dharma* is pointing at inhumanity. In this connection the radical practice of following *ahimsa* even to animals and insects has been cited as a move towards gross animism and much away from human consideration.

It is, however, the case that amongst certain followers of this *dharma* there has been found the acceptance of some such radical moves. This *dharma*, as indicated before, has a long history from antiquity and has witnessed many changes. After all, *dharma* basically is a social institution. It always strives to keep a balance between the social as well as individual needs and at the same time tries to keep the morale of both the sides on a reasonably acceptable pitch. At times, because of certain localised pressures, prevailing taboos and customs, one finds some foreign, unwanted, elements being inculcated into the dharmic framework. This has given rise to some sort of confusion about the proper understanding of the *dharma* itself. Consequently, certain unreasonable customs and practices are mistaken as inherently belonging to the core of *dharma* as such. Dharmic ideas as well as practices need not, however, be construed as absolutely static and closed, so that no change can be embraced within the system. It does, of course, allow modification keeping itself vigilant to the human needs without rupturing the social ethos.

This is, it seems to me, quite true in case of Jaina dharma. Historically, Jainism is said to have grown as a strong reaction to several social taboos and injustices. Not only offering of animals, but even of men, at the sacrificial pyre has been strongly felt by the wise men as substantially affecting the social ethos and consequently a revision at the dharmic order is called for. One of the cardinal principles of Jaina dharma, i.e., nonviolence, is aimed against this act of inhumanity which is not only pernicious to the interest of the individual but also to that of society. In other words, Jaina dharma seems to have been originated purely with a prior consideration of human as well as social need. Its emphasis on non-injury to living beings need not suggest an animism which goes counter to human interest. Rather, the early Jaina teachers make it clear that it is the sense of fellow-feeling and equity on which ahimsa is based.16 The Jaina attitude towards ahimsa is also said to have been based on their metaphysical stipulation regarding the potential equality of all jivas. 17 I think, the Jainas here welcome only such metaphysical, or even supernatural, speculation that does not go counter to the interest of humanity but must in a definite sense supplement it. Dharma, if viewed in this manner, is significant from a socio-moral viewpoint and is thus fundamentally humanistic in nature.

On the one side, so far as Jainism is concerned, there is reasonable reaction against rigid doctrinal ritualism that is in the form of offering of sacrifices to the supernatural sources with the blind hope of getting some favour; and on the other side, there is equal reaction against the gross hedonistic and materialistic tendency according to which the world of passion and sensuality is the only goal to be pursued irrespective of the harm it may cause to the social order. If, according to the first, a supernatural mystical being is though to grant favour, and for that reason all sorts of inhuman activities are encouraged, then equally, at the other end, in the plea to have maximum gross sensuous

¹⁵It is said that for Jainism suicide is a virtue for it "increaseth life." After twelve years of ascetic preparation, a śramana may cause his own death, since nirvana is assured. See Ruth Reyna, op. cit., p. 90.

¹⁶Hermann Jacobi, *The Gaina Sutras*, The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. X (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901), pp. 38-39.

¹⁷S. Chatterjee and D. Datta, op. cit., p. 107.

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enjoyment, the noble spiritual element in man is sacrificed at the altar of crude materialism.

As against both these extremes, Jainism posits a meaningful alternative. It neither advocates a *dharma* of other-worldly theistic transcendentalism which is detrimental to human needs and aspirations on the socio-moral plane, nor does it support materialistic this-worldliness based on unethical and unsocial tendencies which threaten the very foundation of humanity. It is, no doubt, spiritualistic in its formulation. By advocating the ideal of *moksa* for everybody, Jaina *dharma* obviously embraces a spiritualistic outlook. But it should be remarked that this spiritual fervour, even being at times suggestive of supernatural speculations, has never been supported at the cost of human welfare in the social setting. Perhaps that is the reason why Jaina *dharma* is very conspicuous in advancing an elaborate ethical code of conduct which is to be followed by men belonging to any section of society. The *triratnas*¹⁸ of faith, knowledge and conduct, if comprehended in this manner, can be easily found as highly significant in the human perspective. It has, therefore, been rightly pointed out, "Jainism more than any other creed gives absolute religious independence and freedom to man." Bahm also holds that Jainism acclaims the ultimate value of *man*.20

From the above considerations it seems fairly clear that Jaina *dharma* is not spiritualistic in a dehumanised sense of the term. Its strict moral code aims, not at social disruption, but at social solidarity. By advocating *mohavratas* for *Śramanas* and *anuvratas* for *Śravakas* this *dharma* seems to have kept note of men of all attitudes and temperaments. It does not aim at excluding a section only because it remains somewhat asocial. Let not enlightenment be limited to the few but let it be the prerogative of the whole of mankind. This seems to be clearly the message of Jaina *dharma*. It is said, therefore, that *kevalin*, or the enlightened, leads an active life for the good of others. It reveals that the Jaina view of morality is not simply aimed at the perfection of the individual but also at the good of the community.²¹

Jaina's compassion for all living beings, as has already been said, need not suggest an animistic tendency. Human interest cannot be fully accomplished if it becomes fully apathetic toward other creatures. It seems that Jaina *dharma*, in so far as it emphasises the cause of all living beings, virtually pleads for what can be said in modern terminology: ecological balance. The ethical code of conduct that has been prescribed seems to have aimed at mending the human personality in such a manner that man can be socially acceptable. The rigidity and severity both in formulating and also in following such codes, while overlooking the human as well as social needs and requirements, seem to be largely due to some sort of perversion and degeneration. It is perhaps based on a lack of proper understanding of the spirit of the dharmic conceptual framework. If understood along the lines indicated above, this *dharma* can be best described as a form of spiritualistic humanism. It is humanism, but not in the western sense of the term, for it is not based on materialistic and naturalistic ontologies. It does accommodate some form of supernaturalism. But again, it is to be remarked here that, while accommodating

^{18 &}quot;Samyag - darśana - jñana - caritrani moksa - margah"—Umasvani, Tattvarthadhigama - Sutra, English translation by J.L. Jaini (Arrah: The Central Jaina Publishing House, 1920), verse I.

¹⁹J. L. Jaini, Outlines of Jainism (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1916), p. 3.

²⁰A. J. Bahm, *The World's Living Religions* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1964), p. 94 (italics mine).

²¹That is why the Jaina prayer reads as follows: "Let there be rain, in every proper season. Let diseases die and famine and theft be nowhere. Let the law of Jaina gives all happiness to all the living beings of the world."

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a form of supernaturalism, it does not at all move beyond the humanistic foundation. In that sense, it is not negativistic and other-worldly. Rather it pleads effectively for a spiritualistic basis of humanity in the social setting. Human welfare cannot be conceived as a plausible goal, if it is tilted towards gross materialism which overlooks the spirit in man, since (in such framework) all ethical and moral considerations become otiose.

While discussing *dharma*, I have obviously confined myself to the Jaina account. But even then I feel that the Jaina position in this regard is in the main current and acceptable to other Indian *dharmas*, *mutatis mutandis*. Further research in that direction can profitably be undertaken. Jaina *dharma*, in spite of its supernatural leanings, has been shown here as humanistic. The supernatural tendencies, found in Jainism, do not necessarily support negativism and supra-socialism. Because such tendencies, as I have argued here, are rooted in a humanitic framework. I have simply tried to explore the conceptual map of Jaina *dharma*, and I conclude that it is a form of spiritualistic humanism. I do not, however, want to make a critical appraisal of the very concept of spiritualistic humanism since I feel that is beyond the scope of the present work.

Our Glassy Essence: A Peircean Response To Richard Rorty

Stanley Harrison

INTRODUCTION

PEIRCE'S CLAIM that the individual human being or person not only uses signs but is a sign (5.314;6.270;7.583;)¹ is now well known and has evoked extensive commentary, not only within the philosophical community but among others as well.² Many have found Peirce's semiotic view provocative, original, and rich with implications for understanding persons and the interpersonal world. But today it seems more apparent than ever that Peirce's original and striking linkage in 1868 between the being of man and the being of language was a genuine precursor of what was to emerge during the next one hundred years of philosophy as an increasingly central philosophical concern, namely, a concentration on the reality of language and its importance for understanding the human way of being in the world.

There is, however, a certain curious feature of Peirce's semiotic interpretation of man which has recently drawn more attention, and that is his fondness for the image of 'glassy essence,' a phrase he borrowed from William Shakespeare.³ As Peirce devotees know, he invoked this image when presenting his view that man is a sign. For example, in the well known essay where Peirce first develops his striking analogy between a man and a word he writes: "We may think we distinguish between the man and the word when we do not." And then he punctuates his argument with: "...most ignorant of what we're most assured, Our glassy essence.!" (7.585).

That Peirce found the image or idea of "glassy essence" appealing seems beyond dispute because he not only invoked it in his earliest presentations of his semiotic view of man but used it as the title of an 1892 essay (6.238-6.271) and still refers to is as late as 1905 (5.519). It seems fair to say then that the image exercised a life long appeal for

¹We will follow the standard practice for citing references in *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vols. 1–6, ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Vols. 7–8, ed. by Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 2nd. edition). For example, (1.23) refers to Volume 1, paragraph 23.

²One of the best recent examples of someone outside philosophy finding important hints, perhaps solutions, in Peirce's work for basic problems in their own discipline is Milton Singer's *Man's Glassy Essence: Explorations in Semiotic Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984).

³William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, II, iii, 11. 117-123.

⁴This late reference occurs in "Consequences of Critical Common-Sensism" (5.502-5.537) within the context of a discussion about the artificialness of thinking that one can just wipe away any and all beliefs. "...but if they [one's basic beliefs] are marked with talc on man's 'glassy essence', they may disappear for a long time only to be revived by a breath" (5.519). Here Peirce is stressing the naturalness of certain beliefs against the notion of 'mind' as a *tabula rasa*. From this angle one can see the importance of the *continuity* between the semiotic life of man and the processes of nature.

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him. Yet, to my knowledge, Peirce nowhere tells his readers how these enigmatic lines are to be construed. Indeed, one might be tempted to forget about them altogether given their cryptic and admittedly paradoxical character and the fact that one can appreciate his basic semiotic doctrine without having to concern oneself unduly with seemingly opaque references to our glassy essence of which we are simultaneously assured and ignorant!

Yet there are at least two good reasons for trying to determine what Peirce meant. First, as noted, the lure of the image was obviously strong. It seems a matter of fidelity to recognize this and so a matter of curiosity to wonder why. Our suspicion is that the image of glassy essence and its attendant phrasing are in fact a compression of certain important truths for Peirce concerning man and his mode of being as a sign. This we will try to show. After all, Peirce was known for choosing his terms rather carefully, so it is not implausible to think that a proper appreciation of his doctrine of the man-sign might require giving 'glassy essence' its due.

Secondly, and more to the point here, with the publication of Richard Rorty's *Philosphy and the Mirror of Nature*⁵ it seems virtually impossible for supporters of Peirce to ignore the meaning of glassy essence. As readers of Rorty's provocative volume know, he is at pains to explain both the meaning and the historical importance of the image of glassy essence in western philosophy, particularly since Descartes. Rorty thinks this image represents a view of things, in particular a view of knowing and of human nature, which has been deeply influential and deeply mistaken in about equal parts. Briefly, it is the view (which he sees as endemic to western philosophy and beginning with Plato) that human knowing requires a special explanation, ultimately an appeal to a special "glassy essence" (an immaterial soul, which makes knowing possible and an appeal to the "essences" of things in order to have something to know. In short, it is the belief "that man has an essence—namely, to discover essences," or, as he also says, to "mirror nature." But for Rorty, there are no essences nor do we need any special one for ourselves. Consequently, this double appeal to essences is singularly mistaken on both counts.

Our first task, then, is to get clear about the precise challenge which Rorty presents. To do this one must determine what he means by glassy essence. Having done this, we will turn to the interpretation which we think Peirce had in mind when he spoke of our glassy essence. Naturally, we want to see if Rorty's view is one Peirce would have recognized as his own. If so, then the question is whether Rorty's criticisms are sound. If, however, Peirce intended something different from what Rorty has in mind then the issue is whether Rorty's criticisms are relevant at all.

RORTY'S DECONSTRUCTION OF AN IMAGE

According to Rorty "...the seeds of metaphysical problems are found in epistemological difficulties..." (p. 242). Rorty's basic thesis about mainstream western philosophy is that a profound misunderstanding about how human beings can know led, by a series of twists and turns, to what he considers to be the *cul de sac* of modern philosophy epitomized by its concern with epistemology. The seminal seed, he says, was planted by Plato's fascination with mathematics and the apparently unchanging char-

⁵Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Hereafter cited as PMN.

⁶Ibid., p. 357.

acter of mathematical objects.⁷ This Platonic decision, argues Rorty, in favor of eternal essences and their being knowable only by beings with immaterial 'souls' definitively shaped the tradition which claimed that the distinctively human task was to gain accurate representations or ideas of essences. Plato's critical choice of "ocular" metaphors, the notion of knowing as a special kind of "seeing," effectively set in motion the fateful process which culminated in what Rorty terms "the invention of the mind," a process leading eventually to the pivotal seventeenth century and the emergence of Cartesian/Lockean epistemologies with their ideas seeking accurately to copy the natures of things. Their unfathomable dualisms were the side effect of their mistaken view of knowing as something that required an immaterial knower. Kant's genius, according to Rorty, consisted in making clear (to us) that the epistemological project undertaken in the 17th century had become the central obsession of 'modern' philosophy. A doomed enterprise found its most powerful formulation and an entire period found its definition.

There are, of course, in this long story, other important characters, such as Aristotle and Aquinas. They too thought that the distinctively human task was to know the real world. They talked about 'essences' to be known and offered accounts about how we came to know them, accounts which either suggested (Aristotle's) or sought to demonstrate (Aquinas') that indeed there was something metaphysically special about human beings. But Rorty will have nothing to do with such talk because he is a materialist. Thus, both Aristotle and Aquinas, each in his own way, fail to get straight the story about knowledge, and so each historically makes a contribution to our contemporary "readiness to fall in with a specifically philosophical language game," one containing the vocabulary of 'mind,' 'soul,' 'immateriality,' 'essences,' 'correspondence to truth,' and other fictions. It is, says Rorty, a language game tied to the idea of thought as mirror, mind as a special glassy essence wherein ideas accurately reflect the nature of the real world to the inner eye; and there is, he thinks, no warrant whatsoever for this view.

Given Peirce's fondness for Aristotle, his love for the medieval scholastics, his great admiration for Kant, his commitment to the reality of generals, and his deep life-long interest in the nature of representation, it comes as no surprise that Rorty has excommunicated him from the ranks of the relevant.¹¹ The point after all, according to Rorty, is not to try to improve upon the tradition but to begin the long and difficult task of cultivating a new one. Where some see Peirce's work in semiotic as the beginning of an important modification of the 'tradition' which takes questions about knowledge seriously, Rorty sees a continuation of the confusion which needs to be therapeutically dissolved.

⁷In one sense Rorty's book is simply his working out his own misgivings with what he calls "the Platonic quest for that special sort of certainty associated with visual perception." *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁸This, in fact, is the title of Chapter I, pp. 17-59.

⁹Ibid., p. 138-139.

¹⁰*lbid.*, p. 22. The strategy of Rorty is systematically to isolate all the possible candidates which could serve as criterial of "the mental" and then try to show that none is adequate for establishing the ontological divide between mind and body. Had Plato only known as much about the brain as we do today, says Rorty, the notion of mind as ontologically special would never have arisen.

Thus, in his APA Presidential Address, "Pragmatism, Relativism, And Irrationalism," Rorty comments that Peirce never really figured out what he wanted a theory of signs for and that his real value historically arises from the stimulation that he provided for William James. See *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 53 (1982), 720.

SHATTERING DESCARTES' GLASSY ESSENCE

There are really two parts to Rorty's therapeutic effort. One has to do with showing how the notion of mind as "inner arena" or "inner space" with its "inner representations" being surveyed by an "inner eye" got established through the confusions of Descartes and Locke. Rorty aims to deconstruct the post 17th century view of mind with its alleged dualism by showing how questions about universals, raw feels, incorrigibility, pain, etc., do not rquire any appeal to any immaterial mind or soul. Yet to overcome the Cartesian ghost in the machine does not by itself destroy the option of epistemological realism. To kick out the Cartesian cogito is not necessarily to rout the belief that genuine knowledge 'mirrors' the world. And so Rorty devotes nearly two hundred pages to explain what a non-mirroring type of knowledge would look like.¹²

Now, a Peircean, when reading Rorty's discussion of the essential incoherencies of Descartes (and later the mistakes of Locke) may experience a certain feeling of déjà vu and thus grow a little impatient. After all, the mistakes or confusions which Rorty discusses are not errors attributable to Peirce. For example, Peirce is no friend of the Cartesian privileged intuitions, those alleged to "lie behind Cartesian dualism." Further, Rorty's criticism of "privileged representations" as those which somehow are "automatically and intrinsically accurate" cannot be directed at Peirce and his doctrine of fallibilism. Nor will one find any claim in Peirce that "reflections in the Mirror of Nature are intrinsically better known than nature itself."13 Moreover, Peirce is not trying to give a "quasi-mechanical account of the way in which our immaterial tablets are dented by the material world" after the manner of John Locke.14 Nor has Peirce any problem to solve concerning the existence of other minds. In sum, Rorty's attack on the notion of mind as inner arena, his removal of the Inner Eye and, probing more deeply, his pronouncement that the Kantian Transcendental Ego is not necessary, are all acceptable to Peirce. After all, Peirce led the way with his criticism of Cartesian foundationalism and, despite his great admiration and debt to Kant, made plain his own disenchantment with Kantian noumenalism very early in his career.

Moreover, and more to the point, Peirce is not a victim of 'ocular' imagery. Rorty's premise is that Plato supplied "the original dominating metaphor. . . that of having our beliefs determined by being brought face to face with the object of belief." This leads, he argues, to the concern for improving "the activity of a quasi-visual faculty, the Mirror of Nature" and to the view of knowledge as an "assemblage of accurate representations." If so, one faces the problem of having to locate within the Mirror a special privileged class of representations so compelling that their accuracy cannot be doubted. These will be the foundations of knowledge.

But Peirce does not talk about an 'eye' of the mind, nor does he describe knowing as 'seeing.' This is important because when Rorty speaks of the Mirror of Nature and of the inner eye which gazes into it in order to survey the inner representations, he has the Cartesian/Lockean view of thinking as his model. But this model, as we will show, is not one belonging to Peirce. The relevant question, then, is how Peirce understood

¹²See Part Two: "Mirroring" of PMN, pp. 129-311. ¹³Ibid., p. 174. ¹⁴Ibid., p. 143. ¹⁵Ibid., p. 163. This is one of those places where Rorty's dislike of the ocular metaphor seems virtually inseparable from his dislike of a realistic metaphysics, since Plato is indeed employing the metaphor as a way of talking about how we are constrained by Reality. But the idea of our being so constrained is just the only one Rorty doesn't think anybody can defend sufficiently well to support the claim that we can know how things are. This latter is of course what Peirce does claim. ¹⁶Ibid., p. 163.

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'mind' and the activity of 'knowing,' particularly what he meant by representing or 'mirroring' the real. But these questions cannot be answered adequately without paying attention to Peirce's view that mind is a sign and in what sense our significations do represent the real.

Peirce's way of thinking about the relation between knower and known is indeed closest to the Aristotelian or 'scholastic' account. Rorty is aware of the differences between Aristotle's view of knowing and that offered by Descartes and Locke but is no more sympathetic to Aristotle (even less to Aquinas) because they too describe knowing in a manner analogous to visual perception. Peirce knows this as well as Rorty.¹⁷ But the issue is understanding exactly what Rorty finds flawed. We will argue below that the core of Rorty's objection is his dismissal of the reality of the Aristotelian or scholastic intelligible forms. In Peirce this means the denial of what he called habit or law, active general principles of nature. In other words, Rorty's real opposition to the 'scholastic' view of knowing proceeds from his own nominalism.

In Rorty's reconstruction of the history of western philosophy, the scholastic view is mainly significant because it helped create a widespread 'populist' view of 'glassy essence.' It is this populist notion which shows up in the speech by Isabella in *Measure for Measure*. 18 Quoting that text, Rorty offers his assessment of the enigmatic lines about glassy essence:

Our Glassy Essence was not a plhilosophical doctrine, but a picture which literate men found presupposed by every page they read. It is glassy—mirror-like—for two reasons. First, it takes on new forms without being changed—but intellectual forms, rather than sensible ones as material mirrors do. Second, mirrors are made of a substance which is purer, finer grained, more subtle, and more delicate than most. Unlike our spleen...our Glassy Essence is something we share with the angels, even though they weep for our ignorance of its nature.¹⁹

By the time of Shakespeare, according to Rorty, all original differences among Homer, Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, St. Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas as to how man is truly distinctive are simply ignored. The result was a non-deliberate flattening out of inherited notions to produce a "vague but emphatic dualism—ape and essence—which everyone knew philosophers were supposed to know about, even though few could guess what they might hope to say about it." With Descartes came the self-conscious attempt to make this vague dualism precise and to render the popular image philosophically respectable. Only now, says Rorty, thanks to the work of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Dewey (and some others) are we finally in a position to put both epistemological and metaphysical realism behind us as mistakes.

PEIRCE'S GLASSY ESSENCE

Having reviewed certain features of Rorty's understanding of Cartesianism and of 'glassy essence,' it is now time to consider in some detail Peirce's use of this image. First, it is important to note when and in what contexts Peirce invoked the expression.

¹⁷Peirce is very direct about this at 8.18.

¹⁸The lines of interest are as follows: "...But man, proud man/ Dressed in a little brief authority/ Most ignorant of what he's most assured—/ His glassy essence—like an angry ape,/ Plays such fantastic tricks before high Heaven/ As make the angels weep—who, with our spleens,/ Would all laugh themselves mortal."

¹⁹PMN, pp. 42-43.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 45.

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According to Rorty, Peirce is the first of the moderns explicitly to employ this image but, surprisingly, says that this occurs in Peirce's 1892 essay, "Our Glassy Essence."²¹ In fact, however, Peirce develops his bold analogy between a man and a word twenty-five years earlier in "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" (5.310–5.317). Indeed, besides overlooking this, Rorty is also apparently unaware that in a Lowell lecture of 1866 (7.579–7.596) Peirce directly takes up the question of "glassy essence" and clearly dissociates his own view from the populist notion. In this lecture he invokes the image of 'glassy essence' twice but ascribes a *different* meaning to each use. Once one notices the shift in interpretation, the break away from the 'modern' version of glassy essence is cleanly made. Let us look briefly at how Peirce proceeds.

Early in the Lowell essay (on "Consciousness and Language"), having raised the question "what is man?," Peirce gives voice to what he considers the prevalent conception of 'glassy essence' as follows:

Man is essentially a soul, that is, a thing occupying a mathematical point of space, not thought itself but the subject of inhesion of thought, without parts, and exerting a certain material force called volition. I presume that most people consider the belief as intuitive, or, at least, as planted in man's nature and more or less distinctly held by all men, always and everywhere. [And then Peirce adds] 'Most ignorant of what he's most assured; His glassy essence.' (7.580)

Now this conception, Peirce immediately notes, "is a very modern one." In fact, if one were to read no farther than this, it is already evident that Peirce is in agreement with Rorty or, to be accurate, that Rorty agrees with Peirce. That is, it is clear that Peirce saw that glassy essence had come to be identified in the minds of many with the Cartesian notion of soul. And, just as clearly, he stresses the recent vintage of this interpretation and rejects it. After citing other difficulties with the Cartesian view, he says: "In fact, the prevalent view of the present day is an heterogeneous hodgepodge of the most contradictory theories." (7.581) What he does not reject, however, is the usefulness of the idea of glassy essence.

As readers of this Lowell lecture know, Peirce goes on to present and develop his own original view that man's proper mode of being is that of a sign or symbol, concluding his extended anology by saying that "we may think we distinguish between the man and the word when we do not." Then, for good measure, he adds: 'Most ignorant of what we're most assured, Our glassy essence!' (7.585). It seems clear that at this point Peirce intends something different, something he wants to emphasize. He obviously likes the image but wants to dissociate it from its ordinary or popular Cartesian construal. A different interpretation, therefore, is called for. It seems now that 'glassy essence' must be intimately related to how Peirce understands the nature or essence of sign-activity since his answer to the question "What is man?" is that he is a symbol (7.583), that is, his mode of being is a living process of semiotic activity.²² Peirce's basic argument for this

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 42 n. 10. Rorty is pluzzled by the title of the essay since, as he notes, a large portion of it is devoted to a discussion of protoplasm. What he apparently ignores, however, is Peirce's main objective, namely, to describe the essentially semiotic character of habit taking. Peirce is interested in the spreading or generalizing phenomena as it is manifested in protoplasm. The growth of habit is a sign of the one law of mind.

²²Peirce's (by now) classic presentation of his own basic view of cognition is found in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man" (5.213–5.263) and "Some Consequences Of Four Incapacities" (5.264–5.317).

RORTY AND PEIRCE

claim was a result of his own analysis of knowing as inherently semiotic, that is, as mediated by signs. Here is one of the best known passages where this is plainly asserted.

Whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign. But it follows from our own existence...that everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and the rain. When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign. (5.283)

Peirce's argument that every state of consciousness is a sign means (among other things) that no sign is determined *immediately* by its object. Signs refer to objects but they do so *via* other signs. Involved here is the important distinction between the object of a sign and what we say about that object, the meaning we convey *via* our symbolic representations. This difference is important to keep in mind lest we lose sight of the fact that a given sign has a simultaneous and dual relation, one to its object and another to its interpretants.

The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. Its object is the thing or occasion, however indefinite, to which it is implied. Its meaning is the idea which it attaches to that object, whether by way of mere supposition, or as a command, or as an assertion. (5.6)

Furthermore, an interpretant (sign) of a given sign bears a relation to the same object as its antecedent sign. The interpretant may offer an extended or developed interpretation of that object, but it is the same object as is being represented by its antecedent sign. Moreover, the antecedent sign is also an interpretant of some preceding sign since there is (in Peirce's view) no privileged 'first' cognition, no 'intuition' of the object unrepresented by or unmediated by some antecedent sign (though one need not and in the beginning cannot be aware of these preceding signs). This means that Peirce is committed to a potentially infinite series of signs or representations, any member of which has its relation to its object by way of its antecedent signs. No reality appears to us unmediated. Rather, Peirce contends, "every thought must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the essence of a sign."

Now, this process of signs referring to signs is not what bothers Rorty. On the contrary, this kind of internal connectedness among signs is, he says, all any of us has. Propositions are supported by other propositions; beliefs are warranted by appeal to other beliefs.²³ What he denies is that it makes any sense to suggest that true claims are ones which "represent" the real. For him the point of knowing cannot be to get clear about how things really are, if by that one implies that there is some antecedent ontological structure which it is our job to know. In his view this involves a constant begging of the question. Thus he writes

the image of the Mirror of Nature makes us think we ought to be able to attain some transcendental standpoint outside our present set of representations from which we can inspect the relations between those representations and their object.²⁴

²³In fact Rorty's preference isn't only for a coherence theory of truth but for having us see that the vocabulary, the descriptions, the theoretical formulations employed by any community of inquirers, are "optional." This is another way in which he expresses the view that language is radically disconnected from the independently real. See PMN, p. 379.

²⁴Ibid., p. 293.

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In other words, the effort to show how we can represent the real inevitably founders on the impossible task of getting outside our given set of representations in order to check the accuracy of their correspondence with the real world. What's worse, says Rorty, it presupposed that Reality has an independent character which constrains us to think its nature.

But Peirce's semiotic does not require attaining any such transcendental standpoint, nor did he suggest that it did. Peirce agrees with those who would say that all we have to work with are opinions. What he clearly sought to show, however, was that we did have a way of distinguishing the illusory opinions from those which were true and that the object of those which were true was the Real. But to see this one must recognize the really critical difference between Rorty and Peirce is not found in a dispute about transcendental standpoints but in a dispute about the nature of the cosmos. Rorty denies the reality of law or habit as an irreducible mode of being, what Peirce called Thirdness. Without real law or habit as Peirce understood it, his notion that true representations do "mirror" the Real can only be caricatured. Indeed it was Peirce's contention that these laws are "general principles really operative nature" (5.101). Because of them, innumerable daily predictions can be made with confidence. These real generals constrain our semiotic activity, our symbolization of our experience. Without this constraint, not only would the possibility of predicting with confidence be lost but so would the intelligibility of doing so.

THE CONSTRAINT OF THE WORLD

By turning his back on the intimate alliance between Peirce's semiotic view of mind and his unwavering commitment to the reality of generals, Rorty lost the opportunity to see how Peirce's semiotic turn gives a new meaning to "glassy essence." Peirce's favorite argument for the reality of Thirds was the obvious regularity of the world, a regularity manifested by the predictability of experience. That we can successfully predict that events which have not yet occurred will have certain general characteristics could not be attributed to the sheer fortuitous conjunctions of qualities and events. To appeal to chance in this way would be no *explanation* at all (5.93–5.101). That Peirce thought such an appeal to be utterly incoherent is well known.

His own appeal to ordinary experience for *evidence* of the omnipresence of Thirdness is perhaps best exemplified in his discussions of the laws of nature. Here we can see clearly a great divide between Peirce and Rorty. Consider the following from Peirce:

...let a law of nature—say the law of gravity—remain a mere uniformity—a mere formula establishing a relation between terms—and what in the world should induce a stone, which is not a term nor a concept but just a plain thing, to act in conformity to that uniformity? All other stones may have done so, and this stone too on former occasions, and it would break the uniformity for it not to do so now. But what of that? It is deaf and it has no reason. I should ask the objector whether he was a nominalist or a scholastic realist. If he is a nominalist, he holds that laws are mere generals, that is, formulae relating to mere terms; and ordinary good sense ought to force him to acknowledge that there are real connections between individual things regardless of mere formulae. (5.48)²⁵ [See 1.341 for a different way of appreciating Thirds as generals.]

²⁵See 1.341 for a different way of appreciating Thirds as generals.

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Rorty, of course, as a confirmed nominalist, must regard laws as mere formulae relating to mere terms. Not surprisingly, his nominalism is mirrored in the way he understands the relation between language and the world and fuels his desire to eradicate the image of mirroring. Consider his remarks.

We must get the visual, and in particular the mirroring metaphors out of our speech altogether. To do that we have to understand speech not only as not the externalizing of inner representations but as not a representation at all. We have to drop the notion of correspondence for sentences as well as for thoughts, and see sentences as connected with other sentences rather than with the world.²⁶

Rorty could hardly be more explicit. His denial of any real connectedness between speech and reality stems directly from his denial of the reality of generals as active principles in nature which really do constrain our thinking. Indeed, it is only by refusing to admit the reality of Peircean Thirds or generals that Rorty can say that the choice of the "ocular" metaphor hides an "original wish to substitute confrontation for conversation as the determinant of a belief." But this alleged dualism between confrontation and conversation is a false one and not applicable to Peirce (if indeed to Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas). For Peirce "confrontation" occurs continuously via the constraint exercised on inquirers by the regularities of the independently real. "Conversation" or discourse is shaped by their need and desire to conform to the demands of experience.

Whereas for Peirce reality is primarily "an affair of Thirdness as Thirdness, that is, in its mediation between Secondness and Firstness" (5.121), for Rorty there can be only individual events and things in fortuitous *dyadic* reaction with other individual events and things. The connectedness among events which Peirce saw meant that things were related triadically, that what we call the aspects (or firstnesses) of things which were continually occurring in particular events (seconds) were mediated by the governance of active general principles. Thus the steadiness of things, the fact of their having a regular or persistent character(s) is the living result of active laws or Thirds. In general, our response to the press of experience is one wherein we acclimate ourselves to the regularities of nature. These multifaceted regularities which we discover about things make up the content of what we then say about the world.

But the importance of Peirce's commitment to Thirdness is reflected not only in his claim that Reality is mainly an affair of Thirdness but in his identification of Thirdness with Representation. "Representation is precisely genuine Thirdness" (1.532). Again, "...it is proper to say that a general principle that is operative in the real world is of the essential nature of a Representation and of a Symbol because its *modus operandi* is the same as that by which words produce physical effects." (5.105) This means that the life of such active principles consists in mediation, in bringing otherwise disparate elements together, thus creating new regularities or habits. To know something about water, for example, is to affirm (at least implicitly) that a certain relation obtains among possible future events.

Now, to talk about being able to know or be confident that we really have gained access to Nature's representations is just what Rorty won't accept.

Nature may, for all we know, necessarily grow knowers which represent her, but we do not know what it would mean for Nature to feel that our conventions of representations are becom-

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²⁶PMN, pp. 371-372.

²⁷Ibid., p. 159.

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ing more like her own, and thus; that she is nowadays being represented more adequately than in the past. Or rather we can make sense of this only if we go all the way with the Absolute Idealists, and grant that epistemological realism must be based on personalistic pantheism.²⁸

Rorty wants to frustrate the realist by insisting that talk of knowing the real makes no sense unless you have some kind of independent access to the Divine intention. But Peirce nowhere says that progress in human inquiry requires the community of investigators to get beyond or outside of its opinions to see if they indeed do correspond to the Divine thoughts. Indeed, such a demand is obviously impossible to fulfill. Peirce's solution to this difficult problem is to show that the real generals or laws at work in nature are sign and that they do constrain our semiotic lives. But because Rorty refuses to acknowledge Peircean generals as active principles, knowledge can only be "a relation between persons and propositions." 29

No one, argues Peirce, could really doubt that opinions are constrained. Simply put, "There is something...that influences our thoughts and is not created by them" (8.12). That "something" is the reality of habits or active powers, the 'would-be's' of nature, the regularities in future events which our conduct can ignore only at its own peril. The symmetry between the 'thoughts' of nature and our own thoughts is reflected in his notion of a thought or symbol as a "special habit [which] consists in the fact that...it will have certain effects on the conduct, mental and bodily, of the interpreter." (4.431) In other words, our habituated conduct, mental and bodily, is constrained by the real relations which constitute the regular processes and events of nature. Thus, the adequacy of our representations or thoughts about nature is not a matter of having to know independently how Nature might 'feel' about our thoughts (as Rorty satirically puts it) but a question of the sense in which the habits of nature are present to us by way of our symbolic representations. To pursue the special character of this relation between thought and the independently real is to broach the difficult but important question of what it might mean for thought to "mirror" the real.

MIRRORS AND GLASSY ESSENCES

For Rorty "mirror imagery...is the original sin of epistemology." But to be preoccupied with Plato's original preference for the ocular metaphor and its development
into talk about "picturing" the world is to miss what mirroring the world means in
Peirce. When Peirce speaks of progress in human inquiry he is not talking about the
gradual advance of knowledge as the construction of a "copy" of an original as if our
symbolic representations were literally "images" of things. Rather, to reach the predestinate opinion on any given question is to have the object of that opinion (the independently Real) made present to us via our representations. But the context of the
representation is the independently Real in its nature as Thirdness. Thus, to use our
earlier example, the representations involved in our talk about water are not "inner"
copies of water which need to be surveyed by an "inner" eye but the means by which
what-water-is is known. [We are not here discussing the important question of iconicity
in perception, but the way in which the intelligible relations of things are present to us
via our extraordinary capacity for symbolic representation.]

²⁸ Ibid., p. 299.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 152.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 60 n.32.

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Peirce is indeed sympathetic to the view of Aristotle and Aquinas. The intelligible structures or forms which we seek to know (and do know) involve a pattern of relations which are ordered or regular. To speak of "structures" or "forms" or "patterns" is to speak about the regularities of the world which constrain thought.³¹ Furthermore, because we are primarily agents we have the ability not only to know these relations, but we come to know them within a context of activity. We respond to these living relations in many different ways, sometimes just accommodating ourselves to them, sometimes setting out to modify them, sometimes creating relations which would not otherwise occur in nature (genetics). But none of this latter is possible without our understanding the context of relevant structures or forms which make our own activity possible by remaining constant or virtually so.

Contrary to the radical disconnection between language and the world, which Rorty advocates, Peirce helps reestablish the remarkable affinity between the world and our semiotic existence, an affinity made possible because the cosmos itself is a semiotic process.³² For Peirce, Nature's regularities were the signature of a larger activity in which we find ourselves and in which we participate. He was unequivocal about this. Thus he speaks of 'that inward aspect of mind which we egotistically call *ours*; though in truth it is we who float upon its surface and belong to it more than it belongs to us' (7.558). In another place, speaking about our choice of one theory over another, he reminds us that "it is well to remember that every single truth of science is due to the affinity of the human soul to the soul of the universe, imperfect as that affinity no doubt is' (5.47) (See 1.121, 1.316, 2.750).

The language of mirroring which Rorty wants to expunge is indeed integral to Peirce's understanding of our relation to the real world. In fact, this mirroring relation ultimately involves our relation to a creative God.

The universe is to become a more and more perfect mirror of that system of ideas which would result from the indefinitely continued action of objective logic. The universe is, as it were, an awaking Mind....The universe may be said to be governed by a God insofar as it is bound more and more to conform to the ultimate result of the evolution of pure ideas. (Unidentified Fragment)

But what must not be lost sight of is that the mirroring of which Peirce speaks is not one involving immaterial privileged copies (Lockean ideas). Peirce's semiotic analysis is designed to avoid the insurmountable difficulties about "correspondence" which follow in the wake of Locke's analysis. This is also why one must not forget that to be a sign is to be just that sort of being whereby the habits or Thirds of the world inform or shape those habits of thought, action, and feeling which are unified in one's life.³³

³¹There is obviously more which can be said about how Peirce understands the difference between his own position concerning the intelligible "forms" as "universals." That his position is not that of Plato (as he understands Plato) but closer to Aristotle as developed by the scholastics (Scotus in particular) is made clear at 8.18ff.

³²A brief and useful discussion of Peirce's view that the universe is a sign of God is David E. Pfeifer's "Peirce's Application of Semiotic to God" in *Peirce Studies* (Lubbock: Texas Tech Press, 1979), pp.89-100.

³³A closely related issue here is one recently taken up by Douglas B. Rasmussen in his "Rorty, Wittgenstein and the Nature of Intentionality." See the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 57 (1983), 152-162. Rasmussen shows that Rorty's attempt to dismiss the problem of reference as uninteresting simply fails. This of course is a crucial failure since it leaves in place the natural hook-up between thought and what thought is about. This intrinsic relation between thought and the independently real is precisely what we have in Peirce. For him, the possibility of the relation is due to the natural continuity of our semiotic activity with the semiotic processes of the cosmos.

PEIRCE AND THE MYSTERY OF MAN'S BEING

Let us recall once more those enigmatic lines which intrigued both Peirce and Rorty. "This is man, proud man,...most ignorant of what he's most assured, His glassy essence." Why does Peirce say that we are most ignorant of our essence? The following passage provides, perhaps, an important hint.

What is it, then, that the whole people is about, what is this civilization that is the outcome of history, but is never completed? We cannot expect to attain a complete conception of it; but we can see that it is a gradual process, that it involves a realization of ideas in man's consciousness and in his works, and that it takes place by virtue of man's capacity for learning, and by experience continually pouring upon him ideas he has not yet acquired. We may say that it is the process whereby man, with all his miserable littlenesses, becomes gradually more and more imbued with the Spirit of God, in which Nature and History are rife. [And a little later he adds] . . .we are all putting our shoulders to the wheel for an end that none of us can catch more than a glimpse at—that which the generations are working out. But we can see that the development of embodied ideas is what it will consist in. (5.402n2; cf. 1.1615)

Needless to say, all of this is very far away from anything Rorty would recognize. But that comes as no surprise given his dismissal of Peirce. What we see, however, is the essential modesty of Peirce's claim about our ability to fathom the mystery of existence and our place in it. This modesty is an important counterpoint to the emphasis often given to Peirce's conviction that we can know the independently real. The passage above reminds us that despite the successes pragmaticism might yield in attaining the third degree of clarity in our ideas, still our horizons are always finite, our knowings always tinged with vagueness and always fallible, and so our semiotic successes are always qualified.

Thus, even while I am most assured of my essence as a sign or symbol, even though for Peirce I arise out of an already ongoing semiotic process and stand in living relation to it, nevertheless I understand it (at best) only partially. Peirce has said that no son of Adam has ever realized all that there is in him (1.615). One's life as symbol, as a living unity of habits, requires continual disclosure. "...the character of man...consists in the ideas that he will conceive and in the efforts that he will make, and...only develops as the occasions actually arise" (1.615). Thus, each of us gradually discovers who he is. The future is the locus of possible growth.

In any case, it seems reasonable to infer than when Peirce first presented his view that man is a sign he realized the originality of his position and guessed that few would easily follow him. Indeed the analogy between man's being and that of a word cannot but seem strange and strained when first encountered. No surprise, then, that he would conclude his reamrks in those places with the refrain that people would remain most ignorant of what they were most assured. All the more so if one emphasizes the "miserable littlenesses" of which we are capable, the distortions we may introduce by our potentially overweening sense of our own importance while we are dressed, as Isabella said, in a "little brief authority."

But in the final analysis, we must recognize with Peirce that we still remain "most ignorant" because of the essential mystery of our relation to the semiotic process which constitutes the life of the Universe. Though we can discern or catch a glimpse of what ends are being worked out in the cosmos and in human history, and that "growth comes"

RORTY AND PEIRCE

only from love," we cannot fathom the whole. With the human community we seek to live 'in' the truth, to give witness in the best manner we know and so to manifest the life of concrete reasonableness. When successful this quest is a mirroring in the sense that our life, taken in its fullness, is a living, continuous, and ever-deepening disclosure of the reality of creative Love. We are already engaged in a "conversation" where we must "listen" to the voice of this Reality, a voice which speaks to us in the normative dimensions of our existence. But we can hear or discern because our relation to language is not in the final analysis a relation to a tool as it is for Rorty. Rather it constitutes our basic mode of being as a sign. We dwell 'in' language. It is this dwelling which we think Peirce had in mind when he spoke of "... proud man, most ignorant of what he's most assured, His glassy essence."

SYMBOLISM ITS MEANING AND EFFECT

By Alfred North Whitehead

Symbolism presents Whitehead's response to the epistemological challenges of Hume and Kant in its most vivid and direct form. Written in a style devoid of the metaphysical intricacies of his later publications, this work makes both Whitehead's theory of perception and his more general insights into the function of symbols in human culture and society accessible to the scholarly community. It is at the same time an admirable prolegomenon to an understanding of those intricacies, particularly as they surface in *Process and Reality*, since the complex metaphysics of the latter work can be seen as the epistemology of *Symbolism* "writ large."

Originally a series of lectures given at the University of Virginia in 1927, *Symbolism* was first published in that year, and reissued in 1958. It has been reset for this republication, and it appears here in a typographic facsimile of the original.

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FEATURE BOOK REVIEW

Sartre and Marxist Existentialism: The Test Case of Collective Responsibility. By Thomas R. Flynn. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984. pp. xiv, 265.

Ron Santoni

Many thinkers who have read only some of Sartre's earlier literary works, or only Sartre's earlier literary works and some selections from Being and Nothingness (BN), tend to regard Sartre as an unadulterated individualist—a champion of individual freedom who saw other people as "hell" and human relations as conflict. There are even a few philosophers who, having dared to read the Critique of Dialectical Reason (CDR) and some of Sartre's later works, either disqualify Sartre as a social ontologist or declare Being and Nothingness and the Critique to be so mutually repudiating as to preclude a coherent social theory in his thoughts. Yet even thinkers only peripherally acquainted with Sartre's life know it to have been marked by intense social engagement and a deep commitment to social responsibility and the ideal of human community. There is no question that he ascribed responsibility to groups and collectives. Sartre: an existentialist? To be sure! A Marxist? Most likely. But a Marxist Existentialist with a self-consistent view of group responsibility: how?

In Sartre and Marxist Existentialism, Thomas R. Flynn, a discerning interpreter of Sartre's social views, attempts to show how Sartre's developed thought can combine the essential features of Marxism and Existentialism into a "new and challenging social theory" (p. xl). By focusing on collective responsibility—a topic which too few Sartrean scholars address—Flynn tests the coherence of Sartre's social theory and his alleged amalgamation of Existentialism and Marxism. How is it possible, he asks, to reconcile "any concept of collective responsibility" with "the ontology of interpersonal relations" that "explicitly accords only a psychological and subjective status to the 'We' "? (p. 30).

Flynn's initial survey of Sartre's existentialist anthropology in *Being and Nothingness* uncovers a broad spectrum of Sartre's correlative concepts of freedom and responsibility. Freedom and responsibility are basically individual: Sartre's early works imply only individual responsibility for collective situations (including class, nation, family). Yet this ambiguous notion of "situation" (it refers to both my freedom and my "facticity") reveals Sartre's early recognition of the social and becomes a decisive conceptual bridge to a social ontology that is consistent with the existential anthropology of Sartre's early classic. Here is the beginning of a "social dimension"—a function of being-for-others constituted by the other's look (p. 47). But, unlike the "Us," the "We" has only a psychological, and not an ontological, status. As Sartre says, "There is no plural look."

But what about a plural praxis? This is the question which Flynn raises in regard to the second half of Sartre's work. The notion of a unified, common practical effort takes form as early as "Existentialism is a Humanism," the argument of which Flynn sensitively reformulates. The "Universal Freedom Conditional" of this essay—I cannot be concretely free unless everyone is concretely free—and the ideal of common effort come together in the concept of group praxis. We can be free together only so long as we stay in practical union. This is the message of the *Critique* and also of "collective responsibility": "we are responsible for each other's freedom" (pp. 47-48). The appearance of the "group" (in *CDR*) represents "the sudden resur-

rection of freedom." The individual is free only in the group, and, because freedom for Sartre is co-terminous with responsibility, "full responsibility is achieved only in the group" (p. 114).

Hence, human praxis, i.e., "purposive human activity in its material environment" (p. 104)—a concept which, Flynn contends, pervades Sartre's social theory—grounds human responsibility. And it is precisely this all-pervasive praxis, in addition to his mediating third, which "saves Sartre from the excesses of collectivist thought" (p. 139). It maintains the radically existentialist components of freedom and moral answerability in the most causally determining conditions that Sartre can envisage. Just as praxis supports oppressive processes, "Marxist-causal responsibility" (which is essentially non-moral) can be *upheld* by an underlying existentialist-moral responsibility. The agent's project (and thus individual moral values) can be brought into the "impersonal" domain of social causation and the practico-inert. Sartre has succeeded, in this manner and others, in developing a Marxist existentialism and in integrating ethical existentialism with Marxist collectivism. He has established himself as a social thinker without relinquishing his existentialism (pp. 147, 206). He has brought the morally responsible individual into the sociohistorical and communal struggle.

Yet the question may still be raised—as Lucien Goldman has challenged—has not Sartre failed to produce a self-consistent theory of collective responsibility? Has he not maintained collective responsibility without a collective subject?

In spite of Flynn's criticism that Sartre fails to offer an "ontology of relations" (e.g., p. 198), Flynn persistently contends that Sartre's "dialectical nominalism" (e.g., pp. xiii, 91-92, 127) is an ingenious via media between ontological individualism (of a Hayek or Popper variety) and ontological holism (of a Durkheimian sort). In denying ontological status to the group, Sartre is simply refusing any hypostatization of it. The collective subject is, as Sartre says, "the group brought together by the situation, structured by its very action." It is "a form of inter-individual reality" (CDR, 367), a praxis constitutive of the group and its dialectic. Like the for-itself, it is a "non-substantial and relational entity," a "revolving set of practical relations" (pp. 178-179), a phenomenon of l'intermonde (Merleau-Ponty), but not an independent hyperorganism. Far from being the mere psychological "Erlebnis" of Being and Nothingness, the "We-subject" is a real "practical relation" among organic individuals whose activities are "interiorized" by each considering the rest "the same as himself in praxis and practical concern" (p. 125). This notion is consistent with Marx's insistence that "there are only men and real relations between men" (pp. 114, 117, 126; p. 176; Search for a Method, p. 76).

Thus, the relations which mediate individuality and passive activity represent the ontological conditions for ascribing responsibility to social collectives. The "interiorization of multiplicity," whereby "each" becomes "ours,"—the same, everywhere—is the basis for responsibility. The "interiorization of multiplicity"—all for one and one for all—can even be read as the "interiorization of responsibility" (p. 146). The primacy of praxis (e.g., pp. 69, 141), and its practical inert mediation allow the intelligibility and coherence of Sartre's theory of collective moral responsibility. Collective moral responsibility becomes, in Sartre's social theory, both a fact and a value. Being-in-society involves being serially responsible and, often, sharing group responsibility as well. Individual praxis takes for granted such social facticity. But collective responsibility is also a value, a "socioethical ideal" (pp. 184, 201). Sartre's crucial notion of "interiorizing multiplicity" should be read, Flynn submits, as an imperative: "Accept responsibility for the whole." In acting in terms of the collective, in being our brothers' (or sister's) keeper, we are entering the "circle of men" (pp. 202, 203)—a genuine intersubjective community. Sartre has given an adequate, even commendable, account of this individual-social relation.

Flynn's positive over-all reconstruction and general assessment of Sartre's social theory, as well as his effort to show Sartre's ingenious blending of Marxism with his existentialism, does not mean that Flynn is uncritical of Sartre's views. Towards the conclusion of his work, Flynn offers a number of perceptive over-all criticisms, two or three of which I should like to take note of here. Each one relates to what Flynn calls Sartre's "unresolved dichotomies."

First of all, Flynn indicts Sartre for his "angelism" (pp. 192–193). He uses this word to characterize Sartre's demand for each of us to be "ontologically free, prereflectively translucent, and totally responsible." Because of the "utter translucency" or "complete self-transparency" (p. 196) which Sartre claims for presence-to-self or for-itself, he assigns to human beings a responsibility that admits no degrees (pp. 168–169). This is a responsibility which medievalists ascribe to angels, but which one would hesitate to attribute to social man in history. The all/none dichotomy in respect to responsibility is an unresolved opposition in Sartre, though not a fatal flaw.

Secondly, Flynn criticizes strongly Sartre's assumption that all power, save power exercised within the group, is alienating, and that all authority implies some manner of subjection to alien will. Flynn regards this view as a "command theory of authority" and sees it as a corollary to Sartre's all-or-none concept of responsibility—rooted in his defective "angelic anthropology." Against Sartre, Flynn submits that reciprocal autonomy and authority are not mutually exclusive, that a fidelity-trust relationship, in Rousseau's sense, is compatible with reciprocity in "a less than angelic world." In fact, far from being counter to mutual autonomy, mutual trust can be "one of the highest expressions of it" (p. 199).

Thirdly, Flynn contends that, despite Sartre's pervasive emphasis on the primacy of praxis, Sartre's commitment to a praxis philosophy seems, finally, only "half-hearted": no dialectical synthesis of pour soi/en soi, praxis/practico-inert is ever achieved. Sartre's ambiguity concerning "situation" is never resolved. As a consequence, the fundamentally important relationship between the "given" and the "taken," between practical organism and the environment, remains unclear and undeterminable. We are entitled to ask, "Are we conditioned or are we free?" To answer as Sartre has, "We are both together: totally conditioned and totally free," is a verbal dodge offered in the name of dialectical reason unless Sartre gives us a clear indication of his meaning of "conditioned" (pp. 197–198).

Although I have no vested interest in defending Sartre against objections, I feel that each of the above reservations, in fairness to Sartre, deserves at least the outline of a partial response. In respect of the first, I wish to note, first, that Flynn appears to have misspoken when he speaks of Sartre's "demand" that we be "ontologically free, prereflectively translucent, and totally responsible." We are ontologically that way, for Sartre (in BN), whether we relish it or not. But, more importantly, I submit that Flynn may have overinterpreted Sartre's notion of "translucidité" in attributing to Sartre a commitment to "complete self-transparency" and "utter translucency." As Phyllis Morris has pointed out in partial response to my article "Bad Faith and 'Lying to Oneself,' "2 Sartre's usage of "translucidité" wavers between the meanings of the English words "translucence" and "transparency" depending on the context. I wish to add that, in spite of Sartre's insistence on the "translucidité" of both for-itself and praxis, and on its being a condition for both individual and collective responsibility (and bad faith), one cannot identify the two English words in translation. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of what "utter translucency" would mean except "transparency." But there are reasons to believe that by "prereflective" or "pre-ontological" self-awareness, i.e. by the "translucidness" of foritself and praxis, Sartre did not mean complete transparency. He tells us, for example, that "if we take belief as the adherence of being to its object when the object is not given or is given indistinctly, then the essential problem of bad faith is a problem of belief." (BN, Barnes, 67). Thus, despite Sartre's reference to "the total translucency ["la totale translucidité"] of consciousness (BN, Barnes, 49, italics mine) one may argue that the bad faith consciousness is translucent but not always (self-) transparent. And, on this basis, one might contend, against Flynn, that although one is condemned ontologically to total "absolute" responsibility (ascription) tive) one is amenable to degrees of practical responsibility (existential-moral) in one's concrete

Phyllis Morris, "Consciousness as Translucent," unpublished paper presented at 1980 meetings of Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, held in Ottawa, Canada.

²Ronald E. Santoni, "Bad Faith and 'Lying to Oneself," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (March 1978), 384–98.

existential conditions. Although, to be sure, self-conscious praxis lies at the basis of all oppressive or exploitative situations, it does not follow, in spite of Sartre's words to the contrary, that Sartre cannot admit of degrees of moral responsibility for the exploitation and oppression. Nor does it appear to follow that "Sartrean man seems incapable of minor offenses" (p. 197).

As to Flynn's second criticism, it is not clear that the "command theory" of law and authority is a corollary of Sartre's "all-or-none" concept of responsibility. Flynn is on safer ground when he suggests that submission to heteronomous authority is a violation of reciprocal or mutual autonomy. Moreover, his suggestion that submission to rules is a "necessary condition for the...social community Sartre advocates" (p. 199), and thus represents a concession to authority, may well be misleading. For might not the "rules" of which Flynn here speaks, and which Sartre might conceivably endorse, be mainly an expression or "sign" or reciprocal autonomous agreement, of the fused group in consensual action, of reciprocal "sovereignty" rather than non-reciprocal "authority"? The agreed "rules" of the group may be such that each person in a group may still give them to himself or herself, so to say. Rules do not need to become authoritatively institutionalized. Sovereignty need not become coercive "authority" at all. Yet, if the rules are authoritative in Sartre's sense, they can hardly be a condition for the social community of disalienated individuals which Sartre prescribes. Finally, though I concur in Flynn's suggestion that mutuality and a "limited fidelity-trust relationship" (this expression has the odious ring of banking establishments!) are compatible, I question his willingness to see some forms of "authority" in terms of fidelity-trust. Although "fidelity trust" may be both an expression and prerequisite of mutuality, it is hardly reconcilable with Sartre's sense of coercive authority. The quarrel is not simply about the use of words.

With respect to Flynn's third line of criticism, one must continue to confess a sense of uneasiness regarding Sartre's handling of the freedom-determinism issue. That Sartre, in his later writings, retains the primacy of praxis while acknowledging the important role of material conditions, brute being, and the practico-inert does not eliminate (given the strong pour soi/en soi, praxis/practico-inert dichotomies) the problem of interrelating or synthesizing the two. To attribute "soft" determinism to Sartre, as many advocate, is problematic in two ways: although the freedom of the subject is brought together with a determinism of the world as early as in "Materialism and Revolution," (i) the conceptual intelligibility of "soft" determinism is itself in question (e.g. Anscombe)3 and (ii) Sartre would reject "soft" determinism. For, as Flynn does well to remind us, the credo of Sartrean humanism is his statement that "a man can always make something out of what is made of him," however deformed the circumstance (pp. 67, 200). Although Flynn is right in pointing to the tension and obscurity in Sartre's developed position regarding the freedom-determinism issue, he seems to be wanting too much in pressing Sartre for a precise account of the dialectical exchange between praxis and practico-inert, spontaneity and inertia, freedom and necessity. Flynn's demand may involve the questionable imposition of analytic reason on the category of dialectical reason. (Why would Flynn do this, given his own awareness of the categorial error? See p. 91). His own perceptive account of how Sartre's mature conception of mediated collective responsibility dialectically interweaves Sartre's existentialism with Marxist views of social causation and material conditions is testimony to at least the adequacy of Sartre's idiosyncratic view of "dialectical," as well as to the success with which he differentiates it from Marx's sense. Dialectical reason is surely not used by Sartre "to engender reciprocity out of sheer nonsense" (p. 197), despite his irresponsible off-hand comment that we are "totally conditioned yet totally free." Although Sartre's later philosophy shows the residual effects of the sharp for-itself/in-itself dichotomy of BN and the fundamental constitution of the sharp for-itself dichotomy of BN and the fundamental spontaneity/inertia distinction of CDR, it does not follow that there is no dialectical resolution of S tical resolution of free praxis and the unfree practico-inert in Sartre. The difficulty in being able to define objects able to define objective limits and "obscure constraints" in a dialectical relation does not

³In this connection, Elizabeth Anscombe has recently asked: "What is the point in having freedom of will if things are determined?" Cambridge University: Stanton Lecture, March 5, 1986.

disparage the contention that there is one. As Flynn seems so clearly to recognize, the adequacy of Sartre's notion of collective social responsibility turns on, and finally presupposes, such a relation. And Flynn is willing to accept a practical resolution of Sartre's dichotomies, with collective responsibility as an idea. In fact, he has done a superior job of showing how freedom and responsibility are reconcilable with social and historical determinism.

Before concluding this critical consideration of Sartre and Marxist Existentialism, I wish to make two comments, one positive and the other negative. On the one hand, I offer my judgment that Flynn's treatment of Sartre's concept of responsibility is among the most discerning available in Sartrean scholarship. Certainly, I have not come upon any better account of it in the English language. Responsibility is a Sartrean notion that has often been misinterpreted and misunderstood. Flynn's application of distinctions of analytic philosophy to it, his important distinction between the imputability (authorship) and accountability senses of "responsibility" (pp. 13–4; 136–141) and between the causal and existential-moral "hard" and "soft" (p. 181) senses of collective reponsibility, bring much needed analytic clarification to Sartre's controversial and seemingly exaggerated claims regarding the topic. The clarity with which Flynn deals with the issue of responsibility in Sartre virtually makes redundant my own projected article in which I had hoped to show some of the ambiguity and equivocation related to Sartre's discussions of responsibility. Flynn's focal study of Sartre's concept of "collective responsibility" is a distinctive contribution to Sartrean scholarship.

On the other hand, there is, I submit, a pervasive defect in Flynn's treatment of responsibility. While making the important distinction between "noetic" or "ascriptive" responsibility and existential-moral responsibility, he, speaking for Sartre, fails to distinguish the latter from the kind of phenomenon normally called "guilt." Ignoring, in the present context, important complexities related to this issue (e.g., differences between "rational" and "irrational" guilt, between what we might call "objective" and "subjective" guilt), one must surely acknowledge that not all cases of guilt are cases of moral responsibility (or accountability), in spite of the fact that all persons who claim guilt in some way claim the deed(s) for which they, individually or collectively, feel guilt. Flynn conflates the two thorughout this work (e.g., pp. 59-60, 66-68, 202) at both the individual and collective level. The problem seems to be as much Sartre's as Flynn's (see e.g., p. 68). And it is an understandable one, for guilt and innocence are surely marks of moral rather than merely ascriptive responsibility.

I shall leave to another place and time a consideration of the Flynn-Sartre treatment of collective bad faith and its relation to collective responsibility. My initial impression is that Flynn has identified the concepts too closely. Testimony to this is his contention, for example, that "collective bad faith amidst an objectively incriminating situation equals collective responsibility" (p. 68). And, again, the error may be as much Sartre's as Flynn's.

In ending, I wish simply to commend Flynn for offering scholars of Sartre a careful, discerningly researched, comprehensive and challenging reconstruction of Sartre's social ontology. In spite of Sartre's failure to provide an adequate ontological account of social relations, Flynn has shown Sartre to have a sophisticated and intricate theory of collective responsibility which masterfully allows Marxism to become adjectival to his radical philosophy of freedom. Like the works of Aron, Desan, Barnes, Jameson, McBride and Aronson, Flynn's will become an important reference point in scholarship on Sartre's social theory. It is significantly superior to Chiodi's book on Sartre and Marxism.

Cambridge University

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BRIEFER BOOK REVIEWS

William James On the Courage to Believe. By Robert O'Connell. New York: Fordham University Press, 1984. Pp. xi-141.

This is an intriguing and interesting book on a facet of the philosophy of William James, particularly James' justly famous essay on "The Will to Believe," first published in 1896 and subsequently the lead essay in a volume by James entitled *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, 1897.

Were I to have been a pre-publication reader of the manuscript for O'Connell's book, I would have suggested that he place his beautifully written and powerfully wrought Epilogue as his Prologue, for it was not until reading the former did I get the fundamental drift of his intention. O'Connell seeks to place James in that tradition of western philosophy which "proclaim[s] the revenge of that forgotten truth: that the pursuit of wisdom inexorably grips the whole human being, not merely brain and mind, but heart, emotions, imagination and sensibility as well" (p. 126). For O'Connell, this tradition includes Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal, Fichte, Nietzsche, and the Romantic poets. But others could be included, such as Bonaventure, Spinoza of the De Emendatione Intellectus, Berdyaev, Bergson, Marcel, Buber, Camus and the Americans, Edwards, Emerson, Royce and Dewey. These thinkers constitute a rich and formidable reflective tradition, which, until recently, has been out of step wiht much of contemporary philosophical practice. It is refreshing to have Robert O'Connell, a distinguished scholar and interpreter of the work of Augustine, treat us to such an incisive book on James' thought relative to belief. Paradoxical as it might seem, I urge the reader to peruse the Epilogue first so that the richness of O'Connell's earlier treatment will emerge, en passant.

I have read virtually all of the secondary literature on the thought of William James and so far as I can remember, this is the longest and most detailed 'explication de texte' of "The Will to Believe." O'Connell frequently refers to James' critics and defenders, but in fact only a few of the hundreds extant actually surface. Among them are John Hick, W. K. Clifford, C. J. Ducasse and Stephen T. Davis. O'Connell devotes considerable time to their criticisms of James, an unfortunate activity, for his own criticism, although still unconvincing, is more telling and interesting. This is especially true of Hick, who approaches James in an interpretive vacuum. In dealing with these critics, O'Connell is often prolix and is forced to deal with examples on their terms, which is frequently unhelpful.

To the contrary, when O'Connell raises his own criticisms and makes his own effort to defend James, the text is more relevant, more interesting, and of more assistance. He has two basic strategies, one historical and one interpretive. The first is to resuscitate Pascal as an influence on James, especially with regard to James' emergence from his "Crisis" in 1870, a liberation he credited to the work of Charles Renouvier. The suggestion made by O'Connell with regard to Pascal is not rich in textual support but we do have one strong utterance of sustenance. In 1868, William James was entering a period of severe clinical depression, that culminated in his vastation experience, such that he feared the loss of his very own self-consciousness (McDermott, Writings of William James, pp. 6-7). Earlier in 1868, January, James wrote a long letter from Berlin to his friend Thomas W. Ward. He writes:

All I can tell you is the thought that with me outlasts all others, and onto which, like a rock I find myself washed up up when the waves of doubt are weltering over all the rest of the world; and that is the thought of my having a will, and of my belonging to a brotherhood of men possessed of a capacity for pleasure and pain of different kinds. (Letters, I, 130, italics added)

James then subsequently states in the same letter that "I had no idea this morning that I had so many of the elements of a Pascal in me" (p. 133). O'Connell deepens considerably the wager argument in Pascal and for that matter in James. The upshot is that for both Pascal and James, the affective dimension of human response is cognitive and only the hard of heart, the intransigent should be subject to appeal by wager, in which one opts for a decision as a hedge against the odds rather than as a truly human choice. There are rich possibilities in a full-scale comparison of Pascal and James and I urge O'Connell to consider undertaking this worthy task.

O'Connell's second strategy is to defend James against the charge of "wishful" thinking, in the pejorative sense of that term. Holding that for James, "our passional natures not only do but must exert a precursive influence on all our cognitive activities," O'Connell wonders whether this position of James will "plunge us once again into the morass of 'wishful thinking'?" (p. 124) O'Connell thinks not and in a key passage lays out what he thinks James is intending by his doctrine of the will to believe.

But the passional, for James, is a more articulated entity than that: not only are there temperamental differences from one to another, but each individual boasts other strata of the passional besides temperament. In his alertest thinking, James brings us to consider the volunteer labor of education and habit formation whereby we mold these inborn endowments into full-formed "character," with its capacity for moral judgment; this is what is put to the test in over-belief decisions. Central to any rightly formed character, moreover, James contends, is the freely developed capacity for making those ultimate choices not simply at the behest of our temperamental wants and interests, but in the "strenuous" moral mood—a mood which, synthesizing eudaemonism and deontologism, makes us actually "want" a world that makes austere, sometimes even shattering, demands on the slumbering hero dewelling in each of us. (pp. 124–125)

This text of O'Connell strikes me as just about right except for the unfortunate use of the term "deontologism." Surely O'Connell does not mean to equate James' position with the bleak, situation-free deontological ethics of Kant and H. D. Ross, now, lamentably, so in vogue? If I may, I take it that what O'Connell has in mind is James' obduracy relative to situation. There are times, for some of us many times, when the richness of context for decision freezes such that we must act, relying only on a basic, fall-back, last ditch moral position. If that is what O'Connell means by James' deontologism, then he is right; otherwise the term is inapplicable. Also, O'Connell is wise when he acknowledges that James later changed the "will" to believe to the "right" or "readiness" to believe. for no one can "will" a friendship "but no friendship was ever joined without some willingness to believe" (pp. 116–117). This perceptive viewpoint does not appear to me to be in any way deontological.

If someone were to ask me for the best explication of James' "Will to Believe" as a self-contained essay, I would suggest O'Connell's book. If someone were to ask me the best treatment of how James' "Will to Believe" can be defended against contemporary criticism and still stand as a meaningful version of moral and religious decision, I would suggest O'Connell's book. But if the request were to suggest a book in which James' essay was intelligible as interpreted within the framework of his overall philosophical position, then O'Connell's book is very wide of the mark. The problem is that O'Connell leaves out the three main struts of James' life-long thought and writing. With the exception of an occasional vague reference, readers of this book would never know that James held to a "radically empirical metaphysics," with a unique doctrine of "relations," a pragmatist epistemology, and a consequentialist ethics.

O'Connell falls prey to a canard, promulgated by R. B. Perry, that James was "'profoundly opposed to the whole life of scholarship' amounting even to a 'temperamental repugnance to the processes of exact thought' "(p. 24). O'Connell then refers to this alleged characteristic of James as a "congenital weakness." What are the grounds for this philosophical assassination? (Parenthetically, those of us who read all of James' archival remains, that is, thousands of pages of close, detailed philosophical speculation and analysis, find Perry's judgment to be grotesquely incorrect.)

In determining the context for James' essay on "The Will to Believe," O'Connell lists the following publications: "The Sentiment of Rationality," written 1877, published 1879; "Ration-

ality, Activity and Faith," 1879; "Great Men and their Environment," 1880; "Reflex Action and Theism," 1881; "The Dilemma of Determinism," 1884; "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," 1891; and "Is Life Worth Living?" 1895. O'Connell believes, rightly, that all of these essays provide a context for an understanding of "The Will to Believe," which is not surprising given that all of them except for some small portion of "Rationality, Activity and Faith," later integrated into "The Sentiment of Rationality" (1897), are in the aforementioned volume, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. A closer look at James' "Annotated Bibliography," however, reveals that O'Connell has avoided listing some essays that are absolutely essential to understanding James' "Will to Believe," his continuous philosophical effort and seriousness, and his willingness to engage in "processes of exact thought"!

To wit; a) James publishes in January of 1878 his essay, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correpondence," in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, in which he stresses the role of interest in human knowing and sets the stage for his pragmatism. b) James publishes in January of 1878, in Critique Philosophique, an essay entitled 'Quelques Considerations sur la methode subjective," in which he stresses the practical motives of belief. c) In 1884, James undergoes a Montessori type explosion and writes a long essay which lays the footing for his pragmatism, radical empiricism, and his doctrine of the stream of consciousness. Entitled, "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology," it was published in Mind and provided the bedding for virtually all of James' subsequent epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophical psychology. In fact, in 1890, this essay was the main grid in the pathbreaking chapter in The Principles of Psychology, known as "The Stream of Thought."

As to what this has to do with O'Connell's book, I offer the following: first, I would not discuss any of the critics as O'Connell does, for they know little or nothing of what James was doing in his essay; second, O'Connell was right in expanding his commentary to include the companion "popular" pieces, published in James' book on The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Surely, O'Connell's version of the essay and his response to defenders and critics of James is immeasurably enhanced by this context; third, virtually all of O'Connell's objections to James' essay would disappear if he had access to the wider context of James' thought. I do not say that he would agree with James' position, for O'Connell's metaphysics and epistemology is still traditional, whereas James breaks dramatically with the entire canon of western philosophy. What I do say is that the alleged inconsistencies that O'Connell finds in James are simply not there. If you believe in a pluralistic, unfinished, incluctably tychistic whatever (world, reality, cosmos will not fit here), and if you believe that consequences are constituent of intended truth propositions, and if you believe that objects are mock-ups and 'essences but teleological weapons of the mind,' and if you believe that novelty is an ontological presence in all of our endeavors, damning the arrogance of even probability theory, let alone strict causality, then you would know that the will to believe is just a minor articulation of a massive reconstruction of western metaphysics, and as such is coherent, consistent, mild and incisive.

So much for that. I return to repeat a request that Robert O'Connell's book be read, for it is the best, semi-contextual reading of James' essay on "The Will to Believe." If O'Connell were to devote himself to the entire, vast corpus of James' writings, we would be forever in his debt, for he writes eloquently, thinks smartly, and has good, humanistic instincts. But then, no surprise, for Augustine teaches us well about matters of the heart, which striate the work of Pascal and of William James.

Texas A and M University

John J. McDermott

Equality and Liberty. By Kai Nielsen. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1985. pp. xiii + 320.

"In this volume," according to the author, "I try to develop a comprehensive defense and a nucanced articulation of a form of radical egalitarianism." (p. vii) This sounds like an interesting and important thing to try to do. But as one reads on, one may be forgiven for being (a) puzzled about just what it is that the author is trying to defend—in particular how aptly it is described as "radical"; and (b) impressed at the paucity of real argument for his position, despite the 300+ pp. of text.

Regarding (a): what exactly is "radical egalitarianism," as argued for in these pages? At the outset (p. 3), Nielsen says that ch. 1 will try to show that "justice should be linked closely with equality," that equality "is a fundamental human good," that it is "both instrumentally and intrinsically good," and also that it is "a right;" but "I shall principally be concerned with arguing for equality as a fundamental goal, a goal essential for justice, which a perfectly just society would realize." The upshot is unclear. If A brings it about that B is less than equal in a given respect, or even just fails to bring it about that B is thus equal, then B's rights have been violated. Normally this means that redress may be brought about, by force if necessary. But Nielsen does not quite mean this. He thinks, for one thing, that people could legitimately come to own some differential shares of personal property by the sort of "historical" processes advocated by Locke and Nozick. Consider the person who "has mixed his labor and care with something, say built and lovingly cared for, a house or built up a family farm. It would, certis paribus, be wrong, plainly unjust, to take those possessions away from that person and give them to someone else" says Nielsen (p. 68). Nielsen's egalitarianism, then, is not as radical as that of the Bolsheviks, who earlier in this century did in Russia precisely what he says would be "plainly unjust."

And he is willing to allow some weight to the notion of desert, though not much. Like too many recent writers, Nielsen swallows whole Rawls' argument that if A gets x from effort which A was able to put forth by virtue of possessing qualilty Q, where Q, being inborn or due to A's environment or upbringing, is not something A deserved, then A does not deserve x either. "Still, whether or not a person will actually make these choices depends, in the final analysis, on circumstances beyond his control" (iii). But "in the final analysis," we may well suppose, nothing is within anybody's control, including the decision to accept Nielsen's arguments or to mount any of his revolutions. But the obvious inference, that the "final analysis" is simply irrelevant to all practical matters, is not one Nielsen draws. Even so, he is willing to give some weight to desert, and it is not entirely clear how much. In any case, Nielsen's socialism cannot be concerned with such pettiness; for he is concerned, à la the classical Marxian formulations, with eliminating "private ownership and control of the major means of production." I'm not sure what constitutes "major." Numerous individual farm families in Canada and the U.S. nowadays have equipment and land stocks running into 7 figures. Are these "major," or are they within the scope of the passage from p. 68 above? But anyway, it is the biggies Nielsen is after. One gets the impression that redistribution in the Nielsenian scheme would begin somewhere above the Full Professor level.

When would the proposed general takeover be justified? Not just any time, it turns out. In the first place, the Revolution does not begin at home! A believer in equality could, for example, take the difference between his/her own income and what one judged to be the world median, and donate that difference to the poor. But Nielsen does not advocate this:

In a period of political stagnation, to demand of a tolerably well off suburbanite that he greatly diminish his holdings and send a not inconsiderable sum of money to the Sahel comes too close to requiring him to be a Don Quixote. What needs to be altered is the social system (70).

One might wonder what could be the principled basis for this rejection of what seems a plain implication of a sincere and "radical" egalitarianism. Could it be fairness—I shouldn't have to pay unless everyone does? But why does their "unjust" behavior make mine any less so, if that's what I believe?

Meanwhile, it seems that our well-off suburbanite can stay pretty comfortable, downing the odd bottle of Chateau Lafitte, if it comes to that, until the time is right. "No socialist who knew what he was doing," says Nielsen, "would try to institute socialism—say if he could somehow get the army under socialist control—when the masses of people were hostile to socialism and wanted capitalism." The idea is to wait until there is a generally receptive attitude. An interesting idea, this: apparently the socialists who led the various revolutions in just about every currently socialist country in the world did not, then, know what they were doing!

But Nielsen does think that socialism "from above" would be acceptable in conditions when, in the words of G. A. Cohen (from whom Nielsen gets a good deal of his position), "an amount of inclination to capitalism of such a size that unless it were coercively checked, socialism would be subverted, yet sufficiently small that in socialist judgment socialism, with the required coercion, would still be worthwhile." (248) Under those conditions, Cohen says "why should they flinch from imposing the prohibition?" Indeed. Once our socialists get into power, we may be sure that, like all socialist regimes to date, it's jolly well going to stay there, and elections can be ignored.

This upshot, by the way, is in the context of claiming that socialism is compatible with liberty. Nielsen's main argument for that view is G. A. Cohen's. He quotes Cohen to the effect that a socialist society need not prohibit, in Nozick's charming phrase, capitalist acts between consenting adults. The initial defense is that if everybody had socialist attitudes, they would all be in favor of the various socialist actions, and, of course, no proponent of bourgeois liberty could object to them in that case. Then the question of instituting socialism by force "from above" is raised, and the reply, as we have seen, is that socialists should not be in favor of this, if the circumstances were such that most people were not in favor of socialism. But when most people are, then it is all right. This raises a question of democracy that is logically independent of the issue about socialism. For opponents of socialism are also typically friends of democracy; if the people speak in favor of X, then X is what should be done, within very wide limits, even if that involves socialism. Nielsen's view, which at this point, in short, is identical with those of most of the people with whom he disagrees (viz., "liberal egalitarians"), shows you what can be done with a little "radicalism." But the democratic gambit is no defense against anybody who thinks that to prevent people from engaging in "capitalist acts" is to interfere with their rightful freedom. Nielsen would not (I suppose) think that just because, to take Mill's example, 99% of the people disagree with the remaining 1% about some ideological issue, the remaining 1% may legitimately be prevented from airing their views. Why, then, may we suppress the 1% who might like to practice capitalism—that is to say, engage in mutually satisfactory exchanges even though they result in unequal distribution of wealth? For answer, Nielsen (again following Cohen) claims that Nozick

would only have a plausible counter if he could establish the rightness of absolute side-constraints about individual liberty even in situations whereby, upon relaxing them, the extent of human liberty would be much greater than would otherwise be the case. But to opt for the lesser freedom here...is surely mistaken' (248).

What Nielsen has to prove is that socialism, qua socialism, would "extend liberty," if he's going to argue that depriving people of the liberty of free exchange of goods and services would result in increased liberty. Thus: "in reasoning as we did about the above case, we were in effect appealing to the doctrine of the lesser evil. Where the suffering of each individual is the same, there is more suffering if three people suffer than if only one person suffers" (251). But in the first place, what suffering? In Nozick's famous Wilt Chamberlain case, e.g.: which of these persons, willing to spend a quarter to see their hero play, is "suffering"? (Apart from

enthusiastic egalitarians who apparently suffer at the sheer prospect of some people having lots of money?)

Careful reflection on this I believe, will take us to the root of the matter. Why might anyone suppose that capitalist acts, all of which are required to be voluntary, interfere with liberty? Some putatively capitalist acts would have third-party effects such as causing increased pollution. But why should we think that capitalism, as defended by the likes of Nozick—permits these? Pollution obviously interferes with property—indeed, our most basic property, namely our bodies. For a capitalist exchange to be legitimate in the eyes of a proponent of liberty, however, no affected parties' right may be violated—it is not just those immediately involved whose liberty matters. (One might wonder whether Nielsen is not assimilating capitalism in the sense of a free market to "capitalism" in the sense of Latin American right-wing military dictatorships. But such awful cases bear the same relation to a truly free-market economy as, say, Stalinist socialism does to what Nielsen would accept as "true" socialism.)

Suppose, then, we have a case of genuine "capitalist acts between consenting adults" with no covert effects upon non-consenting third parties (not an unrealistic possibility; indeed, it is probably very typical in contemporary society, far from free-market though it be). What can the objection be to this activity on grounds of liberty? I can only think of one: the people involved might perhaps have alternatives in which they would do more for other people. Instead of making these particular mutually beneficial exchanges with voluntarily acting agents, they might have gone out to heal the sick, or whatever. On my view, if you force them to do this rather than engage in their capitalist acts, you do interfere with their liberty. In Nielsen's (and Cohen's) view, however, you have the right to force them to do that. But why is this not a reduction of that agent's liberty, perhaps in the interests of something else—such as welfare or equality (or, perhaps, promoting the liberty of others)? The reply presumably is that the liberty of the people you heal, say, is increased by your efforts more than your own liberty is reduced. On this view, in short, if I do not *promote* the liberty of others, I am *reducing* it: my non-promotion of your liberty counts as a reduction of liberty just as certainly as my active interference with it: letting-die is killing.

There's another angle: inequalities of wealth are inequalities of power. This strikes a responsive chord: libertarians will enthusiastically agree that power over others, properly speaking should indeed be "distributed equally": namely, that nobody should have any of it. Each should, on the libertarian view, have maximal power over her or his personal resources, energy, ideas and so forth; each may, then, use them to such advantage as he or she may see fit by engaging in activities with others that are mutually acceptable. But this, in the libertarian's view, is incompatible with forcing people to promote the good of others. Now, how is it that your having six hundred million dollars, while I have barely enough to keep body and soul together is, in itself, some sort of infringement of my liberty? Why think that people who make a lot more money than I do have thereby done something to restrict my liberty, I should like to know?

One answer goes like this: in a society where capitalist acts between consenting adults led to unequal distributions of wealth, we should be infringing "the right of others to live in a 'republic of equals' "! True. Similarly, prohibiting people from acting on Nazi beliefs also deprives them of their right to live in a society of Nazis. But if we allow "societies" to be very small, then those who like to live in a society of equals are certainly welcome, on the libertarian's view to live in a community of like-minded people as large as they can, by persuasion or example, manage to attract. But this would get us back to Nielsen's first example of voluntary socialism—one that libertarians have no quarrel with. The bottom line on this, I think, is to be found in this significant passage from Nielsen: "(Capitalist) efficiency is directed to maximizing the owners' rate of profit (etc.)...While it benefits those people, it harms, or at least does not maximally benefit, the workers who labor in his firm" (229) (My emphasis). Note carefully the bit I have put in italics. Were Nielsen to omit that clause, what he says would, normally be absurdly false. Including it simply shows that the argument depends on a redefinition of the

notion of harm: 'harming' is 'failing to benefit equally'! Small wonder there's a connection between equality and "liberty"!

There is also an argument about "self-respect," the king-pin of which is that "a levelling of wealth and status" is "an alternative way of achieving equal self-respect." Why should restructuring society so as to deprive the currently wealthy of their wealth and make it impossible for anyone else ever again to achieve it, promote the self-respect of the formerly poor? On Nielson's view, one gathers, Socrates and Zeno should have no self-respect at all.

The basic line in the book is Nielsen's oft-reiterated appeal to his intuitions, coupled with his denial that rationality can get us terribly far in moral theory. Equality seems to Nielsen an "intrinsic good." The view that "there is nothing wrong. . .with people having radically unequal life prospects even when something could be done about it without violating anyone's rights or causing a social catastrophe" is, in Nielsen's view, "morally monstrous." Here is a "radical" view, indeed, for we may be sure that about 99% of Nielsen's fellow humans think precisely that: the sheer fact that they could do something to equalize the life prospects of various random people, without violating anybody's rights, simply does not matter much to most people. They have their own problems to worry about, they will say. These are ordinary people, but if Nielsen is right, they are all "moral monsters." For that matter, so is Nielsen himself. After all, he could do something about this without violating anyone's rights: he could give ¾ of his substantial income (putting him in roughly the 98th percentile of incomes in Canada, I believe) to persons much poorer than himself, doing his bit for equality, and do it without violating anybody's rights; but he does not.

Meanwhile, we have the question what are reasonable principles on which to regulate our behavior toward each other—monsters that we are. The blandness of Nielsen's egalitarianism in practice should not blind us to its theoretical absurdities. No one who is not already persuaded of his views will, I think, find himself/herself any more inclined to adopt them after reading Equality and Liberty. It's an exercise in preaching to the converted. But you will find an extensive, if not always a cogent or careful, review of recent literature relevant to these matters. And it is useful to have the case put by a strongly committed proponent of egalitarianism. It's an untenable view, made to seem less so by the amount of hedging strewn here and there, and its arguments depend either on faulty analysis, a strongly colored view of the world, or the chaff of intuition. But it is instructive that an intelligent and reputable philosopher such as Nielsen could succumb to them; he is far from alone, we certainly owe them a careful look, more extensive than can be sufficiently reflected in this brief review.

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Jan Narveson

Deep Ecology. By Bill Devall and George Sessions. Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985. Pp. 266.

Since the awakening of national concern about environmental pollution in the 1960s, philosophers have become increasingly interested in the relationship between humanity and Nature. Most modern philosophers have operated under the influence of the post-theological, Cartesian paradigm that portrays the natural world as a mechanical object whose only value lies in being exploited for human purposes. This paradigm has been increasingly challenged not only because it seems responsible for the widespread and increasing destruction of the ecosphere on which humanity's survival depends, but also because it provides an unsatisfying account both of humanity and of the natural world of which we are a part. There has been a plethora of different philosophical responses to the issues raised by the "environmental movement." Some of these responses have called only for a revision of the existing paradigm to help insure human survival, while others have called for a new paradigm that provides an entirely different way of conceiving of the place of humanity in the natural world.

The present book, handsomely designed and produced, represents the latter end of the spectrum. Using for its title a concept coined by Arne Naess, the Norwegian philosopher and naturalist, *Deep Ecology* has at least a three-fold mission: 1) to explain the history of the environmental movement, both philosophically and in terms of political activity, in the past century; 2) to set forth the basic principles of deep ecology in contradistinction to the various reform movements that have sprung up during this time; and 3) to enlist the support of readers in participating in the process of bringing about the deep ecological paradigm that is allegedly necessary both to save the planet and to restore humanity to its proper role within the larger scheme of things.

Because it tries to do so many different things within a limited space, the book may prove somewhat frustrating to different kinds of readers. For the professional philosopher, the book may seem somewhat lacking in extensive and rigorous analysis of the moral, ontological, and logical issues raised by an attempt to challenge an existing paradigm and to introduce an alternative to it. Moreover, philosophers still satisfied with the basic principles of the existing anthropocentric paradigm will claim that the book is unnecessarily radical, or that it skips too lightly over issues such as the "rights" of non-human beings. Devall and Sessions, however, counter such criticisms by maintaining that they are insufficiently self-critical to see their own limitations. For example, defining moral issues in terms of "rights" is based on the kind of anthropocentric tradition which is supposedly responsible for the ongoing destruction of the environment by human practices.

Environmental activists, on the other hand, may feel that the book spends too much time on theoretical matters and not enough on topics directly concerned with the consciousness-raising and political activity needed to save the planet. Enough time has been spent, these activists might say, on talking about the origins and nature of the problem: now we must do something about it.

The problem here is faced by everyone who tries to bring together theory and practice in any significant way. Something of this tension seems at work in *Deep Ecology*, too. On the one hand, the authors recognize that there is a need to provide theoretical justification for their revolutionary aims; on the other hand, they also realize that the hour is very late and that what's needed is action designed to forestall catastrophe. My sense is that they do about as good a job as possible to reconcile the twin poles of theory and practice within the limits available to them.

Philosophers interested in more precise and comprehensive analyses of the theoretical issues can turn to the many articles and essays authored by Sessions and Devall in the years leading up to Deep Ecology. These articles, which have appeared in such journals as Environmental Ethics, have been responsible for defining an important area within the broad topic of the humanity-Nature relationship. Activists interested in more direct means of implementing the paradigm shift needed to save the biosphere can become involved in any of several environmental action groups (such as "Earth First!") now operating around the country. But the message of Sessions and Devall is that activism without theory is blind, and theory without action is empty. Whether one agrees with the authors' ideas about the humanity-Nature relationship, one may acknowledge the importance of translating thought into principled action. Sessions and D sions and Devall play the role of conscience to members of the philosophical community; they ask us to become involved in caring for the Earth in a way that philosophers have tended to avoid historically. They also call on all of us—not merely philosophers—to examine carefully our presuppositions about what it means to live on Earth as human beings. Are we here to dominate the Earth, to exploit it solely for the advancement of human power, or are we here to dwell on Earth have dwell on Earth harmoniously in a way that promotes the well-being of the entire fabric of life?

Around this question, the whole book revolves. In their account of the humanity-Nature relation since the rise of the modern scientific paradigm, the authors make it clear that scientific "humanism" radically distinguishes between intrinsically valuable humanity on the one hand, and instrumentally valuable Nature on the other. For such humanism, the aim of human

life is to conquer Nature in a way that increases human power, security, and comfort. Since humanism is the prevailing Western paradigm, it is extremely difficult to move beyond. For instance, once it was discovered that the industrial-technological practices made possible by modern science were polluting the environment, humanists established reform movements to handle the problem. Resource management and wilderness preservation schemes are examples of what Devall and Sessions call "reform" environmentalism.

Many reformist schemes make no challenge to anthropocentric humanism; instead, they call for us merely to alter our practices in such a way as to avoid committing suicide by destroying the environment. A classic battle between deep ecology and reform environmentalism took place at the turn of the century, when John Muir went up against Gifford Pinchot, who successfully represented the resource management perspective that currently guides national policy. Even wilderness preservation schemes, which on the surface seem to be concerned with Nature as such, betray an anthropocentric bias in their justification for such preservation: Urbanized humanity needs to spend time in wilderness to be refreshed and rejuvenated.

Other reform movements include the Judaeo-Christian idea that humanity is not supposed to exploit the Earth, but to be its wise steward, to care for it in accordance with the expectations of its Creator. In earlier writings, Sessions and Devall have been critical of the stewardship idea in particular and the Judaeo-Christian tradition in general for being anthropocentric. In *Deep Ecology*, however, they offer a much more conciliatory view of the positive role that the Judaeo-Christian tradition can play in fostering a non-anthropocentric, theo-centric view of the humanity-Nature relationship.

Having discussed the reformist approach, Sessions and Devall then describe Arne Naess' basic principles of the deep ecological paradigm. These principles include the following: all living things have intrinsic value, independent of their usefulness for humans; richness and diversity of forms of life are both intrinsically valuable and contribute to the realization of the intrinsic value of living beings; humans can reduce such richness and diversity only to meet vital needs; human population must be decreased to insure the flourishing of both human and non-human life; basic policies must be changed in economic, technological, and ideological spheres in order to appreciate and foster *life quality* as opposed to raising the "standard of living" in a material way; finally, those who adhere to these principles have a moral obligation to try to implement them in practice (p. 70). On pp. 70–76, Sessions and Naess provide a sophisticated philosophical defense of these principles against critics who portray them as anti-human, naive, or authoritarian. Readers should compare this defense with the criticisms of deep ecology offered by writers such as Richard Watson.

In chapter six, the authors describe some of the many sources they claim to be supportive of the deep ecology position. These sources include: the perennial philosophy (as discussed by Aldous Huxley, for example); the American literary tradition of pastoralism and naturalism; the science of ecology; the "new physics"; Christianity (including St. Francis); feminism; primal peoples; Martin Heidegger; Eastern religions; Robinson Jeffers; John Muir; and David Brower (a crucial figure in the American environmental movement who moved from reform environmentalism while with the Sierra Club to deep ecology when he founded Friends of the Earth). Other important figures, including Whitehead, Heraclitus, and Spinoza, are discussed in an appendix by Sessions.

Critics might argue that this rather eclectic list of forerunners and supporters of deep ecology cannot be synthesized successfully into a coherent position. But Devall and Sessions, along with Naess, argue that even though the various thinkers, peoples, and positions who support deep ecology might disagree on various particulars, they are for the most part aligned with respect to the basic points: that all things are intrinsically valuable; that humans must learn to dwell on Earth in a way that promotes and sustains the richness and diversity of life; and that humanity fulfills itself not through domination, but through becoming fully conscious of and in actively pursuing its responsibility for enhancing both human and non-human forms of life.

This brief survey of Deep Ecology cannot pretend to do more than touch on its many interrelated and insightful themes. It stands as an important testimony to the possibility of understanding our place in Nature in a way that neither denigrates humanity nor mistakenly elevates it beyond its proper rank. It is not clear to me, however, how the deep ecology position is to take hold in the industrialized world. Even if that world falls apart as a result of its own doing, there are no guarantees that the human society that replaces it will behave in accordance with deep ecological principles. Some critics fear that only an authoritarian regime could put into practice many of the deep ecology principles, although the authors align themselves with the kind of anarchism and decentralization espoused by Murray Bookchin. Other critics say that we can solve the environmental crisis only when human initiative is turned loose to design production processes that are clean and efficient, in contrast to the present ones that are dirty and wasteful. Sessions and Devall oppose the idea that humanity can eventually "manage" the planet in a high-technology way that is consistent with human needs as well as with the longterm needs of other forms of life. Such "New Age" thinking is supposedly still caught up in the anthropocentrism that is the source of our current problem. Time will tell whether the authors are right in their judgment about this issue.

In the meantime, we can be grateful to them for their work in making their ideas about deep ecology available in a clear, accessible, readable, and comprehensive form to professional philosophers as well as to an informed public concerned about the fate of the Earth.

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German Recollections: Some of My Best Friends were Philosophers. By Julius Seelye Bixler. Waterville, Maine: Colby College Press, 1985.

To attempt to prove a philosophical position on grounds of the good character of its author, or to argue against a position on grounds of the corrupt character or perverse personality of its creator, is to commit quite explicitly the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem. But to point out that the philosophy of an individual, a school, or an era is more intelligible if we know something about the personal traits of the thinker(s) and the circumstances in which the philosophizing was done is to remind us of what we need to remember and tend to forget. Bixler does not commit the ad hominem fallacy. But his remarkably vivid memories of the events and personalities which in that era dominated the intellectual life of Germany in the late 1920's focus a penetrating and illuminating light upon those fateful days—days when philosophical positions were being formulated which would be put to a severe test by political developments whose sinister nature could not yet be clearly discerned. Bixler speaks of the mood of gloom and despair that characterized so many Germans in the wake of the First World War. Many had a sense that Germany's fate was harsh, humiliating, and undeserved. But Bixler tells us that amidst this dark and sombre mood there were many who saw on the horizon a savior who would tions. The name of the savior that we expect to hear, of course, is Hitler. We are startled to learn that in fact it was Heidegger. At that early date Hitler was not yet taken seriously by most of the German intellectuals. In the minds of many educated Germans it was the great Professor who, somehow, could be expected to lead the way to salvation and greatness. Bixler makes no bones about his scorn of Heidegger who, far from leading the way to a great and noble Germany simply injected in many, simply joined without a murmur of protest the cruel and corrupt bandwagon of Nazism. Bixler's admiration is reserved for Jaspers who refused his Jewish wife's offer to sacrifice herself in order that he could complete his philosophy.

When the Nazi movement appeared with its bombast, its puerilities, its cruelties, and flagrant injustices, Heidegger capitulated, showing that his philosophy simply did not meet the test, and, as I have

remarked, I cannot think that his ultimate recantation frees him from blame. Jasper's philosophy stood up under the strain, and as a person he paid the price (p. 33 f).

Bixler's firm belief in the values of Pragmatism shows unmistakably in his assessment of the philosophers and their philosophy. With William James, a philosopher whom he admired, and whose thought he taught and wrote about, he was convinced that a philosophy is properly judged not merely by its abstract depth and rational coherence—much less by what he humorously suggests seems to be Heidegger's criterion: its obscurity!—but by the way in which it enables its advocates to live humane and moral lives even amidst the utmost extremities of war and the barbaric atrocities which can come from nationalistic fervor. As William James would say, what we must assess about a philosophy is its "cash value," its ability to prove its truth and its worth not just by the test of abstract logic in the halls of the ivy tower, but in the practical and dangerous affairs of human life. By this test the philosophy of certain German thinkers stood up; that of Herr Doctor Professor Heidegger, the alleged savior of his nation, failed miserably.

Bixler has produced a book which is in the same genre as Roy Wood Sellar's Reflections on American Philosophy from Within. It is not an exposition of the thought of the philosophers it treats, nor is it merely biographical. Rather, it is an informed, and fascinating, commentary on the life and times of the great minds of Germany in the period between the two World Wars, upon how they communicated their thought to their contemporaries, and upon how that thought expressed itself in their personal and public lives. Bixler as a young graduate student travelled to Europe to immerse himself in the dynamic and turbulent philosophical climate which pervaded German intellectual life in that period. It is remarkable that he succeeded in establishing personal acquaintances with so many of Europe's most eminent thinkers, and relationships in several instances which lasted for a lifetime. His acquaintance with theologian Paul Tillich grew into a lifelong friendship when Tillich moved to the United States, and his relationship with Schweitzer continued through correspondence culminating in another visit 26 years later on which occasion Schweitzer treated the Bixler family to a private organ recital.

The battle between two excessively narrow conceptions of human knowledge is the underlying theme in Bixler's discussion of the thought not only of Husserl, Heidegger and Jaspers, but also of Ernst Cassirer, Max Scheler, Heinrich Rickert, Hermann Keyserling, Johannes Muller, Rudolf Otto, and Albert Schweitzer (and brief discussions of such theologians as Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Ludwig Klages, and Emil Brunner). The quest for Truth, especially in an age of the rapid progress of science, is an enterprise which must employ the most discriminating methods of rational thought. It must avoid above all else the intrusion of human emotion or feeling which destroys objectivity and injects desire and preference into what properly must be a disinterested—and thus dispassionate—undertaking. Bixler points out that the Germans are great advocates of scientific objectivity, rationalism, and razor-sharp analytic thought, but at the same time they are also great poets and romantics. It is this dialectic of "head and heart, reason and feeling, precise observation and intuitions that are necessarily vague," which has characterized philosophical thought in the twentieth century. There have been powerful advocates of each approach and some of them have denied legitimacy altogether to the other approach. But Bixler argues that "the Germans have done justice to both" (p. 99). No philosophy can be adequate which does not. Of this Bixler has not the slightest doubt.

The author points out that the Germans, like most other peoples, have had their share of narrowness and one-sidedness of vision. This is true of their scholars, even if one leaves out of account one of the most savage instances of political barbarism which history has known. But the Germans have also had a passion for truth (and "passion" is exactly the right word) which has sometimes transcended the vicious dichotomy of thought, bringing into creative synthesis the sharpest and most penetrating products of human reason and the deepest and most powerful intuitions of human feeling. Any philosophy which fails to do full justice to both of these sides of human concern is thin, attenuated, and anemic. For human life can never be limited to either

side of the dichotomy. We are creatures as much of passion as of reason—would anyone want it to be otherwise? If our philosophical account of our being in the world is to satisfy, it must meet the demands of head and of heart; for we thirst to know not only what is true but also what is good, what is beautiful, and what is significant. Bixler's book attempts to guide us through the thicket of German philosophy and theology and to help us see how these German thinkers were struggling to achieve such a synthesis. The author's style reflects the warmness of his personality; he writes with a twinkle in his eye, with a good-humored fondness for most of the persons he discusses. He conveys also his sense that philosophy ought to be a passionate quest, not just for disinterested facts, but for an understanding of the worth or significance of what we know for human life and affairs. It is this sense of the importance of human knowledge, grasped clearly by some and only dimly by others of the German thinkers, which makes an understanding of their thought important for us. Bixler has breathed life into our understanding of German thought and our perspective on the importance of what philosophers of integrity must always try to do.

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C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion. By John Beversluis. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1985. Pp. xiv + 182. \$9.95.

In his introduction Beversluis divides previous books on C.S. Lewis into two categories: (1) books critical of Lewis which offer "not an assessment but a demolition" and (2) admiring studies of Lewis which are unduly uncritical and adulatory.

Beversluis offers his own book as belonging to neither of these classes, as an argument not a harangue, an assessment not a demolition, appreciative of Lewis but not adulatory, and above all as rationally and judiciously critical of Lewis. If the book lived up to these promises Lewis would have been the first to welcome it: he was a man "hungry for rational opposition" and would have welcomed a rigorous debate of his arguments. I share Lewis' feelings, and as the author of one of the books Beversluis puts into his second category would be glad to be shown important criticisms of Lewis I had overlooked.

Unfortunately, Beversluis does not fulfill his promises and in the end what he says of previous critics of Lewis applies eminently to Beversluis himself: "One begins to suspect that they have reached these negative conclusions a bit too easily". . . His procedure in criticizing Lewis is typically as follows: he begins with a straight exposition of Lewis' views, often with extensive quotation. Then rhetorical negative characterizations of Lewis' views begin to creep into the descripiton. Finally actual arguments against Lewis or criticism of his view are given. But these are extremely brief (ten percent of the total material at a generous estimate), quite cavalier, and more often than not are based on misinterpretations of Lewis' points.

Chapter Two, on Lewis' "argument from desire" is typical. It begins with a rhetorical attack on Lewis' *The Pilgrim Regress* ("this embarrassing work," "this gratuitously censorious little book") based on misinterpreting satire as if it were straight assertion.

Finally, about a third of the way through the Chapter a version of Lewis' argument from desire is given: we have desires no finite object can satisfy, other desires do not exist without an object. It is likely, therefore, that this desire too has an object, and only God would be an adequate object.

Beversluis gives a flurry of objections many of which are beside the point, e.g. some things which do satisfy our desires only satisfy them for a time. He repeatedly begs the question by asserting that "the desire in and of itself proves nothing, points to nothing." Whether it does is the point at issue. The argument "other natural desires have objects therefore probably this one does" is never squarely faced. It is typical of Beversluis that we are never quite sure if he is

denying the existence of the desire, denying that God's existence is the best explanation of the desire, or claiming that the desire exists but is doomed to frustration.

The remainder of the chapter is a curious bit of theology in which it is claimed that the Biblical view of God is quite incompatible with the "romantic view" that all men desire God, since all men desire true happiness and true happiness can be found in God alone, an alleged contradiction which would have surprised Aquinas, among others. There is also a strange muddle about Lewis' autobiographical report that when he found God there was a time when he was tempted to retreat from the commitment involved. Beversluis sees this as incompatible with the claim that God was what he deisred. But surely any accepted lover has experienced the moment when the heart's desire has been attained and the attainment seems momentarily frightening.

The chapter on Lewis' argument from morality is distinguished from the chapters before and after it by an almost total lack of arguments. It is repeatedly asserted that Lewis has ignored important alternative explanations of morality, but it is never shown how these views meet the challenge he poses: how we are to explain our conviction that morality is objective without explaining it away. In general, as I argued in my book on Lewis, his strategy is to cite a fact about human experience (desire, morality, reason) and show that God is the best explanation of this fact, because other explanations explain away the experience. Beversluis never seems to understand, much less answer this strategy, often because he implausibly tries to interpret Lewis' arguments as deductive rather than inductive.

There is an unfortunate tendency in this book to take incidents from Lewis' life, interpret them tendentiously, and use them as against Lewis' arguments. Thus the famous debate with Anscombe is interpreted as a complete defeat for Lewis' argument from reason to God, on the alleged evidence of Lewis' psychological reactions, even though Anscombe herself is quoted in a footnote to the contrary.

More disturbingly, Lewis' honest exposition of his agonized feelings after the death of his wife is interpreted as a loss of his earlier faith in "rational religion." This ignores Lewis' own description of A Grief Observed (quoted in my book) "(it) ends with faith, but raises all the blackest doubts en route" as well as the body of serene and mature work, such as Letters to Malcolm, which Lewis did after Joy's death.

It would not be difficult, and may at some future time be useful, to answer Beversluis' criticisms of Lewis point by point. When misunderstandings, misinterpretations and irrelevancies are set aside, little of substance remains, however: answering Beversluis is not likely to advance our understanding either of Lewis or of the issues involved. This is, I think, because Beversluis never really enters into dialogue with Lewis, never asks himself how Lewis might reply to his facile and fragmentary criticisms. There is a notable lack of the principle of charity in the logician's sense, as well as of charity in the theological sense, despite much rather patronizing praise of Lewis. In the end, the faults Beversluis sees in Lewis are mainly faults which Beversluis himself possesses in an eminent degree: setting up strawmen, producing false dilemmas, drawing fallacious inferences. And he has characterized his own work in describing that of earlier critics: "not an argument but a harangue, not an assessment but a demolition."

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Marxism: Philosophy and Economics. By Thomas Sowell. New York: William Morros and Company, 1985. Pp. 281. \$15.95.

In his new book, which despite its title is more about Marx than about Marxism, Professor Sowell makes numerous condemnatory asides against earlier treatments of Marx, though these

are usually not named, and never refuted in detail. Professor Sowell makes no secret of his opinion that the received wisdom on Marx is grossly inaccurate and that the present work sets the record straight. For the most part, however, Professor Sowell's reinterpretations of Marx are incorrect, and the received wisdom approximately correct.

The most striking instance is Professor Sowell's denial that Marx held a "labor theory of value," or even used the phrase "theory of value" (88-89, 106). Actually, Marx did employ the phrase "theory of value" (Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume III, Moscow: Progress, 1971; London: Lawrence and Wishart, 172; p. 153), but Professor Sowell's slip here is of minor importance. Of more consequence is the question: What was the point of Marx's use of the 'value' concept in Capital? Here, Professor Sowell proceeds in a curious fashion. He frequently and emphatically asserts that earlier interpretations of Marx are mistaken, and that at last he, Professor Sowell, has uncovered the correct interpretation. He goes to some pains to refute the view that Marx equated 'value' and 'price,' without citing any proponents of such a view. He seems to be unaware that most Marx commentators and critics. and all of them of any standing, take it as elementary that Marx did not equate value and price. From his commonplace denial that Marx equated value and price, Professor Sowell leaps to a denial that the point of value is to explain price. Yet Marx insisted repeatedly that, while 'values' (in his distinctive sense) did not correspond with 'prices' (by which he meant money prices), nor with 'exchange-values' (by which he meant prices), nonetheless, values were indispensible in the explanation of prices:

The distribution of the social profit . . . creates prices of production which deviate from the values of commodities and which are the real regulating average market prices. But this deviation abolishes neither the determination of prices by values nor the regular limits of profit. (Capital, Volume III, p. 860)

From Professor Sowell's mistaken view that Marxian 'value' is not part of a price theory, further errors follow. Professor Sowell claims that statements early in Capital, where Marx points out the non-equivalence of value and price, are "time bomb" statements (110), meaning that they escaped the notice of readers for many decades. Professor Sowell does not cite any commentators who missed these statements. He claims that, between the publication of Volume I of Capital in 1867, and that of Volume III in 1894, the debate on Marx's theory of value was conducted on the basis of a misreading of Volume I. Professor Sowell is full of disdain for Marx's greatest critic, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, who is alleged to have "repeatedly misunderstood" Marx, and to have "unknowingly repeated criticisms that Marx made of Ricardo" (109).

This entire account is unsupported and untrue. From the publication of Volume I, it was understood that Marx recognized that in reality average prices did not correspond with values. Böhm-Bawerk acknowledged this in his History and Critique of Interest Theories. Whatever may be thought of Böhm-Bawerk's critical arguments, he meticulously documented every view he attributed to Marx, understood Marx excellently, and committed no mistakes in his account of Marx's value theory. Professor Sowell's depiction of the debate is not internally consistent, for he emphasizes that Engels correctly understood Marx's thinking. Yet the debate on the prima facie contradiction between Volume I (where prices equal values) and Volumes II-III was launched and virtually presided over by Engels, and conducted in the terms he set forth in his famous challenge in the Preface to Volume II of Capital.

Professor Sowell's interpretation leads to misleading presentations of passages from Marx. Here a few instances will have to suffice. According to Professor Sowell:

By the time Marx reached his final approximation on the subject in Volume III, he could say that only in a "transfer of the could be subject in Volume III, he could say that only in a "vague and meaningless form are we still reminded of the fact that the value of the commodities is determined by the labor contained in them." (89)

This is not Marx's final approximation, but the conclusion of Chapter IX, before the crucial hapter X in which he was a personal part of the conclusion of Chapter IX, before the crucial Chapter X in which he presents his proposed solution to the apparent contradiction between

Volumes I and II-III, with many chapters of further approximation to come. The context of the passage is a description of how wrongly matters appear to an individual capitalist. The paragraph of which these words are the conclusion begins: "So far as the variable capital is concerned...matters get cruder or appear to the capitalist in the following light..." (Capital, Volume III, p. 171). In the other example, Professor Sowell asserts:

While others have interpreted Marx's "law of value" as a theory of individual commodity prices, Marx himself flatly contradicted this. Marx presented a picture of "the law of value enforcing itself, not with reference to individual commodities or articles, but with reference to the total products of the particular social spheres of production made independent by division of labour." (89)

Now this quotation merely repeats what Marx often contends, that each individual commodity is to be considered as a representative of its class. An individual commodity will have the same value, and therefore the same price, as each other commodity of the same class, assumed to be perfect substitutes. The labor-time required to produce the whole class of commodities is divided by the number of commodities to give the value, even though some of the producers require more or less labor-time per commodity. Far from suggesting that Marx's law of value is not part of a theory of individual commodity prices, this quotation illustrates precisely that it is part of such a theory; it points out that the individual commodity's value, hence its price, is governed by the value of the whole supply.

Among other cases where what Marx was driving at appears to have passed Professor Sowell completely by is his account of Marx's conception of communist society. He cites Marx's condemnation, in some contexts, of labor-vouchers, but does not cite Marx's recommendation of labor-vouchers in different contexts. He therefore has no occasion to explain this apparent anomaly. Professor Sowell cites Marx's criticism of Proudhon's scheme to reform the market system by eliminating price fluctuations (127). The reader will infer, as the author apparently intends him to, that Marx was in favor of permitting price fluctuations under communism! But of course, Marx was attacking Proudhon for hoping to tinker with and improve the system of market prices, whereas Marx favored the total elimination of 'commodity production,' and therefore of markets, prices, money, and 'value.' Nowhere does the reader get the faintest inkling of the most important idea in Marx's whole analysis: that the stage of history in which production is for sale has reached its fullest flowering, and is about to pass away, to be replaced by a system of society-wide planning, dispensing with 'value' in all its forms.

Where Professor Sowell is not simply erroneous, he tends to rely heavily on long quotations—the same quotations that have appeared so often before in other works that we almost know them by heart—and sticks to a safe and unilluminating gloss upon the quotes, settling on what Marx must have meant by application of a golden mean between competing interpretations. This is the case with the chapter on Marx's theory of history, which is most unenlightening. The one distinctive feature of Professor Sowell's interpretation here, that Marx's emphasis on the economic applies only to social change and not to existing states of society, is dubious in view of statements by Marx which seem to imply a close conformity of superstructure with base.

There are a few good things in Professor Sowell's book. He avoids treating Marx as Holy Writ or as entirely silly, and he occasionally avoids common errors, as when he points out that Marx did *not* use the terms 'socialism' and 'communism' to denote successive stages of post-capitalist society (156–157). But in general this work is so packed with inaccuracies and unenlightening commonplaces that it must be passed over in favor of the many more reliable available treatments of Marx.

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Knowledge of Freedom: Time to Change. By Tarthang Tulku. Oakland, California: Dharma Press, 1984. Pp. 380. \$8.50.

In Knowledge of Freedom, Tarthang Tulku suggests that individuals living in contemporary technological societies face an unsettling paradox:

Beneath the prosperous surface of our lives, we still experience frustration and confusion, anxiety, and even despair. Within our societies, even the most fortunate among us have little hope of complete liberation from frustration and dissatisfaction (KF xviii).

Despite remarkable advances in scientific and technological knowledge during the present century, persons do not know how to free themselves from psychological and emotional ill-health resulting from unceasing conditions of discontent, tension, and anxiety.

Knowledge of Freedom offers a comprehensive diagnosis of the psychological and emotional discomfort that poisons the lives of many people. The crucial idea in the diagnostic study is that of patterns. We suffer distress because we follow patterns of thought and action that leave us confused and ill at ease in an environment of rapid and constant change. In order to gain relief from suffering, persons must learn to recognize and understand the origins and consequences of the patterns they utilize throughout day-to-day life. The proper task of education is to teach persons to observe, question, and transform the patterns that cause them pain. Such an educational endeavor must begin early before individuals have had ways of thinking and acting firmly imprinted in their consciousness. Successful education will result in the development of knowledge that frees persons from habitual conditions of anxiety and tension.

An important stage in this educative project is the recognition of the ways one is conditioned to follow well-established patterns. This conditioning reveals a pattern of physical, mental, and moral development which begins in early childhood and ceases only at death. In his presentation of the ways that parents, friends, schools, and a variety of cultural forces influence thinking, desiring, and acting, Tarthang Tulku offers an analysis of socialization similar to that attempted by Rousseau in the *Emile*. An understanding of forms of conditioning is important because:

Surrounded by the world of our experience, we are bound to what we know. Within its confines, our way of knowing is simply what it is; according to the logic of our conditioning, there cannot be other possibilities—this is the way things are (KF 161).

Once we gain knowledge of the forces that have influenced us to adopt the patterns we utilize, we recognize that without this conditioning we could develop other forms of thought and action which might lead to greater happiness and contentment.

The most interesting sections of *Knowledge of Freedom* are those which dissect specific patterns to reveal how they cause psychological and emotional distress. I will briefly present two of these discussions. The first concerns what can be called a pattern of self-deception. The analysis of this pattern runs along the following lines. In order to compete successfully for material possessions and social status, persons fashion an appearance that will win the approval of others. Along with the public persona comes ways of responding to particular situations and other persons. These responses must be consistent with the image of oneself placed before the public. Tarthang Tulku writes, regarding the patterns of responses that come with public personalities:

As artificial patterns of response become deeply imprinted, they complicate more genuine responses. We learn to conceal ourselves from others, to dissemble, to manipulate, to rationalize, and to excuse our actions in ways that are socially acceptable (KF 197).

Individuals learn to judge as "good" those responses that are acceptable to others. Standing

behind contrived appearances is a person's genuine, unadulterated personality. When reactions spring from this personality which are not consistent with one's desired public image, one tries to disassociate or "disown" these responses and the dispositions of character that are the grounds for the reactions. In other words, an attempt is made to identify and know oneself solely as the public image that one has created.

A situation of deception, confusion, and unease results from the creation of a public personality designed to promote one's interest in a competitive environment. Individuals try to ceptable ways. But the undesirable feelings and thoughts do not vanish. Thus, the attempt to identify oneself with the public appearance and the responses that follow from it, constitute a form of deception. Since the undesirable reactions to situations continue to exist hidden from public view, the individual experiences confusion. What thoughts, feelings, and desires are characteristic of one's actual personality? Out of this confusion arises a condition of unease. One never knows when repressed aspects of character will appear before the disapproving eyes of others and expose the carefully conceived public personality as fraudulent. The unease extends in another direction. Individuals prize the public appearance and responses that bring them approval. Hidden but threatening aspects of character are viewed with scorn, fear, even hatred. Following the pattern of self-deception in response to the demands of a competitive environment leads persons into a condition of unease as they alternatively esteem and detest themselves.

The second example focuses on the ways people respond to experiences of pain and privation. According to Tarthang Tulku, there are few patterns as deeply ingrained in persons as that of avoiding pain and pursuing the pleasure that comes with the satisfaction of personal desires and interests. The desire to minimize the experience of pain—physical and emotional—causes persons to follow a pattern of control and domination with regard to the environment in which they live. In order to gain happiness and pleasure, persons seek to satisfy a set of desires and interests. If the individual can control others so that they act on behalf of his or her interests, then pleasure can be achieved and painful privation avoided. Avoidance of pain, then, demands that persons conduct effective campaigns of control and domination:

But in fact our security depends upon mastering interlocking sets of manipulative patterns. We manipulate others, while others manipulate us, as we all vie for position, assert our will, resist attempts at domination, or search for ways to accommodate conflicting interests (KF 237).

Patterns of control and domination that are formulated in response to pain cause anxiety and suffering for at least three reasons. First, the balance of interests that is maintained through the system of manipulation found in interpersonal relations may be upset at any time. If this happens, one may be unable to control events to one's advantage. Recognition of the precarious nature of the balance of interests established through the network of manipulation leads to distress: "Fear can arise whenever this balance is threatened, enmeshing us in anxiety or even arousing feelings of panic" (KF 237). Second, the ability of an individual successfully to control and dominate the forces that exert influence on his or her life is limited: "We cannot dominate our environment, nor have we any power over time, which leads inevitably into aging and death. No matter how strong or influential we are, we encounter situations we cannot control" (KF 239). Inability to control one's situation makes one "more vulnerable to frustration and pain" (KF 239). Third, when the pattern of control and domination fails to allow one to fulfill desires and satisfy interests and, thereby, avoid pain, the individual seeks a reason for the failure. Sometimes the cause cannot be detected. In such an instance, one may turn on oneself with recriminations: "When pain arises seemingly from nowhere, and there is nothing external we can blame, our logic forces us to turn blame on ourselves" (KF 238). Thus, rather than serving the restant of control serving to relieve suffering, the response to pain which manifests itself in the pattern of control and dominated and demand the suffering and distress. and domination increases experiences of psychological and emotional tension and distress.

Recognition of patterns and the influence they bring to bear on all aspects of human existence leads to knowledge that can eventually free us from the pain, insecurity, and confusion that permeates life in contemporary technological societies. The strength of Knowledge of Freedom lies in its presentation of analyses that may lead to an illuminating diagnosis of the misery caused by habitual conditions of dissatisfaction and anxiety. Knowledge of Freedom is less satisfying in its presentation of specific prescriptions that could be utilized to achieve psychological and emotional well-being. Tarthang Tulku proposes that the focus of human consciousness, which has been "fixated on the objective pole of our experience" (KF 350), be turned more towards an examination of the mind and consciousness itself. Toward this end, the concepts which form the basis for interpreting experience must be carefully examined, revitalized, or, if necessary, abandoned in favor of new concepts that are better suited to the rapidly changing nature of existence in technologically advanced societies. The problem with these prescriptions is that they are presented in the most general of terms. One is left to wonder how we can engage in the task of revamping the conceptual models we have been trained to use. In fairness to Tarthang Tulku, it is important to point out that detailed prescriptive programs are given in some of his other works such as Gesture of Balance and Openness Mind.

Another difficulty with *Knowledge of Freedom* is its failure to address one of the most pernicious and painful patterns found in contemporary society. This pattern is the systematic oppression of certain social groups as a means of promoting the interests of other members of society. For instance, nothing is said of the pattern of the oppression and exploitation of women. Yet, the case can be made—in fact, is being made by certain feminist thinkers—that the suffering and confusion experienced by many today cannot be alleviated until the domination of women by men is eliminated.

These difficulties aside, *Knowledge of Freedom* is an interesting and provocative book that should be read carefully by a wide audience of educators, psychologists, philosophers, and others who work in the social sciences.

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Univ. of Northern Iowa

Social Justice: An Informal Analysis

Shivesh C. Thakur

CINCE SOCIAL justice is of such vital human concern, it is easy to get emotional about it and to think that the last word on it had already been uttered by one's favorite great book or author of antiquity, such as the Bible, the Gita, the Koran or Aristotle. Equally tempting is the tendency, inspired either by religion, ideology or philosophical commitment of one's own, to reduce the myriad complexity of the concept to some comfortable simplicity. Thinking of the first kind rests on the fundamental mistake that 'justice' is a static concept; and the second leads to the erroneous conclusion that it is amenable to a 'hard' definition in terms of necessary conditions. With these errors in mind as contrast, I suggested in a recent paper that 'justice' ought to be seen as an 'evolving' concept, and that it is best treated as a 'cluster' concept. Here, in this paper, I intend to explain, refine and defend those suggestions a little. But before proceeding to do so, let me make a few preliminary points. First, the primary focus of my analysis here will be social justice, i.e., justice as a virtue of society or social institutions, as against that of individuals; although the two are clearly related. Secondly, while my two suggestions—namely, (1) that 'justice' is an evolving concept, and (2) that it is best treated as a 'cluster' concept—make different claims, they are not unrelated. If accepted, either of them by itself, and certainly both of them together, will entail the impermissibility of 'hard' definitions for 'justice'.

My claim that the concept of justice is evolving rather than static, is based on the selfevident but important truism that some at least of what we today might recognize as requirements of justice, e.g. equal rights for all, irrespective of race, sex, religion, caste or occupation, might not have appeared—indeed, did not appear—to be so to our ancient or even medieval forebears. Even Aristotle, to whom we owe so much of our awareness of the complexities of the concept, did not have many qualms about excluding the slaves from the framework of citizens' rights. Not until the abolition of slavery relatively recently did this outlook change. Many of the excesses of conquest, persecution and mutual ridicule, even among Jews, Christians and Muslims-religiously so closely relatedresulted from the inability of one group to recognize and concede that the others had identical rights and entitlements: emotive slogans encapsulating differences between Jews and gentiles, believers and heathens, made 'children of the same God' wage war on each other. And the old battles are still being fought, and old scores still being settled. The ancient Hindu scriptures proclaimed Hindu dharma to be the 'eternal' law and the foundation of justice, among other things. So when Krishna says in the Gita that he, as Lord Vishnu, incarnates himself from time to time in order to save the good, destroy the evil and to 're-establish' dharma, one is apt to be very impressed by the noble sentiments

^{&#}x27;S.C. Thakur, "Just Society: God's Shadow or Man's Work?" paper presented at the New ERA conference on "God: the Contemporary Discussion," held in Seoul, South Korea, August 9-15, 1984; to be published in a forthcoming volume of essays edited by Gene G. James of Memphis State University.

expressed: the orthodox Hindu sheds tears of joy as he proudly recites the relevant verses. But when it is realized that the social order considered so worthy of restoration is none other than the caste system, with its built-in inequities and indignities for those low in the heirarchy of caste, one is no longer sure if the noble sentiments have much to do with justice in its most rudimentary sense, whatever the value of the sentiments otherwise.

Now, what should be our response to these obvious blind-spots in the thinking of traditional societies? Shall we say that they did not have a proper concept of justice? Or is it better to say that they did, but that theirs was a less evolved one? It is evident that some of the liberating insights of later thinkers and seers which have gone into shaping our notions of justice, were not available to the ancients. Perhaps it is best to say that these insights were not explicitly available to them, although the 'seeds' might have been present in the older conceptions. But if our modern outlook reads so much more into the old concept, are we dealing with the same concept or a different one? And what are (should be) our criteria of sameness, anyway? These questions can be, and often are, fascinating in themselves. But in certain contexts they are merely semantic niceties and quibbles, to be set aside as soon as possible. My decision to call 'justice' an 'evolving' concept is partly meant to do that; and I hope that it does so in not-too-arbitrary a fashion nor in a manner philosophically too stifling.

If what I have said above about the evolving character of 'justice' is accepted, then it would seem to follow that every generation has to re-examine this notion in the light of its own conscience. The 'rule-of-thumb' method of determining the contents of justice will consist, initially, of 'interrogating' the rational, moral sensibilities of people at a given time to find out what could be said to be intuitively acceptable. My claim is not that this method will automatically produce philosophically impeccable answers nor that it will necessarily return answers that are free from paradoxes. And I certainly do not mean to imply that simply because people at a given time find certain notions and principles intuitively acceptable that they, therefore, actually are the necessary, sufficient, or even appropriate, marks of justice. I only mean that this method will have to be the starting point in the process of determining what constitutes justice. The philosophers and political theorists will have to examine and refine the 'data' and come up with a coherent theory free, as far as possible, from paradoxes and irrelevancies. It should be unnecessary to add that no philosophical theory could ever be the last word on the subject; and that is not simply because of the nature of the philosophical enterprise, but also, and in this case perhaps primarily, because of the evolutionary character of the concept.

Let us now, in the light of the foregoing analysis, try to sketch the outlines of a just society that could be said to be acceptable to our contemporary conscience. Since mention has already been made of equal rights for all, perhaps our sketch should start with that notion. It seems to me that we will be unwilling to call a society just where discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, religion *etc*. is rampant. Nor are we likely to apply that description to a society where there is no rule of law, *i.e.* where 'anything goes': where, for example, for the same or similar offence one person is ordered to be hanged while another gets away with a small fine or no penalties whatever; or, for example, where punishment is systematically out of proportion to the crime. If there is a society where every time a person utters an abuse, his tongue is cut off; or where every time someone commits adultery, he or she is punished by genital mutilation, we would be

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loath to regard it as a just society, even if the society applies these principles uniformly and without fear or favour. This indicates that while equality of treatment is a good thing, it is not enough: afflicting misery on people, equally or otherwise, is not a mark of justice. And failing to treat people with dignity—whatever the circumstances—is indicative of injustice. Similarly, a society where people do not enjoy certain basic liberties—freedom of thought, speech and action, for example — is, at the very least, deficient in justice, even if this absence of liberties is everyone's fate. We might, however, be willing to excuse this privation of liberties if the society was going through a crisis such that the free exercise of these liberties might be likely to endanger the very survival of the society. We might or might not, however, be willing to be forgiving on this count if the reason for the denial of these liberties was that this made people work harder, for example, even if we were told that this did or might result in the much greater over-all production of economic goods. Slave-owning societies might be more productive of goods, but we would not want to countenance slavery in spite of that fact. Nor would our judgment be significantly altered if we found that the society was one where slaves were treated as such only in the context of work, and not in the distribution of goods. Even if the goods thus produced were distributed equally between slaves and their owners, we would still consider this society unjust. For liberty and dignity are intrinsically valuable; and our sense of justice is offended when we see them being traded off against other goods or values, including equality.

In general, however, we do want to see a fair distribution of economic and social goods. Some might say that only an equal distribution of these can ever be fair. But it is not difficult to see that the pursuit of equality, mindless of other considerations, can also offend our sense of justice. A society in which a highly skilled professional was being paid wages no better than those of utterly unskilled workers or where the scientific 'genius' and the ordinary worker received the same treatment in respect of public esteem, will appear to be unjust because it would be lacking in its sense of proper proportions. A society would be considered even more wanting in this sense, however, if it allowed avoidable poverty, hunger and disease to exist in its midst, or if it countenanced the exploitation of the poor and the disadvantaged by its better-off or stronger members, individually or as a class. It seems to be a demand of justice that we try to 'correct' the imbalances in a society by devising some rational scheme for the equitable distribution of primary goods and for the amelioration, if not eradication, of injustices that nature or history produce and perpetrate. We do not determine in what family a person gets born; but we can try to ensure that such birth does not give the person any undue advantage or disadvantage over others.

This outline of a just society can, of course, be extended, almost indefinitely, because 'justice' is such a complex concept. We will, however, let it suffice for our present purposes. What we need to do next is to pick out some of the key elements from this outline and try to exhibit their significance, and interrelations, in a philosophically defensible model of social justice. It is more than plausible to take the view that the ideal of equality is fundamental to our sense of justice. To start with, we must accept the moral equality of all, irrespective of differences among individuals in other respects. Failure to do so leaves us with no reason why the rich and the powerful should not get more wealth and power at the expense of the poor and the weak. It is because we are all equal as moral agents that justice ignores differences: circumstances of birth and upbringing are deemed irrelevant in the context of justice. The consideration of 'dignity' in the context 216 THAKUR

of justice is related to moral equality. For treating a person with dignity involves treating him/her as an end, and not as a means; and to treat persons in this way is to treat them as morally equal, as ourselves.

Some egalitarian theories of justice, indeed, argue that since we are all morally equal, we ought to be economically equal as well; and, therefore, there ought to be no right to private property, or privilege of any other sort. Others, however, may deem the abolition of private property itself as an act of injustice, because it offends against an important human instinct. We all like owning things, and enjoying the security that this gives us; and it cannot be right, the argument might run, to deprive anyone of this security. Also, not being allowed to own property, when we actually want to, goes against one's basic liberty, an equally important requirement of justice. But even those who do not insist on the equality of outcome may, however, demand certain other kinds of equality. The first among these is almost always equality of opportunity. Justice, it is argued, may not involve the 'levelling out' of everyone; but what it does involve is the creation of social institutions such that anyone, irrespective of race, sex, caste, wealth and other circumstances of birth may attain any social position he or she wishes to attain provided he/she works for it. Another kind of equality that can be said to complement equality of opportunity is the equality of 'burdens.' A society may not be considered just if some of its members carry all, or almost all, of its burdens—such as paying taxes, fighting wars etc.: justice demands that each member of society contribute to the needs of the society, according to his/her ability. By extension, this principle also entails that the poverty, unemployment or other miseries that exist in a society be roughly equally shared across races, classes, sexes, etc., so that such disadvantage does not become the exclusive burden of particular sections of society, or of particular members within such sections. In a just society every person has his/hers basic needs fulfilled, and each receives social goods according to his/hers needs. It is, in other words, a society based on the notion of public welfare.

The *rule of law* requirement of social justice may be taken to be a corollary of the requirement of moral equality. It is because all members of a society are deemed to be morally equal that they are also regarded as legally equal. And it is because of *legal equality* that two persons committing the same offense cannot receive inequal punishment, unless there are mitigating circumstances in one case. At any rate, a society can only be said to be just to the extent that all its members are equal before the law. Another way of making the same point is to bring in the notion of rights, and to say that all members of society have certain inalienable *rights*, which it is the duty of the legal system to protect and enforce. Fundamental among the system of rights that members of a society may enjoy are deemed to be those of the three *liberties*—freedom of thought (conscience), of speech and of action. Sometimes these rights may be formally enshrined in the instrument of a social contract, such as the constitution of the United States; but even when they are not, the ideal of justice for all is reflected in the relevant society's legal system as it respects and defends those rights.

Fundamental though these rights to the three liberties are, it becomes evident, on even minimal reflection, that these individual liberties have to be balanced against the demands of *public interest*. A society which allows all or some individuals to exercise these liberties without any restraint, might be sowing the seeds of its own destruction. More importantly, the unlimited exercise of these liberties by some individuals can only be possible at the expense of the identical rights of others; and a just social order can at best

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allow any individual only the maximum liberty compatible with equal liberty for others. In a just society the rights of individuals are balanced against each other's and, as mentioned earlier, against public interest or the good of the society at large. It is because the determination of justice so constantly requires the *balancing* of rights against rights, rights against duties, needs against abilities, public interest against individual liberties, equality against individual differences, that, at least in a pragmatic context, it must, in the end rest in the 'judge's' sense of *fairness* or fair-play, his/her sense of proportion. And that would seem to be the reason why an account of 'justice' as 'fairness' seems to be so pre-eminently plausible.

An important question of logic may seem to arise at this point. Having outlined the marks of a just society, as we have just done above, should we not now be trying to identify those 'essential' features which would constitute the definition of 'justice' or of a 'just society.' Although there are many marks of justice, surely, the argument might run, only some of them could be said to be its necessary and sufficient conditions. Those who find this argument appealing might see it as an invitation to try to show that only one of them, such as equality, liberty or public interest (utility) constitutes the necessary condition of justice; and that, therefore, the concept ought to be defined as such. It is in contrast to this sort of approach that I take the view that the concept of justice is a 'cluster' concept, not amenable to 'hard' definitions in terms of necessary conditions. The best that we might be able to do in relation to a 'cluster' concept is to list a number of properties and say that when a sufficient number of them are present, and in sufficient degrees, then the concept can be said to have application. In the case of a just society, for example, we might say that the 'cluster' of relevant properties consists of equality of various kinds, security for citizens, the rule of law, human (and other) rights, the basic liberties, public interest, and say, freedom from exploitation of any kind, etc. A society would be deemed to be just when it exemplifies, in reasonable measure, a sufficient number of these. Ideally, of course, a truly just society would have all these properties to the maximum degree possible, and many other desirable virtues besides. But since we do not live in an ideal world, it may be silly to insist that only when all of these are present and in full measure, may we call an actual society just.

The advantages of explicating the concept of justice in this way are two-fold. It allows a greater appreciation of the fact that 'justice' is a very complex concept, requiring a balance between many different features; and of the fact that there are many different conceptions of justice, not all mutually compatible and yet each containing important insights. On the other hand, this approach enables us to avoid the problems involved in defining the concept in terms of necessary conditions. One might quite plausibly take the view, as I do, that none of the properties listed in the 'cluster,' nor any other, is a necessary condition for a society to be called just. Let us take equality, for example. While it is perfectly proper that we regard equality in one or more of its senses as a very important mark of justice, we might be wrong to think that it is a necessary condition. For if a society bears the other marks of justice in adequate measure, but displays certain gross inequalities, we might not, in certain circumstances, be willing to condemn it as unjust for that reason: it may still be a just society, everything considered. Contemporary Britain or America may rightly be regarded as full of gross inequalities of wealth and power; but despite these, they are democratic societies where citizens enjoy fundamental rights and liberties and wherein even the worst-off have their basic necessities generally taken care of. It would be perverse to call them unjust, although we might quite properly wish to see the existing inequalities disappear, or at least decrease.

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What we have just said in respect of equality, applies to liberty, utility (public interest) or any other property of justice. In fact, even more so. For it is not at all implausible to take the view that all the other important marks of justice are in fact 'parasitic' on the concept of equality. Liberty for all, for example, can be said to be a corollary of a prior commitment to equal treatment for all. An autocratic society denies liberties to its citizens because it is not committed to regarding all of them as equals. And that may be also the reason why its citizens do not enjoy fundamental rights or a system of public welfare. It may be objected at this point that I have only succeeded in showing, if I have, that even equality is not a necessary condition of justice, by taking recourse to a 'sleight of hand.' When I talked about contemporary Britain or America being just societies inspite of gross inequalities of wealth and power, I was letting it be understood that people in these societies still enjoyed moral equality; and it is this moral equality on which liberty, rights, public interest, etc. may be said to be parasitic. In order, therefore, to say that equality is not a necessary condition of justice, I need to show that there can be a just society without possessing this kind of equality. The point is well taken. But I think my claim should stand. For, given certain conditions, an elitist society, a 'natural aristocracy,' let's say, may well have to be regarded as just, on the whole, and certainly by contrast with an egalitarian society reeking in poverty, corruption and squalor. As we had occasion to remark in the outline earlier, a society which bestows miseries equally on all citizens, but is no good at doing anything else, may not be considered just, for the important reason that it does not show that balance between virtues and vices that, say, the elitist society cited above might seem to do. On the scale of justice, therefore, it may well be that the elitist society ought to be considered preferable to the merely egalitarian one, even from the point of view of justice.

I conclude, then, that 'justice' ought not to be construed as a concept definable in terms of necessary conditions. However, the question that may be pertinently raised here is this. Granted, if it is granted, that a 'hard' definition in terms of necessary conditions is impermissible or impossible, should we not still be aiming at *some* sort of definition for justice? For, otherwise, the determination of what constitutes social justice becomes too arbitrary. At the very least, we ought to 'tighten' the very vague notion of 'sufficient' in the context of the claim that a society is just if it possesses a sufficient number of properties, in sufficient degree, from the 'cluster' of properties outlined earlier. I admit that the 'cluster'-concept approach to justice is vague and imprecise. But I would like to point out that so is the concept of justice; and, therefore, the approach fits the demands of the case. If a formal definition is either impossible or undesirable, then we have to accept that our analysis of justice has to be informal. If this is accepted, then it should not be difficult to see that the explication of 'justice' in terms of a 'cluster' of identifying marks is a definition of sorts, albeit a 'soft' one. The temptation to look for invariable essences of the concept ought to be eschewed.

Equally, it would be a bit odd to specify in advance the number of properties in question that a society must have in order to be considered just. For no matter what number we prescribe, it is always possible to construct a hypothetical case where we might be willing to consider a society just even though it falls short of the 'magic' number. Likewise, we could envisage a society which, nominally, exemplified more than the required number of properties; but if it turned out that it possessed those properties to such a miniscule degree that for all practical purposes we might as well disregard them, then it would be odd to let the decision be made by the formal fact that the number requirement

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was met. The same considerations will apply to the specification of a precise quantity in which each or all the properties had to be possessed before we could say that the society under consideration was just. The failure to specify the number of properties or the precise degree to which they must be possessed renders the determination of what is to count as a just society subject to our intuitive judgment. But this need not indicate a failure of definition; but only that a different sort of definition was here appropriate. And if this is indeed a failure, then I think it's one that is less serious than the one that might be involved in implying that any definition of 'justice' could have the status of a necessary truth, *i.e.* of an analytic proposition.

Can we not at least specify the order of priorities between these properties? Yes, I think we can; and philosophers frequently do. But we must recognize that any ordering we attempt would be likely to tell more about ourselves—i.e. about our ideological. political or philosophical commitments, preferences or prejudices etc.—than it would about justice: for there may be no 'natural' or 'objective' order among the marks of justice. Almost the whole point of calling 'justice' an evolving concept, as we did earlier, is that this order of priorities tends to change in time. Equally, any attempt at ordering the priorities rigidly runs the risk of introducing a certain pseudo-simplicity into the concept. The reason why the traditional Marxist, Libertarian or Liberal accounts of justice are found to be unsatisfactory by impartial analysts is that each of them orders these priorities in parochial fashion. The Marxist overdoes equality, the Libertarian, liberty, and the liberal, utility. Even an admirably systematic and careful analysis, such as John Rawls', which deliberately attempts to strike a balance between equality, liberty and utility (Rawls rejects 'utility' and opts for the 'difference principle' instead, but he does think that the difference principle has the same practical consequences as the principles of average utility and efficiency), is found unsatisfactory in the end, even by those who in most respects admire his theory. Rawls' ordering of the priorities is seen by others to be just that—namely, his, and not any objective ordering. Also, subtle and powerful though his analysis of justice as 'fairness' is, it is still likely to be found unworkable by many, because, in the end, it too is found to be rigid; and fails to allow for alternative orderings of priorities. In so far as his theory does work, however, it can only be seen to do so when full account is taken of all that he has to say about all that is relevant to justice, rather than only of the formal statement of the two principles he enunciates. I venture to say that his theory only works if it is allowed to encompass all the marks of justice not strictly accommodated by his two formal principles; and if one is willing to do that, one might as well adopt the 'cluster' approach I have suggested above.

As I have repeatedly maintained, this analysis of 'social justice' is informal; and meant to be so, for reasons hinted at earlier. But I do not believe that it is formally flawed in any way. Let me deal with a single, obvious, possible flaw: namely, circularity of definition. I have argued that a society is just if it possesses a sufficient number of properties, to a sufficient degree, from among the 'cluster' outlined in the text. But, it may be asked 'sufficient for what?' And if the answer given had been 'sufficient to make a society just,' then, of course, the definition would be clearly circular. But if my answer were "sufficient for an impartial judge to apply the word 'just' to the society in question," then there is no such circularity involved. For in the definition, the word 'just' is only being mentioned, not used. Those who would prefer to define 'social justice' in narrowly precise ways may bemoan the fact that my informal definition makes the determination of whether a society was just depend on the decision of an 'impartial

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judge.' But I myself do not regard this as a bad thing. As I said earlier, defining this concept in terms of necessary conditions seems to me to be wrong-headed.

Perhaps I need to say a bit more about the problematic notion of 'impartial judge.' Do such creatures really exist? If not, then, for all practical purposes, the concept of justice may be rendered vacuous. This possibility may even remind us of the views of authors like Hans Kelsen, for example, who maintain that 'justice' does not signify anything in particular and is merely a general form of approval; or even of Mill's assertion that the feeling of justice and injustice is not sui generis like our sensations of color and taste. I will have to concede that the idea of 'impartial judge,' like that of 'competent authority,' is frequently employed in philosophy to impart theoretical completeness to the explication of a difficult concept; and also that the completeness, apparent or genuine, is often only achieved if the terms, 'impartial judge' or 'competent authority' are deliberately allowed to remain vague or unspelled-out. In the present context, however, some degree of clarity can be attempted. Before I do that, though, I want to emphasize that one important advantage of the 'cluster' approach to the analysis of 'justice' is that, whether or not an impartial judge can be found, the concept of justice should never run the risk of being vacuous: it will always signify one or another subset of the properties specified in the 'cluster,' although not uniquely or unambiguously so. The 'cluster' analysis not only rules out a narrow, 'essentialist' explication; it, equally, saves the concept from bankruptcy of content.

To return now to the notion of 'impartial judge,' it should be said at the outset that, at one level, it is an indirect way of appealing to the 'quintessentially rational' element in us, our 'ideal reason,' perhaps. These ways of speaking do, of course, involve abstractions; but perhaps not entirely so. For it is not fanciful to suggest or imply that human beings can be meaningfully expected, asked or required to rise above their personal preconceptions, prejudices or ideological commitments, at least sometimes. Some individuals may be more successful in doing so than others, and some may be able to do so more consistently than others. But the supposition that this can be done is not absurd: I do not see how philosophy can proceed without it; nor how the system of an independent, impartial judiciary can function in its absence. In the context of determining whether a society should be considered just, given its particular circumstances, the judge is not required to formulate the contents of 'justice': that is already specified in the 'cluster.' What he has to judge is whether the society in question has succeeded in achieving a reasonable balance between the demands of the various properties; and whether it has ordered its priorities reasonably wisely, given that not all the demands can be met at the same time. This, I think, is the kind of job we, as a matter of fact, expect our professional judges to be able to do; and the impartiality demanded of the judge in our present context is not different in kind from that asked of judges in our courts of law, although it may be different in degree. For here we may be asking the judge even to forget what social, political, religious or ideological tradition he himself comes from, so that his own individual position does not color his choice or judgment. This may, in practice, be more difficult to achieve but, in principle, is simply an extension of the hope or dream that underpins the practice of symbolizing the judge's impartiality by making him wear a wig. The wig, I suggest, should be seen as the 'wig of oblivion': representing our hope that the judge will not be swayed by considerations of personal gain nor deterred by personal prejudice or predilection; that he will be able to forget, as far as humanly possible, that he has a personal, family, class or ideological interest in a given

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case. This 'wig of oblivion,' it seems to me, is an operational principle in the actual administration of justice in our courts of law; and, therefore, taxes the imagination far less than, say, Rawl's 'veil of ignorance' which he requires—in a very different context, of course—for ensuring that the choice of principles of justice be rationally made by equals choosing in the 'original position.' Unlike the 'veil of ignorance' which appeals to our imagination, the 'wig of oblivion' has a firm anchoring in our long tradition of an independent judiciary, which rests on the assumption that judges can, and must, be impartial.

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The "Mystic" and Society According to Ibn Bajjah and Ibn Tufayl

Hani Nasri

WELFTH CENTURY Spain saw a flourishing of Islamic Philosophy which had a great influence on Christian thinkers in Europe. Averroes, "The Commentator," is perhaps the best known in the West today. But the great interpreter of Aristotle was only one in a line of distinguished thinkers. In this article we will consider the teaching of two of these men concerning the relation of the believer to the society in which he lives. They are Ibn Bajjah, known to the European Christians as Avempace, and Ibn Tufayl, known as Abubacer.

Both of these predecessors of Averroes had an interest in "oriental philosophy" especially in the work of Avicenna. This oriental philosophy emphasized "wisdom" and "mystical experience." They were concerned not only to explain it but also to explore its implications for life in their society. Since, on the oriental interpretation, philosophy is not just an abstract and systematic account of "Being" but also the concrete and practical search for genuine human happiness, it has consequences for human behavior, public and private. Hence, those who espouse such a position must face the issue of how to react to a society which, in fact, is disinterested in or even hostile to their way of life.

As Muslims, of course, the oriental philosophers used the religious language of the Qu'ran. They identified the Absolute with God and so when they spoke of union with the Absolute they meant union with God. Their doctrine was frequently viewed with suspicion and hostility by other Islamic groups who accused them of heresy or at least of a dangerous tendency toward pantheism. In turn, those sympathetic to the mysticism of the Orientals accused their accusers of ignoring the moral and religious teaching of the Qu'ran or of interpreting it to their own ends.

Both Ibn Bajjah and Ibn Tufayl had read the oriental philosophers and tried to present what they considered to be the truth in their teaching without falling into pantheism. Each in his own way outlines the human soul's journey to God accomplished in successive stages of purification from things merely material. The final stage in the ascent is a mystical union with God even in this life. The implications of such personal growth for human behavior forced the issue of the place of the "mystic" in society as it actually is. Both thinkers arrived at rather pessimistic conclusions but, as I hope to show, draw attention to something of importance for our time which is perhaps too often overlooked.

Let us consider one major work of each of these men which treats of this issue: Ibn Bajjah's, Tadbir al-Mutawahhid (The Management of Life as One Apart) and Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan (the name of the principal character in his "philosophical")

¹This paper was originally a talk delivered to students at the Lincoln Center Campus of Fordham University in the Fall Term of 1981

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novel"). Ibn Bajjah considers what is the end or purpose of human existence. Without such understanding one cannot know what man is. At the same time he observes human society as it actually is and compares it to the ideal proposed by the Qu'ran.

Ibn Bajjah discusses man's end or purpose in familiar Aristotelian terms. The world of motion is structured by active and passive forces. Ultimately, all motion requires something stable and permanent which accounts for the possibility of motion. This stable and permanent reality is the Unmoved Mover. What is true of motion in general is also true of human behavior. But since human behavior is not merely mechanical but intelligent and free, the human agent needs to know and love what is of permanent and stable value in order to be able to fulfill his nature. Otherwise, he will be unable to understand and to control the constant flux of passion and desire. Eros requires Eidos not only as its explanation but also as its master and guide. Just as the physical world requires Eidos to prevent it from falling into mere chaos (and so into non-being), so, too, the human soul requires the stabilizing presence of Eidos grasping what is of permanent value to prevent it from acting like a mere bundle of blind passions (and so not like a human being at all). Insofar as Eros gains the upper hand in human behavior, that behavior degenerates to an inhuman level. The soul then labors under the illusion that its end and purpose is mere gratification of Eros and so fails to understand its own nature. Thus it is that most men fear death excessively because they are persuaded that since death extinguishes Eros, it brings their existence to a close. In this failure to overcome the instinctive fear of death, one exhibits the extent of his failure to understand what it is to be human. Ibn Bajjah would approve of the Platonic emphasis of the eternal Forms, but he would speak of them in terms of God's Will in order to secure the absolute sovereignty of God over all created things.

Like Aristotle, Ibn Bajjah held that man's end is happiness. But since man is not just *Eros* but also *Eidos*, true happiness cannot consist in the mere satisfaction of passion and desire. It must involve some stable and permanent state in which the human soul is completely satisfied. The only reality which can so satisfy is something which is itself stable and permanent. That something is God, the Absolute. This state of happiness is one of "conjunction" (*ittisal*) with the Divine not merely in an abstract way but in direct personal experience which is frequently likened to tasting rather than to seeing. This conjunction, as concrete, satisfies totally and completely.

Ibn Bajjah seems to think that, in fact, few have this experience although in principle it is open to all since it is the end and purpose of everyone's existence. He sometimes speaks as if this union is achieved by human effort (through asceticism and contemplation). Sometimes he seems to indicate that the final stage of ecstatic union is a gift from God. In any case, there are stages in the development of this spiritual awareness which (with the possible exception of the final one) man can achieve. This development of man's spiritual side is necessary for mystical union with God but it may not be sufficient.

According to Ibn Bajjah, this spiritual journey of the human soul is in conformity with the teaching of the Qu'ran. Indeed in the Qu'ran one will find the material for con-

²The Arabic text of Ibn Bajjah's *Tadbir al-Mutawahhid* can be found in the *Opera Metaphysica* of Avempace (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1968). There is a Spanish translation by M. A. Palacios, *Avempace*, *El regimen del solitario* (Madrid and Granada, 1946). The Arabic text of Ibn Tufayl's *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* can be found in the Beirut edition published by Dar al-Afagh al-Jadidah, 1978. There is an English edition by L. E. Goodman, *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* (New York: Twayne, 1972).

templation and the precepts of moral asceticism which prepare one for happiness. If a doctrine did not conform to God's message revealed through the Prophet it would be merely another delusion. Any claim to direct experience of God by one whose behavior is not in accord with the Qu'ran is suspect.

Now when Ibn Bajjah observed the behavior of men in society as it actually is, and when he considered what that society valued, he found a situation quite different from what one might have expected from those who professed to be believers. He found that most men live only in the realm of Eros and have little or no concern for that of Eidos. Their behavior and the behavior which their society condones and approves is concerned only with the gratification of their ever-changing passions and desires. Anyone striving to live a life in conformity to the ideals of the Qu'ran, a life devoted to union with God, consequently finds himself quite alone, quite isolated (even alienated) from the group. In this sense he is "one apart." In such circumstances, if his convictions are merely abstract, he, too, will eventually succumb to the corruption around him. The pressure of society will simply become too much. His convictions must have become a living force within him if he is to persevere. He has to have had some experience of those values which are permanent and stable. Since the temptation to yield will be recurrent, he must take steps to remain apart by separating himself as much as possible from the group. This may mean real physical separation, but at least it must be moral separation. Thus he might go into voluntary exile like the Christian hermits. He might join some other social group which is not corrupted (if he can find one). He might try to draw other like-minded individuals together to form their own society. He might try to reform the society in which he finds himself. None of these alternatives is easy. Some of them are practically impossible. All of them require heroism.

It might seem that Ibn Bajjah's reflections contradict the Aristotelian principle that man is by nature social. Ibn Bajjah would not think so. Man's social nature does not require him to participate in a society which is corrupt and corrupting. His nature rather demands a society which is good and just. Insofar as the actual society in question is not, human nature demands that he withdraw from it. In so doing he is not denying his social nature but rather affirming it in its integrity. That very natural drive should spur men to seek the good society. Not just any social situation will bring man to happiness and so fulfill his nature. It is better to be "one apart" than one corrupted.

Men band together in society because of a natural drive and a natural need. Ordinarily, their survival depends on it. Society is meant to help man to grow, to so develop his nature that he attains his end. Society requires order maintained through the exercise of authority. Its structures and institutions (social, political, economic) are called civilization. These civilized arrangements are meant to be an expression of and a cadre within which take place responsible human interaction. But to be termed "civilized," a society's laws must be just and its order according to right reason. To the extent that these are not, that society is corrupt and uncivilized no matter how strong and powerful it may be at any moment of history. Not only does not "might make right" but history seems to confirm that wrong eventually makes weak. No one is morally obliged to exercise his sociability in such a society. Even if forced to remain physically in it, he must strive to remain "one apart."

The significant lesson to be drawn from all of this is that no society can be reformed by imposing on it some set of *a priori* conditions, say in the form of a socio-political economic ideology. Nor can society be reformed by a *coup d'état*. The reason in both

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cases is the same, namely, that any such "reform" is only as good as the individuals who make up the society. In the first instance, an ideology imposed will bring suppression of free dissent, and, in the second, the seizing of power by force only guarantees that power has changed hands. Unless, and until, the individuals in a society reform themselves (their values and their behavior), mere changes of structure will not succeed in bringing about the good and just society.

Let us now consider Ibn Tufayl's tale of *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* (Life, son of Awareness). As we have said, this is the name of the story's principal character and the title was borrowed from a work of Avicenna' in wich Hayy is the protagonist. The names of the two other actors in Ibn Tufayl's work are also borrowed from Avicenna's allegory. Beyond this, however, the two works have little or nothing in common. For Avicenna, Hayy typifies the Active Intellect; for Ibn Tufayl, Hayy is human nature taken in abstraction from all societal influences. The other characters, Salaman and Absal, represent, respectively, human nature pragmatically functioning in society and human nature struggling to live contemplatively and religiously within society. The point of Ibn Tufayl's tale is to show that the human soul can develop its powers independently of society. In a corrupt society, however, that development can be arrested and the soul settles for a comfortable accommodation (Salaman). Or if the soul does so develop, it may be forced to flee society and to become "one apart" (Assal).

The story is set on a far off island on which there are no human beings. Hayy Ibn Yaqzan mysteriously appears there as an infant (whether abandoned or spontaneously generated is not certain). Aside from the lack of human life, the island is a natural paradise. The infant is discovered by a doe and is adopted by her—nurtured and protected until he is able to take care of himself. The child gradually learns from nature how to provide for his needs and wants. Finally, when his doe-mother dies, Hayy is faced with the question of the nature of life and concludes that it cannot be something merely material. In successive reflections over many years, Hayy considers the nature of the heavens, of the cosmos, of God. Ibn Tufayl presents these successive stages as occupying intervals of seven years each. These reflections raise a question for Hayy: how to live his life in such a way as to be true to his nature (body and mind). At one point he decides to lead a life of extreme esceticism in the conviction that by stopping the senses he would be able better to contemplate the Divine and to experience personal union with it.

Ibn Tufayl has certain Sufi practices in mind when he describes this stage of Hayy's development. They sometimes induced a trance by whirling in circles. So Hayy is described as doing. The circular motion of the heavenly bodies was considered to be perfect and by imitating that motion one was supposed to become like them. Furthermore, circular motion does not "go anywhere"; it is endless and unchanging. Human reason, however, is discursive and, hence, linear and, hence, advances step by step. The Divine is beyond that linear movement. The practice of whirling into a trance was justified as "going beyond" linear, discursive reason. In a word, the induced trance in which the Divine was to be completed and in which it was to be experienced aimed at stopping the senses and reason. Al-Ghazali, at the end of his last work, cites this poem as expressive of this mystical intention:

When I isolated myself I attained clearness of mind and felt joy;

³See H. Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960).

Because I completely divorced myself from the world of sense and of mind.
You can know that I will not go back to it because it would make me disappear from Your presence and then I will be with You even if You are away from me.4

The danger involved in this sort of mystical trance is that one could easily mistake union with the Divine for identity with it. Reason is not available to interpret the experience correctly. All critical understanding is abandoned. Some mystics indeed use language which, on the face of it, is pantheistic. Whether this is merely over-enthusiastic language or whether they really mean what they say is not always easy to determine. In any case, Ibn Tufayl warns against this way of speaking as "having gone too far" (al-Shath). He depicts Hayy as in danger of such an error and as having been saved from it by God's mercy. Hayy stops these practices and leads a life of moderation waiting for the release of death to bring him to the truth.

It is at this point that another human being arrives on the island—Assal who left his country because he felt himself a stranger in a society which did not appreciate or sympathize with his own mystical and contemplative temperament. Assal meets Hayy and teaches him language. In the course of their many conversations Assal teaches Hayy his own religious beliefs. Hayy discovers that all that is in the Qu'ran about God he had already come to know and to accept. In turn, Assal realizes that all that he had come to believe about God through the Book Hayy had already discovered for himself. The qu'ranic recommendations about the conduct of life confirmed Hayy's experience that extreme ascetic practices were neither necessary nor advisable in order to be united to God.

They decide to return to Assal's land and to try to deliver the spiritual message to the people. They are disappointed to find that they are received with increasing hostility by men like Salaman who refuse to give up their compromise with society. They decide to return to their island to live as "ones apart."

Ibn Tufayl's conclusion, then, is that most men are caught up in a life whose aim is to satisfy their passion and desires, and so have made themselves incapable of grasping the true end and purpose of their existence. Their society both reflects this attitude and reinforces it with societal approval. Only the exceptional individual understands and has the courage to act. Yet human nature, when free from the corrupting climate of a corrupt society, is capable of rising to a life of *Eidos* and of living according to values that are permanent and stable. Human society cannot be reformed unless the individuals who make it up are reformed. Mere external imposition of new social structures will not accomplish anything but a change of those structures. Of themselves they cannot guarantee a change in the individuals and, so, of themselves are always in danger of being corrupted. Hayy and Assal failed in their attempt to convince society. Will all such attempts fail in the future? Must the effort be made anyway? Must there always be those who have courage to live as "ones apart" to prevent society from becoming worse than it is by a constant appeal to conscience? Ibn Bajjah and Ibn Tufayl would most likely answer "yes."

⁴Al-Ghazali, Ma'arij al-Quds fi Madarij Ma'rifat al-Nafs (Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, 1978).

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Newman's Complex Assent and Foundationalism

David Schenck

THE MODERN CARDINAL, John Henry Newman, should have been by now recognized, reluctantly perhaps, as one of the most gifted phenomenologists of thought to have written in English. Indeed, he is rivalled in perspicacity only by Coleridge and James in his own century, and by Polanyi in ours. In a modest effort to appropriate Newman's Grammar of Assent in the name of philosophers investigating activities of consciousness, and specifically in the name of those whom we call "ethicoreligious," I intend to argue that Newman's masterwork may be understood only when read in the context of John Locke's epistemology, and more particularly in the light of the "ethic of belief" which arises out of such an epistemology. While placing Newman in philosophical, as opposed to theological or literary, history, I will also attempt to illuminate the philosophical structure of the Grammar. In particular, I will argue that Newman grants "notional assent" logical priority over "real assent," preserving the place of reflection and dogma in the religious life. Finally, to suggest something of the philosophical largess hidden in Newman's pages, I take the liberty of perpetrating a deliberate anachronism, as philosophers are wont to do. Extrapolating from certain remarks Newman makes on persuasion in argument and from the philosophical method embodied by the Grammar, I venture some remarks on the possibilities of philosophizing after the collapse of "foundationalist" philosophies. For, after all, Newman was one of the first, and indeed remains among the most discerning, of the critics of "foundationalism" which was, and is, a Lockean program.

Unfortunately, Newman has too often been approached in strictly parochial terms or, barring that, exclusively in the light of his involvement with certain literary or reactionary factions of English romanticism. These two most common readings obscure Newman's place in the tradition of Locke, and blind his readers to the philosophical stature he attains by radically transforming (that is to say, undermining) the master's work.¹

'John Speller provided exceptionally detailed remarks on an earlier version of this paper which have been quite vaulable. Doc Powell introduced me to Newman and the 'ethics of belief', and my approach to these issues owes much to him. I would also like to thank Robert Gregg, Lydia Speller, and Thomas Hummell for their comments on versions of this manuscript.

I am not unaware that this paper may be skewed in the direction of the philosophical, at the expense of, for example, Newman on revelation or imagination and literature, both of which are directly relevant to the themes I treat in the *Grammar*. My excuse, if one seems desirable, is that I view this piece as something of a "revisionist" effort. The most noteworthy attempt to appraise Newman philosophically may be found in H. H. Price's Gifford Lectures, *Belief* (London: George Allen, 1969), pp. 130–56 and 315–48. These pages are "noteworthy," however, primarily for displaying a certain "deafness" to the *Grammar*, *prior* to a misunderstanding of it, such that Price is unable to "hear" Newman and consequently "unfit" to criticize him with any authority.

Those interested in the vast theological literature on Newman can consult for guidance, among many other items, Jouett L. Powell, "Newman and his Critics: A History of Reductive Analysis," chapter 2 of his *Three Uses of Christian Discourse in John Henry Newman* (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1975). Those interested in Newman and the imagination, and in particular his surprisingly systematic debt to Coleridge, can do no better than John Coulson's *Religion and Imagination: 'in aid of a grammar of assent'* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). I thank John Speller for putting me on to this most graceful piece.

To sum it up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.

In this concise, bold formulation W. K. Clifford summarized his essay "The Ethics of Belief" (1876)² and crystallized, in quintessential Victorian fashion, the moral burden that nearly all modern philosophy, including that of Locke, had sought to place in the lap of religious thinkers and believers.

Though Cardinal Newman completed his *Grammar of Assent* in 1870 and Clifford his essay in 1876, it is possible and instructive to read the *Grammar* as a point-by-point rebuttal of Clifford's position. Such a reading is possible and profitable because the ethics of belief controversy was old (though hardly tired) by the time Clifford appeared on the scene with his brilliant polemical piece. Given its distinctively modern and British form by Locke, the issue is present in the attack of Charles Kingsley on the good faith of the Cardinal which resulted in Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1864). And writers like Fitzjames and Leslie Stephen, T. H. Huxley, and J. S. Mill were also struggling with the problem, coming up with solutions much like Clifford's. (Though Mill did move closer to Newman and his defenders in his late *Three Essays on Religion*.)³ The works of Newman and Clifford can be said to embody (with some distinction) the opposite sides of this controversy.

Though difficulties for Clifford's somewhat exaggerated position come to mind immediately (e.g.: Can we have evidence for the use of the first words we speak? for their veracity? Are all daily actions based on "sufficient evidence"? Are there no gambles?, etc.), his desire, at once quixotic and banal, to protect society against its ever-present fanatics surely is admirable, and his formula as promising as any could be. Yet, religious people will always find themselves labelled "fanatical" since "sufficient evidence" for Clifford (and for most of us who are "modern" thinkers, perhaps in spite of ourselves) was evaluated on the basis of empiricist psychology and Mill's laws of induction.

As its title indicates, Clifford's essay is concerned with the moral character of the credulous, not with the specific beliefs which they hold. The question he wants to raise does not concern the truth or falsity of any specific belief, say, of the Catholic Church; rather he wants to question their entire approach to questions of belief and to argue that it is dishonorable. In the peculiarly charged atmosphere of Victorian polemics, a relatively minor moral theme from Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding becomes the focal point of discussion, displacing Locke's more prominent epistemological themes. Catholic belief (for Clifford) was suspect from at least two standpoints: 1) it violated the uniformity of nature, and 2) it relied heavily on priestly authority. The first point is relatively clear, given an empiricist psychology and scientific method, and it is tersely summarized here:

4Ibid., p. 28.

²W. K. Clifford, "Ethics of Belief," *Lectures and Essays*, ed. by F. Pollock and L. Stephen (London: Macmillan, 1886), p. 346. (Tallahassee,

millan, 1886), p. 346.

³ James C. Livingston, *The Ethics of Belief: An Essay on the Victorian Religious Conscience* (Tallahassee, Florida: American Academy of Religion, 1974), pp. 17-18, 32.

No evidence, therefore, can justify us in believing the truth of a statement which is contrary to, or outside of, the uniformity of nature.⁵

In the words of Locke, any person who believes obviously absurd statements, "loves not Truth for Truth's sake, but for some other bye end."

Ostensibly an empiricist not inclined to dogmatism, Clifford is a bit rabid on the subject of authority and priests. He concludes that external authority is always coercive and unhealthy, that any priesthood which interferes with an individual's conscience is necessarily bad, and that there is no evidence against the statement that "... the priest is at all times and in all places the enemy of all men..." Such outbursts are based on the conviction that credulity, and the absurd beliefs to which it may lead, impede social progress and harm the general cause of mankind. The Catholic Church is the example par excellence of credulity for both Protestants and atheists in this Victorian setting. The cure for this credulity is relatively straightforward. One must use inference, acknowledge the uniformity of nature, assent only to propositions supported by sufficient evidence, and keep inquiries open. If there is not enough evidence at hand to justify belief. then belief must be suspended until the evidence is secured. Freedom is a key goal here; no absolute commitments can be made because further evidence may come along requiring a shift in assent. The epistemological model is clearly the Victorian concept of physical science, and Clifford explicitly claims that the methods valid in that field are the only valid ones and are to be pursued in all fields.8 Opening an essay entitled, "The Ethics of Religion," Clifford puts forward his basic concern by claiming that morality "deals with the manner of religious belief directly and the matter indirectly."

The roots of much of this polemic in Locke's epistemology are not hard to unearth, though the master is a bit more subtle than this disciple. The crucial passage for the ethics of belief argument is from Locke's *Essay*:

And yet for all this one may truly say, there are very few lovers of Truth for Truth's sake, even amongst those, who persuade themselves that they are so. How a Man may know whether he be so in earnest is worth enquiry: And I think there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. The not entertaining any Proposition with greater assurance than the Proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of Assent, 'tis plain receives not Truth in the Love of it; loves not Truth for Truth's sake, but for some other bye end (E, 697).¹⁰

⁵Clifford, "Ethics of Belief," p. 363.

⁶John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 697. Hereafter, references to the Essay will appear in the text in parenthesis, as follows: (E, 697).

^{&#}x27;Clifford, "Ethics of Religion," in Lectures and Essays, p. 382; cf. also pp. 375 and 380 of that essay, and Clifford's "Biographical," in Lectures and Essays, p. 26.

Clifford, "Biographical," pp. 20, 25-6; and "Ethics of Belief," pp. 339-341, 346; Livingston, The Ethics of Belief, pp. 18, 27.

^{*}Clifford, "Ethics of Religion," p. 369.

logisms, which Locke thought to be rather suspect (E, 670-71).

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The essential elements of Clifford's position are here: no proposition shall be given more credence than its evidence allows; he who consistently runs beyond the evidence is morally suspect, serving some other end than Truth. Clifford's distrust of religious propositions and their sponsoring authorities is faithful to the master, as almost any chapter of Locke's Essay will demonstrate. 11 Locke also argues that error has its source in improper degrees of assent based on inadequate evidence (E, 662-63, 718).

There is, however, at least one passage a close reading of which might have edified

Clifford:

Our knowledge, as has been shown, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain Truth in every thing which we have to consider; most of the Propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay act upon, are such, as we cannot have undoubted Knowledge of their Truth; yet some of them border so near upon Certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them; but assent to them as firmly, and act, according to that Assent, as resolutely, as if they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our Knowledge of them was perfect and certain (E 654-55; his emphasis).

Locke, unlike Clifford, realizes that most often our assents far outrun our evidence, and he recognizes the necessity of this in practical life. Newman later seizes this passage with some glee in his Grammar of Assent, demonstrating his own dependence on Locke and the care with which he has read the master. But Newman will revise the description of the process of coming to certitude in such a way that these practical assents need no longer be viewed as incomplete, and thus inferior, processes of inference.

A quick glance through Newman's Grammar, with an eye on the issues raised by Clifford, will suggest the major points of contention. 1) The authority of the Catholic Church is given positive treatment, as we would expect. Newman speaks of our trust of beloved authorities. He defends the breadth of dogma imposed on the Catholic believer, explaining that it is the Church's job to investigate all aspects of revelation, of which only a small fraction can be known by each believer.12 Clifford would challenge this point on authority, working from his assumption that evidence and inference alone can provide the basis for assessing belief. 2) Newman distinguishes prejudice from certitude based on complex assent (G, 195-6). Clifford seems to have collapsed that distinction. 3) Newman finds that knowing rests on beliefs; reason, assumed to be the power of inference, rests on prior assents (G, 135, 119–81). He argues that formal inference never leads to the certainty that assent does, and that such inference is itself far too abstract to do justice to the reality of the world (G, 197-218). Assent is the basis of certitude for Newman. 4) He insists on the necessity of belief for practical action. Real assent, unlike all kinds of thinking (including notional assent and inference), can influence action (G, G)68). In Newman's words, "Life is for action. If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to the state of th shall never come to action: to act you must assume, and that assumption is faith" (G, 72)72).

¹²John Henry Cardinal Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, ed. by C. F. Harold (New York and London: Longmans, Grammar of Assent, ed. by C. F. Harold (New York) and London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), pp. 107-15. Hereafter references to the Grammar will appear in the text in parentheses. 20 (21) in the text in parentheses, as follows: (G, 107).

So much for the obvious. The force of Newman's case for the justifiability, and thus morality, of belief rests on the persuasiveness of his assault on the cornerstone of the empiricist position: inference. Detailed presentation of Newman's phenomenology of the process of assent is the path to the heart of this argument.

III

In the uncharacteristically obscure opening chapter of the Grammar, Cardinal Newman delineates two "modes of apprehending propositions" and three "modes of holding propositions." Propositions may be apprehended or understood or known as being either notional or real. Notional propositions deal with mental constructions that are general and abstract; real ones with the concrete, the specific and the particular. These two types of propositions may be held in each of three modes: doubt, inference, and assent. These modes are inner mental acts that correspond, respectively, to these specific external manifestations: questions, conclusions, and assertions. When speaking of religious matters one might correlate these modes with these stances: the sceptic, the rationalistic philosopher, the believer. In doubt, a person both withholds assent and refuses to accept the indicated conclusion. A conclusion drawn from inferences is conditional and may be altered if new evidence appears. An assertion, however, as an expression of assent, is not supported by argument; rather, it is a personal act by the speaker that forms the basis for argument and discussion. An assertion is an "enunciation of first principles," so to speak. The mode of assent is unconditional, and this is its chief distinguishing mark. As will later be obvious, it is not the case that assents never change. The holder, however, does not expect assents to changes. It is, therefore, important to remember that Newman is describing active modes of relating to propositions, and not properties of the propositions themselves. Further, when assents do change it is not as the direct result of inference or formal argumentation (though this may be a contributing factor) (G, 3-10).¹³

The foci of discussion for the rest of the *Grammar* are: the mode of assent as it relates to real and notional propositions; and the opposition of that mode to formal inference (which is the mode of inference applied to notional propositions). The following passage (a fascinating study in Newman's indebtedness to Locke)¹⁴ establishes the interrelationship of these distinct mental activities:

In comparison of the directness and force of the apprehension, which we have of an object, when our assent is to be called real, Notional Assent and Inference seem to be thrown back into one and the same class of intellectual acts, though the former of the two is always an unconditional acceptance of a proposition, and the latter is an acceptance on the condition of an acceptance of its premises. In its Notional Assents as well as in its inferences, the mind contemplates its own creations instead of things; in Real, it is directed toward things, represented by the impressions which they have left on the imagination. These images, when assented to, have an influence both on the individual and on society, which mere notions cannot exert (G, 57).

¹³See also G, 163, 176. On the role of inference in assent see the section entitled, "Complex Assent" (G, 142-58). On Coleridge and the notion of "assent" see Coulson, pp. 6-15, 52.

¹⁴Cf. G, 122: "I have so high a respect both for the character and the ability of Locke, for his manly simplicity of mind and his outspoken candor, and there is so much in his remarks upon reasoning and proof in which I fully concur..."

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Real Assent is concrete and alive, whereas Notional Assent and Inference are abstract and mental. Yet Inference stands apart from both modes of assent in that it expresses a conditional, as opposed to an unconditional, mode of acceptance of propositions. This is complicated by Newman's claim that Inference is founded upon Assent. The first thing to untangle is the distinction between the conditional and the unconditional.

Locke recognizes various degrees of assent, but argues that it is inference which determines how much assent is to be given; inference enables us to know whether we can claim to have certain knowledge (E, 668-69). Precisely the *opposite* is the case for Newman. Inference, as noted above, is based on the unconditional starting point provided by assent. Inference itself can never yield certitude. Because its premises may be questioned, because more evidence may always be presented, its mode of acceptance of propositions must remain "conditional." Assent results in certitude, which in turn permits unconditional acceptance. I will take up Newman's justification of the shift to certitude through assent very shortly.

Newman's move to set real assent apart from notional assent and inference is animated by Locke's distrust of abstract speculation and the split he makes between Ideas and Reason. The opening chapters of Locke's Essay consist of a sustained polemic against rationalistic, speculative philosophy. Indeed, the entire essay is an attempt to find limits to human cognitive powers, and thus to undercut fantastic speculation. Locke is also suspicious of syllogistic logic, which he finds to be out of touch with concrete reality and to be no guarantee of certain knowledge (E, 270-71). Newman's emphasis on the vitality of real assent serves, as does Locke's own emphasis on the priority of Ideas, to deflate exaggerated claims made for abstractions of whatever kind, and to restore the centrality of particular, lived experiences. Two major departures by Newman should be noted. The very critique of syllogism in defense of inference used by Locke is altered, and becomes an attack on formal inference in the Grammar. (One might argue that Locke's inference is much more akin to Newman's informal inference and illative sense than to formal inference [E, 668-71; cf. G, 197-250; 261-91]. This may well be true, but inference as put forward by Clifford was surely the scientific, formal style and is subject to criticism under the tenets of Locke and Newman. As we will see shortly, Newman's assessment of informal inference is likely to be too concrete

15 Because a tendency to read Newman's distinction between Assent and Inference, or between Real Assent and Notional Assent in terms of Augustine's discussion of belief and understanding may well be irresistible, some brief remarks erecting barriers are in order. For one thing, since he is involved in controversy and polemic at every turn in his writing, Augustine cannot safely be said to have had any single position on matters epistemological. For our purposes, however, we can focus on his well-known piece, "On the Profit of Believing," in Basic Writings of St. Augustine, ed. by Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1948), cited here by section number. In this essay Augustine affirms the importance of authority in belief, makes a distinction between good liver in the importance of authority in belief, makes a distinction between good liver. tion between credulity and belief, argues for the necessity of acting without certainty in life, and presents his case for knowledge resting on belief. However much this may sound like Newman, one must recall the Neo-Platonic philosophical context within which these arguments unfolded, along with the anti-Manichaean polemics of which this epistemology is a piece. Understanding, for example, is without parallel in Locke or Newman, being a faculty with the control of the Newman, being a faculty which can give humans certain knowledge of the "Divine Power" (section 24).

Augustine's distinctions Augustine's distinctions among understanding, belief, and opinion (section 25) appear to owe a great deal to Plato's "Divided Line" account (Divided Line" accou Plato's "Divided Line" argument (Republic, Book 6, section 6), likely as mediated by Plotinus. Furthermore, belief may be in error for Assessing belief may be in error for Augustine, whereas Newman's Assent, in either form, is unconditional and the basis of certitude. Finally, the employing of certitude. Finally, the emphasis on the probable, the personal, and the historically concrete in Newman's account of the role of informal information. count of the role of informal inference and the illative sense in coming to certitude would certainly be excluded from the proper exercise of one. from the proper exercise of one's understanding by Augustine. In his thought they would more likely find their place in the benighted domain of place in the benighted domain of opinion or perhaps of belief.

and particularistic even for Locke.) Second, real assent itself is much more complex than Locke's Ideas. The Ideas come from our experience, which is direct and self-evident, of "external, sensible Objects" and "the internal Operations of our Mind, perceived and reflected on by our selves" (E, 104-05; his italics). Real assent, too, comes from our experience of concrete facts, but Newman admits a much wider range of facts. Real assent may be given to "sense, sensation, instinct, intuition" when dealing with "matters of this world"; and "as regards our relations with the Supreme Being" we may give real assent to "facts [drawn] from the witness, first of nature, then of revelation, and our doctrines" (G, 75; my insertion). The imagination (Newman calls it the "inventive faculty" or the "faculty of composition") can come up with concrete creations that are ideal, yet subject to real, not notional, assent. The examples given are descriptions by novelists and historians of people and events which we have no chance of seeing (G, 22-23).

Newman's description of abstract mental functions and the role of intellectual judgment again goes beyond that of Locke in complexity and scope. To deal with the given Ideas, Locke spoke of reason and the process of inference. Inference "consists in nothing but the Perception of the connexion there is between Ideas, in each step of the deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see, either the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas . . . " (E, 669; his italics). Perhaps struck by such a passage Newman notes that intellect works on the facts given by real assent (G, 75). And of course this is his argument for the priority (both logical and temporal) of real assent over inference. The role of notional assent here, however, has not yet been specified; it appears to be both assent and inference, yet it is neither concrete nor conditional. Newman admits that this is a confusing matter, since both notional assent and inference deal with notions—creations of the human mind (G, 30-32). Assent to a notion implies unconditional assertion; inference implies reasoning and conditional conclusions. Assent to abstract dogma (Newman mentions the Trinity) is therefore notional; the believer is related to an abstraction with unconditional trust (G, 98). Assent to concrete dogma (Christ on the cross) can be a mixture of real and notional assents. (The pre-eminent example of non-religious, notional assent may be the a-critical trust we place in the words, both concrete and abstract, which we utilize daily.16 Notional assent to dogma, and the intellectual investigation of that assent are prized by Newman-contrary to what one might have expected. Indeed, notional assent is given logical priority in religion. Newman insists that the religious imagination be governed by dogma, and the science of dogma—theology. Theology, he says, can survive without "vital religion"; but religion cannot exist without theology. Dogma is especially important in delineating worship, and in disciplining the imagination (G, 91-92, 111). "It seems a truism to say, yet it is all that I have been saying, that in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason" (G, 92; my emphasis). This logical priority of notional assent in religion must be kept in mind, if we are to avoid reading Newman as a romantic subjectivist as so many have done. 17 Notional assent appears to have no parallel in

Certitude in religion as well as in other areas comes when three conditions are met: a rational investigation has been made, a sense of deep intellectual confidence and repose

¹⁷Powell, pp. 197-202.

¹⁶I intend to evoke here comparisons between certain of Newman's arguments and methods, and those found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

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is felt, and a feeling of irreversibility arises. Religious certitude is based on complex assent, which is a combination of the vitality of real assent and the intellection of notional assent. Initial, simple assent is bolstered by investigation, criticism, and argument. In this way the whole person is taken up in religious inquiry, not just a soul or a mind or an aesthetic sensibility. The investigation of one's initial assents which turn them into certitude is, according to Newman, a rational task that is undertaken in the confidence that the assents will not be overturned. This process is to be distinguished from one of doubt and inference, where assent is withheld. Yet it is still to be seen as an intellectual, rational activity. If the religious example seems implausible, think of the scientist investigating some aspect of evolution. He may say he is prepared to alter the general theory, but he expects to do no such thing. He believes that his investigation will bear out his prior commitment. Though not exact, the analogy is instructive (*G*, 143–6, 164, 196).¹⁸

What sort of tools does one have for such an investigation if the formal inference of the scientist is, along with the rationalistic metaphysics of the philosophers, eliminated? Is there another model for the rational critical, responsible person? Before mentioning Newman's alternative, let us review briefly his case against inference. 1) Alone it cannot lead to certitude or unconditional assertion; 2) it cannot be employed without prior assent; 3) it is too general and abstract to touch the complex particularity of the truth about our lives; 4) it encourages passivity about religious truths (G, 124, 211, 216, 282, 323-24, 374).

Newman's sketch of investigation rests on his distinction between formal and informal inference, and his discussion of the "illative sense." Formal inference includes both the syllogisms deplored by Locke, and the inferential method of science championed by Clifford and derived from the empiricist epistemology associated with Locke (G, 200–204, 216). Informal inference is best described as:

... the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible (G, 219).

The sketch of the reasoning process here, Newman would argue, is much truer to what actually goes on when we think, than are those theories with a priori, highly structured, explicit models of reasoning. "... I think it is the fact that many of our most obstinate and reasonable certitudes depend on proofs which are informal and personal, which baffle our powers of analysis, and cannot be brought under logical rule ..." (G, 229). The multiplicity of hints, reasonings, hunches, hearsay, perceptual data, apprehensions of beauty, all these contribute in a rational way to our certitudes; yet that multiplicity could never be reduced to the procedures of formal inference.

Once again, Newman appears to be drawing on the spirit of Locke to counter the disciples of Locke. Locke notes:

He that will look into many parts of Asia, and America, will find Men reason there, perhaps, as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a Syllogism, nor can reduce any one

¹⁸Relevant are the entire section entitled "Complex Assent" (G, 142-58) and the chapter "Certitude" (G, 159-96). For some fascinating parallels with contemporary work in epistemology and philosophy of science, see Parts II and III of Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), especially chapter 10, "Commitment."

Argument to those Forms: I believe scarce anyone ever makes Syllogisms in reasoning within himself (E, 670; his italics).

The final element of the *Grammar* at which we must briefly glance is the role of the illative sense in cognition. Locke speaks of judgment as being that which balances wit, by carefully distinguishing Ideas which appear similar and by operating "contrary to Metaphor and Allusion." Judgment, however, cannot lead to certain knowledge, only to probable assent (E, 156, 685). Newman speaks of the illative sense as akin to "common sense," as concerned with "right judgment in ratiocination," as denoting skill in inferential processes. Aristotle's conception of *phronesis* is discussed as a parallel conception in the domain of ethics. Whenever we discuss practical activities, Newman continues, we never hesitate to speak of "skill" as that which guides, say, carpenters or ship-builders at every step in their work. Why should we not then recognize a similar skill in intellectual matters, and speak of it as the illative sense? Only the trustworthiness of this illative sense allows us to have confidence in processes of inference and reasoning carried out by given thinkers (G, 268–73).

One comes to possess an illative sense not through logical science, but by trusting persons whom we know to be masters in their field, and worthy of trust.

And if we wish ourselves to share in their convictions and the grounds of them, we must follow their history, and learn as they have learned. We must take up their particular subject as they took it up, beginning at the beginning, give ourselves to it, depend on practice and experience more than on reasoning, and thus gain that mental insight into truth, whatever its subject-matter may be, which our masters have gained before us. By following this course, we may make ourselves of their number, and then we rightly lean upon ourselves, directing ourselves by our own moral or intellectual judgment, not by our skill in argumentation (*G*, 259-60).

Let me highlight: 1) the trust in individual persons, as authoritative teachers and as discerning thinkers, which this model implies; 2) the context-bound nature of a reasoning which must be learned from a master within a given field; 3) the radically historical nature of the knowers involved. 19 Education which stresses formal inference and generalized rules of logic will *not* lead to the specific intellectual skills, the specificities of the illative sense, necessary for reliable judgment in individual areas of inquiry, such as religion, or (for that matter) science, or gardening, or rowing. A philosophical tradition blind to such nuance will be unlikely to recognize, must less grasp, those subtleties out of which complex assent and certitude in every region of life, including the religious, grow.

IV

Since deliberate anachronism is something of a *faux pas* in a predominantly historical paper, a rather laconic sketch of Newman and "foundationalist" philosophy is in order. "Foundationalism" may be understood as that effort to ground our convictions in a given area, say natural science or ethics, on an incorrigible base. Incorrigibility is typically understood to suggest evidence that is univocal in meaning, and unchanging or

¹⁹Cf. Polanyi on "apprenticeship" in his section "Tradition," pp. 53-4, for a very similar argument concerning the development of judgment, or what he calls "Connoisseurship" in the very next section.

stable through time. Sense-data were, for example, among the most exalted paradigms of proper foundations, and were felt to "justify," in a very strong sense, perceptual as well as scientific judgment. No one has surpassed Locke's depiction of the philosopher's task in such "foundationalist" programs: "... 'tis Ambition enough to be employed as an Under-Labourer in clearing the Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish ..." (E, 10). Philosophers resolve or dissolve unseemly ambiguities in "terms," and snare unfounded claims masquerading as "substantiated." This leaves the science of the "incomparable Mr. Newton," or other inquiries modelled after it, responsible for the discovery and articulation of properly founded claims.²⁰

If, however, one finds the phenomenological account of Newman's Grammar persuasive, then it must be acknowledged that the very inferential procedure of science, and those methods of the "under-labourer" which seek to emulate it, are themselves "founded" on something else, something "deeper." And this something deeper is that process of coming to certitude depicted in the accounts of informal inference, with the illative sense as its guide. Somewhat paradoxically, Newman, in pushing foundational inquiry to its depths, learns that that program itself uncovers at its foundation its own solvent: informal inference. The "foundation" of all the elaborate structures of the master-builder Newton, and his underlings, Locke and Clifford, turns out to be that remarkably haphazard process of hunches, hints, and happenstance called informal inference.²¹

Pondering this, one must suppose that if Newman is correct, the quest of "foundationalism" is empty—there are no incorrigible foundations. This in turn suggests that the philosopher's task must be reconceived. (Indeed, this is where various heirs of both the Anglo-American and Continental foundationalist traditions find themselves today—Rorty, Cavell, Derrida, Foucault, Gadamer, to name only a few.) And, in fact, I find that Newman's work both articulates and embodies one such revisioning, a conception of philosophy free of foundationalist assumptions.

The articulation may be found in Newman's discussion of the role of logic in what he calls "concrete reasoning":

This I conceive to be the real reasoning in concrete matters; and it has these characteristics:—First, it does not supersede the logical form of inference, but is one and the same with it; only it is no longer an abstraction, but carried out into the realities of life, its premises being instinct with the substance and the momentum of that mass of probabilities, which, acting upon each other in correction and confirmation, carry it home definitely to the individual case, which is its original scope (G, 222).

Reasoning is not altered in its form. But what we hope for from reasoning is. And it is altered by finding itself now in the midst of lived complexities, building on premises of "instinct" and "probabilities." Situated thus we find that:

Logic then does not really prove; it enables us to join issue with others; it suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the lines of thought; it verifies negatively; it determines when differences of opinion are hopeless; and when and how far conclusions are probable; but for

²⁰This business of uncovering improperly founded claims is, in its Victorian variation, precisely the question of the "ethics of belief" which we have already considered.

of the "ethics of belief" which we have already considered.

21Cf. the role of "forms of life" and linguistic practice in Wittgenstein's descriptions of judging, and the dimension of human capabilities which Polanyi calls the "tacit component" of knowing.

genuine proof in concrete matter we require an organon more delicate, versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation (G, 206).

Logic, verbal argumentation, or—I suggest—philosophy, cannot provide proof, but rather tools for exploration and coordination of those probabilities, hunches, and clues which make up investigation and persuasive argumentation in all walks of life. Such step-by-step verbal, notional investigation yields certitude not by proof, but by accumulation. This accumulation results in persuasion, by persons of other persons. And a critical element here will be our trust in the powers of reasoning and in the depth of discernment of the other; his or her "illative sense," in short.

Thus in concrete reasonings we are in great measure thrown back into that condition, from which logic proposed to rescue us. We judge for ourselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles; and our criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual and moral character of the person maintaining them, and the ultimate silent effect of his arguments or conclusions upon our minds (G, 229-30).

Logic will not bring us to incorrigible foundations, nor will it guarantee flawless argument. It is useful as a tool of investigation and persuasion in the service of a mind we respect. But it is a tool whose deeper effectiveness is not to be found in its explicit design, but in its informing of our silent mind, our sense of the tacit, our notional imagination.

The embodiment may be found in virtually any section or chapter in the *Grammar*. Typically, Newman will spend two or three pages setting out the notional structure of his position. Then he will turn to examples, introduced in various ways;

I ought to give an illustration of what I have been stating in general terms; but it is difficult to do so without a digression. However, if it must be, I look around the room in which I happen to be writing, and take down the first book which catches my eye (G, 206).

A discussion of a magazine article on textual emendations in Shakespeare ensues, filling some four pages and illustrating a point about the complexity of informal inference and the necessary role of personal judgment therein. Mark the random, even arbitrary generation of the example, its positive lack of relationship to the formal argument given in the preceding pages. And though not the case here, it is typical for Newman to turn to another example, and yet another, each almost completely unrelated to the first, and each equally as much a digression. (E.g., Newman discusses the following to illustrate his claim that certitude emerges out of probabilities: the claim that Great Britain is an island; Father Hardouin's arguments that many great classical works—those of Virgil and Horace, among others—were forgeries of thirteenth century monks; his conviction that he will certainly die some day [G, 223-29]. The thread binding these is just Newman's note that he is taking "instances belonging respectively to the present, the past, and the future.") Yet these explorations with concrete examples, whether real or imagined ("Let us suppose that I wish to convert an educated, thoughtful Protestant ..." G, 219), bring to life the notional structure, and in such a fashion as to be most persuasive. For we are shown directly the rewards of learning to see the world as Newman sees it. He suggests to us that if we were to take up a certain set of notions, related to one another in this particular fashion, we would then see the following ... Philosophy becomes an activity, a noetic activity one wants to say, of educating one's vision of the 240 SCHENCK

world. This it is, rather than proofs resting on firm foundations, or menial labor in the service of some such proposed proofs.

Cardinal Newman stands in the line of Lockean epistemologists, but with the singular distinction of carrying that mode of foundationalist inquiry to its self-destructing, albeit "logical," conclusion. And unlike most critics of foundationalism he is able not only to articulate a picture of a new mode of philosophy, but also to embody that picture in his own practice, in the structure of his argumentation and in the style of his presentation.

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Negation, Affirmation and Zen Logic

Hsueh-li Cheng

I

THERE HAVE been various interpretations of Zen (Ch'an) Buddhism since it was introduced to the West. It seems that some erroneous views are largely due to an inadequate understanding of the nature of negation, affirmation and logical reasoning as Zen regards them. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how negation and affirmation function in Zen expressions and why Zen appears to be so illogical.

Zen literature seems to abound with irrational and absurd teachings and acts. The inconsistencies and contradictions are considered by many to be logically inexplicable. For scholars such as D. T. Suzuki and C. G. Jung, they should be understood psychologically. In Zen, Suzuki writes, "logic is psychology, and psychology is logic." For others such as Rudolf Otto and Heinrich Dumoulin, Zen should be apprehended ontologically rather than psychologically. The essence of Zen Buddhism consists in its ontology. Essentially for those scholars, Zen is a mystical awareness of ultimate reality. Zen Buddhists go beyond logic and are said to look for the absolute. Zen illogic and irrationality, according to them, cannot be intelligently explained and point toward transcendence.

In this paper I will examine Zen logic and point out that it is based on the doctrine of the twofold truth in accordance with the Buddhist Middle Way. If one can see Zen by means of the twofold truth, many illogical and absurd statements and actions appear less so. And many seeming inconsistencies and contradictions are not so logically inexplicable. They need not be understood merely as psychological matters, nor need they be seen only as pointing to something transcendental. Zen logic has its proper place and function in the field of logic.

According to most scholars, negation or negative propositions in Zen are really "for affirmation." They are dialectical ways to express and describe what cannot be described by language, and they all point to some realities or reality. For Suzuki, wu-nien should be known as the unconscious, and wu as the absolute unconscious. For others, kung and wu are metaphysical symbols and stand for pure being or pre-reflective experience. Zen negation is said to be derived from Nagarjuna's philosophy and is said to be essentially the same as the neti, neti (not this, not that) expression of the Upanishads.

Zen is indeed the practice of Nagarjuna's philosophy, but this paper seeks to show that the logic of Nagarjuna and Zen is not the same as ordinary logic or the Upanishadic philosophy. Unlike the *neti*, *neti* expressions, negations in Nagarjuna's and Zen philosophy are not "for affirmation." Truth in Zen is not a view but the absence of views.

Finally, both Nagaruna and Zen question the validity of basic principles of logic. It may be that Zen is not so irrational in nature, but rather that rationality is not so rational

¹D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), p. 182.

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as we believe. Few seem to realize that this is one of the important messages that Mahayana Buddhism would like to convey. This paper will expound this point and suggest that it is central to the wisdom of Zen.

1

According to most contemporary scholars, there must be an object of knowledge in Zen epistemology. Zen prajña is the right seeing or apprehension of something ultimately real in the world. Its meaning lies in the entity for which it stands or to which refers to. Suzuki has written, "Prajna is another name given to self-nature when the latter sees itself, there is no Prajna outside self-nature." And all negations in Zen, for Suzuki, should be understood as the negation of something real. So wu—"no," "not," or denial used to discuss prajña—denotes no-ness, not-ness or something negated. Thus Suzuki translated wang-chi-wu wu-chi-fo as "to forget means no-ness, no-ness means Buddhahood."

Wu-nien and wu-hsin, for Suzuki and Jung, are the terms for no-consciousness or the unconscious. The apprehension of the unconscious is a psychological leaping and cannot be expressed in ordinary logic, hence it is stated in negative words. Suzuki observed:

When thus the seeing of self-nature has no reference to a specific state of consciousness, which can be logically or relatively defined as a something, the Zen Masters designate it in negative terms and call it "no-thought" or "no-mind," wu-nien or wu-hsin. As it is "no-thought," or "no-mind," the seeing is really the seeing.

The unconsciousness belongs to the sphere of transcendence where pure subjectivity is said to be pure objectivity, and where there is a perfect identity of man and nature, of the one and the many. This transcendental psychology, according to Suzuki, is the key to apprehending logic in Zen. "In Zen philosophy, in fact in all Buddhist philosophy," he wrote, "no distinctions are made between logical and psychological terms, and the one turns into the other quite readily. From the viewpoint of life no such distinctions can exist, for here logic is psychology and psychology is logic." The experience of recognizing the unconscious and merging into nature is abrupt enlightenment. It is not a continuous and discreet movement from error to truth, but is described as

a leap, logical and psychological, in the Buddhist experience. The logical leap is that the ordinary process of reasoning stops short, and what has been considered irrational is perceived to be perfectly natural, while the psychological leap is that the borders of consciousness are overstepped and one is plunged into the Unconscious which is not, after all, unconscious. This process is discrete, abrupt, and altogether beyond calculation; this is 'Seeing into one's Self-nature.'''

Prajña or wisdom, then, is a psychological and dialectical leaping. It does not follow the laws of logic and does not occur as the outcome of reasoning. It occurs "when rea-

²Ibid., p. 178.

³Ibid., p. 206.

⁴Ibid., p. 163.

⁵ Ibid., p. 241.

⁶Ibid., p. 182.

⁷ Ibid., p. 185.

soning has been abandoned as futile, and psychologically when the will-power is brought to a finish."8

In the act of seeing into nature, Zen is thought to contradict how soever it is that we may view things ordinarily and to introduce an order other than what is familiar. The function of Zen wisdom is to stop reason and logical processes. As a result, Zen literature is filled with surprising paradoxes and impossibilities which are peculiar to itself and for which it is known.

Suzuki asks, "Why these contradictions?" And he answers: they are so because of tathata. They are so just because they are so, and for no other reason. Hence, no logic, no analysis, and no contradictions. Things, including all possible forms of contradictions, are eternally of tathata. "A" cannot be itself unless it stands against what is not "A"; "not-A" is needed to make "A" be "A," which means that "not-A" is in "A." When "A" wants to be itself, it is already outside itself, that is, "not-A." If "A" did not contain in itself what is not itself, "not-A" could not come out of "A" so as to make "A" what it is. "A" is "A" because of this contradiction, and this contradiction comes out only when we logicize.9

Like Suzuki, Heinrich Dumoulin also holds that Zen is illogical in his *History of Zen Buddhism*, where he wrote,

In almost all the *koan*, the striking characteristic is illogical or absurd act or word. A monk once asked, "What is Buddha?" The master replied, "Three pounds of flax." Or a Zen master remarked, "When both hands are clapped a sound is produced; listen to the sound of one hand." Again: "Last night a wooden horse neighed and a stone man cut capers." To take a final example: "Buddha preached forty-nine years, and yet his broad tongue never once moved."

The koan are seen here as a mockery of the rules of logic, but for Dumoulin, metaphysics rather than psychology serves as a basis for apprehending the illogic in Zen. Zen's inconsistent and absurd statements are meant to manifest the inadequacy of all words in expressing reality. If Zen, according to Dumoulin, is for absolutism, and this is said to be the practice of Nagarjuna's philosophy. Dumoulin stated that "their philosophy intends something positive in all its negations. The insight into the nature of the self that is awakened in sudden enlightenment is an insight into emptiness, into nothingness."

The transcendental reality cannot be described by ordinary language and hence has to be stated in negative ways. So Zen negations, in this view, are really negations for affirmation and stand for something positive in the world. Wu-nien, wu-hsin, wu-hsiang, wu-chih and wu-chien are the negations that refer to ultimate reality. They represent the ontological awareness of the true state of things. Satori is said to be this mystical experience. In discussing the doctrine of no-mind, Dumoulin argued that Suzuki's own late contributions acknowledged the limitations of the psychological view. Dumoulin as-

⁸Ibid., p. 186.

⁹Ibid., pp. 268-269.

¹⁰Heinrich Dumoulin, A History of Zen Buddhism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 130.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 100.

¹²Heinrich Dumoulin, Zen Enlightenment, translated by John C. Maraldo (New York: Westherhill, 1979), p. 50.

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serted that "the negating expressions of the sutras must be understood metaphysically, in terms of the philosophy of the Middle Way."13

Thus, a variety of expressions in Zen Buddhism, some negatively and some positively formulated, are thought to refer equally to ultimate reality. This is said to be similar to the metaphysics of the Indian Upanishads. Like the Upanishadic neti, neti (not this, not that), Zen wu-nien, wu-hsin, wu-hsiang, wu-chien and wu-chih point to transcendental being that cannot be conceptualized. The underlying metaphysics of Zen Buddhism is traced to the Upanishadic absolutism, and the essence of Zen Buddhism, according to Dumoulin, should be seen in this historical development.14

During the past few decades, this ontological interpretation has been very popular among Zen scholars. Recently the view that Zen positive and negative expressions point to a transcendental reality, which essentially lies beyond affirmation and negation, has prompted some scholars to develop a phenomenological interpretation of Zen. According to this view, wu refers to something prior to either affirmation or negation, and this something is "the immediate source of one's direct experience." The Zen doctrine of no-mind is neither transcendental psychology nor a metaphysical system, but a phenomenological teaching. T. P. Kasulis wrote, "No thought or no mind is not an unconscious state at all; it is an active, responsive awareness of the contents of experience as directly experienced (before the intervention of complex intellectual activity."16 It is concerned only with what is experienced, not with the notions of reality outside experience. Zen satori, in this view, is a pure, non-conceptualized, pre-reflective experience which is the ground of all experiences. Kasulis states clearly, "Zen is primarily interested not in the source of the universe, but in the source of our experience of the universe."17

III

It seems to me that Zen's seemingly incoherent statements are less absurd and unintelligible than they appear. They are not given arbitrarily; instead, they are deliberately made by means of the twofold truth in accordance with the Buddhist teaching of the Middle Way. If Zen is seen in this way, it would not appear so illogical as is ordinarily believed.

In Nagarjuna's texts and in other Mahayana writing, we read, "All Buddhas taught Dharma by means of the twofold truth for the sake of sentient beings. They taught by means of, first, the conventional truth, and second, the ultimate truth."18 The twofold truth is primarily a soteriological device, and is provided for the sake of saving sentient beings. It reflects a difference in the way one may see things. The so-called worldly truth (su-t'i, samvrtisatya) is an attached point of view. Ordinary people have all sorts of illusions, prejudices and preconceived concepts, and see the world with emotional and intellectual attachment. When things are perceived from this standpoint, they are believed to have a fixed nature, characteristic and function, and it is thought that their true state can be described by language. This viewpoint is often presented as discursive knowledge and is for ordinary unenlightened people.

¹⁴Heinrich Dumoulin, A History of Zen Buddhism, p. 287.

¹⁵T. P. Kasulis, Zen Action/Zen Person (Honolulu: The Univ. Press of Hawaii, 1981), p. 55.

¹⁸Middle Treatise, XXIV:8; Twelve Gate Treatise, VIII. See also Chi-tsang, The Meaning of the Twofold Truth, pp. 77-115, and The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, pp. 1-14.

Yet one may be enlightened and be emptied or devoid of illusion, prejudice and preconceived concepts. The world is then apprehended without attachment. When things are perceived from this perspective, they are no longer believed to have determinate nature, characteristic and function. This unattached standpoint is called ultimate truth (chen-t'i, paramarthasatya). To see things from this standpoint is to see the world through the eyes of wisdom.

In the strict sense, worldly truth is avidya, ignorance, and distorts the true state of things. Yet it is not entirely useless in achieving nirvana. Instead, it can be employed as a convenient means to help ignorant beings become enlightened. Ultimate truth has to be communicated and explained by speech, and speech is conventional and conditional. "Without worldly truth," Nagarjuna states, "ultimate truth cannot be obtained." Thus, on the one hand, the bodhisattva knows through eyes of wisdom that conventional truth as discursive knowledge is ignorance and should be eliminated, but, on the other hand, he realizes that words and discursive reasoning are needed in order to communicate and expound the Buddha's Dharma to sentient beings. Now, how can one be discursive and nondicursive, be transcendental and worldly at the same time? For the Mahayana, this can be and is done by means of the twofold truth. The enlightened person practices skillfully and lives in this attached world without attachment. While he uses words and concepts, he realizes that they are empty.

According to *The Meaning of the Twofold Truth* by the Chinese San-lun master Chitsang, seeming inconsistencies and contradictions in Buddhist teachings and practices spring from the twofold truth and can be cleared away if one sees them in light of this truth. For Chi-tsang, the twofold truth as skill-in-means (*fang-pien*) serves as an exegetical technique to clarify illogical expressions in Buddhism and to make the Buddha's teachings "all true."

Zen is the practice of the doctrine of the twofold truth. While Zen literature appears to abound with inconsistent expressions such as "see and do not see," "real and unreal" and "painful and not painful," all these are delivered by means of the two-fold truth, and one should understand them in this light. To comply with conventional usage, Zen masters may say that I see, or you should see, objects of right knowledge. But from an unattached standpoint, all things are empty, and hence the same masters also teach that one should not see any right thing. Ordinary people are deluded with attachment and do not see the emptiness of all things. If one's attachment is eliminated, one can then "see." For example, once Sheng-hui asked Hui-neng, "Do you see or not?" The master replied, "I both see and do not see!" Hui-neng taught, "If your mind is with attachment, you do not see; if your mind is without attachment, you see." The master had led the disciple to see things as not having one being.

Zen is also the practice of the twofold truth as the Middle Way. For the sake of repudiating the annihilationist, Zen masters may claim that existence is real, and in order to reject the eternalist outlook they may say that existence is unreal. They are practical and skillful. Different messages may appear logically incompatible and yet can be accepted as true if we bear in mind that their truth-value is their effectiveness as a means, upaya, to nirvana. The statements are delivered from different perspectives, and each

¹⁹ Middle Treatise, XXIV:10; Twelve Gate Treatise, VIII.

²⁰Chi-tsang, The Meaning of the Twofold Truth, pp. 79c and 81c.

²¹The Sutra of Hui-neng (also called the Platform Sutra or Sutra Spoken by the Sixth Patriarch on the High Seat of the Treasure of the Law) (Hong Kong: H. K. Buddhist Distributor Press, 1952), p. 33.

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should be known from its appropriate perspective. Assertions are regarded as true in a context; under certain circumstances it is true to say that existence is real, and under others one might claim that existence is unreal. In this way, all truths are pragmatic in character; they are given by Zen masters to eliminate extreme views. This practice of the Middle Way was well expressed by Hui-neng as follows:

Whenever a question is put to you, answer it in a negative, if it is an affirmative one; and vice versa. If you are asked about the worldly truth, deal with the ultimate truth; and vice versa. From the dialectical correlation of the two truths the doctrine of the middle way is manifested. If all issues are handled in this manner, you will not be far away from the truth.²²

Zen teachers negate in order to eradicate the extreme position of an inquirer's affirmation, and vice versa. So Zen masters say to both negate and affirm about the same event, appearing to be inconsistent or absurd. But actually their teachings and practices reflect the twofold truth in accordance with the doctrine of the Middle Way.

From the ultimate standpoint, words and names are empty and one should keep silent. But from the conventional standpoint, language is needed and one must speak. Through the twofold truth, Zen masters live in transcendental and conditional worlds simultaneously, and hence are silent and not silent. They use words and concepts, and are not bound by them. This is part of the meaning of the Zen koan, "Buddha preached forty-nine years, and yet his broad tongue never once moved."²³

Zen masters are not fixed by any particular things, and would employ any means to enlighten sentient beings. From the ordinary standpoint, one hand cannot produce a sound; only when both hands are clapped is a sound produced. But from the higher standpoint, any thing, even one single hand, can be used as a means to communicate and to enlighten one's mind. So, the Zen master said, "Listen to the sound of one hand." Actually for Zen masters, a small finger would serve as a better tool to communicate messages and to awaken people than the whole hand. This was well illustrated by Chu-chih's one-finger Zen. Whenever he instructed disciples or answered questions, Chu-chih would only lift his finger. His main teaching seems to be "Listen to the sound of one finger!" This appears to be absurd, yet it is a good skillful means. Many people are said to be enlightened by its truth.²⁴

IV

Zen is the practice of what may be called "empty logic." As far as logical arguments are concerned, empty logic is best exemplified in Nagarjuna's dialectic. When Nagarjuna was involved in logical dispute, he was empty-handed and merely employed the logic of others to defeat them. Ordinary logic usually aims to establish a viewpoint or position. It assumes that the denial of *P* affirms or entails the truth of *not-P*, and vice versa. In ordinary logic, negations are given to refute an antithesis so as to establish a thesis. Logic is used to determine whether one should accept *P* or *not-P*. But unlike ordinary logic, empty logic does not aim to establish a view. It does not have its own prindinary logic, empty logic does not aim to establish a view. It does not have its own prindinary logic, empty logic does not aim to establish a view. It does not have its own prindinary logic, empty logic does not aim to establish a view.

²²Ibid., p. 41. ²³Pi-yen-lu, pp. 168c and 215b. See also D. T. Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, pp. 59 and 62. ²⁴Pi-yen-lu, p. 159.

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ciples of reasoning, but simply uses the opponents' logic to display the absurdity of their arguments. The opponents' reasonings only are refuted in light of their own logic. Nagarjuna was skillful in repudiating others without arguing for his own particular viewpoint.

Sunyata is not a view of reality but a medicine or device to empty us of emotional and intellectual attachment to any view. To empty all views, for the Madhyamika, is not to form a new view of reality. If it is held as a view, it should be emptied. In this empty logic, negations are not for affirmation but merely to refute errors. P is wrong, not because not-P is right. If not-P is regarded as a right view, it needs to be refuted.

Epistemologically speaking, the refutation of erroneous views, for Chi-tsang, was itself the illumination of the right view (p'o-hsieh-hsien-cheng). The so-called right view is not another view but merely an absence of views. According to ordinary epistemology, the right view differs from the wrong view; the refutation of erroneous views and the illumination of right views are two separate things. The refutation of a proposition "the blackboard is white" is given in order to illuminate another proposition "The blackboard is black." Such negation is made in the light of affirmation; it is negation for affirmation. The Upanishadic neti neti belongs to this kind of negation, and is itself a view of reality. Its epistemology presupposes a certain metaphysics. But the Madhyamika negation does not presuppose anything or any ontological view; instead, it is the absence of views.²⁵

Historically, Nagarjuna's dialectic is a critique of the Upanishadic *neti neti* philosophy, through what seems to be the practice of the Indian dialectic of *vitanda*. *Vitanda* is a type of debate where one reasons to refute a rival position without any attempt to establish or defend one's own position. In this refutation-only kind of debate, forming and justifying one's own position is thought either unnecessary or impossible or both. Madhyamika reasoning belongs to this tradition of Indian philosophic debate.²⁶ So, unlike the Upanishadic negation, its negation is refutation-only. One who fails to see this and tries to look for what it stands for or points to, Nagarjuna contended, would be "like a man who, perceiving the body of a woman created by magic as really existent, feels desire for her."²⁷

It seems to me that Zen practice should be understood in this philosophical and historical background. Zen masters are empty-minded and cling to nothing. Like Nagarjuna's negation, Zen negation is not for affirmation. The denial of P does not entail the affirmation of not-P. For Zen as well as for Nagarjuna, not-P is also extreme and should be refuted. Hui-neng must have known well Chi-tsang's teaching of p'o-hsieh-hsien-cheng and did not regard the refutation of erroneous views and the illumination of right views as two separate things. For him, right is "that which is without any view" and wrong is "that which is with some view." As used by both Nagarjuna and Huineng, critiques of metaphysical views should lead to the abandonment of metaphysical speculation. Madhyamika and Zen masters just use the opponents' logic to defeat them; metaphysical viewpoints are shown to be untenable in the light of the metaphysicians'

²⁵See Hsueh-li Cheng, Empty Logic: Madhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources (New York: Philosophical Library, 1984), pp. 33-53.

²⁶For the detailed discussion of this, see Bimal K. Matilal's Introduction to *Nagarjuna's Twelve Gate Treatise* by Hsueh-li Cheng (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1982), pp. x-xi. See also Hsueh-li Cheng, *Empty Logic*. pp. 46-49.

²⁷Hui-cheng-lun, 27.

²⁸ The Sutra of Hui-neng, p. 26.

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logic. Zen Buddhists have likened the technique to "riding the thief's horse to chase away the thief."29

An attachment to any view is regarded as a disease, and Zen is yao (medicine) for curing the disease. In the Pi-yen-lu we read, "For forty-nine years, in more than three hundred assemblies, the World-honored One taught according to circumstances—all of this was giving medicine for curing the disease, like exchanging sweet fruit for bitter gourds. It is for purifying your karma and making you clean and free." Like medicine, Zen negation is primarily a soteriological tool to empty us of illusion, evil and suffering. So kung, wu and mu in Zen should not be seen as a negation for affirmation. Like Nagarjuna's refutation-only device, no and not are not for "no-ness." If it is held as a view or a negation for affirmation, it should be refuted.

Unenlightened persons are not empty-minded and are committed to epistemological objects and linguistic entities. For them, knowledge rightly understands or apprehends something in the world or in the mind, and a term means an extra-linguistic referent for which it stands. To gain knowledge is to find something, and to know meaning definitely is to look for a precise referent. But Zen masters do not hold the concept of meaning as a relation between words and extra-linguistic referents. For them, words and even names do not have definite meaning in themselves, but acquire different meanings in different situations. If the situation changes, meaning may change and even disappear. Once a monk asked Chao-chou, "What is Chao-chou?" Chao-chou answered, "East gate, West gate, South gate and North gate." The monk had assumed that to know is to know something and that names stand for definite objects or persons, and hence asked the question. The master's answer puts in practice Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness. Linguistically, to see all things as empty is to eliminate the assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between concepts and referents. So instead of giving a definitive answer, the master simply said, "East gate, West gate, South gate and North gate."

The words wu-nien, wu-hsin and wu-hsing do not have definite meaning, and it is a mistake for scholars to look for their referents. It makes little sense to debate and to figure out whether the referent is psychological, ontological or phenomenological. Zen's negative expressions aim to remind us that "something" is empty. Zen prajña is not a view of reality but an unattached awareness that reality is empty.

V

When contemporary scholars talk about the status of logical reasoning in Zen, they usually follow the popular view that logic is devoid of contradiction and absurdity, and then hold that Zen is illogical. Few see that an important message from Zen and Mahayana Buddhism is that logic is really illogical. The problem of logic for Zen and many other Mahayanists is not that reality is beyond rational description but that so-called logical reasoning involves contradiction and absurdity. One need not follow conventional logic rigidly and absolutely. From the worldly or conventional standpoint, logic may be acceptable, yet from the ultimate standpoint, ordinary logic is illogical.

²⁹ Pi-yen-lu, p. 167c.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 212a.

³¹ Pi-yen-lu, p. 149a.

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According to the basic principle of ordinary or Aristotelian logic, "to be" and "not to be," or "is" and "is not," cannot be at the same place at the same time. Freedom from contradiction is a necessary condition of truth and rationality. A true logical statement is considered to be true necessarily; its denial is contradictory. The truth of a proposition P entails the falsity of -P, and the falsity of P implies the truth of -P. One cannot accept the validity of both P and -P. To do so would be irrational.

Zen logic is the practical application of Nagarjuna's philosophy of logic. Nagarjuna was well known for his critique of all views. He claimed that if freedom from contradiction is a necessary condition of truth and rationality, then predications or conceptual statements are unintelligible and would have to be ruled out. His dialectic aims to show that our basic logical and linguistic structures appear to be sound, but really involve contradiction and absurdity.

Nagarjuna analyzed the nature and scheme of predication carefully. When a logical or any conceptual predication is made, it consists of a subject and predicate. This, Nagarjuna pointed out, really raises serious conceptual problems. How can one proposition have two parts? The subject and predicate are two different things. If a logical statement must be devoid of contradiction or absurdity, how can one and two, and same and different, form one true statement? These cast doubt upon the rationality of logic.³²

Furthermore, Nagarjuna questioned the validity of the basic logical principle that to be and not to be cannot be at the same place at the same time. Usually people use this principle to evaluate whether a certain judgment is logical or illogical, and rational or irrational. But Nagarjuna asked, "By what principle, standard or means of cognition (liang, pramana) do we justify this principle?" If we use another principle to justify this one, this would not be the fundamental principle. And one may also ask, "By what principle do we justify the other principle?" There would be an infinite regress. It is impossible for us to be certain about the validity of such a basic principle of logical reasoning.³³

Logicians may claim that the basic principle of a logic is a presupposition and does not need justification, but Nagarjuna contended that this really allows something non-justified. One's position is inconsistent, as Nagarjuna pointed out. "If you mean to say that a pramana is proved without a pramana . . . you commit a logical fallacy, as you [implicitly] maintain that there are things which are proved by the pramanas and there are things [such as the pramanas themselves] which are not proved by the pramanas." On the other hand, if one is to be consistent and fair, and allows such an unjustified thing, one should not question and complain about the existence of other illogical things.

It may be argued that to say that the basic principle of logic does not need justification simply means that the principle is self-evident. For example, "Just as fire, which can illuminate itself and also illuminates other objects by its light, the same is the case as regards the *pramana*, which can prove, at the same time, itself and the other notions." But this defense is not tenable. Fire appears to illuminate itself without depending on other things, but actually this is not the case. If there is no darkness, what and how can

³²Twelve Gate Treatise, VI:1. See Hsueh-li Cheng, Nagarjuna's Twelve Gate Treatise, p. 81-84; see also Hsueh-li Cheng, Empty Logic, pp. 117-118.

³³ Hui-cheng-lun, 32.

³⁴ Ibid., 33.

³⁵ Ibid., 34.

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fire illuminate? Properly speaking, illumination is the destruction of darkness. No fire can illuminate without darkness. So "fire illuminates itself" or "the principle proves itself" is fallacious. Moreover, if a thing illuminates itself, it would be subject and object at the same time. But subject and object are two different things. How can they be one thing?³⁶

Here Nagarjuna questioned not only logical reasoning but also the sources of cognition. The chief means of knowledge such as perception, inference, analogy and authority can all be repudiated in the same way. He said, "Thus a *pramana* is not proved by itself; direct perception is not proved by direct perception; inference is not proved by inference; analogy is not proved by analogy; authority is not proved by authority; nor are they proved by one another." Nothing is self-evident and absolutely certain.

Although the practical Zen masters did not engage themselves in purely logical debate, they had revered Nagarjuna as a second Buddha and accepted the conclusions of his dialectic. Like Nagarjuna, Zen masters maintain that ultimately no intelligible predication can be formed and no rational logic can be established. An enlightened person should be wise enough not to make assertions. Such is the theme of the following tale recounted of Bodhidharma:

Bodhiharma had stayed in China for nine years. He wished to return to India. He called in all his disciples and said, "The time has now come for me to depart, and I want to see what you have attained." The disciple Tao-fu said, "As I see it, the truth is above affirmation and negation, for this is the way it functions." The Master said, "You have attained my skin." Then a nun, Tsung-chih, spoke, "As I understand it, the truth is like Ananda's viewing the Buddhaland of Akshobhya: it is seen once and never again." The Master said, "You have attained my flesh." Another disciple Tao-yu claimed, "Empty are the four elements and non-existent the five skandhas. According to my view, there is no Dharma to be grasped." The Master said, "You have attained my bones." Finally, Hui-k'e bowed reverently and stood silent. The Master declared, "You have attained my marrow." For Zen masters, an understanding of silence is prajña, wisdom. It is also the intelligent way to avoid contradiction and absurdity. The silence eliminates contradiction and ignorance; it is the manifestation of wu (enlightenment, satori).

The Zen silence is similar to the Buddha's silence described in Nagarjuna's Twelve Gate Treatise: "A naked Tirthika asked the Buddha, 'Is suffering made by itself?' The Buddha kept silent and did not answer. 'World-honored! If suffering is not made by itself, is it made by other?' The Buddha still did not answer. 'World-honored! Is it then made by itself and by other? The Buddha still did not reply. 'World-honored! Is it then made by no cause at all?' The Buddha still did not answer.''³⁹ According to early Buddhism, the Buddha refused to discuss metaphysical issues but talked instead about the urgent problem of suffering, its origin, cessation and the way leading to its cessation. Yet for Nagarjuna, even assertions concerning the fact of suffering are unintelligible, and hence, really, the Buddha not only maintained silence about metaphysical issues but also about the Four Noble Truths, the central message of Buddhism. Following this logic of silence, a Zen koan states, "Old Sakyamuni (Buddha) appeared in the world

³⁶ Ibid., 35-49.

³⁷ Ibid., 52.

³⁸ Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu, vol. 3.

³⁹ Twelve Gate Treatise, X.

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and in forty-nine years never said a single word. During the period from the Land of Brilliance to the river Hiranyavati, he never spoke a single word."40

Nagarjuna is famous for using an opponent's logic to defeat the opponent's arguments. By itself, logic may be unjustifiable, yet it is useful and can be employed to eliminate ignorance and help people achieve enlightenment. Conceptual expressions may not have an epistemological value, yet they have a practical value. Following this philosophy, Zen masters use mistakes to correct mistakes (chiang-ch'e chiu-ch'e). The Chinese Pi-yen-lu finds that a conceptual assertion by itself has neither reason nor justification. However, for the sake of benefitting sentient beings, conceptual devices, such as the following statement by Master Shan-hui of the fifth century, 2 are needed:

Empty-handed I go, and behold the spade is in my hands;
I walk on foot, and yet on the back of an ox I am riding;
When I pass over the bridge,
Lo, the water floweth not, but the bridge doth flow.

Those words appear to be unacceptable. Yet from another standpoint Shan-hui's utterance points up the unacceptability of some basic principles of logic. If Shan-hui is unacceptable, why not logic itself? no truth is absolutely true; logic is created by human beings and does not have a priori validity. Conceptual devices which help to spread Dharma and help others achieve nirvana can be provisionally accepted as true. There is no reason to be enslaved by logic, and one can employ unconventional, illogical means to express this understanding. Thus so-called illogical Zen is not so absurd but rather a manifestation of wisdom.

⁴⁰ Pi-yen-lu, p. 168c.

⁴¹ Ibid., 181a.

⁴²Pi-yen-lu, 219b. See also D. T. Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, p. 58.


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The Aim of Augustine's Proof That God Truly Is

Roland J. Teske, S. J.

THE HEART of Book Two of De libero arbitrio (hereafter DLA) aims to show "how it is manifest that God is." All the commentaries that I have been able to consult speak of this section as a proof for the existence of God or even as the Augustinian proof for the existence of God, though they differ considerably in their assessment of the success of the proof.2 Yet "how it is manifest that God exists" seems a strange way to refer to a conclusion arrived at by mediate reasoning many pages long. And the conclusion that "God is and truly is" suggests that the "is" in question may be a far richer notion than that expressed in the proposition that God is.3 What I shall argue in

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this paper is that to regard the central section of *DLA* II as merely concerned with proving that there is a God is to miss a great deal. For, I believe that an equally important, if not the most important, goal of this section is to lead the reader to conceive of God as a spiritual substance, immutable and eternal.⁴ There are, I believe, a number of reasons that can be urged in favor of this thesis. Though perhaps no one of them is of itself sufficient, the cumulative effect is, I believe, highly suasive.

I. AUGUSTINE'S MAIN INTELLECTUAL CONCERN AT THIS POINT

In this section of the paper I want to argue that the main intellectual problem that Augustine faced during the years prior to and immediately after 386 was not the existence of God, but the nature of God as a spiritual being. I shall first trace what he called "almost the sole cause of my error" (Confessions V, 10, 19; hereafter, Conf.) and then show that, though conceiving of God as a spiritual substance was a serious problem for Augustine, knowing that there is a God certainly was not.

The *DLA* was begun while Augustine was still in Rome before his return to Africa. Though the second and third books may well be somewhat later, the work was completed by the time of his ordination as a bishop. At the time at which he wrote *DLA* he was still very much concerned with Manichaeism and its theological objections to the Catholic faith, and so it is understandable that Augustine would in these early writings respond to the Manichees and try to win over his Manichee friends to his newly found faith, especially since he had won many of these same friends to Manichaeism. Hence, one would expect that these early writings reflect Augustine's own theological problems prior to 385-6 and the solutions to them that he discovered. Augustine, however, did not differ with the Manichees over whether or not there was a God, but over whether or not God was bodily. Furthermore, if, as we shall see, the inability to conceive a spiritual substance is the main ground for Augustine's becoming and staying a Manichee, then there is even stronger reason to suppose that he is here concerned with conceiving of God as a spiritual substance.

In reading Confessions III through VII, one can hardly miss the repeated recurrence of one theme, namely, Augustine's complaint about his inability to conceive a spiritual substance. Indeed texts that mention this inability abound from III, 4, 7, where after

⁴In "Les conversions de Saint Augustin et les débuts du spiritualisme en Occident," Moyen Age 67 (1961), F. Masai speaks of the whole of DLA II as an ascent from the sensible to the intelligible (p.26). And he singles out II, 8, 20–24 as a proof of immateriality (p.24, n.41). But I have not found any author who maintains the thesis that I am arguing for, namely, that the central thrust of DLA II is to bring the reader to conceive of God as a spiritual substance.

Indeed, Boyer, in *L'idée de Vérité*, p. 65, argues that, to deal with Augustine's proof for God's existence, one should separate it from such other questions as: "les théories de la vision de Dieu, de l'illumination, de la participation, de l'essence divine," though he admits that they are often found together. This move, of course, presupposes as *un point de départ* a thesis that is almost the direct opposite of the conclusion for which I am arguing.

'Augustine tells us in the *Retractationes* I, 9, 8, that he began the *DLA* while he was still in Rome. Since the second book is a revision of the first, it was surely somewhat later. The style, however, of the second seems closer to that of the first than that of the third. That Augustine says that "the second and third books were completed when I could, after I had been ordained a priest at Hippo" (ibid.), by no means rules out the possibility that much of the second book was finished quite early. Cf. P. Sejourné, "Les conversions de saint Augustine d'après le De Libero Arbitrio I," *Revue des Sciences Religieuses* 89–90 (1951), 359–60, and R. O'Connell, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391*, (Cambridge, 1968), p. 53.

reading the Hortensius he begins to burn with a fierce love of wisdom and begins to rise up to return to his God, until VII, 9, 13, where he first encounters the libri Platonicorum. If one thinks anachronistically, it is easy to suppose that this inability to conceive a spiritual substance is a personal intellectual blindness largely due to a life of sin and pleasure.⁶

Such, however, was not the case. Verbeke's study of the notion of *pneuma* has shown that until the time of Augustine there simply was not present in the Western Church a concept of the spiritual in the sense of a non-corporeal substance. And Masai's article amends Verbeke's conclusion insofar as he attributes the source of the concept of spirit in the technical sense to the influence of Neoplatonism. Whereas Verbeke sees the origin of the concept of spirituality in the biblical revelation, Masai more plausibly attributes it to Augustine's contact with the writings of Plotinus.

A. ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN THE CATHOLICA

That there was no clear doctrine of the spiritual nature of God in the African Church would seem to follow from the fact that Augustine believed for nine years that the Catholic Church held that God was in the form and shape of a human being. That is, if an intelligent man in search of the truth—and surely Augustine was such a one—could be so long "mistaken" about what the Catholic Church held, it would seem reasonable to suppose that this was due to the fact that there was no doctrine of divine spirtuality taught in the African church.9

When Augustine began his search for wisdom, he was clearly put off by the demands for faith and intellectual humility (Conf. III, 5, 9). He found a literal reading of Scripture posed problems that were only exacerbated by the baiting questions of the Manichees who promised a Christian wisdom without having to believe. The Manichees asked the young reader of the Scriptures whether God was confined by a bodily shape and had hair and nails (Conf. III, 7, 12). At that time he did not know that God was a spirit and that our being made in God's image did not mean that God has our shape. According to Conf. VI, 3, 4, it was only nine years later in the Milan of Ambrose that he found that the Catholica did not hold, as he had thought, that God was "limited by the shape of the human body. . . . "Under the influence of Ambrose's preaching he came to

⁶Masai quotes Testard's expression of surprise that the early Augustine seemed to lack an awareness of some basic Catholic beliefs, such as, the spiritual nature of God and the soul (Masai, p. 13; Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Ciceron (Paris, 1958) I, p. 110). Recently Alvin Plantinga supposed that no one in the history of philosophy except perhaps David of Dinant and Thomas Hobbes thought that God was material (A. Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee, 1980), p. 38–39). Such unawareness of the development of spiritualism in the West is reflected in the recent Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (1978) on the topic of "Immateriality" in which Augustine seems not to have even been mentioned.

G. Verbeke, L'évolution de la doctrine du pneuma, du stoïcisme à s. Augustin (Paris and Louvain, 1945).

§F. Masai, pp. 16-23. "... il faut inverser les rôles que cet historien de la philosophie attribue au platonisme et au christianisme, dans le processus de spiritualisation de l'esprit. C'est le platonisme qui a élaboré la conception—d'origine manifestement philosophique—d'intelligence, de pensée, d'esprit. Mais ces notions grecques n'avaient pas encore pénétré dans les milieux qui traduisirent la Bible ou conçurent le Nouveau Testament. C'est seulement par la suite, surtout à partir du IIIe siècle, que la philosophie spiritualiste trouva, en Plotin notamment, des interprétes capables de l'imposer à l'attention générale" (p. 17).

There was, of course, the biblical sense of 'spirit' prior to the time of Augustine, though that sense by no means implied an immateriality such as Augustine derived from his contact with the Platonists. One must remember that Tertullian insisted that God is a body, even if he is a spirit. "Quis negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est?" (Adversus Prax., 7; cited by Masai, p. 18.)

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regard as "infantile nonsense" what he had thought was the doctrine of the Church, namely, that God was confined "in a space, however, high and wide, yet bounded on every side by the shape of human members" (Conf. VI, 5, 5). Again in Conf. VI, 11, 18, he says,

One great hope dawned: the Catholic faith does not teach what we once thought and what we vainly accused it of. Her learned men hold it blasphemy to believe that God is limited by the shape of the human body.

If then Augustine believed for nine years that the Catholic Church held an anthropomorphic view of God, such a view of God must have been fairly common among the faithful of the African Church in which he grew up. 10 After all, we do know that there existed at the time of Augustine a monastery of anthropomorphite monks in Egypt who were regarded as little more than eccentric. 11

One need not, however, go beyond Augustine to find evidence of such anthropomorphism in the Church. For, in *De moribus ecclesiae* X, 17, Augustine admits that there are within the Church children (*pueri*) not in time, but in virtue and prudence who "think of God in a human form and suppose that he is such." These little ones are still nurtured at the breasts of mother Church. Augustine also admits that within the ranks of the Manichees "no one is found who limited the substance of God by the shape of the human body"—an opinion than which there is none more abject. Such a text seems to imply that there are within the *Catholica* many little ones whose idea of God is that of a very large man. Within the Church they are safe, while the Manichees, though not having such a crass view of God, have separated themselves from the Church. So too in *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti* he asks his readers to compare with the Manichees—not the spiritual Catholics who can "see that the divine substance and nature is not stretched out in space"—but

our carnal and little ones, who are commonly wont, when they hear certains members of our body in an allegory, as when God's eyes or ears are mentioned, to picture God, as a result of freedom of the imagination, under the shape of a human body (XXIII, 25).

Here Augustine clearly gives preference to those "who think of [God] in a human form cloaked in its kind with the highest dignity" as opposed to the Manichees who think of God as a mass diffused everywhere infinitely except where it gapes open before the land of darkness. For the carnal ones will, if they remain in the Church, be fed with milk until they grow strong enough to abandon the material images of God and to think

¹⁰In St. Augustine's Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul, pp. 18-20, Robert O'Connell describes the "conservative" African Catholics who resisted Augustine's Plotinian understanding of the faith. "African Christianity especially seems to have been conservative in tendency, suspicious on principle of any such flight toward philosophical intellectus of the faith" (p. 19).

d'Alexandrie!—des orthodoxes convaincus du caractère corporel de la divinité. Sur l'importance de ces 'anthropomorphites' . . . on peut consulter la monographie récente de A. Favale: *Theofilo d'Alessandria*, . . . mais en ayant évidemment soin de considérer ces moines égyptiens, non comme de grossiers novateurs, mais comme les représentants *attardés* d'une mentalité antérieure à la diffusion du spiritualisme plotinicien et à son incorporation dans le patrimonie intellectual de la chrétienté'' (p. 21).

of spiritual things. The Manichee, however, must cease to be a Manichee in giving up his imaginings.¹²

Even in a text as late as the Homilies on the Gospel of St. John, Augustine clearly implies that the "carnal" or "animal" men in the Church think of God as bodily and even imagine "the Father in one place, the Son standing in another before him and pleading for us ... and the Word producing words on our behalf, with a space between the mouth of the speaker and the ears of the hearer. ..." Even "spiritual" men by reason of the habit of bodies have to drive away such corporeal images like "pesky flies from the interior eyes" of the mind. Augustine in this text interprets the Pauline "spiritual" as opposed to "carnal" or "animal" in terms of the ability to think of God as an incorporeal and immutable substance.

Thus it seems that Augustine's belief that the *Catholica* held an anthropomorphic view of God was correct, at least with regard to the vast majority of the faithful, especially if the "spirituals" were only those who, under the influence of Neoplatonism, were able to think of God as an incorporeal substance. After all, in Milan Augustine discovered that it was the *learned* men of the Church who rejected an anthropomorphic view of God. And O'Connell has argued convincingly that Augustine's Platonizing version of Christianity met with considerable resistance among the "conservative" Christians of the African Church.¹⁴

B. MANICHAEAN AND STOIC MATERIALISM

Though Augustine never could accept an anthropomorphic view of God, he did for nine years hold a materialistic view of God while he was an auditor in the Manichaean

¹²This is a significant argument for the convert to Neoplatonism. For the *Catholica* can embrace both the carnal and the spiritual, though the former are little children compared to adults. Manichaeism, however, cannot include the spirituals, for once one conceives of God as an incorporeal substance he has ceased to be a Manichee.

It strikes me that this passage also throws light upon Augustine's state of mind described in Contra Academicos II, 2, 5, where he says that, after the discovery of Neoplatonism, he turned to Saint Paul convinced that such men as the Apostles could not have lived as they did if their teaching and writing were opposed to "this so great a good," namely, Neoplatonic spiritualism. Cf. John J. O'Meara, St. Augustine: Against the Academics (Westminster, 1950), pp. 177-8, n. 24. Augustine's excitement is surely due to his previous conviction that the Church was tied to a materialist view of God, which would, therefore, have been opposed to "huic tanto bono."

Finally, it is interesting to note Augustine's ambivalence with regard to anthropomorphism, for though he brands it as the most abject of opinions and as one the learned in the Church regard as blasphemy, he still finds it tolerable in the little ones in the Church and even ascribes to it a certain dignity in comparison to the Manichaean position.

13 In Ioan. Ev., tr. 102, 4, PL 35, 1897-98; also tr. 103, 1, PL 35, 1899. Cf. A. Solignac's note, "Spirituels et charnels," in the BA edition of Les Confessions II, pp. 629-34. Also cf. O'Connell, Confessions, pp. 162-172, esp. p. 172, n. 5, for a criticism of Solignac's view. The text from In Ioan. Ev. is cited by neither author; yet it clearly ties "being a spiritual" to Neoplatonism through the ability to think of God as an incorporeal substance. There is a moral or ascetic dimension to the animal/spiritual distinction. It is however, the intellectual dimension that seems to have been neglected, perhaps largely because the novelty of the spiritalis intellectus that Augustine was proposing has been forgotten.

It is startling to hear the saint tell his congregation: "cogitantes in hac present turba Caritatis Vestrae necesse est ut multi sint animales," even though these "animales" are simply those who "nondum se possunt ad spiritalem intellectum erigere" (In Ioan. Evan., tr. 1, 1; PL 35, 1379).

Joseph Capello notes, "Afri eo mentem emicam corporibus habebant ut Tertullianus ipse scripserit in de carne Christi II: 'Nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est'" (p. 151).

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sect. He admits that he thought that God was "an immense shining body" and that he was "a particle of that body" (Conf. IV, 16, 31). He tells us that at Rome he

wished to meditate on my God, but I did not know how to think of him except as a vast corporeal mass, for I thought that anything not a body was nothing whatsoever. This was the greatest and almost the sole cause of my error. As a result, I believed that evil is some substance ... (Conf. V, 10, 19-20).

And, in another similar text, he says,

If I were only able to conceive a spiritual substance, then forthwith all those strategems would be foiled and cast out of my mind. But this I was unable to do (Conf. V, 14, 25).

He thought of God and evil "as two masses opposed to one another, each of them infinite, but the evil one on a narrower scale, the good on a larger" (V, 10, 20). God, he believed, was infinite on all sides except where he was limited by the realm of darkness. Thus the Manichaean God was a mass extended infinitely in every direction except on the side where it was bordered by the evil mass. In *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti*, XXI, 23, Augustine tells us that the Manichees offered the example of a cross-shaped bread to aid the imagination of their followers. Three parts were white and infinitely extended in every direction except on the side where the black part rests. ¹⁵ Such a view of God was what Augustine held more or less firmly for a period of nine years. As we have seen, he attributes the cause of his errors to his inability to conceive a spiritual substance.

Augustine's passage from Manichaeism to Catholicism was not by any means direct. Rather he was briefly caught in the skepticism of the Academy, and also he seems to have come to hold a materialism not unlike that of Stoicism and his African predecessor, Tertullian. For at the beginning of Book VII where Augustine is already well along in terms of his return to the Catholic faith, he presents a conception of God as infinitely extended in all directions. He again complains that he "could conceive of no substantial being except such as those that I was wont to see with my own eyes" (Conf. VIII, 1, 1).

By this time Augustine believed that God was incorruptible, inviolable, and immutable, since he clearly saw that to be such was better than to be corruptible, violable, and mutable, even though he as yet did not know how he knew this. 16 He thought of God

as something corporeal, existent in space and place, either infused into the world or even diffused outside the world through infinite space. . . . For whatever I conceived as devoid of such spatial character seemed to me to be nothing, absolutely nothing, not even so much as an empty space (Conf. VII, 1, 1).

Clearly Augustine has distanced himself from the Manichaean view of God insofar as he now no longer holds two opposing substances, but one substance and that unbounded. Thus he seems to have adopted a Stoic materialism and to have thought of God as

¹⁵Cf. Les Confessions I, 674, where A. Solignac describes the Manichaean doctrine of "cuneus"—wedge, by which the realm of darkness cuts into the realm of light.

16 It is interesting to note that Augustine seems to have come to this insight prior to his contact with Neoplatonism, though the latter has often been blamed for his "static" conception of God. a great corporeal substance, existent everywhere throughout infinite space, which penetrates the whole world-mass, and spreads beyond it on every side throughout immense, limitless space (*Conf.* VII, 1, 2).

Thus the earth and the heavens and every thing in them would "have" God who would fill all bodies, just as the sun penetrates and fills the air. Such a view of divine omnipresence, however, he later realized, entailed that larger things held a larger part of God and smaller things a smaller part (Conf. VII, 1, 2).

Several paragraphs later Augustine tells us that he imagined the whole of creation as a huge, but finite mass and thought that God "encircled it on every side and penetrated it, but ... remained everywhere infinite" (Conf. VIII, 5, 7). He pictured God as an infinite sea and creation as a huge, but finite sponge "filled in every part by that boundless sea." Such would seem to be the view that he labels idolatry in Conf. VIII, 14, 20. For he tells us, when he turned from Manichaean dualism, his "soul fashioned for itself a god that filled all the places in infinite space. It thought that this god was you ... and became the temple of its own idol." Thus the early part of Book VII bears the mark of Augustine's dalliance with Stoicism. God is first seen as "diffused" throughout the world and then the imagery is turned about so that the world is seen as in God. But in both views God and the world are spatial.¹⁷

In this section I have tried to present what Augustine speaks of as the sole cause of his error, namely, his inability to conceive of a spiritual substance. He explicitly claims that, because he could not conceive a spiritual substance, he came to regard evil as a substance opposed to God. We have seen that he always rejected an anthropomorphic view of God and shunned the Catholic Church for many years because he believed that Catholics were anthropomorphites. On the other hand, he held for nine years a dualistic materialism, and even when he gave up Manichaeism, he still was left with a materialism, even though of a Stoic sort. It was only through contact with the *Platonici* that he was able to come to a concept of God as a spiritual being, and there is every reason to believe that Augustine's problem in conceiving a spiritual substance was not personal, but due to the lack of such philosophical concepts in almost the whole Western Church. 19

Now the fact that this was Augustine's main intellectual problem does not, of course, force us to interpret the core of *DLA* II as an *manuductio* toward a spiritual conception of God, for an author need not always discuss his more urgent problems. However,

¹⁷In Early Theory, p. 98, O'Connell mentions with regard to this text "the familiar earmarks of Stoicism: the allusions to air and sunlight. Their penetration of the bodies situated in them furnished frequent Stoic analogies for the Divine Presence to all limited beings. Bathed in this presence, they are, in addition, all "governed both inwardly and outwardly by Your secret inspiration"—the pneuma central to classic Stoic thought." Cf. also on this point: Gerard Verbeke, "Augustin et le stoïcisme," Recherches Augustiniennes I (1958), 67-89, especially pp. 79-80.

¹⁸Fortunatus' question: "Is there something outside of God, or is everything in God?" (Contra Fortunatum, 5), it seems to me, throws light on how Augustine viewed the connection between the inability to conceive a spiritual substance and the positing of evil as a substance. For the question implies that God is extended such that anything is either inside or outside of God. Since from the Confessions we know that Augustine could conceive of nothing real except extended body (VII, 1, 2) and that he could not bring himself to deny the reality of evil—for otherwise our fear of evil would be a greater evil (VII, 5, 7), we see that he was faced with the choice of either placing evil in God or making it another substance outside of God. Since he could not locate evil in God, he was forced to hold a finite God who is limited by an evil substance.

¹⁹There was, of course, already a Neoplatonic Christianity in Milan that included Ambrose. However, apart from this nucleus there simply was no spiritual concept of God or of the soul in the Western Church.

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when one adds to this the fact that whether or not there is a God was never an urgent question for Augustine or, he thought, for his contemporaries, it becomes more likely that his aim in *DLA* II is at least also to bring us to conceive of God as a spiritual substance.

C. GOD KNOWN TO ALL

Though the endeavour to prove the existence of God has, at least since the Middle Ages, been one of the main concerns of philosophy, it was not such for Augustine. He did not personally experience the question of God's existence as a genuine problem for himself. He tells us in the *Confessions* that he always believed that God exists and has providential care for us.

Sometimes I believed this more strongly and at other times in a more feeble way. But always I believed both that you are and that you have care for us . . . (VI, 5, 7-8; cf. also VII, 7, 11).

But Augustine also held that God "is everywhere hidden, everywhere available to all (publicus), whom no one can know as he is, whom no one is permitted not to know" (Enarr. in Ps. 74, 9; PL 36, 952). If no one is allowed to be ignorant of God, then there is something quite otiose about a proof for the existence of God, especially one that runs on for so many, many paragraphs.²⁰

And this is not an isolated text. In his Homilies on the Gospel of John, Augustine says that the God of all creation

could not be entirely unknown even to all the nations before they believed in Christ. For such is the power of the true divinity that it cannot be entirely and completely hidden from a rational creature already using its reason. Apart from a few in whom nature has been very deprayed, the whole human race admits God as author of this world. Insofar, then, as he has made this world splendid in earth and sky, even before they were imbued with the faith of Christ, God was known to all nations (*In Ioan. Evan.* tr. 106, 4; *PL* 35, 1910).

In commenting on Psalm 13, 1, Augustine says that not even those philosophers who think perversely and falsely of God have dared to say that there is no God. And for that reason, Augustine explains, the fool said in his heart that there was no God, for he did

²⁰There is in St. Augustine's writings on the existence of God, if not a "contradiction" at least a tension, if I may use the gentler expression. For, while Augustine supposedly offers many arguments which claim to show that God exists, he also holds the doctrine that there is no one who does not know that God exists. I am reminded of the opening lines of the final section of his first *Inquiry*, where David Hume muses over the great number of philosophical arguments "which prove the existence of a Deity and refute the fallacies of atheists," along with the claim by the religious philosopher that there can be no one "so blinded as to be a speculative atheist." The religious philosopher thus is found to be in the odd position of struggling (1) to prove that there is a God so as to rid the world of atheists, and (2) to maintain that there cannot be anything like a speculative atheist for whom a proof of God's existence might be of help. Knights-errant seeking to render the world dragon-free, Hume quips, never doubted the existence of such monsters.

Perhaps one way in which this tension in Augustine's thought might be alleviated is by recognizing that the so-called proofs of God's existence are better viewed as equally emphasizing our coming to a correct idea of the nature of God as a spiritual being.

not dare to say it aloud, even if he thought it in his heart.²¹ In dealing with Psalm 52, 1, he says that there are in fact very few who say in their hearts that there is no God.²² Furthermore, Augustine says that all creation proclaims, "God has made us." In preaching on Romans 1:20, he says,

Ask the world, the beauty of heaven, the brightness and order of the stars, the sun . . . the moon; ask the earth fruitful with plants and trees, filled with animals, and beautified with men, and see if they do not respond to you by their meaning, God made us (Sermo 141, 2, 2; PL 38, 776).

The fact that things change proclaims that they were made, and the beauty of things in this world discloses the beauty of their Maker. In other words, the movement from the visible things of this world to God was an easy and spontaneous one for Augustine, though, unlike Plotinus, he did use some sort of argument.²³ But if the existence of God is so readily known and known by almost everyone so that even the fool does not utter aloud that there is no God, is it really likely that Augustine's principal aim in *DLA* was to prove that there is a God?

II. ARGUMENTS FROM THE TEXT ITSELF

That Augustine aims in *DLA* II to show that God is a spiritual being, immutable and eternal, can be argued to from the text itself in a number of ways. First of all, any proof of the existence of God has to start off with some basic idea of what is meant by the term, God, in order to go about showing that there is something to which the term applies. In *DLA* II, Augustine and Evodius agree that, if there is something superior to our reason—at least if it is eternal and immutable— then that is God. Though Evodius initially protests that God is not "that to which my reason is inferior, but rather that to which no one is superior" (II, 6, 14), he seems willing to accept this, if he finds "there is nothing above our reason except that which is eternal and immutable. . . . "

What is important to my argument is that Augustine has just pointed out that all bodies are mutable, that the life which animates our bodies is mutable, and that reason itself is mutable. Furthermore, in stating the major premise of the argument, Augustine stresses the non-corporeal vision by which reason discerns its God. Thus whatever is immutable will be both incorporeal and superior to what is highest in us, namely, reason.

²¹ The fool said in his heart: There is no God.' For not even certain sacrilegious and detestable philosophers who thought perverse and false things of God dared to say: There is no God. Therefore, the fool said it in his heart, because no one would dare to say it aloud, even if he dared to think it' (*Enarr. in Ps* 13, 2; *PL* 36, 141).

they are few, and it is difficult to come across a man who says in his heart: There is no God. None-theless they are so few that for fear of saying this in a crowd they say it in their heart, because they do not dare say it with their mouth" (Enarr. in Ps 52, 2; PL 36, 614). "Few are found of such great impiety that there is fulfilled in them that which was written, "The fool says in his heart, "There is no God." Such insanity pertains to only a few" (Sermo 69, 2, 3; PL 38, 441).

²³In the BA edition, Thonnard says (p. 519), "Plus exigeant que Plotin, il ne considère pas l'existence de Dieu comme immédiatement évidente, puisqu'il entreprend d'en donner une démonstration rationelle, en remontant par les divers degrés jusqu'au vrai Dieu, l'UN suprême." So too, in the ACW edition, Pontifex says that Augustine rejected the view of Plotinus that God's existence was immediately evident, and needed no rational proof" (p. 254).

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If reason—without the use of any corporeal instrument—not through touch, not through taste, not through smell, not through the ears, not through the eyes, and not through any sense inferior to itself, but through itself discerns something eternal and immutable, it ought to admit that it its God and that it itself is inferior (*DLA* II, 5, 14).

If all bodies are mutable and if the proof attains something that is immutable, it follows that that something is not a body. Furthermore, if that immutable and, therefore, eternal something superior to our reason is seen only by non-corporeal eyes and in a non-corporeal discernment, it too must be non-corporeal. Hence, the initial notion of God with which the argument begins is that of a spiritual substance, immutable and eternal. And the goal of the proof, therefore, must be to attain such a being.²⁴

Another indication that Augustine was not, in *DLA* II, merely showing that there is a God, but showing how God is to be thought of, can be drawn from the formulation of the conclusion, namely, that "God is and is truly and sovereignly" (*Est enim Deus, et vere summeque est*; XIV, 39). For whatever Augustine might mean by "is" when he uses the verb without conscious reflection on its meaning, when he does explicitly reflect on its meaning, he ties *esse* with immutability, self-sameness, eternity. ²⁵ For example, he says,

For, any thing, of whatever excellence, if it is changeable, is not truly; for true being is not present where there is also nonbeing. For whatever can be changed, once it has been changed, is not what it was; if it is not what it was, a certain death has taken place there; something has been slain there that was and is not now (*In Ioan. Ev.*, tr. 38, 10; *PL* 35, 1680).

Texts from Augustine that show that true being is closely tied to, if not identical with, immutability and eternity could be produced in great number. For the purpose of this article the following should suffice as both clear and representative.²⁶

Therefore, the angel, and in the angel the Lord, had said to Moses who sought his name, "I am who I am. You shall say to the children of Israel: "Who is' has sent me to you." To be is the name of immutability. For, everything which is changed ceases to be what it was and begins to be what it was not. Only what is not changed has true being, pure being, genuine being (Sermo 7, 7; PL 38, 66).

I am called "Is," he said. What is: I am called "Is"? That I remain eternally, that I cannot be changed.... Therefore, the immutability of God deigned to express itself by that phrase, "I am who I am" (Sermo 6, 3, 4; PL 38, 61).

What is unchangeable is eternal; it is always the same way. But what is changeable is subject to time . . . (De div. quaest. 83, q. 19; PL 40, 15).

²⁴This initial notion is not a conceptual grasp of what it is to be an incorporeal being. If it were, there would, of course, be no need for the extended exercise that follows. It is rather a verbal definition or a mere notion whose referent becomes gradually understood (*intellectus*) in the course of the long *manuductio*. Thus,

25 There are uses of the verb "to be" (esse) that seem simply to assert there is something or someone. Thus, for example, the proof in *DLA* II begins by establishing that Evodius or the individual inquirer exists by means of what has been called the Augustinian cogito. However, though creatures are, their being is not true being, for their being is a failing or ceasing to be (*DLA* III, 7, 21).

²⁶For further evidence, cf. Etienne Gilson, "Notes sur l'être et le temps chez saint Augustine," Recherches Augustiniennes II (1962), 205-223.

Hence, Augustine's conclusion, namely, that God is and is truly and sovereignly—at least if the words are taken to mean what Augustine says they mean when he speaks formally—states that God is immutable and eternal and, hence, incorporeal.

The best argument from the text, however, is based upon what Augustine does do in the many paragraphs of *DLA* from II, 7, 15 to II, 12, 38. For what he does in these paragraphs is to guide his readers to a conceptual grasp of God as a spiritual substance that is present everywhere and whole wherever He is present. That is, he gradually guides his readers to a grasp of the *Verum Esse* of God, of His immutability and eternity, of His omnipresence and spirituality. And he does this in dependence upon Plotinus' dual treatise on omnipresence, namely, *Ennead* VI, 4 and 5.27

In order to see that Augustine does lead his reader to a conception of God as a spiritual substance, let us turn to the section that immediately follows that in which Augustine and Evodius agree upon the structure of the proof, namely, DLA II, 7, 15. At this point one would expect the argument to get under way. Augustine could simply have argued that there are truths of mathematics and of wisdom which are immutable and according to which we judge and about which we do not judge. He could, therefore, have concluded, there is something immutable and eternal above our reason, which, in accord with the previous agreement with Evodius, should be acknowledged to be God. But instead of immediately appealing to such truths, Augustine introduces a discussion of commune and proprium with reference to the objects of the bodily senses, a discussion that the BA edition labels as a digression. It can be regarded as a digression, of course, if one insists upon believing that Augustine was chiefly concerned with demonstrating that there is a God. One then, it would seem, has also to believe that Augustine cannot compose very well, for if that were the case he rambles off his topic for many a page.28 Moreover, in the light of O'Connell's study of Augustine's use of Plotinus, it is hard to continue to treat DLA II, 15-33 as "an anomaly to be ignored or as a mere digression."29

Rather the discussion in II, 7, 15–19 begins the long *manuductio* by which Augustine guides his reader to the concept of a spiritual substance that is immutable and eternal. First, he points out that each person has his own bodily senses, interior sense, and reason or mind. Yet the objects of our senses of sight and hearing are such that several of us can see the same visible object and hear the same sound. The other senses are not quite the same. For in smelling and tasting something we change the object we smell or taste so that another person cannot taste or smell precisely what I have tasted or smelled. And though two persons can touch exactly the same surface, even the same part of the same surface, they cannot do so at the same time. Augustine points out that two persons cannot both sense what one person in sensing changes and appropriates into himself.

²⁷O'Connell's pages (*Early Theory*, pp. 53-55) of juxtaposed texts from *DLA* and *Ennead* VI, 5, 10 show that Augustine was well aware of Plotinus' treatises on omnipresence. "The likelihood is that Augustine either had the *Enneads* to hand when writing the *De Libero Arbitrio*, or, at very least, had its turns of phrase quite fresh in memory" (p. 57).

²⁸H.-I. Marrou's comment with regard to the *Confessions*, "Augustin compose mal," was one that he himself had soon to retract. Cf. O'Connell, *Confessions*, p. 9. But those who see in *DLA* II "a digression" (Thonnard), "slow and tortuous" reasonings (Gilson) or a lack of systematic argument (Pontifex) surely imply that Augustine has not put things together very well. Another argument in favor of my thesis is precisely that the alleged digression is to the point and that the allegedly tortuous reasoning is a requisite *manuductio* toward a very difficult concept.

²⁹O'Connell, Early Theory, p. 53.

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What we do not change and make our own in sensing, we both can sense either successively by touch or simultaneously by sight or hearing.³⁰ He sums this up in a rule:

Thus it is clear that those things which we do not change and yet sense by the senses of the body do not pertain to the nature of our senses and, hence, are rather common to us, because they are not turned and changed into what is proper and, so to speak, private to us (II, 7, 19).

He further specifies "proper and private" as "that which belongs to each of us alone and that which each of us alone perceives in himself, because it properly pertains to his nature." And by "common and, so to speak, public" is meant "what is perceived by all perceivers with no corruption or change of itself" (II, 7, 19).

After initiating this discussion on "common" and "proper," Augustine begins to look for something that we can see not by the eyes of the body, but by the eyes of our mind, by our reason, communiter, for something that offers itself to all and that is not changed by those to whom it is present, but remains whole and uncorrupted. Thus he turns to consider the law and truth of number and the truths of wisdom. He shows how they are common to all who reason, are immutable, not changed or corrupted or appropriated by any viewer. No one is crowded out, but all can share in truth and wisdom. And as we can each hear the whole of the same sound and each see the whole of what the other sees, so too by our reason each of us can grasp the whole of a truth of mathematics or of wisdom.

In paragraphs 20 through 38, the *commune* and *proprium* theme is sounded again and again. The phrases, "communis" or "communiter omnibus" appear well over twenty times in discussing the truths of mathematics and of wisdom. Similarly the phrase, "manens in se," occurs frequently, and wisdom and truth gradually emerge in personal guise, indeed in the guise of a beautiful lover.

³⁰In Ennead VI, 4, 12, Plotinus uses the examples of sound and sight to illustrate how participation does not divide the intelligible reality in which the many share. For example, he says, "A sound is everywhere in the air, a one not divided, but a one everywhere whole, and with regard to vision, if the air passively receives the form [of the visible object], it retains it undivided. But not every opinion agrees with this; let it be said only to show that the participation [of the many] is in one and the same reality. The example of sound makes it clearer how in all the air the form is present whole. For everyone would not hear the same thing, if the uttered word were not whole in every place and if each hearer did not receive it in the same way" (Unless otherwise indicated, translations from Plotinus are my own, though I have closely followed Bréhier's).

"One of the "problems" with the proof has to do with how Augustine moves from the eternal truths of mathematics and of wisdom to the eternal Truth and Wisdom that is God. Thonnard speaks of two modes of being for the eternal truths: "I'un participé dans notre esprit, où elles vivent sous la forme multiple des règles des nombres et de la sagesse; l'autre absolu, dans la source du Verbe, où elles vivent sous la forme parfaite de l'infinie simplicité de la Vérité divine" (p. 521). He argues that to move from the participated mode of multiple truths to the absolute mode of simplicity, one needs the principle of causality, which is, in its Augustinian form, the principle of participation, though he admits that this step is absent from Augustine's argument and that for "l'esprit intuitif d'Augustin" (p. 523), there is hardly need for making this step explicit.

It is interesting to note that for Plotinus the topic of omnipresence is treated in *Ennead* VI, 4 and 5, in the context of the question raised in Plato's *Parmenides* regarding how a Form can be shared by many things and yet not be divided. Bréhier says in his introduction to the *Enneads* on omnipresence, "Chez Platon, Parmenides voulait montrer que, faute d'admettre cette vue paradoxale qu'une seule et même chose peut être présente à la fois partout, la participation aux formes était inconcevable: Socrate était donc invité demontrer que cette thèse paradoxale était véritable. C'est précisément ce que tente de montrer Plotin, en se placant précisément au point de vue de Socrate: . . . " (Plotin, *Ennéades* VI, lere Partie (Paris, 1963), p. 162).

In XII, 33, Augustine explicitly refers back to the discussion of "commune" and "proprium" in VII, 15–19. As what we see in common with the eyes or hear in common with our ears cannot be a part of my nature or your nature, so what each of us sees with the eyes of his mind cannot belong to the nature of either of our minds, but is some third thing upon which each of us gazes. This truth we see in common is superior to our minds, because it is immutable and, "manens in se," it neither increases when we see it nor decreases when we do not (XII, 34). Moreover, we do not judge it, but judge in accord with it.

By XIII, 35, *Veritas* appears as one we should embrace, enjoy, delight in.³³ In the Truth, in which the highest good is known and held, we are happy and blessed. We cannot lose against our will such truth and wisdom. "For no one can be separated from it by places" (XIV, 37).

We have what we all enjoy equally and in common. There is no crowding and no failing in it. She welcomes all her lovers without rendering them jealous. She is common to all, yet chaste to each. No one says to another, "Withdraw so that I can approach; remove your hand so that I can embrace her also." All cling to her; all hold the Self-same (XIV, 37).

This wisdom is our food and drink; yet we do not change it into ourselves. Whereas food for the body is changed into something proper and private to the eater, when one partakes of wisdom, he does not change it into himself. "What you take of it, remains whole for me." So too what each of us breathes in of wisdom does not become a part of each of us, but remains "whole and at the same time common to all" (simul omnibus tota est communis). Truth is less like what we touch, taste, or smell, and more like what

"One of Augustine's favorite phrases that he uses in speaking about God is "manens in se." E.g. in Conf. VII, 9, 14, we find "manentis in se sapientiae;" in VI, 11, 17 "in se manens innovat omnia;" and in X, 10, 24, "verbo tuo . . . in se permanenti." The second phrase is recognized as a quote from Wisdom 7, 27. However, forms of the phrase, "manens in se," also appear often in Plotinus, especially in Ennead VI, 4 and 5, the double treatise on omnipresence. In De Trinitate V, 3, 14, Augustine explains that "manens in se" means that in producing the world God remains unchanged. He says there of the Holy Spirit, "And it is written of him that he acts and he acts while remaining in himself; for he is not changed or turned into any of his works." Thus, the expression seems to sum up what O'Connell says of the function of the Eros image in Ennead VI, 5: "But, to begin with, a word of explanation on its function in the argument. . . . The relation that Plotinus means to exclude is one whereby the superior reality . . . will compose with the beings of the interior world, becoming a "form" ap-prop-riated by one being to the exclusion of others. Such a relation would prevent its remaining integrally present to each and common to all" (Early Theory, p. 52; cf. also, p. 56).

"O'Connell sums up the point well: "Along with both authors' presiding intention of contrasting "common" possession with individual "appropriation" of any desired good, the first thing that strikes one on examination of this parallel is the initial identity of basic image: it is a question in both cases of Beauty—in characteristic feminine form—being sought by her many lovers" (Early Theory, p. 56).

"Both Plotinus and Augustine use the image of "no crowding" of the lovers around the Truth; so too both authors emphasize that there is no failing or running out on the part of the object loved. Augustine too follows Plotinus' language of "seeing and touching" with his "cernimus et tenemus."

The expression, "idipsum omnes tangunt," is startling, for idipsum is one of Augustine's favorite expressions for God, the Self-same. Cf. James Swetnam's study on Augustine's use of the expression: "A note on In Idipsum in St. Augustine," The Modern Schoolman XXX (1952-3), 328-31. There is, of course, a variant reading, "ipsam," which would here mean the Truth; though I believe the first reading is preferable, in either case there is the startling idea of "touching God." Yet such language is Plotinian and even traceable to the Ennead on omnipresence. For example, "Yet we must think of how we touch the good with our souls" (VI, 5, 10). And "we see the good and lay hold of it" (VI, 5, 10; the latter quoted from Early Theory, p. 55).

"Augustine's words seem almost copied from Plotinus' expression: "I do not attain one good and you another, but [we both attain] the same" (Ennead VI, 5, 10).

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we see or hear. For each of us hears the whole sound and each sees the whole of what we see. Yet there is a great difference between bodily seeing and hearing and seeing with the mind.

For the whole word is not sounded at once, but stretched out and produced through times ... and every visible image swells out through places and is nowhere whole. And these things are taken away against our will, and we are prevented from enjoying them by crowding (XIV, 38).³⁶

In the case of Truth and Wisdom we are not elbowed aside by fans pushing to get closer to see and hear better.

She is close to all and everlasting to all who love her and turn to her in the whole world. She is in no place, and yet is nowhere absent. Outside she admonishes; within she teaches. She changes for the better all who behold her; she is changed for the worse by no one (XIV, 38).³⁷

What Augustine has led us to is a conception of subsistent, personified Truth and Wisdom that is stretched out neither in space nor in time, that is whole in every place and at every time, that remains in herself while making everything new. Thus, what Augustine has done in this long section of *DLA* II is to lead his reader to conceive of a being that is truly, that is noncorporeal, unchanging, and eternal. Had he wished to establish merely that there is a God—something that was never a problem for him— he could have done so without so many paragraphs that have struck many as off the mark, because they had missed the point.

III. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

I have argued that the proof in *DLA* II that God is, and truly is, is best understood not merely as a demonstration that there is a God, but rather as a *manuductio* toward a conception of God as a spiritual substance that is immutable and eternal. The first part of the article deals with Augustine's main intellectual problem in the years prior to 386-7, namely, his inability to conceive a spiritual substance—an inability, we must not forget, that he shared with the whole Western Church. He refused to accept the anthropomorphism that he believed was the doctrine of the Catholic Church and accepted Manichaean dualistic materialism which he held for a period of nine years. In abandoning the Manichaean position, he moved to a Stoic materialism until, in hearing Ambrose preach, he began to realize that the learned men of the *Catholica* did not think of God as bound by the shape of a human body or even as being bodily at all. Only through contact with the writings of the *Platonici* did Augustine find a way to think of God as incorporeal, as present everywhere and whole wherever present.

Secondly, I showed that whether or not there is a God was not a problem for Augustine or, he thought, for hardly anyone else. Even the fool did not venture to say aloud

³⁶Augustine's use of "intumescence" with reference to the extension and distension of the world in space and time not merely recalls the association with the fall of the soul into body and time through the "tumor superbiae," but evokes Plotinus' use of onkos for "mass" or "body."

superbiae," but evokes Plotinus' use of onkos for "mass" or "body."

Naugustine's language in speaking about Veritas and Sapientia and their pulcritudo makes the use of the feminine pronoun seem natural, though the Wisdom and Truth referred to is, of course, the Word, the eternal Christ.

that there is no God. Hence, I concluded that it would seem reasonable to interpret *DLA* II as addressing Augustine's main intellectual problem, not the question of whether there is a God, especially if there is supporting evidence in the text itself.

The second part of the paper presents reasons to show that *DLA* II does indeed lead Evodius and the reader to a conception of God as incorporeal and immutable, as a substance present everywhere and whole everywhere. The initial notion of God with which the argument begins, the formulation of the conclusion, and the content of the argument itself render it highly likely that Augustine was concerned with the conception of God as a spiritual substance every bit as much as—if not more than—with establishing that there is a God. Especially the clear dependence of *DLA* II upon Plotinus' dual treatise on omnipresence, *Ennead* VI, 4 and 5, indicates that Augustine was at least as concerned with the nature of God as with his existence.

This conclusion should not, after all, be very surprising. For, there is good reason to believe that a philosopher's theory of knowledge is determinative of his theory of being. 38 Now in Augustine's case, human knowing was understood in terms of the model of vision. As we have eyes of the body, so there is the mind, the eyes of the soul. What seeing is to the eyes of the body, that understanding is to the eyes of the mind. What visible things are to the seeing of bodily eyes, that intelligible things are to the understanding of the mind. 39

Whereas for Aquinas there were two basically different acts of the intellect, for Augustine there is basically one sort of intellectual act, and that is conceived on the model of bodily vision. Aquinas distinguished the acts of understanding from the acts of judging, the former leading to answers to questions for understanding, the latter leading to answers to questions for reflection. Thus Thomas could hold that existence is what is grasped as the proper content of the answer to a question for reflection, while form is what is grasped in answering a question for intelligence. And because there is the distinction between types of questions and types of intellectual acts, there is also a distinction on the side of the known between contents of acts of understanding and contents of acts of judging.

If one, however, does not distinguish acts of understanding from acts of judging, if, as Augustine did, one sees all intellection as basically a kind of seeing, then there will not be a distinction between the contents of judgment and the contents of acts of understanding. That is, one will regard existence as something to be grasped in an intellectual looking with the eyes of the mind that is not distinguished from what one grasps insofar as one understands what the thing is. For, without the distinction between acts of the intellect, one will be an essentialist in the sense that one will not distinguish existence and essence, esse and essentia. If one, consequently, holds that to be is to be something, it is easy to see why he would interpret a question, such as, how is

³⁸B. J. F. Lonergan, Insight. A Study of Human Understanding (New York, 1957), pp. 399ff.

³⁹Augustine's elaborately worked out parallel between seeing with the eyes of the body and seeing with the eyes of the mind is well known. Cf. above note 13, for his comparison of bodily images of God with pesky flies that one has to sweep away from the mind's eyes. "Menti hoc est intelligere, quod sensui videre" (De ordine II, 3, 10). "Ego autem ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus. Non enim hoc est habere oculos quod aspicere ..." (Soliloquies I. 6, 12).

⁴⁰In De trinitate V, 2, 3, Augustine says that God is undoubtedly "substantia" or "essentia"—what the Greeks call "ousia"—and explains that essentia is related to esse, as scientia and sapientia are related to scire and sapere. Furthermore, God is "summa essentia" (De vera religione XI, 22), and to be "summe ac primitus" is "to be utterly immutable" (De doctrina christiana I, 32, 35).

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it manifest that God is? as not merely asking whether there is a God, but as asking how God is, i.e., as something that is vere summeque, that is Idipsum. "For he is sovereignly and primarily (summe ac primitus) who is utterly immutable and who could say in the fullest sense, 'I am who am' ..." (De doctrina christiana I, 32, 35).

Human Beings

Vincent M. Cooke, S. J.

IN THIS PAPER I give a philosophical account of some characteristics of human beings. In doing so I cover ground usually discussed under the rubric of philosophy of mind, rational psychology, or the philosophy of man. In the conclusion I also briefly discuss certain questions of special interest to Christian philosophers. For this reason, at least some of what I say may be construed as part of a Christian *De Anima*. All, or almost all, of what follows seems to me obvious, but I would be very surprised if it should seem so to all my readers. The philosophers to whom I am most indebted are Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Wittgenstein, and that too should be obvious. I want to preserve the insights which I think are most valuable in the Aritotelean-Thomistic tradition, without making a commitment to the Aristotelean philosophy of nature and doctrine of hylomorphism; at the same time I want to develop that tradition along Kantian and Wittgensteinian lines.

Bernard Lonergan once lamented that many philosophers tend to concentrate on study of the soul to the neglect of study of the subject. By the subject Lonergan meant the conscious person, the self, which is the source of human activities and which is implicitly aware of itself in the performance of its activities. The soul, on the other hand, is not something which is given to consciousness. It is something which is argued to on the basis of that of which we are conscious and on the basis of whatever other relevant beliefs or philosophical views we consider to be true. Thus, Aristotle developed his account of the human soul on the basis of an acute introspection of conscious human states and activities, as well as by utilizing doctrines drawn from his study of metaphysics, physics, and biology. As Lonergan observed, however, "it very easily happens that the study of the soul leaves one with the feeling that one has no need to study the subject and to that extent, leads to a neglect of the subject."

In the remarks which follow my perspective is that of an analysis of the subject, or, to use a less philosophical term, of human beings. Human beings are conscious; human beings perform actions; human beings are persons. Understood with an appropriate degree of vagueness, such remarks are grammatical truths which elucidate at least part of our concept of a human being. Neglect of the subject, and an overly quick transition to a metaphysics of the soul seems to me the source of much confusion in contemporary philosophy of mind.

This confusion is not surprising since, although we are aware of ourselves as subject, one of the first things we are apt to notice about human beings is that we encounter them in the world and that we ourselves are one of them. We observe human beings. Human

¹See Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J., "The Subject," in William F.J. Ryan, S.J. and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S. J., eds., A Second Collection (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), p. 73. See also Lonergan's "Christ as Subject: A Reply," in F. E. Crowe, S.J., ed., Collection (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 196.

²Lonergan, "The Subject." p. 73.

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beings are objects, as well as subjects; we recognize them, reidentify them, and say many things about them. In so far as they are objects they are like stones, trees, animals, and God. Further, as part of the physical world, they perdure in space and time, and they have a beginning and an end; in these latter respects they also are like stones, trees, and animals, but unlike God. Human beings are one of the kinds of objects we encounter in the world. Human beings are also living animals, which distinguishes them from stones, trees, and God. In so far as human beings are objects we are tempted to believe we can give a complete account of them in observational terms.

Human beings, however, also do things: they are subjects. Human beings think, hope, love, talk, work, play games, tell stories, calculate, and say prayers; they see trees and colors, hear sounds, and feel pains. In so far as they have these characteristics and similar ones, it seems appropriate and relatively non-controversial to say they have a soul. Human beings also have a certain weight, colour and appearance; they are situated somewhere at some time. In so far as they have these latter characteristics and similar ones, it seems equally appropriate and non-controversial to say that they have a body.

In proposing the above use of 'soul' and 'body' I am making a recommendation which I think captures much of what, in ordinary language and abstracting from special philosophical theories, we want to say, or should want to say, when we speak of soul and body. It seems fairly obvious that there is no single ordinary use for these terms, probably because various philosophical and religious views of man's soul and body, together with innumerable folk variations on philosophical and religious doctrines, have long acquired systematic and quasi-systematic uses in our language. The point, however, does not seem to be an important one; even if there were an ordinary use for these terms, nothing of philosophical interest would hang on that fact.

To say that human beings have a soul is to say that they can do various things. In the list given above I enumerated their ability to think, hope, love, speak, perceive, etc. These are all things which human beings do. The category of action is, in this way, internal to that of having a soul. To say that human beings have a soul is to say they have a capacity or ability to perform actions. The soul simply is this capacity for action which human beings have.

The last observation is important. In so far as we are reporting our conscious awareness of what it is to be a human being, we are aware of ourselves as a unity which is the subject of diverse sets of attributes which we can group under the dual categories of soul and body. We are not aware of soul or body as distinct entities but as modifications of the one entity which is our self. We possess a soul and a body in so far as we are the one subject of diverse attributions. To say that the soul is the capacity for action which human beings have seems to me to say what is important and worth preserving in the Aristotelean-scholastic doctrine that the soul is a *principium quo*.

Not every capacity for action is a human soul. Dogs can bark and recognize their master; plants can grow and bloom. The range of activity available to animals and plants is much more limited than that available to human beings. However, in so far as they have a capacity for action one could say that to that degree they have a soul. Aristotle and Aquinas gave this same extension to the term "soul." Our interest is, however, in human beings.

It is the human being or, equivalently, the subject, the person, the self, which has a soul. It is the human being, not the soul, who thinks, hopes, loves, etc. In so doing he exercises the ability he possesses. Some human abilities require a vehicle in order to be ex-

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ercised. I have the ability to write, but can do so only by utilizing a pen or other instrument as a *vehicle*. Similarly, seeing utilizes the eyes, hearing the ears, and thinking utilizes at least some parts of the brain. It is important to distinguish the subject of the action, his ability to perform the action, the action itself, and the vehicle which is utilized in performing the action.³

I have thus far spoken of the human soul as a capacity for performing actions. This must now be given more precision. The soul is, first of all, a capacity for acquiring and, possibly, learning additional capacities for action. The human being, as he comes forth from his mother's womb, may or may not possess certain innate abilities. The precise determination of these, if such there are, probably lies in the domain of empirical psychology. Minimally, the human being must have the ability to acquire and possibly to learn additional capacities. The distinction between the mere acquisition and the learning of a capacity is that learning is itself already an activity which presupposes the possession of certain abilities. It presupposes at least the ability to be attentive, to form beliefs, and to make judgments. The mere acquisition of an ability logically presupposes nothing but the ability to acquire it. Philosophers who have defended a doctrine of innate ideas have generally thought of the gaining of additional mental capacities as a process of learning. Empiricist philosophers have used the model of mere acquisition. The issue seems to be a factual one which, once the appropriate distinctions have been made, cannot be further resolved by philosophical reflection.

At this point we can introduce the concept of mind. I have spoken of the soul generally as a capacity for activity and more specifically as the capacity for the acquisition or learning of further capacities for action. Not everything which the mature human being can do can be done from birth. Much has to be acquired and learned. Among the set of things which a human being can do are those which we describe as "intellectual," "mental," or, more generally, as utilizing or displaying mastery of one or more concepts. Our language of mentalese refers to a wide family of phenomena, not always sharply distinguished from the non-mental. When a human being thinks, speaks, reads, hopes, believes, he is utilizing those capacities which we refer to as belonging to the mind. The clear cases of the mental usually display or presuppose a linguistic capability in the agent. When a human being grows old, increases in weight, and dies he is doing things which clearly are not mental. There are intermediate phenomena such as walking, eating, and sleeping which stretch from the border of the mental to the non-mental. We are somewhat strained to come up with examples of human activities which do not involve some degree of utilization of mental ability, although I think that the examples I have given show that there are such. The vast majority of the interesting activities we attribute to human beings fall under the category of mind.

In performing "mental" activities the human being displays his possession of concepts. When we make a judgment that something exists, we display our possession of the concepts of 'something' and 'existence.' A concept, in this sense, is subjective, something which a subject possesses. If we do not have the concepts of 'something' and 'existence' we cannot judge that something exists. Similarly, if we ask a question, point to something, or ride a bicycle, we display our possession of the concepts of questioning, pointing, and riding a bicycle. It is the human being who makes judgments, question-

³These points are discussed by Anthony Kenny, *The Legacy of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 138-139.

For a fuller discussion of this point, see Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 95-99.

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tions, points, rides a bicycle, etc. These are human performances. In doing them we show that we have the appropriate ability, i.e. we possess the concept. The mind is the ability which a human being has to acquire, learn, or, more problematically, innately or a priori possess concepts. The mind is thus a capacity which human beings have in order to acquire and/or to learn further capacities which we call concepts.

What is it which human beings possess when they possess a concept? It was the genius of Kant to be the first to see clearly, or at least to see clearly most of the time, that the possession, mastery, or understanding of a concept is the possession, mastery, or understanding of a rule. The person who knows how to ride a bicycle, and in this sense has the concept, has mastered the rule or rules for riding a bicycle. He has the know-how. Subjectively the concept is the possession of the subject. Objectively the concept is the rule or rules. What we understand when we understand anything is, formally considered, a rule. The possession of a concept is what enables us to perform, or in Kantian jargon is a condition of possibility for, a particular "mental" act.

Kant thought that human beings who have a mind are in their first moment active, and in so far as they are active must possess the conditions of possibility for the rudiments of mental activity, i.e. what he called the categories (basic concepts) of the understanding.6 Kant was notoriously wrong in his claim to have identified the complete set of basic concepts, but he was surely right on two points. First, human beings must be able to do something if they are going to act at all, i.e. there must be a basic element of spontaneity in human beings. Kant called this element of spontaneity the understanding or faculty of judgment. Second, they must have the ability to perform the minimal kind of actions which would enable them subsequently to acquire further capacities from experience, i.e. there must be some set of basic concepts which are not learned from experience. I do not mean to suggest that it may not be possible to give a causal explanation, possibly in terms of the development of the brain and nervous system, for the emergence of spontaneity and basic concepts in the growth of the human organism. This seems to me the element of truth in Empiricism. In this sense spontaneity and basic concepts could be said to be merely acquired. The important point, however, is that they are not learned, i.e. they are not the product of some prior activity of the subject such as experience, because they are the conditions of possibility for any activity or experience on the part of the subject.

The vast majority of our concepts are undoubtedly learned. We learn many as we are drilled and trained in the learning of a language. We learn others in the course of a lifetime of experience. In learning concepts we learn how to perform various kinds of activities. The activities may be mental, such as the forming of judgments and beliefs. They may be overtly linguistic, such as the various kinds of speech acts. They may involve other kinds of knowing how, such as riding a bicycle, investing in the stock market, or

'See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A106. The commentator who makes the most of Kant's notion of concepts as rules is Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963).

"Few of even Kant's most sympathetic followers are convinced that Kant successfully identified the twelve specific "non-acquired," *i.e. a priori*, concepts of human understanding, but a strong case can be made that something like Kant's categories are required. This is the thrust of Peter Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (London: Methuen, 1966). It is unfortunate that Strawson concentrates on reconstructing a Kant concerned exclusively with the logical priority of conceptual schemes and neglects Kant's account of mental activity. Strawson seems to consider Kant's doctrine of mental activity incorrigibly connected with what he considers the blunders of the psychology of transcendental idealism.

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performing sophisticated scientific experiments. In each case our mastery of the concept is the mastery of a rule, technique, or practice. The notion of a rule is basic; techniques and practices are rule-governed procedures.

It is important that we see clearly the relationship between concepts, rules, understanding, and what is to be understood. Let me, therefore, recapitulate some of the main points I am making. In order to do anything one must have the ability to do it. No one can perform an action in general; it is always this or that specific kind of action. In order to perform a specific kind of action, one must have a specific kind of ability. I cannot hit a baseball, if I do not know how to hit.

Among the things which human beings do is to make judgments. In making the specific judgments that we do, we display the abilities which we have. These specific kinds of ability we call concepts. I cannot believe that the book is on the table unless I have the concepts of book, table, and spatial location. I learn these concepts when I learn correctly to pick out books and tables and distinguish them from other things, etc. To perform these actions correctly is to have mastered the rules for identifying and distinguishing books and tables. To speak of "rules" in this context is simply a way of characterizing the regularized practices we all learn in growing up. Typically we express our mastery of these rules by the use of language, but I am not saying, nor do I think, that all our judgments are expressed in language.

When I do make a particular judgment, e.g. that there is a book on the table in front of me, I utilize the concept (rules) which I possess to judge that the object in front of me conforms with the condition of the rule. In making the judgment there is, of course, no formal appeal to a rule. I simply act correctly, i.e. in accord with a rule. It is in principle possible for someone to correct me if I think I am acting in accord with the rule but am not actually doing so. To master a rule does not mean that one must be able to go on and

formulate the rule or give an account of it. Just as there is no judgment in general, but always this or that judgment specified by the concepts utilized, so too there is no object in general, but always this or that object specified by the regularity to which I perceive the object to be subject. It is because the world is subject to regularity that there is something to be understood. A world which was, in Kant's words, "a pure rhapsody of appearances" would be absolutely unintelligible to us. Our world and our concepts are in this way homogeneous: the rule which is understood in the concept is affirmed by the judgment to be instantiated in the object. They are also interrelated: it is the regularities in the world (the physical world as well as the world of social, cultural, and religious interactions) which provide us with something to understand, and thus challenge us to the mastery of new concepts and the forming of new judgments. It is the mastery of sets of concepts which enables us to perceive the kind of world which we do. Many of our concepts are inseparably connected with language, and in this sense our world can be said to be specified by our language. It is also true, however, to say that we have the language we do because of the general features of the world in which we live. It seems to me this is in accord with what Wittgenstein meant by describing the speaking of a language as part of the natural history of mankind. It is also in accord with a "realist" reading of Kant, which should not be surprising since Wittgenstein was a Kantian.

We might say that human beings are the rule-governed, concept-making animals. Human beings have a mind. It is because they have a mind that they can be attentive, ask questions, acquire concepts, elaborate theories, make judgments, and pursue the multi-

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farious activities which constitute the world of human culture. The human mind is the most sophisticated part of the human soul, but it is in continuity with and of a kind with the entire soul. The soul is a capacity for action, and the mind is the capacity for that set of activities most characteristic of human beings, i.e. those activities which are concept-governed.

The view of the human soul and mind which I have presented is a non-dualistic one, at least in the sense in which Descartes is said to be a dualist. Against Descartes, I have stressed the unity of human beings as the subject of all their activities, while denying that the human self can be simply identified with the human soul. The soul and body are aspects of the one entity which is a human being. It makes no sense to identify the human being with either his soul or his body, and, in this sense, Cartesian spiritualism and materialistic monism are both wrong. The truth of dualism is that there are indeed diverse aspects of human beings which provide us with a basis for distinguishing soul and body along the lines which I have indicated. The non-Cartesian dualism which survives philosophical reflection is one which denies that human beings or persons can be identified with either spiritual substances or material substances. Human beings are neither angels nor stones. They are a different kind of thing which can only be known by responding to the invitation to "look and see."

Does the account which I have presented allow for the possibility of the religious doctrine of personal survival after death? As a Christian I would be most chagrined if it did not. It is the human being, the person, the self, who has a soul and a body. When the human being dies, his body decays and ceases to be the foundation for spatial and temporal predications of the human being. Can the human being still exist and be the subject of activities attributable to him because of the capacity for activity which is the soul? I do not see any metaphysical or logical reason why this should be impossible, although one is strained to come up with a description of the precise kinds of activities which could be intelligibly asserted of a human being in such a bodiless state. That may, however, simply reflect a limitation on our powers of conceptualization. Thinking and loving are the most likely candidates, provided we separate from our concept of thought and love criteria for the application of these concepts constituted by bodily manifestations. For this reason the possibility of an immediate resurrection of a "spiritual" body—a possibility entertained by various contemporary theologians—comes as an interesting development in Christian doctrine. At any rate, I know of no valid argument to show that there is a contradiction in asserting a doctrine of personal survival after death, and as far as I can see, nothing in my account implies such a contradiction. In death the body decays, but it should not be presumed that therefore the subject, the person who possesses the body, necessarily ceases to exist. This is what must be shown and not presupposed.

Are there positive reasons to believe in personal immortality? That is really the subject of another paper. Let me briefly say that the arguments I have seen seem at best probabilistic rather than demonstrative, and that the best of the probabilistic seem to rest on variations of the Platonic principle that like is known by like. If human beings can come to know and love God in this world, that would seem to be a reasonable ground for the hope that I may continue to know and love God after death. This hope may be reenforced by various additional religious beliefs, but ultimately the question of personal survival after death is a factual, not a conceptual one. There is no contradic-

tion involved in my ceasing to exist.

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The position I have been defending differs from that of a classical metaphysician such as Aquinas in at least the following ways. First, I take the notion of a person or human being, the subject of our multifarious performances, to be a primitive one. For Aquinas, in so far as he can be taken to address this question, the notion of a human person seems to be derivative from the composition of the notions of soul and body. As I have introduced the notions, soul and body are parasitic on person. For this reason Aquinas could argue that, while the soul was immortal, the human person could not survive death unless and until there were a resurrection of the body. Secondly, Aquinas, at least sometimes, attributed activities to the soul, which enabled him to argue from the nature of those activities to the nature of the soul. If the activities are not subject to the limitations of matter, limited to space and time, then the soul of its nature would not be so limited. I have tried to maintain consistently the position that it is not the soul but the human being who is the subject of human activities. If the human soul can survive death it is only because the human person (the principium quod) who possesses it can so survive. The soul is a capacity, and capacities can exist only as modifications of subjects who possess them. Aquinas does not seem in this context to have clearly and consistently attended to the notion of the subject, for reasons which are not altogether clear to me. It may be, as Lonergan suggests, that the notion of the subject was not thematically developed until modern times.7 Perhaps, too, Aquinas felt a religious constraint to defend a theory of the immortality of the soul (rather than personal survival) since this may have appeared to him as part of the content of Christian faith as understood in classical metaphysical categories. Whatever the reason, it seems to me that inattention to the subject leads to serious misunderstandings about what it is to be a human being.

Whether I can exist without a body is a factual question. We know that human beings have bodies and that human beings die. Whether human beings also have the property of being able to exist without a body is something which no amount of a priori reasoning will resolve. I think a case can be made for the reasonability of the belief, but that will surely have to be the subject of a future paper.

⁷Lonergan, "The Subject," pp. 69-71.

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Mind-Body Interaction and the Conservation of Energy

Robert Larmer

INTRODUCTION

THE THEORY that the mind is an immaterial substance distinct from the body, but which nevertheless acts upon the body, is not a popular one in contemporary discussions of the mind-body problem. One of the major reasons underlying the widespread rejection of this theory is that it is felt that it commits one to denying the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. To many thinkers, this seems too high a price to pay, since to deny the Principle of the Conservation of Energy is to deny one of the most fundamental scientific laws (The First Law of Thermodynamics) and, arguably, to place in question the whole scientific enterprise.

My aim in this article is to assess the strength of this objection to mind-body interaction. My thesis is that the usual replies made by interactionists are inadequate, but, strong as this objection appears, some important logical distinctions have been overlooked and when these are taken into account the force of the objection vanishes.

THE OBJECTION

The claim that the action of an immaterial mind upon the body would violate the Principle of the Conservation of Energy arises from the fact that such action implies that, in the case of a mental event causing a physical event, there will exist "a gap between the state of the brain before the mental event has had its effect and the state of the brain after the mental event has had its effect." This claim that we will find ourselves unable to explain the physical state of the brain at that particular time, unless we make reference to the action of a non-physical mind upon the brain, implies that the mind, in acting upon the brain, changes the position of some of the material particles making up the brain.

Thus, if one holds that an immaterial mind acts upon the brain, one is committed to denying the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, *i.e.* The First Law of Thermodynamics, which is taken to state that the amount of energy in the universe is fixed and that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. The reason such a conclusion is implied is that the mind, in changing the position of some of the material particles making up the brain, changes the amount of energy possessed by the brain. If this new amount of energy does not arise by virtue of energy being transferred to or from some physical source, but is created through the action of the mind, then it follows that the amount of

¹D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), p. 32.

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energy in the universe is not fixed. Indeed, given the fact that matter is conceived as being essentially a form of energy $(E = mc^2)$, it follows that the mind, in creating energy, creates, or at least potentially creates, matter.

Such a conclusion, it is urged, is a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that an immaterial mind could act upon the body. To hold that energy, and consequently matter, may be created by the mind's action upon the body, to hold that the First Law of Thermodynamics, a law presumably a foundation of the whole scientific enterprise, is false, is ridiculous. Thus, Mario Bunge argues that if interactionism were true then:

energy-a property of all and only concrete things-would fail to be conserved. And so physics, chemistry, biology, and economics would collapse. Faced with a choice between these 'hard' sciences and primitive superstition, (the hypothesis of a substantial immaterial mind which acts upon the body) we opt for the former.2

SOME INADEQUATE SOLUTIONS

Various attempts have been made to counter this objection. They fall into three basic categories. These are:

- 1. Attempts to argue that, although the action of the mind upon the body involves the creation of energy, energy could still be conserved by virtue of the fact that a corresponding amount of energy may just happen to disappear somewhere else.
- 2. Attempts to argue that the Principle of the Conservation of Energy is only statistically valid and hence that, so long as the mind's action does not create a great deal of energy, the action of the mind upon the body need not be taken to violate the Principle of the Conservation of Energy.
- 3. Attempts to argue that the Principle of the Conservation of Energy is merely the defining-postulate of a wholly closed physical system and therefore any attempt to rule out the theory that an immaterial mind acts upon the body on the grounds that such a theory violates the Principle of the Conservation of Energy is only to beg the question.

The first suggestion I have listed is the weakest of the three. Indeed it is so weak that it appears very infrequently in the literature and even then has little weight placed upon it by its proponents.3 Its basic defect is that it confuses what is logically possible with what is plausible or probable. One cannot argue that because some state of affairs is logically possible, that it is, therefore, likely to be realized. Thus, although it is certainly logically possible that, by happy coincidence, whenever the action of mind creates a certain amount of energy an equal amount of energy invariably vanishes from the world at

²Mario Bunge, The Mind-Body Problem (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 17.

³C. J. Ducasse, in his article "In Defense of Dualism" in *Dimensions of Mind*, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1960), p. 89, attributes to C. D. Broad the argument that "it might be the case that whenever a given amount of energy vanishes from, or emerges in, the physical world at one place, then an equal amount of energy respectively emerges in, or vanishes from, that world at another place." I am unable to find this argument in Broad's work. Certainly it is not present in Broad's The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Kegan Paul, 1937). Whether or not this argument is to be found somewhere else in Broad's writings, its absence from Broad's major book on the mind indicates that he did not place much emphasis upon the argument.

some other place even though the two events are not causally connected, the probability of such a state of affairs being actually realized is vanishingly small. Even supposing that one could satisfy oneself that such a remarkably improbable coincidence had, up to the present time, continually occurred, one could scarcely justify the belief that it would continue to occur: the odds against such a remarkably improbable coincidence continually occurring are so great as virtually to guarantee that, at some point, energy will not be conserved. Indeed, the probability of such a coincidence and its continual occurrence are so low that, faced with the seeming occurrence of such a situation, we would likely question whether the mind was indeed immaterial; preferring, instead, to postulate the presence of some strange, hitherto undiscovered, form of energy which acts upon the brain and must be taken into account in formulating the Principle of the Conservation of Energy.

The second suggestion is somewhat more plausible. Sir Karl Popper, in *The Self and Its Brain*, a book he co-authored with Sir John Eccles, suggests that "the law of the conservation of energy . . . (may) turn out to be valid only statistically." Presumably, if this were the case then the action of the mind upon the body could be viewed as relatively minor fluctuations which do not really violate the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, provided we remember that this principle is really a statistical one, not absolute.

Such a response is not entirely adequate. There are at least two problems. The first is that, unless one supposes that only a relatively small number of interactions take place between minds and bodies, it is very improbable that energy will be even approximately conserved. Although it is possible to conceive of some sort of averaging effect, what we will find is that the greater the number of events involved the less chance there is of energy being conserved in even an approximate sense. 5 Given the large number of events which the interactionist claims are instances of mind-body interaction, there is little hope of salvaging the Principle of the Conservation along statistical lines.

The second problem is that, even supposing we can get around the difficulty that there seem to be too many events involved for it to be likely that energy is even approximately conserved, it is far from clear that the First Law of Thermodynamics could (i) be reformulated in a statistical manner, and (ii) that it would be desirable to reformulate it in such a manner. Concerning (i) I wish only to note that it is a matter of debate whether the First Law of Thermodynamics could be reformulated along statistical lines. A number of writers such as D. W. Theobald, J. J. C. Smart and Eugene Wigner argue

⁴Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (Springer: International, 1977), p. 541.

'This point can be made clear by means of a simple experiment. Take a hundred decks of cards from which the Jacks, Queens and Kings have been removed. Let the red cards have a positive value, e.g. the three of diamonds will be worth plus three, the seven of hearts will be worth plus seven. Let the black cards have a negative value, e.g. the four of clubs will be worth minus nine. Aces will have a value of either plus one or minus one depending on whether they are a red or black suit. Now thoroughly shuffle each of the decks of cards and draw one card from each deck. Add the value of all the cards and then return each card to the deck from which it was drawn. Reshuffle the cards and repeat the procedure.

The point of this experiment is that it provides a good analogy to a physical system subject to the influence of a large number of immaterial minds. The value of each card represents the effect on the system due to the influence of one mind. The total of all the cards represents the net effect of a large number of immaterial minds acting upon the system. Clearly, although the net effect of any one mind will be relatively small, and although there will be some kind of averaging effect, the net fluctuation of energy can be quite great. Clear also is the fact that the greater the numbers involved the greater the fluctuation will be. Given the number of minds and the number of instances of mind-body interaction the interactionist postulates, it is not at all clear that energy be approximately conserved even if the effect of an individual mind is very small.

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that conservation or invariance laws must be conceived as absolute, not statistical.6 Whether or not they are right in arguing this is a debate into which I do not propose to enter. It is sufficient for my purposes to note that it is not clear that the First Law of Thermodynamics can, in fact, be reformulated along statistical lines. Concerning (ii) it is fair to say that, whatever the outcome of the debate concerning (i), the First Law of Thermodynamics (the Principle of the Conservation of Energy) is not, at the present time, viewed as a statistical law by the scientific community. We may conclude, therefore, that, at least at the present time, it has not been shown that it is possible or desirable to reformulate the First Law of Thermodynamics along statistical lines. Popper's suggestion, although interesting, constitutes no real solution to the problem of how to reconcile interactionism and the Principle of the Conservation of Energy.

The third suggestion, namely, that the critic, in rejecting interactionism on the grounds that it implies the falsity of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, begs the question of the possible truth of interactionism, is by far the strongest and most direct of the interactionist's usual replies. C. J. Ducasse, one of its most eloquent proponents, formulated it in the following way:

the conservation of energy is simply a postulate, and more particularly a defining postulate, of the notion of 'an isolated physical system' (irrespective of whether or not anything short of the whole physical universe could be an isolated system). That is, conservation of energy is something one has to have, if (as the materialistic ontology of physics and more generally of naturalism demands) one is to be able to conceive the physical world as wholly self-contained, independent, 'isolated'. Accordingly, when what observation reveals seems to be dissipation of energy instead of conservation, conservation is saved by postulations ad hoc; for example, by postulating that something else, which appears when energy one observed disappears-but which was not until then conceived as energy-is energy too, in 'another form'; ...

Conservation of energy, thus, would be an obstacle to the possibility of psychophysical ... causation only if it were known to be a universal fact; ... But this is not known—only postulated, and postulated only to save the universality of the conservation of energy. And what need, other than a doctrinaire one, have we to postulate a physical cause, when observation reveals a psychical one?7

Ducasse is correct when he asserts that one cannot simply define out of existence the question of whether an immaterial mind acts upon the body. The problem with such a reply, however, is that it largely misses the point and, on this account, underestimates the force of the critic's objection. The point, as the critic will be quick to note, is not that one begins by rejecting the claim that an immaterial mind acts upon the body, but that there exists an initial presumption in favour of the truth of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. The critic, in saying this, is not simply begging the question of in-

⁶There is a great deal of doubt that such a reformulation is actually possible, let alone desirable. Note, for example, Theobald's comment that, "In any physical system it is of the utmost importance to ascertain what it is that is conserved absolutely during physical processes, for something conserved there must be ...," The Concept of Energy, p. 49; J. J. C. Smart's comment that "there is at least considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as to whether a successful theory can be developed by the considerable doubt as the considera cessful theory can be developed which rejects the conservation laws" Between Science and Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1969) York: Random House, 1968), p. 162,; and Eugene P. Wigner's remark that "It is now natural for us to try to derive the laws of poture and the same of poture and derive the laws of nature and to test their validity by means of the laws of invariance rather than to derive the laws of invariance from what we believe to be the laws of nature" in, "Invariance in Physical Theory," proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 93 (1949), 522.

³C. J. Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death (La Salle: Illinois, Open Court Publishing Co., 1951), p. 241.

teractionism's truth. Rather, he is pointing out that, in light of the fact that the Principle of the Conservation of Energy has an enormous body of experimental evidence in its favour, and, in light of the fact that mind-body interaction would violate the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, it would take a great deal of evidence to establish mind-body interaction.

The critic will go on to claim that we do not have as great an amount of evidence in favour of mind-body interaction. He will claim that faced with two claims which cannot both be true, it is only rational to believe the one for which there exists the most evidence, namely, the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. He does not, however, on that account beg the issue in favour of naturalism, and Ducasse errs in thinking that he does.

The basic problem with Ducasse's suggestion is that it does not take into consideration the possibility that the critic may justify his rejection of mind-body interactionism by means of a balance-of-probabilities argument. The critic is quite willing to acquiesce to the demand that we not beg the question of the truth of interactionism, but he will insist that, if we must decide between the truth of interactionism and the truth of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, this be done on the basis of which claim is supported by the larger body of evidence. He will point out that Ducasse's suggestion that this objection simply begs the question of interactionism's truth fails to take into account that there is a legitimate presumption in favour of the truth of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy which cannot be overcome except on the basis of some stronger body of evidence in favour of interactionism.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Examination reveals that none of these attempts constitutes an adequate rebuttal of the objection it is supposed to refute. I propose, therefore, to develop an alternative approach which does adequately deal with this objection. It has some similarities to Ducasse's approach to the problem, but differs significantly in that it avoids the balance-of-probabilities argument which constitutes such a problem for Ducasse's view.

My alternative approach hinges upon a hitherto unnoticed distinction which must be made between two forms of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. The Principle of the Conservation of Energy is commonly stated as: "Energy can neither be created nor destroyed"; or as: "In a causally isolated system the total amount of energy remains constant." These two formulations are used interchangeably; the unspoken assumption being that they are logically equivalent. Clearly, however, they are not. The claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed is considerably stronger than the claim that the total amount of energy in a causally isolated system remains constant. It is possible to deduce the weaker claim from the stronger, i.e. it is possible to deduce the statement, "In a causally isolated system the total amount of energy remains constant" from the statement, "Energy can neither be created nor destroyed," but it is not possible to deduce the stronger claim from the weaker, i.e. it is impossible to deduce the statement, "Energy can neither be created nor destroyed" from the statement, "In a causally isolated system energy remains constant." We must, therefore, distinguish between what may be termed the strong form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, namely, the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed, and the weak form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, namely, the claim that in a causally isolated system the total amount of energy remains constant.

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Further to be noted is the fact that the experimental data which are taken to ground belief in the Principle of the Conservation of Energy more directly support what I have called the 'weak' form of the Principle. The experimental evidence only demonstrates that in a causally isolated system the total amount of energy will remain constant. It does not, in itself, demonstrate that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. If one wishes to arrive at this stronger form of the Principle, then a further premise to the effect that there exists nothing capable of either creating or destroying energy, is required. To say this, of course, is not to rule on the question of whether such a premise can be justified. It is merely to raise the possibility that one might accept—on the basis of the large body of experimental evidence in its favour—the claim that in a causally isolated system the total amount of energy remains constant, yet deny the further claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed.

The relevance of this distinction and my remarks concerning the relation of each of these two forms of the Principle to experimental evidence is this. The person who believes that the mind, considered as an immaterial entity, acts upon the body is under no compulsion to deny the weak form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, *i.e.* the claim that in a causally isolated system energy will remain constant. The interactionist denies, not that in an isolated system energy will remain constant, but that the human body is an isolated system. The interactionist rejects, therefore, not the well-evidenced claim that in an isolated system energy remains constant, but the considerably weaker claim that the human body is an isolated system in the sense that it is uninfluenced by an immaterial mind.

The interactionist must, of course, deny the strong form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, *i.e.* the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. In doing this, however, he is under no compulsion to deny any of the experimental evidence supporting Principle of the Conservation of Energy. The interactionist, no less than his opponent, accepts the large body of experimental evidence which suggests that in an isolated system energy is conserved. He denies only the further claim that there is no sufficient reason to postulate something other than energy whereby energy might be created or destroyed. He denies, in other words, not the experimental evidence upon which the Principle of the Conservation of Energy is based, but the legitimacy of the inference required to move from the claim that, in a causally isolated system, energy is conserved, to the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed.

The real issue, therefore, is not whether interactionism is consistent with the experimental evidence supporting the Principle of the Conservation of Energy—clearly it is—but whether the interactionist is in a position to resist the move from the claim that the total amount of energy in a causally isolated system remains constant to the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. The basic question is whether the premise to the effect that there exists nothing capable of either creating or destroying energy can be justified. If it is justified, then any theory of mind-body interaction, even though it does not conflict with any actual experimental evidence, must be rejected. If it is not, however, then no objection to interactionism based upon the Principle of the Conservation of Energy is possible.

THE RELEVANCE OF OCCAM'S RAZOR

It is important to note the relevance of Occam's Razor to the issue of whether the inference required to move from the weak form to the strong form of the Principle of the

Conservation of Energy can be justified. Its relevance lies in the fact that any attempt to justify this inference must ultimately be based upon Occam's principle that one should not multiply entities needlessly. The reason this is so is simple. There is, it must be granted, no logical contradiction in the notion that there might exist something capable of creating or destroying energy, e.g. immaterial minds. Further, it is virtually impossible to disprove absolutely the existence of something which is logically possible. There is, for example, no absolute disproof of unicorns or faeries. In practice we must fall back upon Occam's Razor and insist that one not postulate the existence of something without adequate evidence. The critic, therefore, can never absolutely disprove the existence of immaterial minds; he can, however, insist that one should not believe they exist unless presented with adequate evidence that they do.

Interestingly, in saying this we find ourselves making contact with the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Occam's Razor, at least in this context, seems to function as a form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It states, essentially, that one should not postulate the existence of entities without sufficient reason to do so. Any attempt either to deny or to justify the inference that energy can neither be created nor destroyed must be based upon Occam's Razor and, therefore, ultimately upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

What we will find, therefore, is that the critic will argue that there is no sufficient reason to postulate the existence of immaterial minds. Invoking Occam's Razor, he will argue that in the absence of such evidence the physical universe must be viewed as wholly self-contained and independent. Given there is no sufficient reason to postulate that anything other than the physical universe exists, there is no reason to think there is anything which could change the amount of energy resident in the universe. Hence, the inference that energy can neither be created nor destroyed can be justified.

The interactionist, on the other hand, will argue that there is sufficient reason to postulate the existence of immaterial minds. He will deny that the physical universe is selfcontained. He will argue that parts of it, *i.e.* human bodies, are influenced by the action of immaterial minds. Hence, he will deny that the inference that energy can neither be created nor destroyed can be justified.

The basic issue, therefore, will be whether the interactionist can adduce sufficient evidence to justify postulating the existence of immaterial minds. If he can, then the further inference needed to reach the strong form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy is unjustified and the critic is in no position to object to interactionism on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the truth of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy.

The critic, of course, will resist the interactionist. It is important to realize, however, that the critic cannot proceed by constructing a balance-of-probabilities argument based on a presumed conflict between the experimentally established claim that in an isolated system energy is conserved and the claim that the body is influenced by an immaterial mind. The interactionist, no less than the critic, accepts the fact that in an isolated system energy is conserved. The real issue is not whether there is evidence which justifies one in thinking that in an isolated system energy is conserved, but whether there is evidence which justifies the conclusion that the body is sometimes influenced by an immaterial mind. The debate, therefore, is not over whether energy is invariably conserved in an isolated system, but whether the human body is a causally isolated system, in the relevant sense of never being influenced by an immaterial mind. Obviously, if there is

evidence which justifies the conclusion that an immaterial mind sometimes acts upon the body then the inference needed to reach the strong form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, *i.e.* the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed, is unjustified and the critic is in no position to object to interactionism on the grounds that it violates the Principle of the Conservation of Energy.

My point, put somewhat differently, is that the critic cannot object to interactionism on the basis that it is inconsistent with the truth of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. Clearly, interactionism is consistent with the weak form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, i.e. the claim that in an isolated system energy is conserved; the form most directly supported by the experimental evidence. Interactionism can only be objected to on the basis of the strong form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, i.e. the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. The strong form can only be argued for on the grounds that there exists no sufficient evidence to justify postulating something whereby energy may be created or destroyed. The debate, however, between the critic and the interactionist is precisely over whether such evidence exists, i.e. over whether immaterial minds capable of creating or destroying energy exist. The critic cannot, therefore, begin the discussion by dismissing interactionism on the grounds that it is incompatible with the truth of the strong form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. For the critic to dismiss interactionism on these grounds would only be to beg the issue of whether such evidence does exist; he is not at liberty merely to assume that the interactionist cannot satisfy the requirements of Occam's Razor.

CONCLUSION

I conclude that no objection to interactionism can be generated on the basis that it is incompatible with the truth of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. Interactionism conflicts not with the weak form of the Principle, the claim that in a causally isolated system energy will be conserved, but with the strong form of the Principle, the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. Any attempt to object to interactionism on the basis of the strong form of the Principle is, however, illegitimate, since to do so only begs the question of whether the inference required to move from the weak to the strong form of the Principle is justified. Obviously, if interactionism is true then the inference required to move from the weak to the strong form of the Principle is unjustified.

Lest the interactionist become complacent over having thus disposed of any objection based upon the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, it must immediately be observed that this is not achieved without a price. It is quite true that interactionism is formally consistent with experimental evidence usually taken to ground belief in the Principle of the Conservation of Energy and that the critic cannot proceed on the basis of a balance-of-probabilities argument founded on a presumed conflict between the evidence which supports belief in the Principle of the Conservation of Energy and this is a point which must be stressed, is the interactionist at liberty merely to assume that because his theory is formally consistent with the weak form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy—and, therefore, formally consistent with the experimental evidence supporting the Principle of the Conservation of Energy—he is in a position to block the inference required to reach the strong form of the Principle of the Conserva-

tion of Energy. The interactionist must produce some body of evidence which justifies him in postulating the existence of immaterial minds; otherwise he leaves himself vulnerable to the charge that he has cluttered up the ontological landscape by needlessly postulating entities for which there exists no evidence.

The discussion, therefore, far from being over, has but begun. The interactionist, if he is not to succumb to the sharp edge of Occam's Razor, must produce evidence which justifies him in postulating the existence of immaterial minds. The critic, if he is to employ Occam's Razor, must show that the interactionist is mistaken in thinking that such evidence exists.

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Process and Privation: Aquinas and Whitehead on Evil

Paul Thelakat

THE CLASSICAL authors, viz. Augustine and Aquinas, defined evil as privatio boni. Many of the process thinkers assume that their conception of evil is something new and different from the classical one. C. Hartshorne maintains against the classical view that evil, which is discord, "is not mere absence of harmony, but positive clash." Another interpreter of Whitehead wrote:

Evil is the force of fragmentary purposes which disregard the eternal vision. It is not enough to say that evil is negative or *privative*. Evil is a brute negative force on its own account.³

David Griffin in his process theodicy maintains that the defenders of the privation theory deny genuine evil in the world. He wrote:

And in fact, Journet finally follows Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Maritain in asserting that there is no genuine evil in the world.4

Although the doctrine of privation can explain some evil, according to him, it cannot comprehend all evils. In short, the process thinkers consider the privation-theory as inadequate and unacceptable. This position is challenged here. Moreover, I suggest that the process conception of evil as envisaged by Whitehead is not entirely different from the classical notion.

First of all, we have to clarify the notion of *privatio boni*. Many read the notion of privation as mere absence. Hence they complain about the denial of the power of evil or even of evil itself. The great champions of the theory, Augustine and Aquinas, cannot be said to be unaware of the power of evil that is active everywhere. Augustine denied the Manichaean theory of substantial evil. For this he took inspiration mainly from Plotinus. According to Augustine, every thing is created good. No thing is evil; but this does not mean evil is nothing. In Plotinus Matter (which is Non-Being) is called Evil. But he distinguishes between "primary evil" and "secondary evil." Matter is called evil

¹St. Augustine, Enchiri. 3.11; PL 40, 236; Thomas Aquinas, De Malo 1.1.

²C. Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964), p. 196.

³J. S. Bixler, "Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion," in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (PANW), ed. P. Schilpp La Salle: Open Court, 1951), p. 497 (italics mine).

⁴D. Griffin, God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), p. 94. ⁵Plotinus, Enneads 1.8.8.

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in the primary sense, i.e. it is "the Principle of Evil." But any actual evil is a participated evil. So evils in the world are secondary evils—active participations in the primary evil. Evil happens when soul moves towards Matter. So evil is the movement towards Non-Being. Hence evil cannot be considered as mere absence devoid of any power and activity. In Augustine also, evil is primarily moral evil. He wrote: "We do evil from the choice of the will."8 The free will is one's own power (voluntas): "the power even of those that are hurtful is from God alone." When the will moves toward an evil end it is called "evil will": "Thus an evil will is the efficient cause of a bad action." The efficient cause of an evil will is said to be "deficient," "since the effect is in fact a deficiency."11 This tells us that evil is a negative notion, but it is not a notion of mere absence. it involves movement and power.

In Aristotle, "the philosopher" according to Thomas Aquinas, privation is one of the four oppositions.12 And its place is between the oppositions of contradiction and contrariety. Aquinas observes that Aristotle frequently used the name contrary for privation; for Aristotle privation in a certain manner is contrariety. 13 Aquinas wrote:

Corporeal creatures are good by nature; yet they do not represent universal good, but particular, limited good. Hence there is opposition between them, they enter into conflict with other things which are equally good in themselves.14

It is this conflict that brings about evil, which is privation. Aristotle wrote: "The violent taking away of anything is called privation." Evil is not the contrary of good but the privation of good, because there is no metaphysical evil. Evil as such is not a reality in things but the privation of a particular good inherent in a particular good. 16 Evil cannot be defined in terms of being. It has to be described in terms of negativity and absence. But it is not a negativity of nothingness, of mere absence; rather it is the negativity of privation, of absence due to a conflict. As Charles Journet wrote: "It is an inverted positivity." Aquinas was keenly aware of the conflict and the resulting absence in evil. So he wrote:

Privation is twofold: one is privation as a result (privatum esse) e.g. blindness takes away sight altogether. The other is privation in process (privari) e.g. sickness is privation of health.18

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6Ibid. 1.8.7.
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⁷Cf. E. B. Costello, "Is Plotinus Inconsistent on the Nature of Evil?", International Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1967), 483-97.

⁸Augustine, De Lib. Arbi. 1.16.35; PL 32, 1240.

Augustine, De Nat. Boni 32; PL 42, 561.

¹⁰ Augustine, De Civi. Dei XII.6; PL 41, 351.

¹¹ Ibid., XII.7; PL 41, 355.

¹² Aristotle, Metaph. bk V. 10; bk X. 4.

¹⁴Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ST), 1.65.1 and 2; (translations are generally taken from A. C. Pegis, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Random House, 1949).

¹⁵ Aristotle, Metaph., bk V. 22.

¹⁷C. Journet, *The Meaning of Evil*, trans. M. Barry (New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1963), p. 43. 18ST I-II. 18.8.

While "privatum esse" highlights the loss and absence as an end result, "privari" stresses the conflict and suffering which leads to the loss. The notion of privation at once implies the deprivating act and the deprivation as the result. To renounce either of these two aspects is to truncate the definition of evil.

Not any absence of good can be called evil and privation. This is the oversight made by D. Griffin. For he wrote:

Evil is the privation of good. Accordingly, since being and goodness are identical, evil is a privation of being ... For, if being and goodness are identical and good and evil are opposites, the statement that evil is privation of being can be reversed, so that a privation or lack of being is evil. Since any possible universe will necessarily have a lack of being in comparison with infinite being, any possible universe will necessarily be evil.19

This is a shallow caricature of the privation theory. In the tradition, finiteness has never been called evil. Evil is not absence of a good, but the absence of a good that should be present. "Hoc privari dicimus quod natum est habere et non habet."20 The following text directly counters Griffins' objection:

For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil and also that everything would be evil because of not having the good belonging to something else ... But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense is an evil.21

As Aristotle said "a man cannot be described as blind at every stage of his existence but only when he lacks sight at a time when he would naturally have it."22

After having clarified the notion of privation, we have to ask, wherefrom comes the deprivating activity in the world? If there is no such thing as evil, what causes deprivation? Aquinas wrote:

That which is not, is not the cause of being. Therefore every cause must be some being. Now evil is not a being, as was shown above. Therefore evil cannot be the cause of anything. Hence if evil be caused by something, this must be a good.23

So the power of evil comes from good. As he said: "The good is the material cause of evil."24 Evil, however, has no formal cause; it is the privation of form. But how can good cause evil because evil is not in the nature of good? This leads us to Aquinas' conception of the origin of evil.

According to Thomas, every creature is moved by an appetite. And good is the object of every appetite: "All action and movement is for a good."25 But the "moving for" is for a definite good. Omne agens agit propter finem.26 "Definite good" means a particular good in a particular measure and order (modum et ordinem).27 An agent attains a

¹⁹D. Griffin, God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy, p. 91-92. ²⁰Thomas Aquinas, De Malo 1.2.

²¹ST 1.48.3.

²²Aristotle, Metaph. bk V. 22.

²³Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles (SCG) III.10.

²⁴ST 1.49.1.

²⁵SCG II.3.

²⁶SCG III.3.

²⁷ST 1.5.5.

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particular good in a particular measure and order. This implies that an attainment of a particular good is at once the non-attainment of other particular goods or even that particular good in another order and measure. "The presence of one form is always accompanied by the privation of another." The text tells us that forms can be mutually obstructive. The movement of the appetite for a good can attain two situations, both of which will be considered evil: (i) the creature in its movement may achieve a good far below its nature, that is, less than what it ought to be; (ii) it may attain a good which is totally incongruous with its nature, to the effect that the good causes evil. So Aquinas wrote:

But an evil limit, species and order are so called as being less then they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to belong; or they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous (quia sunt aliena et incongrua).²⁹

St. Augustine also held a very similar view. He considered evil as diminution or corruption of good; and corruption is "nothing other than the destruction of good."³⁰ Destruction of good takes place due to the rule "that contraries cannot coexist in one thing."³¹ In no thing "can two contaries exist at the ame time."³² Consequently evil arose from the conflict of goods. Things get at cross purposes because of sin. Things in their own proper places (in suis locis) are admirable and good.³³ But they are "found to be hurtful when immoderately or unseasonably (immoderate et inopportuna) used."³⁴ In this perspective we can say that something becomes a destructive agent when it is out of its proper place and time.

But we still want to ask: Why does a thing move into a situation of conflict and destruction? Aquinas' answer is fundamental to the understanding of the notion of evil in classical theism. He wrote: "Now evil does not occur except accidentally and unintentionally."35 What do "accidentally" and "unintentionally" mean? As we have seen, everything intends some good; no thing moves with an evil intention. Even the one who goes to commit suicide does so for some good he has glimpsed for himself. So evil is not intentional from the side of the creatures. This, as we shall see, does not deny moral evil. Evil is not even intended by God. Thomas said: "God, therefore, neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done."36 This can be interpreted as God leaving a realm of activity undecided by Himself. Aquinas held that divine providence (i) "does not exclude contingency nor impose necessity on things";37 (ii) "does not exclude the liberty of choice";38 (iii) "does not exclude fortune and chance."39 Allowing for contingency, freedom and chance would mean here "neither willing evil nor not willing evil." To remove the possibility of evil would mean to remove the possibility of contingency, freedom and chance. This does not say, however, that God is permitting evil per se. The distinction between per se and per accidens is crucial. Following Aristotle, 40 Aquinas as-

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<sup>28</sup>SCG III.6.
<sup>29</sup>ST 1.5.5 ad 4.
<sup>30</sup>Augustine, Enchiri. 4.14; PL 40, 238.
<sup>31</sup>Ibid.
<sup>32</sup>Ibid.
<sup>33</sup>Augustine, De Civi. Dei XI.22; PL 41, 335.
<sup>34</sup>Ibid.
<sup>35</sup>SCG III.15: "Malum autem non evenit nisi per accidens et praeter intentionem, ut probatum est."
<sup>36</sup>ST 1.19.9 ad 3: "Deus igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri."
<sup>37</sup>SCG III.72: "non excludit contingentiam, nec necessitatem rebus imponit."
<sup>38</sup>SCG III.73: "non excludit arbitrii libertatem."
<sup>39</sup>SCG III.74: "non excludit casum et fortunam."
<sup>40</sup>Aristotle, Physics II.6.
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serts: "that which is accidental (per accidens) is subsequent to that which is per se, the accidental cannot be first."41 Directly permitting contingency, freedom and chance means indirectly permitting conflict and destruction. In this perspective, the objection of the philosopher Boethius, who asked: "If there be a God, whence comes evil?," is according to Thomas, a misplaced question. On the contrary, he made this daring statement: "If there is evil, there is a God." The reason for this affirmation is significant. He wrote:

For there would be no evil, if the order of good were removed, the privation of which is evil; and there would be no such order, if there were no God.44

Denying the possibility of evil would mean the removal of the order of good. The tree of evil cannot be separated from the tree of good, for they are one and the same. Permission to make is inseparable from the permission to break. In short, evil is unintentional both from God's and from the creatures' point of view.

Evil is unintentional, but this does not mean that it is always involuntary from the part of the creatures. There is a distinction between intentio and voluntas. Everything always intends the good; but everyone does not always will the good. Intention is strictly the striving of an agent for its own achievement of a good—the good private to the agent. The good is abstracted from context and consequence. Voluntas is a more restricted notion applicable only to those agents which are free and conscious. Here the agent is not closed within its own private good, nor is it blind to the good of other agents—the public good. The will is the capacity to foresee the context and consequence of the meditated action. The private good of the intention can be seen by the will as public evil. In such a situation, if the will chooses private good, then there is moral evil. Aquinas wrote:

Hence it follows that, although evil is without intention, it is nevertheless voluntary . . . For intention is directed to the last end, which we will for its own sake. But the evil is directed also to that which we will for the sake of something else, even though we would not will it absolutely.45

Evil is broader than moral evil. All sufferings are not results of moral evil alone. Private good can cause public privation even if nobody wills it or intends it. In that case, evil is accidental. So Aquinas said:

Since, however, evil and good are opposite to each other, and one opposite cannot be the cause of the other except accidentally . . . it follows that good cannot be the effective cause of evil except accidentally.46

Still, the doctrine of accidental happening of evil can conflict with the Thomistic doctrine of an omniscient and all-powerful God. The doctrine of God needs a reconstruction especially on the question of the God-world relationship.⁴⁷

[&]quot;SCG III.15.

⁴²Boethius, De Consol. I, prose 4; PL 63, 625.

⁴³SCG III.71. 44Ibid.

⁴⁵SCG III.6. 46SCG III.10.

ACT. N. Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God: A Neo-Thomist Perspective (North Carolina: Wake Forest Univ., 1979), p. 90.

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Having sketched briefly the doctrine of privation, we shall proceed to see how A. N. Whitehead describes evil. Whitehead's philosophy is pivoted on the idea of the actual entity. An actual entity creates itself by "the togetherness of the 'many' which it finds."48 "The many become one, and are increased by one."49 To become is to become something definite. "The definition is the soul of actuality."50 Definition is setting of boundaries. This enveloping of borders has two aspects. The first is the objective data, the world in disjunction. This is something which is already determined. The second aspect is the subjective aim which is the decision upon the chaotic many. The word "decision" has to be understood in its root sense of "cutting off." This means that actualization is definite and finitude involves the exclusion of alternative possibilities. The initial datum involves some discord between its elements. An actual entity weaves itself by unifying the elements of its datum. But in this weaving of itself "what is 'given' is separated off from what for that occasion is 'not given'."52 This discord in the datum is an initial "incompatibility." The word "incompatibility" (incompatibilitas) is used as a sounding of suffering. But as Hartshorne notes, "incompatibility, like chance, is inherent in particularity."53 This initial disharmony is neither evil nor suffering but is the active possibility of becoming. The conversion of possibility into actuality is the toil of the actual entity. The toil of becoming consists in the handling of the incompatibility inherent in the objective data. In Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead speaks of three ways in which the initial incompatibility can be resolved. They are anaesthesia, aesthetic destruction and readjustment.54

i. Anaesthesia: As the word suggests, in this way the opposing incompatibility is inhibited (eliminated without conflict) from experience. This is the way of mere negative prehension. Triviality is another name for it. Since every becoming is definite, it involves some sort of elimination. Whitehead wrote:

There is no totality which is the harmony of all perfections. Whatever is realized in any one occasion of experience necessarily excludes the unbounded welter of contrary possibilities. There are always 'others' which might have been and are not. This finiteness is not the result of evil, or of imperfection. It results from the fact that there are possibilities of harmony which either produce evil in joint realization, or are incapable of such conjunction.55

Contrary possibilities which are incapable of harmonious conjunction have to be eliminated to avoid conflict and destruction. This elimination results in a triviality which cannot be called evil. To do so would be to call finitude, and the finite world as such, evil. It does not mean, however, that no triviality is evil. The clause "incapable of such conjunction" of the above text calls for careful attention. All contraries need not be "incapable of conjunction." In a context where contraries are capable of contrasting relation, to anaesthetize the contraries is lack of adventure and a great omission. White-

⁴⁸A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (PR) (corrected edition) (New York; The Free Press, 1978), p. 32 (21). 49PR 32 (21). 50PR 340 (223).

⁵¹PR 68 (43). 53°C. Hartshorne, "Chance, Love and Incompatibility," The Philosophical Review, 58 (1949), 440.

⁵⁴A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (AI) (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 334.

head called such a triviality evil. "One aspect of evil is when a higher grade of adequate intensity is thwarted by the intrusion of a lower grade."56 The phrase "adequate intensity" can be explained by a text from Religion in the Making.

A hog is not an evil beast, but when a man is degraded to the level of a hog, with the accompanying atrophy of finer elements, he is no more evil than a hog. The evil of the final degradation lies in the comparison of what is with what might have been. During the process of degradation the comparison is an evil for the man himself, and at its final stage it remains an evil for others.57

Thus, when there is the inhibition that degrades the adequate intensity that should be present, there is the evil of triviality. We can, therefore, distinguish between necessary triviality, which is not evil, and unnecessary triviality, which is evil. "Degradation" is another name for it.58

ii. Aesthetic destruction: In this way of handling the data, the opposites are kept present but they are not contrasted or related. This gives rise to a situation of conflict and destruction. Whitehead wrote:

There must be the proper sort of things in the proper sort of togetherness. The togetherness of a spark and gunpowder produces an explosion, which is very unlike the two things.59

This dimension of conflict and destruction persuades Whitehead to say: "Evil is positive and destructive."60

iii. Readjustment: This third way "arises when the clash in affective tones is a clash of intensities, and is not sheer logical incompatibility of qualities."61 Here the incompatibility is not between feeling this or that, but between feeling this as much as that or feeling that as much as this. This opposition can be contrasted to bring richness and strength: "if one be kept at a lower intensity in the penumbra of feeling, it may act as background to the other, providing a sense of massiveness and variety."62

An actual entity becomes by unifying, in any of the above three ways, the initial datum. Whatever it has become, it is a value-achievement. "Value is inherent in actuality itself."63 "Everything has some value for itself, for others, and for the whole. This characterizes the meaning of actuality."64 This is clearly the denial of a Manichaean type of dualism, where evil is considered substance or actuality. No actuality in itself can be called evil.

Evil exists only in inter-relations. Whitehead holds the doctrine of essential relatedness of things. Relation is not an accident but the essence of reality. He wrote:

A single fact in isolation is the primary myth required for finite thought . . . there is no such fact. Connectedness is the essence of all things of all types ... No fact is merely itself.65

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<sup>56</sup>A. N. Whitehead, "Immortality," PANW 692.
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⁵⁷A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (RM) (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 94.

⁵⁹A. N. Whitehead, "Immortality," PANW 699.

⁶⁰RM 93.

⁶¹AI 334.

⁶²AI 334.

⁶³RM 97.

⁶⁴A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (MT) (New York: The Free Press, 1938), p. 111. 65MT 9.

Time and space are dimensions of relation of events. As he said: "On an old theory of relativity, Time and Space are relations between materials; on our theory they are relations between events."66 Accordingly we can hold that the "where" (in time and space) of an event determines to a great extent the "what" of that event. In this essential interrelation of events, an actual occasion can experience evil in its becoming. And once it has become, it is an object of further becoming. So it can become a destructive agent in the becoming of another occasion. Although an actual occasion is good (value achievement) in itself, it can be cause of evil for others. That is to say, good causes evil. Hartshorne wrote: "Tragedy lies not in conflict of good with mere evil but of good with good."67 Evil is caused by the conflict of goods. "A new actuality may appear in a wrong society, amid which its claims to efficacy act mainly as inhibitions."68 "Insistence on birth at a wrong season is the trick of evil."69 A good out of place or out of time breeds evil. Hence, a dog in the manger and a pebble in the shoe are positive evils. So Whitehead said: "When anything is placed in another situation, it changes."70 "Unseasonable art is analogous to an unseasonable joke, namely, good in its place, but out of place a positive evil." After all, wheat out of place is a weed.

In Whitehead's system, an actuality can be misplaced either by chance or by voluntary decision. Chance is more real in Whitehead than in Aquinas. Whitehead thinks that "there is no reason to hold that confusion is less fundamental than is order." He further explains this dipolarity of determinism and indeterminism:

The result of our human outlook is the interweaving of apparent order with apparent accident. The order appears as necessity suffused with accident, the accident appears as accident suffused with necessity.73

So a novel actuality "may be either fortunate or disastrous." According to Hartshorne: "Chance is real and a major cause of our suffering." Hence, a "certain element of disorder and conflict is to be expected, even assuming a theistic interpretation." The phrase "even assuming a theistic interpretation" is pertinent. God is no guarantee that there will be no evils in the world. For He does not determine everything in the world. As Hartshorne wrote, God "establishes an order in which creatures can send each other particular goods and evils."77 This is fully in agreement with Whitehead's view. God, who is the principle of limitation and the Lord of possibilities, establishes an antecedent order which is "permissive" of dislocations and confusions.78

66 A. N. Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (PNK) (Cambridge: The Univ. Press, 1919), p. 26.

⁶⁷C. Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), p. 203.

68PR 341 (223). 69PR 341 (223).

⁷⁰A. N. Whitehead, "Immortality," PANW 699.

71 AI 345.

72MT 50.

⁷³A. N. Whitehead, Science and Philosophy (New Jersey: Littlefield Adams, 1964), p. 140.

⁷⁵C. Hartshorne, "Whitehead and Berdyaev: Is There Tragedy in God?", The Journal of Religion, 37, (1957), 74.

76C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics (La Salle: Open

⁷⁷C. Hartshorne, Natural Theology for Our Time (La Salle: Open Court, 1967), p. 81. 78PR 373 (244).

An actuality can be misplaced by voluntary decision. The notion of self-production involves the aspect of other-production. A subject in becoming itself becomes an object. The subject in creating itself can foresee the consequences of its objective existence. That is, the subject, in becoming, is aware of the location where it would be born as an object. It is this foresight of future existence that makes the agent morally responsible. "Foresight is the product of insight." Where there is no such foresight there is no morality. Foresight refers to "the relevant future," a factor of the category of subjective intensity.80 So he wrote: "The greater part of morality hinges on the determination of relevance in the future." The not-yet of the future is in some way already in the becoming of the present. The subject, in other words, has a concern for its objective existence and the concern is a component in the experience of the subject. Accordingly, morality could be conceived as the claim of the unborn on the living. When an agent voluntarily rejects the cry of the future for the sake of the present, there is moral evil. Hence, one who drinks, without sobriety, for the intensity of feeling in the immediate present, and being aware of the consequences in the relevant future, is responsible for the deeds of his drunken mood. Concern for objective existence in the relevant future is a concern for social existence. So he said: "Morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook."82 When the concern for public welfare is disregarded, the private good attained can become a destructive or degrading agent in respect to the public good.

The above analysis of the becoming of evil in relation to the becoming of an actual occasion tells us that, in Whitehead's system, there are only two types of evil, namely, 1. destruction and degradation (or suffering) and 2. unnecessary triviality.83 More attention is given to the notion of destruction. Both notions, however, are important in an adequate and comprehensive consideration of evil. Whitehead writes: "Now evil is exhibited in physical suffering, mental suffering, and the loss of the higher experience in favour of the lower experience." ⁸⁴ In Adventures of Ideas he hints at a definition of evil:

Qualifications have to be introduced, though they leave unshaken the fundamental position that 'destruction' as a dominant fact in the experience is the correct definition of evil.85

Although destruction is dominant in the definition, degradation has not been discarded from his concept of evil. His 'definition' can be clarified by a later text on the matter. In "Mathematics and the Good" he wrote:

There is then the evil of triviality—a sketch in place of a full picture. Again, two patterns eliciting intense experience thwart each other. There is then the intense evil of active deprivation.86

⁷⁹AI 113.

⁸⁰PR 41 (27). ⁸¹PR 41 (27). ⁸²PR 23 (15).

⁸³ Two texts could be brought forward against this conclusion that there are only two types of evil in Whitehead. In PR 517 (340), he speaks of "the ultimate evil" in the world which is "deeper than any specific evil." And in "Mathematics and the Good," after having spoken of the two types of evil—triviality and intense evil of active deprivation—he says: "There may be other types of evil" (PANW 679). It can be convincionally in the conference of the same types of evil" (PANW 679) in the conference of the same types of evil" (PANW 679). It can be convincionally in the conference of the same types of evil" (PANW 679). vincingly argued that these texts need not be so understood. The discussion would take us too far afield here (although I am prepared to make the case), so for the present let us assume that, for Whitehead, as far as this cosmological epoch of ours is concerned, there are only two types of evil.

⁸⁴RM 92.

⁸⁵AI 333.

⁸⁶A. N. Whitehead, "Mathematics and the Good," PANW 679.

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"Active deprivation" has replaced "destruction." Evil is at once the subjective experience and objective fact of destruction and deprivation. The word "deprivation" is capable of including both types of evil—destruction and degradation.

Is this an altogether different notion of evil than privatio boni? Perhaps through the long history of use and abuse, many fail to see the notion in its proper perspective. The rich insights of Aquinas or of Augustine cannot be banished in intellectual honesty with the slogan of "dark ages," as if they have no relevance for our "enlightened age." Any serious Whiteheadian scholar sees Platonic and Aristotelian roots in process thought. In this context, it is not a surprise to see both Whitehead and Aquinas coming to a similar point of view on a particular issue. As far as their conceptions of evil are concerned, we can see certain areas of fundamental agreement between them. First of all, both agree that things or actualities in themselves are good. Every actual entity is a value achievement. Secondly, both are of the view that evil arises out of the conflict or opposition of goods. These goods get into a conflicting situation, either by chance or by moral decision, which forsakes the call of the public welfare for the sake of the private good. Thirdly, both speak of two types of evil. In the place of privari of Aquinas we have destruction in Whitehead and in the place of privatum esse, degradation or unnecessary triviality. There is, however, a major difference between them. In Aquinas evil pertains to the categories of accidents. But in Whitehead evil is essential. But "essential" does not mean "substantial" as in Aquinas. The ultimate matter of fact in Aquinas (substance) and in Whitehead (actual entity) is good. Essential in Whitehead means relational. Relation is far more fundamental in Whitehead than in Aquinas. This is the effect of Whitehead's attempt to balance, in philosophic systematization, the two poles of reality, namely, process and permanence. In this respect, the Thomistic system has to be deconstructed to make it relevant. But on the question of the philosophic description of evil, Whitehead cannot be quoted against the idea of privatio boni of Aquinas.

BRIEFER BOOK REVIEWS

Grundkurs Philosophie. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz: Verlag W. Kohlhammer. 1982-1985.

The Grundkurs Philosophie is a 10-volume series of philosophical texts published by the Jesuit philosophical faculty of the Hochschule für Philosophie of Munich. The Hochschule (Berchmanskolleg) is the transplanted institute of philosophical studies which was once located at Pullach, outside of Munich. The new Berchmanskolleg is a degree-granting institution which offers not only the bachelor's degree in philosophy, but also the licentiate and the doctorate. Though primarily established to provide philosophical studies for Jesuits preparing for the priesthood, Berchmanskolleg enrolls lay students as well, both men and women.

The old Pullach boasted a faculty of Josef de Vries, Walter Brugger, Johannes Lotz (when not at the Gregorian in Rome), Johannes Hegyi, Auguste Brunner (as a scholar in residence). Together with Emerich Coreth and Otto Muck of Innsbruck, these philosophers formed a strong and influential force in German-speaking Catholic philosophy. Today Coreth and Muck are still teaching in Innsbruck, and Brugger and Lotz are still active in Munich though semi-retired from teaching. The regular teaching faculty in Munich is a new, young group of Jesuit philosophers. It is this new faculty, together with Emerich Coreth, which is putting out the series mentioned above. Ten volumes, in paperback, are projected, five systematic and five historical volumes. Each volume averages about 180 pages, but the print is small and the pages full. There is a bibliography in each volume as well as a name and a subject index.

The five systematic volumes have already appeared, and two of the historical volumes. These are:

- 1. Philosophische Anthropologie, by Gerd Haeffner
- 2. Allgemeine Erkenntnishtheorie, by Albert Keller
- 3. Ontologie, by Bela Weissmahr
- 4. Allgemeine Ethik, by Friedo Ricken
- 5. Philosophische Gotteslehre, Bela Weissmahr
- 8. Philosophie des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts, by Emerich Coreth and Harald Schondorf
- 9. Philosophie des 19, Jahrhunderts, by Emerich Coreth, Peter Ehlen, and Josef Schmidt.

The volumes still to come are:

- 6. Philosophie des Altertums, by Friedo Ricken
- 7. Philosophie des Mittelalters, by Richard Heinzmann
- 10. Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, by Emerich Coreth, Peter Ehlen, Gerd Haeffner, Friedo Ricken

This may be characterized as a post-Vatican II or a post-neoscholastic series of philosophiucal texts. The authors are clearly familiar with the Catholic tradition and with the scholastic philosophy of the recent past. They are also in continuity with it. Nonetheless, they do philosophy very much in the contemporary mode. They are not traditionalists in the sense of presenting and defending the positions of St. Thomas. They engage the issues and the philosophers of the present. As was the case with continental Jesuits generally, German Jesuits were never as strongly influenced by the Gilson-Maritain forms of Thomism as were their counterparts in the United States and Canada. The post-kantian style of transcendental philosophy initiated by the Belgian Jesuit,

Joseph Maréchal, was more in vogue. It is still in evidence in Coreth and Lotz, as well as in Bela Weissmahr. On the theological level this mode of philosophizing, with a heavy dose of Heidegger, was expanded and developed by Karl Rahner, who spent his last years at Munich and Innsbruck.

Berchmanskolleg has always been more concerned with Kant and with meeting his challenge to a realistic metaphysics than with the revival of scholasticism in its pre-kantian forms. Kant is still the dominant philosopher in the German-speaking philosophical world. A recent survey conducted at a German philosophical convention asked who is the most important German philosopher today, Kant or Hegel. The answer was overhwhelmingly for Kant. Significant is the fact that none of the recent philosophers were considered. This perhaps indicates that none of the current philosophers in Germany dominates the scene now as Heidegger did for thirty years.

Perhaps the most interesting phenomenon in Germany is the influence of British analytic philosophy. Of course the British linguistic movement was itself influenced by the Vienna Circle of logical positivism and by Frege, and perhaps also by Brentano. Language philosophy is as a result fairly strong in Germany and Austria.

One characteristic of scholastic philosophy is that it engaged in philosophical dialogue with the entire community of philosophers, and at its high point in the Middle Ages, it was very contemporary. This is true today of the Berchmanskolleg faculty. Though its primary context is the German-speaking philosophical world, it operates within the broader context not only of the continent and of Britain, but of America as well. The linguistic analysis approach, say of Ricken and Keller, does not limit the dialogue to linguistic authors but includes ancient, medieval, and modern thinkers such as Heidegger, Habermas, and Gadamer. Gerd Haeffner, a Heidegger specialist, shows that orientation in his Anthropologie. Bela Weissmahr in his Ontologie and Gotteslehre betrays a link with the Maréchalian tradition, but one has to look hard to recognize it. Each of these authors, following the principle of St. Thomas that the weakest argument is one from authority, do their own philosophy. They do not simply reproduce positions of the past.

As the title of the series indicates, these volumes present a "foundational" course in philosophy in the sense that they deal with the initial or "foundational" questions to be raised in each area of philosophy. "Foundational" does not mean elementary or simplified philosophy. The dialogue is pursued at the university level.

My remarks have been confined to the systematic volumes of this series, in part because the historical volumes are not yet completed, and in part because the originality of the series stands out more prominently in the systematic volumes. The two historical volumes so far published are clear, competent accounts and evaluations of the philosophers discussed. They are up-to-date, and might serve as good companion volumes to systematic courses or as useful texts in courses in the history of philosophy. When completed they may well offer a contemporary counterpart to Copleston's history.

Finally these volumes would be more readily available and so more useful to us in the English-speaking world if they were in English. I hope that some publisher will recognize the value of this series and commission an English translation.

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A Treatise on God as First Principle. By John Duns Scotus. Trans. and ed. with commentary by Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. 2nd ed., rev. and enlarged. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1985. Pp. xxiii + 373. \$15.00

Perhaps the actual writing of *De primo principio* was done by scribes; perhaps Scotus only drafted an outline and left others to complete it with passages from the *Ordinatio* he had indicated. (About fifty percent of the treatise apparently comes verbatim from *Ordinatio* I, dist. 2.) Nevertheless, scholars agree that Scotus himself is the author of *De primo principio*. Beyond that there is disagreement—on the dating of the work, on its relationship to the possibly spurious *Theoremata*,

and hence on the proper reading of the treatise itself. As regards dating, the consensus is now that *De primo* is a late work, in part because of its extensive borrowing from the *Ordinatio*. The relationship to the *Theoremata*, and in particular to theorems XIV-XVI (the *tractatus de creditis*), is somewhat more controversial. The author of *De primo* claims to prove both the necessary existence of a Supreme Being and something of its nature, including infinity, simplicity, unicity, intelligence and free will. By contrast, the author of the *Theoremata* claims that none of these is demonstrable by natural reason: all are *credibilia* and cannot be proved. Etienne Gilson, who took Scotus to be the author of both works, labored to reconcile the obvious conflict between them. He concluded that Scotus speaks as a *theologian* in *De primo* but as a *philosopher* in the *Theoremata*.

Gilson's interpretation of Scotus is mentioned briefly in the introduction to Father Wolter's new edition of *De primo principio*. One should keep it in mind while reading the translation and accompanying commentary. It will, I think, help to explain why Wolter takes such pains to underscore the demonstrative character of Scotus' arguments—to establish, beyond any reasonable doubt, that *De primo* is *not* a theological work. Considering the pains taken by Scotus himself to employ only necessary premisses, and thus to satisfy the stringent requirement for a syllogism yielding *scientia*, it is difficult to see how Gilson's reading of the treatise could be sustained. One may doubt whether Scotus succeeded in proving all of the attributes of God he undertook to demonstrate, but one can hardly doubt that he tried.

Wolter's translation has changed little since it was first published in 1966. Two exceptions are 2.48, where a problem with the earlier translation is corrected, and 4.77, where a phrase dropped in the translation is reinstated in the subsequent commentary (p. 353). A minor slip in 4.18 has escaped undetected. ("... Nothing every happens contingently, that is, unavoidably...." should obviously read "... Nothing ever happens contingently, that is avoidably...." Yet on the whole, Wolter manages to make his translation both accurate and readable—which is no mean feat, considering Scotus's penchant for an almost unintelligible succinctness. Just one caveat may be in order: Scotus' wording is sometimes more consistent from one argument to the next than Wolter's translation would suggest. In chapter 3, for example, Scotus argues that something "effective" (effectivum) is simply first (3.7), that it is incapable of being caused (3.16), and that it is most actual (3.18). "Effectivum" is rendered in 3.7 as "able to produce an effect," in 3.16 as "able to cause effectively," and in 3.18 as "able to exercise efficient causality." None of these translations is wrong, and the variations do make the English text less repetitious, but they also tend to make the logical structure of the treatise less evident. Of course, anyone concerned with Scotus's exact words can consult the Latin, which is printed on facing pages.

The great virtue of this new edition of *De primo principio* is the more than 200 pages of detailed commentary it includes. Even seasoned medievalists often find Scotus a difficult thinker. He tends to argue in a sort of shorthand, sketching the outlines of a proof, citing authorities, alluding to "what was said above" (or worse, "elsewhere"), and arriving at a conclusion before the baffled reader has firmly grasped his premisses. One needs at least a little background to follow the arguments and a great deal more to appreciate them. Wolter's commentary is extremely effective in this regard. He sets out the various steps in Scotus's reasoning, supplies relevant passages from the *auctoritates*, and fleshes out vague cross-references. Scarcely any acquaintance with medieval thought is assumed. Technical terminology, axioms of scholastic philosophy, doctrines of Aristotle and his Muslim followers—all are patiently explained. Those unfamiliar with Scotus's teachings will find Wolter's learned exposition an invaluable guide. For specialists in medieval philosophy the work should need no recommendation. After all the nonsense that has been written about Scotus, it will come as welcome relief.

As might be expected, Wolter makes the best case he can for Scotus' views. He bridges gaps in the reasoning, answers likely objections, and offers additional arguments of his own. But if Wolter writes as an apologist for Scotus, he stops well short of a slavish discipleship. Some of the proofs for God's infinity draw sharp criticism, and a few working assumptions are clearly rejected. Where the Subtle Doctor relies on doctrines that are, at best, dubious, Wolter often excises the offending

premiss and shows how the argument can be recast. This is typically the case where the argument presupposes that "Forms are like numbers" or that "Every agent acts for the sake of an end." Though a fair portion of the treatise is reworked by the commentator, one never loses track of where Scotus' thinking ends and Wolter's begins. The distinction is scrupulously maintained.

Another advantage of this extensive commentary is that it has something to offer virtually everyone: for students, a lucid introduction to medieval metaphysics; for analytic philosophers, a review
of Scotus' innovations in modal logic; for historical scholars, some useful comparisons between
Scotus and other philosophers. (The various borrowings and departures from Avidenna are traced
in particular detail.) Unfortunately, readers may have to skim to find the pages where their
bailiwicks are discussed. The index to the volume is sadly inadequate. It lists only subjects (omitting names), and gives section numbers instead of page numbers. This may be a sufficient guide to
the treatise itself, but it does a gross disservice to the commentary. Even those familiar with *De*primo principio can profit from Wolter's insight into the complex thought of the Subtle Doctor.

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Free Will and Values. By R. Kane. New York: State University of New York Press, 1985. Pp. 229. \$44.50 cloth; \$16.95 paper.

Free Will and Values by R. Kane is a careful examination of the free will/determinism controversy, a unique defense of the libertarian view, and above all a mature philosophical work which deserves serious attention and rewards careful study. In his Preface, Kane tells us that the book was "a dozen years in the making," and I believe it. The argumentation is detailed and thorough, the main thesis imaginative, and the presentation balanced and fair. Perhaps the highest compliment I can pay the book is that the objections I found myself formulating while reading the early chapters were always addressed skillfully, if not always to my mind convincingly, in subsequent chapters. For that reason alone, I recommend the book very highly.

Kane divides his book into two parts. In Part I, he reviews the dispute between libertarians and compatibilists (chapters 1 and 2), cleverly sets forth the intuitions that seem to support the libertarian view (chapter 3), and examines four different kinds of libertarian theories (chapter 4). He concludes that all existing theories fall prey "either to the confusion of identifying freedom with indeterminism or to the emptiness of postulating obscure or mysterious forms of agency or causation" (p. 74). In Part II, he then tries to give an account of libertarian free will that makes no appeal to (what he calls) "mysterious forms of agency." He in effect concedes to compatibilists that uncaused events are chance occurrences and then tries "to make chance occurrences ingredients of processes of rational willing without undermining the . . . rationality of these processes" (p. 109). In the case of practical choice, chance occurrences initiate "processes of thinking about or imagining, remembering or attending to, possible states or changes that may be relevant to deliberation" (p. 105); in the case of moral choice, "the agent's effort of will to act from duty in moral conflict situations . . . is [also] indeterminate" (p. 149). Libertarian free choice, therefore, is "due to a combination of reason and chance" (P. 153).

No thumbnail sketch of Kane's position will, of course, do justice to the full complexity of his arguments, but I turn now to my own reservations about those arguments. My first reservation concerns the way in which Kane defines "determination" (p. 30), which is as follows:

D2: The occurrence of a state or change E at a time t is determined if and only if there is some combination of past circumstances relative to t, or past circumstances relative to t and laws of nature, whose joint existence is a logically sufficient condition for the occurrence of E at t.

I fail to see, first of all, why a libertarian must deny that a free choice is determined in the sense specified by D2. If an essentially omniscient God should believe at T_1 that Smith will do A at T_2 ,

then Smith's doing A at T₂ would be determined in the sense specified by D2; but none of Kane's arguments even begin to show that free will is incompatible with that kind of "determinism." Of course Kane could easily repair D2 by restricting himself to cases where past circumstances are causally sufficient for the occurrence of E at t, but that leads me to a second reservation. If I am not responsible for a choice that is determined by sufficient causes beyond my control and I am not responsible for chance occurrences, why should I be responsible for a choice that is produced by an ingenious mixture of causal conditions beyond my control and chance occurrences? One of Kane's theses is that the amount of moral effort a moral agent expends is itself a matter of chance, and one implication of this, he admits, is that one has only partial control over one's own will. But if such an intrusion of chance limits one's control over, and therefore one's responsibility for, one's own will, why should chance be thought of as a condition of moral responsibility at all? It looks as if, on Kane's view, we are finally responsible for our choices only to the extent that they are causally determined.

I think Kane successfully argues, however, that chance can be an ingredient of rational deliberation without undermining the rationality of the process; it may at times, for instance, play a role similar to that which inspiration plays for the creative thinker (see p. 102). But at every point where chance figures into Kane's theory, causal factors of which the agent is unaware could play exactly the same role. So why not be a compatibilist? Kane's answer is, I think, convincing. If we should come to believe that the "character and motives" of a vicious criminal "were determined by his heredity and environment," our "resentment against him" would be transferred to whomever (or whatever) we believe to be genuinely responsible.

Now, it will be argued that anger and resentment can be transferred to the parents, or to God, because these emotions are person directed emotions. But they cannot be transferred to non-personal objects like the universe or Fate. This may be true, but it does not affect the main point. If my resentment cannot be transferred to some other persons, then it will be *transformed* into something else, call it bitterness, sadness, frustration, or a combination of these and other feelings or emotions. The main point is that the resentment I initially had toward the [criminal] . . . is now being directed *away from* him as an individual toward other things, and may be undergoing transformation into other emotions in the process (p. 181).

I agree with this. But I fail to see how a "randomizing process . . . in the brain" (p. 147) makes a difference at this point. If the amount of moral effort expended is itself a matter of chance and therefore outside the agent's control, then our resentment towards the criminal must again be transformed into some other emotion, such as sadness or frustration.

My own view is that an appeal to agent causation is required at this point and that, in the end, agent causation is no more mysterious than event causation. But that is a difficult and controversial matter. Whether my objections to Kane's theory, as I have sketched them out here, can ultimately be sustained is a judgment a reader should make only after studying carefully his important contribution to the topic.

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Thomas Talbott

Alvin Plantinga. James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, eds. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985. Pp. 420. \$24.00 paper.

Alvin Plantinga is clearly among the most interesting philosophers writing today. Widely recognized as the leading contemporary philosopher of religion, he has also made substantial contributions to the literature in epistemology and philosophy of mind. His work in metaphysics on is

of especial significance. The present anthology is an excellent critical guide to Plantinga's work and, since the questions concerning essence and modality which have been the focus of his work in metaphysics figure prominently in current philosophical discussions, it is also invaluable as a guide to recent developments in analytic philosophy.

The book is divided into three parts: a "self-portrait" by Plantinga, a selection of original essays concerning various facets of Plantinga's work, and Plantinga's replies to each of the essays in turn.

Plantinga's self-portrait includes a lively account of his life and intellectual development as well as discussions of the issues which figure as topics of the essays which follow: the problem of evil, the epistemology of religious belief, the ontological argument, necessity de dicto and de re, proper names and possible worlds.

Of the essays, each of which appears for the first time in this anthology, the first five focus on issues in metaphysics and philosophy of mind while the four which follow are more directly concerned questions of theological interest. All are clear, rigorous and insightful, in the best tradition of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Peter van Inwagen's essay, "Plantinga on Trans-World Identity," is an exceedingly lucid, nontechnical exposition of Plantinga's account of trans-world identity. Briefly, van Inwagen argues that the alleged problem of "identity across worlds" is generated by a misleading picture of possible worlds as concrete objects which house possible individuals. It is this account of possible worlds which renders identity across worlds problematic, for given this account, he suggests, we shall either be forced to treat individuals as aggregates of items existing in different possible worlds or to conclude that objects which are "identical across worlds" differ with respect to certain properties. Adopting Plantinga's account of possible worlds as abstract objects, van Inwagen claims, liberates us from this captivating but misleading picture and so dissolves the problem of identity across worlds.

Nevertheless, though van Inwagen may be right about the final solution to the problem of identity across worlds his account of the sources of puzzlement about this, and the related issue of "identity through time" is too dismissive. The pictures van Inwagen rejects, even if misleading, are generated by the difficulty philosophers have discovered in attempting to square modal talk, and tensed talk, with the classical account of identity. In the case of modal talk the difficulty arises because intuitively we want to say of some objects that, while they could have been a little different in certain respects they could not have been very different from the way they actually are. If such talk is analyzed in terms of identity across worlds then it would seem transitivity of identity is threatened: little differences traced across a succession of possible worlds add up to big differences and in some cases it appears that we shall be forced to conclude that the same object that has property, P₁ in W₁ has P₂ has P₂ in W₂ and the same object that has P₂ in W₂ has P₃ in W₃ whereas the object which has P_1 in W_1 is not identical to the object that has P_3 in W_3 . Even if we grant, with van Inwagen, that some puzzles concerning identity "across worlds" arise from a misleading picture of worlds as concrete objects, this puzzle does not.

John Pollock's essay, "Plantinga on Possible Worlds" is a longer and rather less sympathetic account of Plantinga's notion of a possible world. In The Nature of Necessity and a series of subsequent articles, Plantinga endorses "actualism," the claim that "there isn't anything that doesn't exist" and "serious actualism," the doctrine that an object cannot have a property at a world in which it does not exist while rejecting what he calls 'existentialism,' the thesis that thisnesses, singular propositions, states of affairs, and possible worlds do not exist if the objects involved in them do not exist. Pollock, in a technical tour de force takes him to task on each count, and Plantinga responds in kind.

Kit Fine, who has been closely associated with Prior, is sympathetic to Plantinga's actualism but takes issue with his alleged "reduction" of talk about possible worlds and possible individuals to talk about propositions and properties in "Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse."

In a somewhat different vein, Diana Ackerman considers Plantinga's doctrine that proper

names express essences in "Plantinga's Theory of Proper Names." Of special interest is her brief but extremely suggestive discussion of the paradox of analysis.

Carl Ginet discusses the two issues in philosophy of mind which have figured most importantly in Plantinga's writings: the problem of other minds and the reconstructed Cartesian argument against materialism which Plantinga expounds in *The Nature of Necessity* and elsewhere.

Among the most interesting and most subtle essays in the present collection is Robert Adams' piece, "Plantinga on the Problem of Evil." It, Tomberlin's paper, "Plantinga and the Ontological Argument" and Philip Quinn's essay, "Plantinga on Foreknowledge and Freedom" are superb examples of how the logical and metaphysical machinery discussed in earlier papers can clarify traditional theological issues.

In "Plantinga's Epistemology of Religious Belief" William Alston gives a largely sympathetic account of Plantinga's defense of the rationality of religious belief. Though, as Alston notes, Plantinga has not until recently attempted an explicit account of the epistemological status of religious belief, I suspect that his most important, and most radical, contribution to philosophy of religion is in this area and look forward to further progress in the project of constructing a "Reformed epistemology" which he mentions amongst his plans for the future.

Each of the essays in this anthology is equipped with notes and references. The book is also supplied with a bibliography of Plantinga's works, indices of names and subjects and an excellent bibliography of recent literature on the topics under discussion.

The book is uniformly excellent, not only in the quality of the individual contributions but in the balance and selection of materials, the notes, references and indices. The only caveat, particularly for readers from other academic disciplines, is that the essays differ with regard to their accessibility: Philip Quinn's elegant essay, "Plantinga on Foreknowledge and Freedom" should be intelligible to every intelligent, literate person and, being an exemplar of analytic philosophy of religion, ought to be read by all theologians; on the other hand, philosophically naive readers will find Ackerman's piece, in many respects the most interesting of the essays, hard going. Readers who are innocent of modal logic will not be able to make much sense of the pieces by Pollock and Fine and even philosophers who do metaphysics will have to bone up on probability theory to appreciate some of Robert Adams' arguments.

Theologians, by and large, are unsympathetic to analytic philosophy and have tended to regard it as a threat. Even in some philosophical circles it is becoming fashionable to deplore the supposed shortcomings of analytic philosophy—its alleged triviality and failure to make sense of traditional philosophical problems. The essays in the current anthology belie these charges. Theologians will find the pieces on traditional religious questions illuminating. Philosophers will recognize all the discussions as models of analytic philosophy at its best. And anyone who, like Plantinga, is committed to both orthodox Christianity and orthodox analytic philosophy should respond to this volume with a resounding "Amen."

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H. E. Baber

Freedom and Alienation. By H. D. Lewis. Edinburgh and London: Scottish Academic Press, 1985. Pp. X +162. £12.50.

H. D. Lewis addresses in the present volume, as he has done so often and so well in his long career, some central topics in the philosophy of mind, ethics, and religion. He continues here the trenchant defense of dualism and free will that he advanced in *The Elusive Mind* and *The Elusive Self*, All three books are drawn from Lewis' Gifford Lectures.

The theories of personal identity dominant in contemporary philosophy, Lewis argues, fail to grasp the essence of the question. Most philosophers today treat the self as if it were an object in the Lewis' Gifford external world. To establish whether the ship of Theseus, in the familiar example,

remains the same ship when its planks are altered requires, obviously, resort to description of the ship at various stages of time. Similarly, many philosophers take continuity of description as the key to the mystery of personal identity—either continuity of experience or of body. (Everyone knows the slogan, "same body, same person").

Lewis forcefully claims that these views betray our own experience of the self. "Is there anything here that is truly different, different in some radical way, from the way qualities belong to various entities in the world of nature? I firmly maintain that there is" (p. 2). The self is not a quality of experience, but what has experience. As such, it cannot be described, since to describe something is by definition to give a qualitative description of it. How then can we speak of the self at all? And how do we know that Lewis's view of the self is correct?

Lewis answers both questions at once. Although we cannot describe the self, it is given in immediate experience. No further proof of the nature of the self is possible or necessary: we just see that it is so. Against the objection that immediate awareness gives us at best but a momentary self, Lewis holds that a fuller conception of the self can be built up through the use of memory. In some instances memory includes "the same awareness of oneself as the distinct irreducible subject of experience that we find ourselves to be now" (p. 6).

Our author knows full well that many today spurn intuition, but he is undaunted. Sometimes argument is futile, and one must just see something directly. "If I am asked for a reason why pain is bad, and not just something I do not like, what am I expected to say?" (p. vi). A problem with Lewis's position is that many philosophers of mind apparently fail to have the intuitions about the self that he does. It seems to me, nevertheless, that his case is a strong one. I am not sure, however, whether Lewis's point shows that continuity theories of the self are false. Perhaps one can have the direct experience of the self that Lewis discusses only under certain conditions, which these theories set out. Is it given to intuition that our subjective experience of the self need depend on no external conditions?

Lewis, one may be sure, would have a powerfully argued response to this query. But his book treats much more than personal identity. In his second chapter "Punishment and Responsibility," Lewis shifts to a new topic. After distinguishing sharply between legal punishment and moral responsibility, Lewis briefly discusses the major theories of punishment. He opposes the retributive theory: "For my own part, however sympathetic I try to be, I can find no merit of fittingness in the infliction of suffering on an offender as an end in itself or an inherent ethical requirement—punishment for its own sake" (p. 25). Punishment instead has its proper aim in deterrence. Lewis has again not hesitated to resort to intuition as the ultimate arbiter: he fails to see the relation of fittingness the retributivists postulate, and that is that.

Intuitions continue to paly a prominent role in the book's next few chapters, which deal with free will. Lewis believes that we know immediately that in some cases, our will is free—neither the external world nor our characters determine our choices. We experience a "freedom without parallel elsewhere, a totally new beginning" (p. 37). By no means, however, do we experience such freedom whenever we make a choice. On the contrary, it is only when we must choose between moral duty and natural inclination that we experience free will.

This point, Lewis holds, is easily misunderstood. Free will does not enter the picture when we decide what our duty is: it comes in at a later stage. "[H]ow important it is not to conflate the process of deciding what we ought to do with our doing it" (p. 47). Questions of what constitutes our duty are matters of belief, not action; and here Lewis does not recognize the radical kind of choice he believes exists in the situation described above.

P. H. Nowell-Smith has raised an interesting objection to this position. To say that one has free will, in the libertarian sense, is to say that one could have chosen otherwise, under precisely the same conditions. Yet how can our experience, which is after all of our actual choice, not of some choice that we did not make, tell us this? "It seems very plausible therefore to conclude generally that the alleged immediate awareness of freedom is ruled out from the start" (p. 70). By now, the reader can guess Lewis' rejoinder. Our choice is not the exercise of a disposition at all: exactly what

is given in experience is that our choice is radically new. We do not adopt a conjecture that we could have done otherwise: we directly see that certain choices are up to us.

Lewis ably counters his determinist adversaries, but I wonder whether he is vulnerable to assault on the opposite flank. I am not entirely persuaded that cases of free will arise only if moral duty clashes with inclination. Lewis' argument shows at most that we know we have free will only in such clashes, but it does not follow from this that we lack free will in other types of choice.

Lewis has managed to include in a relatively short book illuminating suggestions about a remarkable number of topics. In Chapter VI, "Motive and Intention," Lewis defends the view that an action consists of what one intends to do, rather than what in fact one accomplishes. "But the action proper is the intending or setting ourselves to achieve our aim" (p. 92). As he is well aware, his view requires him to repudiate some influential modern theories of intention, e.g., that of Elizabeth Anscombe, and he readily does so. Intention for Lewis is an internal mental event that may cause physical behavior: it is not the behavior under a certain description. Further, not any mental event will do. An intention is a setting ourselves to do something, as against a mere desire that something takes place. In the course of his argument, Lewis includes a penetrating criticisim of Donald Davidson's influential treatment of intention.

The author concludes with a discussion of the self and religion. As one might anticipate, Lewis does not look kindly on the doctrine, found in many Eastern religions, that the self merges into a higher unity. On the contrary, the personal relation of the self to God is for him at the heart of religion. Although one's self always remains distinct from God, God is always present in our experience, whether we are aware of this or not.

Few philosophers match Lewis's combination of insight and argumentative skill; this book is a major contribution.

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The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge By Jean-Francois Lyotard.. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. Pp. 128. \$19.50 cloth; \$8.95 paper.

To be postmodern has become quite *de rigueur* among literary and social analysts. Writers such as Hassan, de Man, Kristeva, Derrida, and Gebser are often identified as advocating this viewpoint. Yet a clear and concise list of the characteristics associated with postmodernism has not been published until now. Although various attempts have been made to define what it means to be postmodern, they lack the philosophical rigor necessary to conceptualize adequately this idea. Lyotard's work is significant for the simple reason that he understands both philosophy and aesthetics, and therefore is able to detail the theory and social implications of postmodernism.

Lyotard begins by declaring that postmodernists express "increduity toward metanarratives" (p. xxiv). This is essential, he argues, because modern works are sustained by "meta-theory", thus eviscerating reading and all other forms of human action. When perception serves merely to highlight a reality sui generis, reading is nothing more than mimesis. Using a Marxist phrase, Lyotard claims that knowledge loses its "use value" when reading assumes this form (p. 5). Consistent with Marx, Lyotard means that reading is stripped of its expressive quality and becomes alienated from human creativity. Hence learning is associated with the acquisition of exact "quantitites of information", which are prepackaged in ready-made language.

Pursuing this point further, Lyotard writes that once knowledge is objectified the criteria for truth become technological. Since the interpretive element of reading is discredited as subjective and capricious, only standards uncontaminated by *praxis* are presumed to be useful for judging behavior. As a result of this dualism, truth is cited to be inherent to a text. The accuracy of reading, accordingly, is assessed in terms of how closely the symbolic nature of a text is followed. Lyotard

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refers to this as the "performativity" principle, whereby the "relationship between input and output is optimized" (p. 11). In other words, once reading is purged of interpretation, the stable system of thought and language that constitutes a text can be revealed as efficiently as possible.

With truth defined as adaequatio rei et intellectus, Lyotard charges that texts are read according to "market" demands. Texts are no longer pleasureful, as Barthes remarks, but are assayed with reference to prevailing literary standards. Again invoking Marxist imagery, Lyotard is suggesting that texts convey an underlying reality, over which persons do not exercise any control. Conceived in this way, he says writing is "terroristic," in that texts represent the "realization of the fantasy to seize reality" (p. 82). Because a text embodies reason and interpretation opinion, readers are inadvertantly enslaved to the word. A text reifies existence, as the word is provided with the latitude to cajole readers into denying any doubts they may have about reality. In a manner of speaking, literary space is nothing but a variant of the basic Newtonian theme.

As a way of rehabilitating reading, Lyotard undercuts the dualism that underpins modernism. Most significant about this demarche is that reading is no longer innocent, as noted by de Man. According to Lyotard, postmodern work "puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself" (p. 81). Truth is not something that lurks within the interstices of a text, but an "event" that cannot be separated from the act of reading. As Lyotard explains, truth is always experienced indirectly, or in terms of the place it holds on the "itinerary of Spirit or Life" (p. 35).

Lyotard's position on the nature of truth is sustained by his view of language. Specifically, he understands language to be a creative capacity that mediates all phenomena, as opposed to a self-contained system comprised of clearly defined signs. At this juncture he relies upon Wittgenstein and writes that speech can best be described as a myriad of "language games." Rather than existing a priori, truth has a biography that is linguistically inscribed. Consequently, "knowledge has no final legitimacy outside of serving the goals envisioned by the practical subject, the autonomous collectivity" (p. 36). Simply put, truth is interpretive and not pristine, as both knowledge generation and acquisition are implicated in acts of reading. Knowledge obtains its meaning from what Lyotard calls "self-management", which is a Marxian way of stating that truth is grounded on labor.

Central to Lyotard's position is that technical competence is insufficient for the discovery of valid knowledge. Merely increasing methodological rigor will not guarantee that truth will be revealed, since the meaning inaugurated through reading may be obscured. Because the aim of technically oriented research is to minimize the influence of the human element, the interpretive side of data is dismissed as irrelevant. This means that knowledge is associated with structures, while speech acts are ignored as a viable source of truth. Yet, as Lyotard demonstrates, truth without a history would be ineffable and, thus, non-sensical. Hence communicative competence is essential for discovering the significance of a text or any other phenomenon. Instead of searching for the structural framework of a text, for example, critics must realize that the meaning of a work cannot be distinguished from the manner in which it is read. The legitimacy of truth is derived from the "autonomy of interlocuters in ethical, social, and political praxis" (pp. 39-40).

To suggest that every reading of a text is a re-reading, and never an original, has some critics worried. They contend that without an Archimedean base for truth one reading of a text is as valid as any other, thereby plunging literary criticism into chaos. Subsequent to Lyotard's subversion of dualism the traditional rendition of objectivity is not acceptable, yet does this mean that truth is abandoned altogether? For only if truth has to be justified by an ahistorical standard does a rejection of dualism result in nihilism. Lyotard, however, claims that knowledge can be legitimized through 'linguistic practice and communicational interaction' (p. 41). In other words, a social bond can be secured among persons that is linguistic and does not represent a 'unitotality.'

Instead of defining truth as the mind conforming to the norms indigenous to a universally accepted point of reference, Lyotard suggests that a common understanding among persons is possible without adopting this type of metaphysical system. By coming to appreciate each other's use of language, the definitions a person advances about reality can become public knowledge. Once this

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information has been disseminated, how a person may act in a particular situation can be anticipated with regularity. Although a person's actions can be interpreted correctly, the resulting truth is not objective in the traditional sense. Thus, according to Lyotard, the rules of society are "agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual cancellation" (p. 67).

Discovering the order of a text is not impossible, yet certainly more difficult than introducing absolute norms to explain the word. Language, instead, must be allowed to speak for itself, so that an author's intentions might be uncovered. Since artists work "without rules to formulate the rules of what will have been done", a writer's initial reading of a text holds the key to its meaning (p. 81). To paraphrase de Man, a person must read a text in a manner similar to its author, thereby making the second reading as competent as the first. Even for a Marxist such as Terry Eagleton, the intentions of an author sustain the reality harbored by a text. These intentions, however, are not based on natural laws, but are thoroughly interpretive. A legitimate reading of the word represents a type of contractual relationship between author and reader, or a "fusion" of interpretive horizons, as described by Gadamer.

Contrary to the claims made by opponents of postmodernism, literary analysis is not corrupted by the style of deconstruction advocated by Lyotard. Obviously a lazy reading of texts cannot be tolerated, yet their meaning is not destroyed. Only a hierarchical rendition of truth has been discredited, whereby an ultimate *archë* is assumed to direct all reading. Lyotard, in a manner similar to Derrida, conceives truth to be "local", for "knowledge is no longer the subject, but in the service of the subject" (p. 36). Yet does this indicate that a valid reading of a text is impossible? Certainly not, simply because knowledge that is confirmed intersubjectively has the power to unite persons. A socially mediated truth, simply put, has at least as much legitimacy as one that is abstract. The difference, however, is that the former is "anti-colonial" (Derrida) and presupposes the importance of reading. Reading is thus resurrected as essential for both creating and recognizing knowledge.

Without encouraging solipsism, Lyotard shows that the word can embody humanly inspired meaning. This theoretical gambit is quite a breakthrough, as order without control is now feasible. A text does not have to coerce persons to insure that it will be read properly, since truth can result from the dialogue that occurs between reader and author. And as Lyotard notes, norms that originate from the *vox populi* do not have the autonomy necessary for them to be repressive. By placing human action at the center of order, Lyotard transforms the reader into a guardian of history. Therefore, reading is truly liberating.

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Schelling as Post-Hegelian and as Aristotelian

Joseph P. Lawrence

SCHELLING, particularly in this country, still stands in the shadow of Hegel. He is regarded as the most "romantic" of the idealists, the author of an elaborate and highly speculative philosophy of nature. This romantic label suggests that he resisted the logic of philosophical reflection and advocated a Rousseauistic return to nature. Because such resistance can scarcely be reconciled with his philosophical idealism, Schelling is viewed as a thinker entangled in inconsistencies, of more interest historically than philosophically.

Against this, one might consider Heidegger's judgement that Schelling was a more profound, original, and consistent thinker than Hegel.¹ Even if inclined to dismiss Heidegger's judgements, one must still acknowledge that Schelling was more than an important step in the development of Hegel's thought. He not only outlived Hegel by 23 years, but also worked out an extensive critique of Hegel's thought. In his later period he developed a conception of "positive philosophy" which has as its *source* (not only its subject matter) mythology and revelation rather than the philosophical concept. It is in this connection that he speaks of "philosophical induction." In light of the fact that Schelling's late philosophy is generally associated with his critique of Hegel, the title of this article, insofar as it proposes to entertain the question of Schelling's status as a Post-Hegelian, appears to be justified, if at the outset somewhat paradoxical.

In part I will indeed want to argue that Schelling is properly understood as a Post-Hegelian—that is, that he deliberately and successfully thought "further" than Hegel. Yet I do not want to assert that his thinking is essentially post-metaphysical. To do so would be to operate with a too narrow conception of what constitutes metaphysics. It is in this regard that I entertain Schelling's affinity to Aristotle. I also want to avoid the common conclusion that there are two different Schellings: one, the early Schelling, the friend and co-worker of Hegel, and the other, a transformed Schelling, a post-idealist who discovered a real world which cannot be penetrated by reason.²

¹Martin Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971). This work has recently been translated by Joan Stambaugh under the title, Schelling's Treatise On the Essence of Human Freedom (Athens, Ohio/London: Ohio University Press, 1985). For Heidegger's conclusions with regard to the relative merits of Schelling and Hegel, see the English translation pp. 4 and 165 and with regard to Schelling's thinking as the culmination of the entire tradition of metaphysics, pp. 175 and 181.

²This division has left its mark on all the classic treatments of 19th-century German historians of philosophy such as Erdmann, Zeller, Kuno Fischer and Windelbandt. One result of such a division is that Schelling's late philosophy can more easily be passed over entirely as, for instance, in Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, 3 volumes (Tübingen, 1921-24). Kroner views Schelling as important only insofar as he represents a link in the development of the Hegelian synthesis. The late Schelling is presumably no

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Such a treatment is, I believe, fundamentally wrongheaded. For support I can allude to Walter Schulz's classic of Schelling scholarship: Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings.³ Published in 1955, this work underscores the significance of the late period of Schelling's thinking, while insisting that it forms an integral part, indeed that it—and not Hegel's philosophy—constitutes the true culmination of German Idealism and with it the true culmination of the long tradition of Western metaphysics that had begun with Plato (the influence here of Heidegger is evident).

While I fully agree with Schulz's conclusion, at least when stated in this very general fashion, I believe that it was accompanied by an exaggeration of Schelling's systematic intent and a failure to confront what Schelling himself regarded as the central discovery of the late philosophy, a thought which had been prepared already in his very earliest writing, namely, that the principle of absolute transcendence, the source of freedom in both divine creation and human history, while manifesting itself in its self-surrender to the immanence of self-reflective reason, does so only incompletely: reason is always limited by the unfathomable nature of its own origin. This has two important consequences: reason must be regarded as the result of a gift of disclosure so that its structure is not that of a fully autonomous self-determination; and reason will always remain limited over against the source of its historical emergence. What Schelling in his earliest period-in his System of Transcendental Idealism, for instance-grasped as the mystery of the great work of art, namely, that it is the product at one and the same time of human invention and of a compelling inspiration that transcends what any artist consciously commands, now becomes the basis for an ontological claim about the historicity of being itself.4 He had now, at the highest level of

longer an idealist and can be passed over in silence. We find the same general division in Horst Fuhrmans, Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter. Schellings Philosophie in den Jahren 1806–1821. Zum Problem des Schellingschen Theismus (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1951). Fuhrmans, however, reverses Kroner's evaluation and concentrates primarily on the late Schelling, whom he favorably regards as a realist and a Christian theist. Insofar as these interpretations regard Schelling's late philosophy as taking its point of departure from a trans-rational reality, they contribute to the idea that that philosophy is fundamentally postidealistic in nature.

³Walter Schulz, *Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings*, lst ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1955); 2nd ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1975). This work not only accomplishes the task of disclosing the underlying unity of Schelling's thought, but it also makes clear to what degree Schelling represents, from within idealism, the most significant alternative to Hegel. Schulz later expanded his thesis to include the late philosophy of Fichte. Schulz's particular claim, that Schelling, insofar as he comes to the notion of a transcendent and pre-reflexive origin through a continuation and extension of idealistic reflection, is an idealist, strikes me as questionable, particularly since Schelling himself always stresses that his thought is *neither* idealism nor realism.

*Walter Schulz prepares, but does not himself develop, the recognition of this "positive" dimension which cannot be rationally deduced, but can only be "discovered." It is this which constitutes the focal point of Dieter Jähnig's two-volume study, Die Kunst in der Philosophie; Volume One: Schellings Begründung von Natur und Geschichte; Volume Two: Die Wahrheitsfunction der Kunst (Pfullingen: Neske, 1966 and 1969). Jähnig offers an interpretation of the entire System des transzendentalen Idealismus (1800), which is based, however, in particular on the concluding section on art as the appropriate organon of philosophy. In the System Schelling recognizes the irreducibility of art to reason and thus anticipates the idea of his late period that philosophy itself must be divided into two separate enterprises, a "negative" philosophy that follows the development of the concept and a "positive" philosophy that recognizes the possibility of a transrational revelation and thus turns to mythology and Christian revelation for its new

philosophical abstraction, encountered the historicity and conditioned nature of that speculative reason which unfolds and articulates the structure of being as such.

It is this point, somewhat obscured by Schulz's zeal in displaying the continuity of the *idealist* Schelling, which makes possible a fruitful discussion of Schelling's relationship to the Post-Hegelians. In recent years Manfred Frank has contributed the most to fostering such a discussion.⁵ Frank's work quite correctly calls attention to the non-transparent source of movement, which Schelling tries simultaneously to mediate and to leave untouched in its immediacy. Yet Frank goes too far in regarding this principle as evidence of Schelling's fundamental materialism. Schelling's thinking, from beginning to end, remains—to use a key term of his own reflections—*indifferent* to the metaphysical dichotomy between idealism and materialism. From the vantage point of this indifference one can consistently interpret Schelling as an idealist or a materialist, so that recent studies brought together by Sandkühler which emphasize Schelling's materialism and realism are fully correct while nonetheless shortsighted.⁶ Schelling's insight is not incompatible with Platonism. He thus views being and thought, nature and spirit, as belonging together and reflecting one another insofar as they themselves are emanations of an absolute unity that itself lies "beyond being."

In the following, I would like to locate Schelling's thinking by showing how it differs from that of Fichte and Hegel, in order then, in a second step, to show how precisely in its "post-Hegelian," its "modern" aspect, this thinking bears strong affinities to aspects of Aristotle. Categories like conservative and progressive shed little light on Schelling's philosophy. His metaphysical spirit and his insistence upon the organic structure of nature and of the whole cannot be accounted for by reference either to the French Revolution which took place in his youth or to the Restoration which formed the political background of his late philosophy. In order to accomplish the task of locating his thinking, it will be convenient, however, to conclude my remarks with a brief characterization of his political philosophy and his philosophy of history. This could serve the polemical function of showing how an "Aristotelian" foundation, far from resisting a disclosure of historicity, in a sense first makes it possible. The decisive works for this analysis are far from the middle period of

sources. See volumes XI-XIV of Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, Sämtliche Werke, edited by K.F.A. Schelling, Volumes I-XIV (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–1861). For the sake of convenience, I will in this article only refer to the German edition (I-XIV) and use my own translations. English translations of a number of Schelling's works do exist.

⁵Manfred Frank, Der unendliche Mangel an Sein. Schellings Hegelcritik und die Anfänge der Marxschen Dialektik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975). See also Frank's introduction to his edition of the Paulus transcript of Schelling's Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/42 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977). A later work Der kommende Gott. Vorlesungen über die Neue Mythologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), also deals largely with Schelling, although the context is no longer determined by critical theory.

⁶Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.), Natur und geschichtlicher Prozess. Studien zur Naturphilosophie F.W.J. Schellings (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984).

⁷Plato's Republic, 509 b. That the source of limitation and determination withdraws itself from such determination is reflected in the paradoxical structure of the eidos as such, which, while making visible, itself remains invisible. This aspect of Platonic thought was pronounced through the neo-Platonic tradition by which it was mediated to Schelling.

⁸Sandkühler (op. cit, p. 78f.) expresses this insight—in explicit opposition to his own previous view as given in H.J. Sandkühler, Freiheit und Wirklichkeit. Zur Dialektik von Politik und Philosophie bei Schelling (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968).

Schelling's philosophizing, his treatise On Human Freedom and the Ages of the World, both of which have existed for years in English translation.

I

Schelling's critique of Fichte is that the latter's system is necessarily one-sided, for it proceeds from the Cartesian-Kantian starting point alone—the knowing subject? Thus Schelling's own attempt in his earliest stage was to develop a philosophy of nature. Fichte had understood nature as representing the self-imposed limit or other which is generated out of the absolute self in its attempt to know itself. The Absolute generates nature in an original ungrounded act and comes then to grasp itself as activity by progressively overcoming the inert matter which lies before it, by remolding it in accordance with the will of the acting subject. Nature as a concrete, knowable object he regards, like Kant, as the result of the activity of the knowing mind. Merely passive sense perception does not account for the unity that constitutes and binds together the world of objects. Fichte goes beyond Kant, however, in also regarding the material content of perception as itself ultimately stemming from an act, not of the empirical, but of the transcendental or absolute self. Schelling follows Fichte in regarding the ground of reality as activity but differs from him in his insight that this absolute activity cannot be grasped as the self, for it lies before and beyond not only the generation of nature but of the self as well.

The central concern of Fichte's philosophy is practical—it can perhaps be most succinctly understood as laying out the program of modern technology. It regards nature as a dead object that must be subjugated to the will of the subject—the will, moreover, of the specifically human subject. Thus in his 1795 essay, Über die Würde des Menschen, Fichte calls for mankind to act upon nature "until all matter bears its stamp, and all spirits constitute with its spirit one spirit." The technological conquest of nature together with the technological reorganization and mechanization of human social and political institutions represents the process by which the finite human self elevates itself to the status of the original Absolute, for which nature is pure product.

I point to this problematic to remind the reader that what is at issue here is far more than an arcane point of metaphysics. Upon the issue of the immanence or the transcendence of the Absolute (and this would include, but not necessitate, its possible transcendence into absolute non-being) rests the issue of the autonomy and substantiality of the whole realm of nature. Metaphysical decisions in this sphere have an immediate practical application. In other words, I am pointing out that our own tech-

⁹IV, pp. 84-92. At another juncture we find Schelling condensing his critique of Fichte in the charge that the latter has "converted what is actually the principle of *sin*, the ego, into the principle of philosophy" (VII, 26).

¹⁰Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke, edited by I.H. Fichte (Berlin: Veit, 1845-46), vol. I, p. 415. It is above all with regard to the status of nature that Schelling attacks Fichte's system, claiming that "nature loses its last measure of dignity where its entire existence is directed towards the end of human cultivation and production...The forces of nature are, according to Fichte, only there in order to be subordinated to human ends. This subordination is at times expressed as the gradual conquest and negation of...nature by man—and at other times as the vitalization of nature through the life of reason. But isn't every such subordination a destruction of what is living? And how could anything be vitalized that is merely supposed to exist as a limit?" (VII, 110).

nological age is grounded in an hubristic metaphysics of which Fichte's system represents the most consistent exemplar. Schelling offers a much-needed alternative. The key to his critique of Fichte is his insight that there is not only a posited, but also an immanent, and thus discoverable, rationality in nature itself. Not all order proceeds from the mind.

In countering Fichte's position Schelling had thus to seek a philosophy that begins not with the self, but with the guiding principle of reason alone. This principle is viewed as unfolding in a process of self-development that simultaneously incorporates within it the realms of nature and of the knowing self. The center of the development is neither subject nor object, but the *indifference* between the two. A transsubjective, truly absolute reason undergoes the dialectical process of development in order to carry out the implicit imperative of reason that the unity of being attain a complete disclosure, a disclosure which is possible only through opposition to differentiation and at the same time through an extension of differentiation that uncovers the underlying unity of being: the absolute identity which is the focal point of the young Schelling's philosophical attention.

In order to enter into the development of reason the self must abandon its preoccupation with its own concerns—such a self-preoccupation Schelling finds in Fichte's project of the Wissenschaftlehre¹—in order to give itself over to the higher spirit which is, far from being founded in the cogito, actually the ground of all self-consciousness. Schelling's discovery of the idea of science as unfolding the objective order of being, which was to become so crucial for Hegel, was itself the result of his realization that the self has a history, that it emerges—and here is the crux of Schelling's often discussed materialism—from a nature which in independence of the self has the self as its own innermost possibility. The ecstasy of the self into the higher life of reason is made possible by the experience of the higher life of the spirit that dwells in the heart of nature.

It is impossible to judge whether this is tantamount to a senseless natural mysticism apart from its concrete development in the whole of Schelling's philosophy. I would myself suggest that Schelling's primary insights can indeed be verified by reference to the self-disclosure of being. Important at this juncture, however, is merely an appreciation for the degree to which the idea of *development* underlies Schelling's early thought—and the degree to which the univocal line of that Fichtean development which springs from the single source of the knowing and acting subject is modified in order to make way for a complex dialogue of differing spirits (a discussion of Schelling's turn towards mythology would here be in order)¹² coordinated in the common medium of reason.¹³

¹¹This rejection of the self-certainty of self-consciousness leads to a renewal of the Greek experience of wonder as the true origin of philosophy. "Wonder," Schelling writes in 1821, "is a beautiful word, which should be etched deeply into our souls, particularly since there are many dull-witted men who encourage the beginner in philosophy to turn inwards—to explore his deepest depths, as they say. This means, however, nothing more than to be drawn ever deeper into one's own limitation. Man has no need to turn into himself: the real necessity is that he be lifted out of himself" (X, 230).

¹²Schelling regards nature as an independent sphere of life and spirit and finds in it the source of all genuine inspiration in art—and in the collective artwork of mythology. The resistance of nature to absorption in a transcendental reflection makes possible an escape from the solipsistic structure of such reflection. On the relationship between nature and mythology see Jähnig, op. cit., vol. 1. See also vol. 2, pp. 181-200.

¹³The recognition that each part of the system of being can be regarded in its own relative independence and as such as a totality is the key to Schelling's understanding of reason (*Vernunft*) in opposition to the

An appreciation of this will help to show the inadequacy of the famous objection which Hegel raised against Schelling's notion of the Absolute in the preface to the Phenomenology. The objection is that Schelling's Absolute is an empty identity, like a "night in which all cows are black." His Absolute is simply posited in the beginning as if it had been shot "out of a pistol" instead of emerging from a long process of development, which process Hegel views as necessary insofar as it alone yields the determinations by virtue of which the Absolute can be thought—and can be thought as being. We find that the source of these formulations—as of so much else in Hegel's philosophy—lies in Schelling's own writings,¹⁴ for he too was aware that an Absolute totally separated from the realm of relativity and change would be a merely formal Absolute void of all real content. The notion of an emerging Absolute that delivers itself over to the immanence of reason is thus common to both philosophers. For Schelling it is clearly not the Absolute qua rational articulation of an implicit into a fully explicit and manifest unity which remains in darkness. That would be absurd. It is instead the Absolute in its ground (that is, in the ground of that differentiation without which the Absolute would indeed be empty of content) which defies complete appropriation into the transparent and fully knowable categories of reason.

It is from here that we can grasp the point where Hegel's critique does serve to clarify a fundamental difference in the thought of the two thinkers. That, according to Hegel, the Absolute becomes fully mediated in thought, that its absolute nature does not exist apart from its classification in a universally valid and universally comprehensible science, is what is here at issue. Schelling—even in the period of his system of identity—had never presented his philosophy in the form of such an absolute science.15 He remained committed to philosophy instead of proclaiming the emergence of the science of absolute reason. It is in this connection that one is to understand his contention that the ability to philosophize is not given in the universal form of reason but in an aesthetic sense,16 which is why art, not logic, is the appropriate organon of philosophy.17 Philosophy is an esoteric endeavor precisely because its object—the Absolute—even in its comprehensibility is ultimately incomprehensible. Thus Schelling's question: If all is reason, then why is there reason?18 The highest knowledge possible for man is the knowledge of precisely this incomprehensibility. In this way Schelling belongs to the tradition of the docta ignorantia.19 The knowledge he finally claims is the knowledge of his lack of knowledge—a knowledge he regards as positive for it brings the knower before the full mystery of being, which in its impenetrable

understanding (*Verstand*). See, for instance, his *Philosophie der Kunst* (V, 393), in which a discussion of mythology serves as the context for this determination of reason.

¹⁴Schelling criticizes in his 1802 philosophy of identity "those who can see nothing more in the Absolute than a dark night.... For them the Absolute is reduced to a mere negation of difference; it is nothing more for them than pure privation" (IV, 403). Karl Jaspers was the first to call attention to this (and other) passages in which Schelling anticipated the language of Hegel's famous critique. See Karl Japsers, Schelling. Grösse und Verhängnis (Munich, 1955), pp. 302f.

15The impossibility of a truly universal system is a favorite theme of particularly the early Schelling. Thus he presents his system of identity explicitly as his own system, not as the system—Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801).

16III, 351.

17III, 612-630.

18Cf. Schulz, op. cit., p. 7.

19XIV, 3-29.

nature accomplishes the "Verstummen der Wissenschaft," the silencing and satisfaction of the restless desire to know.²⁰

According to Schelling, the complete elevation of being into reflection is an impossibility, the recognition of which is not a purely negative skepticism,²¹ but a positive knowledge of the very highest form of being, which evokes "absolute awe."²² It is the kind of knowledge achieved in the wonder and awe that come over one in the experience of the great work of art, or in the recognition of the great beauty emanating from the simple words of profound philosophical truth. The richness of such knowledge is made manifest in the cultural products engendered by genuine enthusiasm. The act of reflection, despite the contention of Hegel's *Logic*, never overcomes being in its entirety, but wrestles with it as the unsublatable ground of its own vitality. This is, then, Schelling's main objection to Hegel:

That the application of the concept of process to dialectical development, where this does not entail an enduring struggle, but rather a simple, an even boring, progression, bespeaks a grotesque misuse of words, that is Hegel's only means to hide the lack of *true life* in his thinking.²³

In Schelling's treatise On Human Freedom and in his Ages of the World, he emphasizes the priority and the "unfathomable antiquity of the physical," which constitutes the ground from which the Absolute lifts itself into existence. This ground, Schelling explicitly states, is a limit for reflection that "no man can transgress, for God himself cannot step over it." It is the

incomprehensible basis of reality, the irreducible remainder which by the greatest effort cannot be dissolved in understanding but remains eternally in the depths. Out of this which cannot be understood, understanding in the true sense is born.²⁶

This stands in stark contrast to the principle we find at the beginning of Hegel's Logic, the most general concept of being, the ens commune, which in its abstraction is empty of all content and identical with nothingness. Schelling's critique of Hegel has been passed on to posterity primarily by Kierkegaard and Marx. Its gist is that Hegel had constructed an imposing system of concepts that in their orderly progression had completely abandoned the richly differentiated field of existence, rife as it is with contradictions which mere reflection can never resolve. Moreover, the movement of

²⁰"I am much closer than most will ever be able to understand to that silencing of philosophy which occurs when we recognize how infinitely personal everything is, how impossible it is, really ever to know anything." F. W. J. Schelling, *Die Weltalter. Fragmente*, ed. M. Schröter (Munich: Beck, 1946), p. 103. (Henceforth cited as *WA*.)

²¹WA, 103: "A Socrates could be proud of this kind of not-knowing which is so different from that weak delicacy, which in the name of self-infatuated sophism raises itself against all serious claims of knowledge. One of the signs of the horrible ills of our own times is that such effeminacy claims the title of sublime ignorance for itself and dares to regard its negativism for Socratic wisdom and humility." Schelling's remarks have a particular relevance in today's context.

²²XIV, 13.

²³X, 137.

²⁴WA, 9; VIII, 205; XII, 620.

²⁵ WA, 218.

²⁶VII, 360.

the concept, Hegel's pivotal idea, the movement, for instance, of abstract being into nothingness which is becoming, is not a movement of the concept itself, but of the concrete existing thinker, who is aware of the insufficiency of the abstract concept over against the multiplicity of distinctions in the actual world. Hegel, it is true, yearned for that absolute reason which articulates and determines itself, but his own system was nonetheless precisely that, his own system and he himself remained blind to that fact.27 The development of the concept is not the purely logical development which Hegel proclaimed. If it were, it would have remained restricted to the formal sphere. Instead it is a development towards a series of articulations which themselves depend upon the peculiar worldview and cultural education of Hegel as a thinker living in a particular context and with particular mental restrictions and capabilities.

Schelling's critique is much more thoroughgoing than I am here able to show.28 The main point I seek to make is that it refers us to the fact that reason can never fully grasp the ground of its own existence.29 Reason unfolds the inner structure of selfdetermination, but can never penetrate behind the primary existence of the self which does the determining. Self-determination is always mediated by the historicity and finitude of the self in question. This finitude constitutes the structure of the whole of that which is, for that which is, is only as that which is not nothing. The relation of self-negation, which according to Hegel serves to give an account for the necessity of being, is itself mediated by the prior and irreducible fact of being and thus cannot function as an explanation of that very being.30 In Schelling's thought, being shows itself once more in its true and overwhelming intensity, that it is, that non-being is not. Being is thus restored in its fundamental meaning as mystery, as that which according to Aristotle has always, still does, and always will baffle us.31

II

What I have thus far attempted to do is to locate Schelling within the tradition of German Idealism. The conclusion of my remarks can thus be pulled together: Schelling represents, as Walter Schulz has so convincingly shown, the culmination of German Idealism and thereby of the entire tradition of Western metaphysics. The thinkers who follow him seem to be-if not anachronisms and thus intellectually impotentpost-metaphysicians. This is the case for Marx and Nietzsche, for Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Schelling himself both completes the tradition of metaphysics and initiates the post-metaphysical epoch. It is my primary contention that he accomplishes both of these moments in one philosophical act: thinking that which is so in its totality that it once again appears as looming defiantly over the abyss of non-being. "Once again," I say, for this is a return to a disclosure of the fiery Logos of Heraclitus, the well-rounded circle of being revealed to Parmenides that is sharply defined over

²⁷X, 131.

²⁸I have dealt elsewhere with the relationship between Schelling and Hegel. See Joseph Lawrence, Der ewige Anfang. Zum Verhältnis von Natur und Geschichte bei Schelling (Tübingen: Köhler, 1984), pp. 14-48.

²⁹With regard to the pure facticity of reason, Schelling (from the time of the Ages of the World into his late philosophy) makes frequent use of the untranslatable term "unvordenklich," which refers to that being behind which thought cannot penetrate insofar as it itself is the precondition of thought.

³⁰ Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 34-41.

³¹Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1028 b 3-5.

against non-being.³² The end of metaphysics is the return into its beginning. It is this that post-metaphysical, "post-Hegelian" thinking is just now coming to realize. Schelling as a post-Hegelian is far more than an Hegelian.

He is an Aristotelian.

Now, for those who have a general acquaintance with Schelling this claim might seem strange. For Schelling is often relegated to the tradition of Neoplatonism33 and apparently he did not occupy himself seriously with the texts of Aristotle until at least the middle period of his thinking (1809-1821).34 But even in the earliest period, when Schelling was occupied with the Neoplatonic scheme of being and thought, the real and the ideal, as complementary emanations of absolute identity, we find significant Aristotelian features. Some of these were clearly mediated by Leibniz: the notion of rest as the ultimate origin of movement, the insistence upon the infinite divisibility of matter, the idea that nature is constituted by a dynamic interaction between opposing forces of expansion and contraction, and above all the doctrine that essence is unique to the individual, that primary form is not a single idea shared by many different individuals, but that such form is always unique and individual in its manifestation.35 I emphasize this latter point, for one finds that in Schelling's own rendition of the theory of ideas he identifies the ideas with the gods of mythology and then emphasizes the fundamental particularity and historicity of the gods and their world.36 Schelling is thus Aristotelian even in his Platonic phase.

This becomes even more evident when one notes how Schelling differs from Leibniz: he insists upon the irreducibility of sensual qualities to quantifiable structures and thus develops a philosophy of nature in the spirit of Goethe's *Farbenlehre*—and in that of Aristotle's twofold attack against the formalism of Plato, on the one hand, and, of Democritus, the originator of the atomic theory, on the other.³⁷ But, above all, the

³²It was one of Heidegger's significant accomplishments to bring Parmenides and Heraclitus together in this fashion.

³³For example Harald Holz, "Die Struktur der Dialektik in den Früschriften Fichtes und Schellings," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970), pp. 71–90.

³⁴The first sign of a sustained confrontation with Aristotle we find in the discussion of the principle of contradiction in the *Ages of the World*. In the two early versions (referred to here as *WA*), Schelling regards the principle as a hindrance to the recognition of the unsublatable contradiction which lies at the heart of all being. But in the 3rd version (published in volume VIII of the *Sämtliche Werke*), the principle is presented in its positive and correct Aristotelian significance as an ontological principle governing the transition from potentiality (which admits contraries) to actuality (in which such contrariety is overcome). We also find in this 3rd version of the *Ages of the World* the first systematic presentation of the theory of potencies which dominates the late work (see volumes XI and XIII) and is there presented in explicit reliance upon Aristotle.

³⁵It is one of the merits of Alan White's popular introduction to Schelling that it calls attention to this Aristotelian understanding of essence by Schelling. See Alan White, Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1983), p. 87. White's work relies on the thesis of Klaus Hartmann that Schelling's philosophy is significant insofar as it completes (and by its failure displays the absurdity of) the theological moment in metaphysical thinking, while at the same time (through the critique of Hegel's Logic) calling into question the validity of the parallel ontological completion of metaphysics. See Klaus Hartmann (ed.), Die ontologische Option, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976).

36V, 393-95.

³⁷Lawrence, op. cit., p. 177. Particularly relevant in this regard are Aristotle's *De Gen. et Corr.*, II, 1 and *De Caelo*, III, 8, which focus on the infinite divisibility of matter as the necessary indeterminate ground for the generation and decay of individual entities.

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early Schelling proves himself an Aristotelian in the incredible pathos with which he describes the emergence of nature from the depths of a teeming, swirling, dark and chaotic *prima materia* which itself exists only as potentiality but which as the undying appetitus materiae for form and actuality gives itself constantly over to the ordered and organic world of completed nature.

The insight into the Dionysian core of nature, the indeterminate ground from which nature moves toward form and determination, so central to the philosophy of nature, is retained and given greater depth in the middle period of his thinking, the period of the treatise, Of Human Freedom, and the uncompleted, perhaps uncompletable main work of Schelling, the Ages of the World. This latter work exists in numerous versions, all of which collapse before the insurmountable problem of how to incorporate the future (the dimension of indeterminacy par excellence) into a systematic philosophy of the whole. But the primary problem of this middle period is how to account for the reality of evil: in this single problem one confronts the riddle which actual human history seems to unfold apart from and outside of the orderly progression of absolute reason. It is a riddle which Hegel's philosophy of history failed to acknowledge. Instead of explaining away the apparent irrationality of history, Schelling sees in it the primary proof of the reality of human freedom. The question thus emerges. How is this freedom to be reconciled with the metaphysical demand that there be an ultimate system of the whole, that all beings ultimately be united in a unified system of being as such?

Schelling's resolution of the problem is simple and elegant. Human freedom he views as possible, insofar as human existence is grounded, not in the fully articulated form of the Absolute, in the light and clarity of the divine understanding, but in the formless and chaotic ground from which the Absolute eternally elevates itself and defines itself as Absolute. It is in this problematic that Schelling's implicit Aristotelianism becomes progressively more explicit.

For Aristotle, the critique of Plato's theory of ideas rests upon the central insight that ideas lack within themselves a ground for their independent subsistence. A form is always the form of a concrete individual. Individuality is retained only on the basis of an indefinable material substratum that is finally responsible for separating one being from another being. Substantial differentiation necessitates a ground that cannot be dissolved into transparent and fully cognizable forms. If this ground were itself fully determinate, then every being that emerges from it would be a mere manifestation of one common substance, for the determination would define the ground—as by Spinoza—in the form of one being. This is the basis of Aristotle's understanding of prote hyle—of prime matter.³⁸

For a being dependent upon the Absolute to be able to raise itself in defiance against the Absolute, it must have a ground of independence, which Schelling understands as primeval nature, tamed, but never fully overcome, in its formation into an ordered cosmos. A child is dependent upon his or her parents and yet proves itself a true child first when it lays claim to its own individual person, when it finds that it must go its

³⁸The concept of prime matter is the ultimate consequence of Aristotle's stand against Parmenides' philosophy of identity. The path of being and not-being is not set apart from the path of being, indeed the latter is clearly the continuation of the former, as one realizes when one sees to what extent the problematic of the unmoved mover in Aristotle arises out of the problematic of movement, in particular the recognition of that which is eternal motion (*Met.* IX, 8 and XII, 6). For Aristotle's understanding of prime matter, see *Met.* IX, 7 and *De Gen. et Corr.*, II, 5.

own way. That the way of each is, however, unique and unrepeatable, is the result of the individual's subsistence in an indeterminate ground, the actual source of individuation. The rational organization of the manifold of reality into that unity that emerges when each difference is accorded its proper place in the system of the whole, can itself be accomplished only *after* differentiation has occurred. If the law of idenity *alone* reigned, then all things would be reduced to the abstract form of an undifferentiated void. The condition of the rational disclosure is thus that which violates the standard of reason: this is given in the fundamental metaphysical category of potentiality, whereby one and the same thing can potentially be different and contrary (though not contradictory) things.

This last thought, unfolded in a series of elaborate theories of potency, led finally to Schelling's deep engagement with the writings of Aristotle and to his discovery of the true ontological import of the principle of contrariety (which generally carries the name of its special instance, the principle of contradiction). Schelling was perhaps the first major philosopher since Aristotle himself to see clearly that this principle is not to be understood in its formal and trivial sense, but as a generative principle, by virtue of which the contrary claims of potentiality are separated and defined so that potentiality moves toward actuality.³⁹ Potency is thus, in its primary meaning, the principle of growth and development in that which is real. The principle of "contradiction" is above all a principle of *change*.

Schelling shares with Aristotle the realization that reason, the form which unfolds being into the unity of its absolute disclosure, has *unreason* as the necessary condition of its development. This—and not the *ratio*—is what Schelling means by ground. His discovery of the *historicity of being* is a discovery—as paradoxical as this may sound—that carries Schelling back to Aristotle, who is so often thought of as the thinker of an eternal and unchanging nature. A simple reference to Aristotle's *De Generatione et Corruptione*, which treats the difference between the genesis and death of individuals and the cyclical mixture and return of the elements, should suffice to establish the parallel.

To extend the paradox, we might reflect upon the final consequence of Hegel's thought, which is generally viewed as more profoundly historical than Schelling's.⁴⁰ The sublation of the condition of reason into reason itself—the project of Hegel's Logic—is the eradication of the actual subsistence of reason in an ordered and unfolding cosmos. The logic of Hegel has nihilism as its necessary conclusion. Speaking historically, and with an eye on our present situation, this may mean world destruction, the irrevokable "end" of history.

I can thus conclude this section by referring once more to Schelling's critique of Hegel. He finds ridiculous, for instance, Hegel's hopeless attempt to find a proper transition from logic to nature. The absolute idea, Hegel says, decides to surrender itself to the real. According to Schelling, this is impossible. "That which is to make a free decision must be something which actually exists," he writes; "a mere concept cannot make a decision." For Schelling himself the problem of the transition does not exist; his own thinking, he says, "is already with its first step within nature." *12

³⁹XI, 304-315.

⁴⁰For the position that Schelling's is indeed a more profoundly historical philosophy than Hegel's, see Paul Collin Hayner, Reason and Existence: Schelling's Philosophy of History (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967).

⁴¹X, 154.

⁴²X, 146.

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What is fascinating in Schelling is the way in which he was forced—in defense of the traditional Christian doctrine of a creation which arises from a free decision of a truly existing being—to think beyond the position of Christian metaphysics according to which a creation would be *ex nihilo*. For he grasps nature as the necessary precondition of the creative act. It is in this sense that he refers to the "unfathomable antiquity of the physical."⁴³

With this we arrive at the one thought that most clearly draws Schelling towards Aristotle.⁴⁴ For the realization that nature cannot be constructed by reason, that it is not a product, but is always pre-given and functions as the condition of the disclosure of rationality, is a thoroughly Aristotelian insight, as is indeed the realization that nature is not a system of dead and inanimate things but a system of possible entities hungering and thirsting for form and being. That such form is not finally attainable, if such an attainment would mean that the universe be frozen in a single manifestation, follows from the original and ultimate meaning of form itself, for form is activity, a ceaseless attraction of not-being into being, whereby in each disclosure of being absolute and complete presence may be realized, for not-being is the opening in which beings are. The irreducibility of being into a series of discrete and separable forms makes possible its unity. This unity is mirrored in each of its parts, each of which is a self-subsistent and independent whole.⁴⁵ In Schelling's words,

we demand for reason as for imagination that nothing in the universe be compressed, limited or subordinated to anything else. We demand for each thing a particular and free life. Only in the lower form of the understanding is there subordination. In reason and in imagination everything is free and moves itself in the same ether, without pressure or friction. For everything is in its turn for itself the whole.⁴⁶

One senses here a profound metaphysical pluralism that lets thinking respond to the unique form of being embodied in every individual entity—and which precludes the subordination of such a form to a unified system of being as such. It is precisely such a pluralism which lies at the root of Schelling's growing attachment to Aristotle. His counsel to the philosophical initiate can thus be read as a description of Schelling's

⁴³VIII, 205; WA, 9, 46; XII, 620.

⁴⁴Schelling's early philosophy of nature could well be explicated as a kind of rediscovery of the Greek undertanding of nature as *physis*. And yet, according to the late Schelling, who is particularly concerned with the correspondence between his own earlier understanding of intellectual intuition and Aristotle's concept of *noesis noeseos*, he had—despite the remarkable convergence he points to—not read Aristotle at all during the early period (XI, 559). We find here evidence of a fundamental *inner* relation between Greek philosophy and German Idealism that transcends any question of historical influence. For an illuminating discussion along these lines of Schelling and Aristotle see Georg Picht, *Hier und Jetzt*, vol. 1, (Stuttgart: 1980).

⁴⁵The most suggestive account of the ambiguity of form is to be found in Aristotle's *Physics* II, 1, where privation is explicitly acknowledged as a kind of form. It is precisely such an ambiguity that is necessary for the final understanding of form as activity (*Met.* IX, 8). The ambiguity is of course not absolute but is to be understood in terms of a *pros hen* equivocity. The *one* in terms of which the equivocal terms can be resolved is, however, clearly the activity itself. The latter is contrasted with any motion which exhausts itself in the attainment of its goal. It is not contrasted, however, with motion *per se*, for it is the form of eternal motion.

⁴⁶V, 393.

own philosophical path: "the best course for a life dedicated to philosophy is to begin with Plato and to end with Aristotle." His late philosophy—the four volumes of the philosophy of mythology and revelation—is structured around an elaborate interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, in which Aristotle is finally made to conform to the general outline of the systematic program of German Idealism, but not without first effecting a transformation of that program opening it ecstatically towards the future, the region of what cannot be posited, but can only disclose itself according to its own secret logic.

Ш

From what has been said the general parameters of Schelling's philosophy of history are already apparent. All of history cannot, in the Hegelian fashion, be regarded as a single progression from chaos to form which itself follows upon form having, for the sake of its manifestation, given itself over to chaos. For the two moments are more intimately interrelated than even Hegel had realized. Freedom as pure self-determination beyond all conditionality is an illusive goal and cannot constitute the solitary telos of history. There is no one form of being, for the latter is the form of the formless. Stated more concretely, what Schelling would ultimately reject is the monolithic character of Hegel's philosophy of history.

This is not to say that Schelling overlooked the evident movement of history towards planetary unity. In his early *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (1800), such a movement is in fact the center of his concern. Kant's ideal of a world-federation of states bound together by a common constitution and a common concept of right represents for the early Schelling the ideal towards which history is necessarily directed.⁴⁹ But such an ideal is not the final *telos* of history, but rather the necessary condition of the attainment of the final goal, which lies above and beyond the political form of the state. The organization of a legal constitution Schelling sees as the development of a "second and higher nature" which, if successfully organized, will function on a purely mechanical level. Its purpose is to assure that peace without which the higher life of the spirit, which breaks the bonds of necessity, cannot be unfolded. World government is the necessary condition of the free and separate articulation of each autonomous culture. That culture itself as the life of freedom is irreducible to any one form of expression points to what is unique in Schelling's philosophy of history.⁵¹

The contrast to Hegel lies in particular therein, that Schelling regards freedom as more than the mere Spinozistic affirmation of necessity. It is his attempt to preserve a place of authentic freedom which leads him to deny the possibility of an "absolute synthesis" of freedom and necessity, that is, he explicitly denies that the providential plan of history can ever be realized in time. "The ultimate ground of harmony be-

⁴⁷XI, 380.

⁴⁸For an excellent treatment of how the late Schelling builds his theory of potency around an interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* see Hideki Mine, *Ungrund und Mitwissenschaft. Das Problem der Freiheit in der Spätphilosophie Schellings*, (Frankfurt/Bern: Peter Lang, 1983), pp. 57-90.

⁴⁹III, 586, 593.

⁵⁰III, 583. Schelling's philosophy of the state remains essentially the same in the final period of his thinking in which it is characterized as the "negative side" of the philosophy of history (XI, 563).

⁵¹How Schelling in the *System of Transcendental Idealism* accomplishes the mediation of necessity and freedom is the subject of an important essay in Werner Marx, *Schelling: Geschichte, System, Freiheit*, (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1977), pp. 13-62.

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tween freedom and objectivity (that which accords to law) can never become fully objective, if the appearance of freedom is to be preserved." If the purpose of history is the revelation of its hidden ground, this purpose can never be fully realized. God actualizes himself in human history, but always incompletely. "God is not, if being means that which presents itself in the objective world; if He were, we would not be. Thus He is involved in a process of ongoing revelation." The resistance of the ground of history to complete determination means the collapse of the priority of reason, the principle of unity in being. It is for this reason that Schelling regards the future of history as necessitating the "return of science to poetry" and anticipates the emergence of a new mythology, which itself is not to be rationally formulated in accordance with specific human needs of particular political goals, but is to represent the unpredictable gift of history itself. S4

This basic structure of Schelling's philosophy of history is recognizable in his late philosophy as well. Against Hegel, he insists that the state—the means to freedom, not its end—cannot be the goal of history.⁵⁵ The state represents essentially the limit of what we can determine for ourselves. The life of self-determination has to be directed towards a limit in order to make room for a higher disclosure which we ourselves cannot command.⁵⁶ Man is not free until he opens himself for a revelation from a spirit that, insofar as it itself is the origin of all rule, does not conform to the command of a preestablished rule. The ecstatic openness towards the principle of historical emergence is given in what the later Schelling calls "philosophical religion."⁵⁷ Such a religion is the completion of the Christian epoch, for it attains the medium of authentic universality in which no particular is subordinated to another. It is called philosophical for it is no longer exclusive⁵⁸—it transcends all cultural and national barriers and thereby fulfills the original imperative of universal love. It is nonetheless religion and not philosophy for in it philosophy's insurmountable limitation—the inexplicability of reason itself—becomes manifest.

It is in the name of philosphical religion that Schelling deals with non-Christian mythologies. It is the claim to universality which demands the acknowledgement of the truth claims of non-Western and non-Christian ways of thinking. Schelling arrives at his most important insight for a philosophy of history in his attempt to work out the

⁵²III, 602.

⁵³III, 603.

⁵⁴III, 629.

⁵⁵Thus in the ältesten Systemprogramm from 1796 (a fragment of Schelling that has been preserved in a manuscript written down by Hegel) the 21 year-old Schelling writes: "that there can be no idea of the state, for the state is something mechanical... Only what is the object of freedom can truly be called an idea. Thus we must go beyond the state!—For every state treats free human beings as cogs in a machine, which it should not do. The state must therefore be terminated." See Rüdiger Bubner (ed.), Das älteste Systemprogramm. Studien zur Frügeschichte des deutschen Idealismus, Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 9 (Bonn, 1973).

⁵⁶See Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 215-229. The higher life of the spirit—as manifested in art and philosophy—Schelling regards as the result of an inspiration that transcends what we ourselves could consciously produce.

⁵⁷XI, 250, ff; XI, 568. The primary characteristic of philosophical religion is that it "can only be sought with freedom and can only be found with freedom" (XI, 255). And yet freedom is here not thought as self-determination, but as a result of a disclosure of being itself, to which man can only be open once he has abandoned the will to determine everything according to his own ends.

⁵⁸XIV, 331.

basis for a genuine dialogue between cultures. This grows first of all out of the realization that the structure of historicity did not emerge first with Christianity,⁵⁹ but was evident in the myths that gave meaning to all archaic cultures.

In all of the original visions of mankind, in all religions without exception, we find the quiet anticipation of that series of personalities which is necessary to account for the condition of a fully unfolded and pacified creation. For it was not only the Indian religion which lets the highest God beget a second, Brahma, through whom a new world, hidden in the heart of the primeval world, is released and articulated.⁶⁰

With the exception of Vico, Schelling is the only philosopher of the tradition who regards the origin of history in conjunction with the origin of culture as such.61 His interpretation of history is developed for instance with great clarity in his portrayal of the myths of Demeter and Persephone where the possibility of radical transformation, the dawn of an utterly new epoch, is central.⁶² Like Vico, Schelling was convinced that the universal end of Christianity can be attained only where the operation of Providence in non-Christian cultures can be clearly discerned. The one God who gathers history into the Gestalt of Christianity attains his full essence as the God of love at that point where he is revealed as a non-jealous God, a God who acknowledges his kinship with all other gods. The ecstatic openness of a knowledge that confronts the ground of incomprehensibility in Being conforms in spirit with the ecstatic openness of Being itself. Although a recognition of this openness has at times been made difficult by metaphysical thinking, it can nonetheless be regarded as the fruit of such thinking when carried to its limits. Our own age appears to be caught in the grips of the uniformity of rational thinking. An appreciation of the way Schelling—at the culmination of metaphysics-rediscovers the multiplicity emanating from a Being that transcends the Logos, as the Father transcends his Son, can give us hope that nihilism will yet be overcome.⁶³ Schelling's realization that God as *Deus revelatus* is always also Deus absconditus is more than a step leading in the direction of Kierkegaard and Heidegger.⁶⁴ It is above all a recognition of the possibility of an authentic future, for

⁵⁹The standard notion that a historical vision emerges first with Christianity, that pre-Christian cultures were bound to the form of eternal recurrence, finds its classical formulation in Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago/London: Univ. of Chicago, 1949/85). This is indeed the conviction of Schelling himself in his *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* from 1803 (see especially the 8th lecture, V, 520–529). By the time of the *Weltalter* (1811–1815), Schelling had begun to look to the pre-Christian experience in order to discern the real structure of historicity.

60 WA, 68.

⁶¹See Dieter Jähnig, "Philosophie und Weltgeschichte bei Schelling" in Welt-Geschichte: Kunst-Geschichte. Zum Verhältnis von Vergangenheitserkenntnis und Veränderung (Köln: DuMont, 1975), pp. 38–67.

⁶²VIII, 345-369; XII, 636-642; XIII, 415-417. See Robert F. Brown, Schelling's Treatise on "The Deities of Samothrace" (Missoula, Montana: Univ. of Montana, 1977).

⁶³Schelling cites such Biblical passages as John 14, 28 and Mark 18, 21 in order to underscore the transcendence of the Father over against the Son (XIV, 47). This leads to a theory of the Trinity that borders on tritheism and, in the tradition of Joachim of Fiore, is used to interpret history as divided into discrete epochs governed by each of the different divine personalities (XIV, 51-73). The possibility of a new covenant is the possibility of the emergence of the new philosophical religion that will be mediated through the Spirit rather than imposed by command.

⁶⁴For an excellent discussion of this see Michael Theunissen, "Die Dialektik der Offenbarung: Zur Auseinandersetzung Schellings and Kierkegaards mit der Religionsphilosophie Hegels," *Philosophisches*

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the mystery of Being involves a depth of meaning that reason cannot uncover. Schelling is not "romantic" insofar as the entire thrust of his thinking is directed towards preparing us for a real future. The affinity of his thinking to that of Aristotle calls attention, however, to the fact that an epochal transformation, the dawn of a new age, does not end in an utter break with the past, for it first delivers the authentic past to us and thus binds us in spirit to that which is.

Jahrbuch, 72 (1965), 134–160. Hegel regards God as utterly revealed. As the Absolute, his essence is the self-clarity of the concept. By insisting upon a dimension of concealment in the divine essence, Schelling and Kierkegaard are able to set the living God apart from the God of metaphysics. It is the living God, whose revelation is historical (and not merely logical) that is the subject (in both senses of the word) of Schelling's positive philosophy. Because such a disclosure cannot be conceptually deduced, one can legitimately interpret revelation as a source rather than merely an object of Schelling's philosophical concern. It is precisely here that Schelling breaks out of the ghetto of a philosophical tradition concerned only with its own internal problematic. This is the source of that philosophical induction which links him to Aristotle.

Nietzsche as Sophist: A Polemic¹

Daniel C. Shaw

IN MOST of his writings, Friedrich Nietzsche is extremely hesitant to attempt to characterize the world as it is in itself. He overcame that hesitancy, however, in *Gay Science*:

The total character of the world is to all eternity chaos,—in the sense not of the lack of necessity, but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropormorphisms. None of our aesthetic or moral judgments apply to it.²

This assertion about the nature of reality is deeply troubling in light of Nietzsche's claims about values. What I propose to do in what follows is to examine the implications of this statement for Nietzsche's critique of morality, and how his urging positive values might best be viewed in light of this quotation.

It follows from the above quote that (in Arthur Danto's words) "there is nothing about reality to be said (or, about reality, there is only that to be said)." How, then, are we to take the assertions that morality is anti-nature, that universal values are inevitably life-denying, or that ressentiment is a destructive source of moral valuations? Even more problematic is the status of his positive statement that one ought to adopt the attitude of amor fati, or his suggestive claim that

What is essential "in heaven and on earth" seems to be...that there should be obedience over a long period of time and in a single direction; given that, something always developed for whose sake it is worthwhile to live on this earth; for example, virtue, art, music, dance, reason, spirituality.... "You shall obey someone, and for a long time, else you will perish

'An earlier version of this paper was first presented as a seminar report for the NEH sponsored summer seminar on Nietzsche and Post-Modernism directed by Bernd Magnus at the University of California, Riverside, in the Summer of 1985. I am indebted to Professor Magnus for his helpful comments, as well as to my fellow participants, especially Charles Harvey.

²Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), Section 109.

³Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 130. Further citations from this text will be followed by "Danto" and the page numbers from which they are taken.

⁴cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking Press, 1968), pp. 486-91. Further references to this text will be followed by "TI" and the page numbers from which they are taken.

⁵cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), Section 221. Further references to this text will be followed by "BGE" and the section numbers from which they are taken.

⁶cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals in Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), Book III, Section 11.

⁷cf. The Gay Science, Section 276.

and lose the last respect for yourself'—this appears to me to be the moral imperative of nature which, to be sure, is neither "categorical" as the old Kant would have it (hence the "else") nor addressed to the individual....8

The entire rhetoric of life-enhancing or life-denying values, on which both his critique and his positive views depend, seems to presuppose that *life is something in itself* which can either be enhanced or denied. Some interpreters, like Heidegger, might wish to inject at this point that life *is* Will to Power, according to Nietzsche. But this leaves us with the paradox that philosophy both denies that the world has any inherent order and affirms that (to use Heidegger's phrase) "the primal Being of beings is the Will to Power." The very status of his critique of morality, and of the alternative views which he urges, depends on solving this paradox. 10

As I see it, one can interpret the status of this critique in at least three different ways. One might claim that Nietzsche's critique is grounded in an essentialist theory of value, which corresponds with some inherent moral world order, an interpretation which he explicitly denies in the passage from Gay Science cited above. One could, alternatively, claim that Nietzsche's is a better hierarchy of values to adopt than the ones he is criticizing, according to some agreed upon set of criteria, either pragmatic or otherwise. The danger here is that one's interpretation of Nietzsche might become indistinguishable from, say, the philosophy of William James. Or, one might altogether avoid any semblance of paradox by claiming that Nietzsche's deconstruction of philosophy as traditionally conceived implies that any critique, or urging of positive views, has the status of sophistry. It is this latter alternative which I wish to develop.

Remember how the dichotomy between philosophy and sophistry was delineated by Plato.¹¹ The philosopher seeks after the truth, to which reason will infallibly guide us, if we only subject ourselves totally to her dictates. Wisdom consists in knowledge of the Forms, and it is the goal of the philosopher to attain justified true belief about these immaterial entities. On the other hand, it is the goal of the sophist merely to persuade; he deals in the realm of opinion, and indiscriminately uses all of the rhetorical devices which he finds effective in accomplishing this goal. Philosophy is a true art, while rhetoric is like cookery, merely designed to please. *Ad hominem* strategies, for example, are perfectly respectable for the sophist to employ, but the philosopher will eschew such devices as ineffective in attaining truth.

The fundamental presupposition of the above picture is that there is a "true world" which it is the goal of the philosopher to uncover, and to which reason will lead us. It is precisely this presupposition that Nietzsche denies in the section from *Twilight of the Idols* entitled "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable." He has Plato specifically in mind when he writes:

⁸Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), Section 188. Further citations from this text will be followed by "BGE" and the section numbers from which they are taken.

Martin Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra" trans. by Bernd Magnus, in *The New Nietzsche*, edited by David B. Allison (New York: Delta Books, 1977), p. 72. Heidegger's interpretation of the Will to Power as an ontological theory is, of course, controversial.

¹⁰For purposes of this paper, terms like "life," "the world," "value" and "being" are used interchangeably. This is not to suggest that they should be taken to be synonymous, but rather that the same problems of self-reference arise with regards to each of them.

¹¹Plato discussed the distinction often, but made it most clearly in Gorgias, 463a-467a.

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The "true" world—an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating—an idea which has become useless and superfluous—consequently a refuted idea: let us abolish it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.) (TI, pp. 485-86)

Once this fabled status has been recognized, the end of philosophy as it has been traditionally conceived is at hand. The classic distinction between appearance and reality is collapsed: "With the true world we have abolished the apparent one" (TI, p. 486). But abolishing this distinction undermines the rift between the philosopher, who is concerned about knowledge of the "true" world, and the sophist who deals in opinions about the apparent one.

Presumably, however, the end of philosophy does not mark the end of conversation about topics that have traditionally been construed as philosphical. The question is one about the status of so-called "philosphical" discourse, past, present or future. In the debate between the Platonists and the Sophists, the Platonists prevailed. The nature of philosophical discussion was hence dominated by the Platonic problematic. Philosophy came to be essentially identified with this problematic; anything else just was not deemed "philosophical." Nietzsche claims to have cut away the linch-pin on which this view of philosophy turned; in the absence of its grounding in a "true world," the dominance of the Platonic problematic might best be viewed as the triumph of the most skilled sophist of them all. If there is no "true world" to which philosophical world views can either correspond or fail to correspond, the question becomes one of whose views will prevail in the debate, or, to use a Kuhnian phrase, which paradigm becomes dominant.

But, if this is the case, then perhaps the sophists were right after all. Truth as correspondence is to be rejected; a number of alternative world views might be equally coherent; hence truth might best be seen provisionally as the view which is agreed upon at the end of the debate, subject to revision when the debate re-ignites. Here the sophists emerge victorious.

There are, of course, good and bad sophists, with the distinction roughly turning on the issue of whether the sophist is indeed convincing to the audience he is addressing or not. If truth is the view which is agreed upon at the end of the debate, then would it not be the good sophist who would tend to win such debates, and hence be able to impose his viewpoint on his interlocutors?

On this view, "life-enhancing" and "life-denying" locutions are merely effective rhetorical devices designed to convince one's audience, e.g. that Christian morality is to be abandoned and the will to power to be adopted. Granted that Nietzsche shows more intellectual conscience than most sophists, with his perspectivist rhetoric and his occasional recognitions of the provisional status of his assertions, still such honesty might indeed be one of the reasons some find him so convincing.

The analogy with the sophist is not without textual evidence from the Nietzschean corpus. Indeed, it was the following passage which first suggested this interpretation to me. In TI "What I Owe to the Ancients," Section 2, Nietzsche condemns Plato in favor of Thucydides, 12 in whom he claimed that "the culture of the Sophists...reaches its perfect expression." Nietzsche stated the contrast thusly, "Plato is a coward before reality, and consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has control of himself, consequently he also maintains control of things" (TI, pp. 558-59).

¹²While Nietzsche's characterization of Thucydides as a sophist is controversial, his point is still clear.

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This is quite a flattering portrayal of the sophist. One who has control of himself also has control of things by virtue of his ability to impose his own forms on a chaotic existence. Plato, on this view, confronts this chaotic existence and cannot cope with its rigors, therefore he retreats from them into the ideal realm, the "true world," seeking metaphysical solace.

The analogy with the sophist takes the sting out of the seeming paradox that Nietzsche both repudiates morality and urges values on us. Nietzsche denies morality in the sense that he claims that there are no moral values inherent in nature or man:

To deny morality—this can mean, first: to deny that the moral motives which men claim have inspired their actions really have done so.... Then it can mean: to deny that moral judgments are based on truths. Here it is admitted that they really are motives of action, but in this way it is errors which, as the basis of all moral judgment, impel men to their moral actions. This is my point of view....!³

Yet Nietzsche is perfectly willing to urge that we resolutely follow some value at length and in a single direction, and that we should sublimate the passions rather than extirpate them. What then is the status of his remarks? Are they, too, merely errors? And, if there are no "truths," what would it mean for them to be "errors"?

They would be errors if Nietzsche claimed that we all (or some of us) are obliged to follow such commands. He repudiates the possibility of any rational foundation for such claims. Yet, like the Sophist, he is still willing to urge these values upon his readers, and use every rhetorical device (including sometimes speaking as if the Will to Power were a cosmological truth) in order to influence us. Granted, such influence is not pernicious, especially given Nietzsche's constant insistence that one must find one's own way. Still, it must be assumed that Nietzsche wished to be taken seriously, and that he did not want the values he urged to be rejected out of hand.

Nietzsche repudiates the objectivity of valuation, but does not thereby repudiate valuation. Unlike Camus in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, Nietzsche does not conclude from the death of God that all hierarchial valuations are to be rejected. On the contrary, Nietzsche contends that "life itself forces us to posit values; life itself values through us when we posit values." (TI, p. 490)

But how can he make such a claim about "life"? It is at least conceivable that Camus is right, and that one need not posit values in order to live. I take Nietzsche's rhetoric here to be rather in the nature of a *challenge*. In the absence of a God, and in a world whose essence is to all eternity chaos, Nietzsche challenges us to attempt to impose some order and form on this formlessness. It is here that the distinction becomes clear between Nietzsche and previous moral philosophers. While they claimed to discover some inherent moral order already existing in nature, or the human soul, or the faculty of reason, he rejects the possibility of any such discovery. It might seem like the distinction is between finding inherent values and inventing or making one's own values and then imposing them on reality. But, if there are no inherent values to find, the distinction between finding and making no longer makes sense. We are left with actual value judgments made by particular individuals, and their influence on the actions of themselves and others, and on the world.

¹³Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), Section 103.

The position of the "new philosophers" which Nietzsche heralded is hence quite the same position as their forebears, the sophists, were in. In the absence of any such eternal forms or universal values, about which the philosopher can be right or wrong, the "new" task of philosophers is to become the synoptic visionaries of their age. Abhetoric plays a central role in this endeavor, and rightly so; "mere sophistry" is only a pejorative term when the hope of attaining the one true value (or set of values) is still being nurtured. Abandoning all such hope, Nietzsche is reframing the role of the philosopher as one who must will new values, a willing which in itself alone can be the source of such values.

If the foregoing account has anything to recommend it, we are in a better position to understand the import of his criticisms of the content of previous moral philosophies. When he criticizes the categorical imperative as shackling the truly unique individual, or condemns utilitarianism for taking happiness to be the purpose of life, he is doing so, in part, to help convince us to adopt his own theory of value, the Will to Power. Yet this does not entail that he must prove that these previous moral philosophers have failed to discover the moral truths already inherent in nature. Were Nietzsche to claim this, he would have fallen into the same trap of dogmatism for falling into which he condemns previous philosophers.

This is part of the thrust of Nietzsche's oft repeated doctrine, "There are no moral phenomena at all, but only the moral interpretation of the phenomena" (BGE 108). Were there a moral order inherent in nature, then phenomena would have inherent moral significance, and that significance would not be "merely" a matter of interpretation. But in the absence of any such order, phenomena have the moral significance which we interpret them to have, no more and no less.

One cannot overestimate the importance of the freedom (construed here as autonomy, the ability of self-legislation)¹⁵ which such a recognition makes possible for the individual. But, in Nietzsche's view, such freedom is not to be confused with license, with the random ability to do anything one feels like when one feels like it. Unlike Camus, Nietzsche does not advocate trying to make up for the absence of quality in experience by maximizing the quantity and diversity of experiences. This too is a formula for nihilism, albeit a more subtle kind than Platonism or Christianity. Such a formula opposes Nietzsche's dictum that obedience at length and in a single direction is the necessary condition for creating anything for the sake of which it is worthwhile to live on this earth.

Such creation would never lose sight of the fact that it is done over an abyss, and has no further grounding than the strength of will of the individual who does the valuing. Being such self-conscious creators is the task of the "new" philosopher:

Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say "thus it shall be!" They first determine the Whither and For What of man... With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that it is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument,

¹⁴There is a strong parallel here with the recent work of Richard Rorty, in both *Philosophy and the Mir*ror of Nature and Consequences of Pragmatism.

¹⁵It is in this sense that Nietzsche speaks of "such a pleasure and power of self-determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing over abysses." Op. cit., Gay Science, Section 347. Kaufmann comments in a footnote that "This conception of 'freedom of will' (alias autonomy) does not involve any belief in what Nietzsche called 'the superstition of free will' " in Section 345 (alias, the exemption of human actions from an otherwise universal determinism).

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a hammer. Their "knowing" is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth iswill to power. Are there such philosophers today? Have there been such philosophers yet? Must there not be such philosophers?— (BGE 211)

Just above this passage, Nietzsche puts it more succinctly: the task of the genuine philosopher demands that he create values.

This theme of creating values is a continuous leitmotif of Nietzsche's later works. It is expressed beautifully in Thus Spoke Zarathustra with the metaphor of a child. The spirit must pass through a nay-saying phase, which Nietzsche captures with the image of a lion, in order to create the freedom for oneself for new creation. But the lion cannot create new values, for that spirit must metamorphose into the child:

The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world.16

Nietzsche's criticisms of previous moral values trace the career of the lion, taking on the dragon of "Thou shalt." The lion destroys all sense of the unconditional obligatoriness of moral values, by exploding their foundations and pointing out their decadent influences. Yet Nietzsche does not face the task of the genuine philosopher if he fails to become the child and will new values.¹⁷ But he does not fail to do so. As late as the Antichrist, Nietzsche can be seen to be urging this new value: "What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness."18 But this is not the place for a lengthy discussion of so controversial a notion as the positive content of Nietzsche's theory of the Will to Power.19

Let me return to Nietzsche's critique of morality for a minute. The search for the rational ground of morality was the search for foundational proofs for universal moral standards which would apply to everyone indiscriminately. This was, according to Nietzsche, the ultimate affront to the diversity of human existence, the irrational attempt to treat as equal those who are very clearly unequal. Nietzsche reserves some of his most vitriolic polemics for such seekers after a universal morality, for they embody one of the most execrable expressions of the herd instinct, which seeks to stunt the growth of all truly unique types.20

All this ultimately hinges on Nietzsche's perspectivism with regard to values. His attitude is perhaps best expressed in the section from Thus Spoke Zarathustra entitled "On the Spirit of Gravity," "This is my way, where is yours?—thus I answered those who asked me 'the way.' For the way, that does not exist." As a self-conscious mocking of Jesus Christ, who said "I am the way, the truth and the life," Zarathrusta's pro-

¹⁶Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 139.

¹⁷This is a controversial claim. For an opposing view, see Bernd Magnus' "Nietzsche and the Project of Bringing Philosophy to an End" in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 14 (Oct. 1983).

¹⁸Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 570.

¹⁹The last chapter of Danto's book Nietzsche as Philosopher offers a clear treatment of the Will to

Power, taken both as an ontological theory and as a standard of valuation. ²⁰Indeed, Alexander Nehamas, in his forthcoming book Nietzsche: Life as Literature, argues that "What Nietzsche eventually comes to attack directly is not any particular judgment but the very tendency to make general judgments about the value of life in itself..." (p. 149-150 in the typewritten manuscript).

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nouncement points the way towards a true individual autonomy, which no longer requires gospels proclaiming the "good news" for everyone.

Yet, regardless of this, Nietzsche's earlier claim seems to be universal in thrust. Either one shall obey someone for a long time and in a single direction or one shall perish and lose all respect for oneself. Though this is only a hypothetical imperative, there is little indication that Nietzsche allows that perhaps tomorrow the human race will change to such an extent that the resolute pursuit of some values will not be required in order to give one a sense that life is meaningful. This, too, might best be regarded as a hyperbolical rhetorical ploy. It is always an effective rhetorical device to characterize a situation as offering only two possible aternatives, one of which appears patently absurd to embrace. Only then would Nietzsche be consistent with his pronouncement that every such purported standard "is at bottom a preconceived dogma, a fancy, an inspiration, or, at most, a heart's desire made abstract and refined, and defended with reasons sought after the fact" (BGE 5). Rationalizations, not reasons, ground all such proposed standards.

What I am arguing is that one clear way to see Nietzsche's attempt to urge values as consistent with his claim that moral philosophy is impossible is to embrace whole-heartedly sophistry as what really goes on in discourse about values. This means one must recognize that there are no moral facts, that all judgments of value are opinions, and that differences of opinion about values cannot be adjudicated by reference to unconditional standards of any kind. This, I take it, is the upshot of accepting Nietzsche's claim that:

Judgments, judgments of value concerning life, for it or against us, can, in the end, never be true; they have value only as symptoms, they are worthy of consideration only as symptoms; in themselves such judgments are stupidities. One must stretch out one's fingers and make the attempt to grasp this amazing finesse, that the value of life cannot be estimated. (TI, p. 474)

Such judgments are symptoms of the individual who makes them, "the personal confessions of their author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir" (BGE 6). To appreciate these assertions is to realize, according to Danto, "the moral neutrality of the world and the subjective coloring of every value judgment" (Danto, p. 134).

Characterizing the debate about values as sophistic allows Nietzsche to avoid charges of self-contradiction when he advocates certain values and character traits.²¹ He sometimes might *appear* to make claims about the nature of moral reality, or the essence of human nature. But he is well aware that no such claims can be true, in the sense of corresponding with the way the world is in itself. Nietzsche's critique of morality is sheer unadulterated rhetoric, designed to convince us that Platonic-Christian-Kantian values are to be abandoned. His advocacy of positive values and character traits has the same status. When he claims that everything that heightens the feeling of power in man is good, he is giving a seductive description of how life might be viewed, with the intent of convincing us that we, too, should adopt such a value. Such advocacy is not pernicious, for Nietzsche goes to great lengths to urge his perspectivism, that each and every one of us must fashion his or her own hierarchy of

²¹For other accounts which try to avoid this problem without claiming that Nietzsche is, in some sense, a sophist, see John Wilcox's *Truth and Value in Nietzsche* and the aforementioned book by Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, forthcoming from Harvard Press.

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values, guided by the principle that whatever hierarchy best enhances our own feeling of power is the one that is right for us.

This move would also answer some of Nietzsche's critics, who condemn him for committing ad hominem fallacies, genetic fallacies and the like. If the debate is sophistic, the traditional distinction between logic and rhetorical argumentative techniques goes by the boards. One might view Nietzsche's own criticisms of traditional logic in this light, as when he observes that "behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, too, there stand valuations..." (BGE 3). This is not to say that all rational argumentation should thereby cease. Rather, rational, logical persuasion just is the best rhetorical device, in most contexts. What logic must surrender is its claim to privileged status, as necessarily leading us more effectively to "the truth" about moral matters. Furthermore, Nietzsche's own use of hyperbole, cant, irony, insults and other such devices should hence be seen as brilliant rhetoric rather than bad philosophy. Indeed, his claim that psychology should become the queen of the sciences²² takes on a special import from this viewpoint, for the good sophist must be a keen psychologist.

The polemical status of this thesis can now be made explicit. Calling Nietzsche a sophist is controversial because of the pejorative connotation that term has taken on since Plato prevailed and set the problematic for the history of philosophy. Nietzsche's deconstruction of the philosophical tradition entails that sophistry need not be saddled with the bad reputation it has acquired as a result of that tradition. Sophists were perfectly respectable and influential members of the Athenian community, who made no apologies for their skills and abilities. If there is no "true" morality, debates about values are matters of opinion, and are hence sophistic. To indicate that this term needs to be stripped of its negative connotation, I might borrow the technique of erasure which has figured prominently in the work of Jacques Derrida.²³ My claim might best be written as follows: Debates about values are best viewed as sophistic.

This is not to deny that some beliefs and actions are more utile in attaining certain ends than others, and that this is a matter of more than one's opinion. Yet it is on the ends to be attained that the essential debate about moral values focuses, and it is this issue about which Nietzsche seems to contend that there can be nothing else save opinions.

As my interpretation has thus far been grounded in quotations from the published writings, I feel justified in concluding by citing a note from the Nachlass which states my thesis quite clearly.24

The Sophists verge upon the first critique of morality, the first insight into morality. . .they divine that all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophistical . . . they postulate the first truth that a "morality in itself," a "good in itself" do not exist, that it is a swindle to talk of "truth" in this field.

22cf. Beyond Good and Evil, Section 23.

²³As in Derrida, I am using this technique as a strategy to undermine the entrenched meaning of sophism as a result of its being vanquished by Platonism. Derrida describes the move of erasure as the strategy "of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself...." This passage from Writing and Difference was quoted by Gayarti Spivak in her introduction to Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1984), p. xviii.

²⁴For a clear discussion of why reference to the *Nachlass* can sometimes be problematic, see Bernd Magnus' "Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888: The Will to Power and the Übermensch," in the January, 1986 edition of the Journal of the History of Philosophy.

The Greek culture of the Sophists had developed out of all Greek instincts; it belongs to the culture of the Periclean age as necessarily as Plato does *not...* And—it has shown itself to be right: every advance in epistemology and moral knowledge has reinstated the Sophists—our contemporary way of thinking is to a great extent Heraclitean, Democritean and Protagorean: it suffices to say that it is Protagorean, because Protagoras represents a synthesis of Heraclitus and Democritus.²⁵

I take it that he means here that every advance in moral knowledge has confirmed the teachings of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things, and that, Platonic paradoxes to the contrary notwithstanding, moral valuations remain matters of opinion.

²⁵Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), Section 428.

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The "Cogito" in St. Thomas: Truth in Aquinas and Descartes

James Reichmann, S.J.

CENTRAL PROBLEM of continental philosophy since the 17th century has been that of self-knowledge. How does one come to know oneself? How does one know that one is a thinking being? How does one explain the genesis of the "I" awareness? What is involved in affirming that "I" exist?

René Descartes focused attention on this perennial problem of knowing which ultimately is one with the problem of truth. That is not to say that it was a problem unknown to the great philosophers of the past. Quite the contrary, but by basing the entire development of his philosophy on his *Cogito*, his "I think, therefore I am," Descartes polarized the problem in an arresting way. As a result, philosophy in the West has not been the same since, and all philosophers of the contemporary as well as the modern era can trace, in some respect at least, the perspective from which they view the searching questions regarding knowledge and truth to "The Method" of Descartes.

Supposedly, Descartes provided philosophy with a new, challenging starting point; one genuinely congenial to the climate of his times and one which respected the most dearly held convictions of the Renaissance man, namely, the privacy of the individual and the intoxicating celebration of man's "newly discovered" autonomous freedom. Subsequent philosophical developments, especially on the continent, constitute more than a mere footnote, surely, but hardly more than a complex series of variations, on the fundamental theme of the Cartesian Cogito. German idealism from Kant through Hegel wrestles mightily over the Cartesian patrimony, seeking through exquisite refinement and modification to fine tune the instrument bequeathed to them. Later developments in our own century from Husserl and the beginnings of phenomenology, through Heidegger and his phenomenological hermeneutics, including the variations of Gadamer and even to some extent of the French deconstructionists, bear subtle if sometimes faint repetitions of the original Cartesian refrain. Husserl himself acknowledged his considerable indebtedness to Descartes through his own restricted employment of the Methodic Doubt.

One of the attractive features of any philosophy which incorporates some aspect of the *Cogito* into its fabric is its openness to a personalist emphasis. It centers the philosophical enterprise where it appears it ought to be centered, that is, on the human person, whereby the very dignity and role of philosophy itself is enhanced. Whether heretofore the "I" had been significantly emphasized or not, the clear perception obtaining during the time of Descartes was that it had not; that a personalist dimension in philosophy had all but been overlooked in the preceding centuries. Certainly in our

own time one is safe in saying that there has been a fairly common persuasion amongst philosophers that the person had become objectified, reduced to the level of a mere object, a thing-in-itself, and that the active role of the knowing subject in the knowing process had all but fallen into a state of oblivion.

As is known, in his *Cogito*, Descartes designates the "I" not merely as the center of his philosophy but as its very starting point. It is an "I," however, (and this must strike any observer as strangely paradoxical), which is highly impersonal, estranged as it is from all sensory awareness and indeed from all content save that of mere thinking. The conscious life of this primordial "ego" is thus minimal. Nonetheless, it is by employing this all but empty "I" as a starting point that Descartes intends to unfold his entire philosophical system: the appropriation of himself as a person, the existence of mathematical truths, the existence of God, and, finally, the existence of the sensible world.

Let us now turn our attention to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, specifically to his theory of knowledge. Here my intent will be to explore the similarities as well as the differences found between his position and that of Descartes. To what extent is one justified in speaking of a *Cogito* in Thomas? My contention will be that Thomas' theory of knowing is personalist in a very profound sense, and that there is indeed a *Cogito* operative within his philosophy though of a quite different cast from that found in the philosophy of Descartes.

As is known, for Aquinas all actual knowledge begins with the senses. This is a point he never seems to tire of making. It is necessitated by the fact that the possible or receptive intellect is, in the order of knowing, purely potential. Thomas likens it to primary matter. Just as the latter is pure potency to form, so the receptive intellect is, as regards knowing, totally without determination; it is formless.¹ Consequently, Thomas characterizes the claim that the intellect produces forms within itself without the aid of sensible things as one which "does not appear to be entirely reasonable."²

For Thomas, then, actual knowing only takes place when the receptive intellect receives an intelligibility. This occurs through the agent intellect's illuming the sensory experience. Upon the reception of the intelligibility derived from the sensible world the receptive element is actualized in part, i.e., to the extent that the intelligibility itself participates in the actuality of being. Only at this point can actual knowledge be said to occur. For Thomas, human knowledge is markedly body-dependent because the human intellect is inherently ordered toward body and the sensible world. That is its normal and proper environment. As the lowest of all intellectual forms,³ the human intellect is only then possessed of actual knowledge when it knows something other than itself, and in the first instance of knowing that other must be an inhabitant of the sensible world.

In addition, so weak is the power of the human intellect's intellective light that it is incapable of knowing fully in one penetrating vision that which it knows. Rather, it must gradually and painstakingly find its way from one act of understanding to another, and this for two reasons. First, because what it knows, it knows but imperfectly, and second, because what it knows is not itself, but an imperfect participation of something which is.

¹Cf. De Ver., q. 10, aa. 6 & 8. ²De Ver., q. 10, a. 6. ³De Ver., q. 10, a. 8.

It is precisely the human intellect's abstractive mode of knowing that accounts for the fact that it does not know fully what it knows through one luminous gaze or *intuitus*.⁴ It is also the reason why for Aquinas there must be a complex or reflective act of understanding by which the intellect knows not only its own understanding as something proper to itself, but also as an expression of an original other, alien to itself.⁵ This intellective act, which he calls judgment, is thus unique to the human mode of understanding; it is not shared by the angelic or divine intellects which know perfectly whatever is actually present to them in any intellective act.⁶

In the human, it is in this second or perfective act of understanding that Thomas' Cogito can be seen to surface. It is in the judgment that the intellect fully appropriates to itself the nature of its own act. When first the intellect is informed by the intelligibility drawn from the sensible world, it is actualized to the extent that formal intelligibility is itself an act. Already the intellect is one with the other, though in a limited way, and the actuality of its own knowing is already the same as the actuality of that which exists independently of itself. Yet at this "moment" the intellect is not aware of itself as other. Consequently, it cannot yet properly be said to know itself. This it accomplishes through the reflective act of judgment, whereby it comes to understand the nature of its own act, namely, that it is conformed to the other. In this way the intellect comes to recognize itself as the author of that act. It is formally in the recognition of this authorship that for Thomas the "I" emerges in consciousness as actual.

Thus, for Aquinas, there is in judgment a simultaneous affirmation of the self and the other. Indeed, this is the very nature of judgment, for in judgment there is the formal recognition of the nature of the knowing act. The precise reason why the human intellective act must terminate in an act distinct from the first act of understanding, is the dual nature of the intellective act itself which emerges from the *common principle* of the self and the other intertwined and united in one actuality. Truth demands that this duality be recognized, and it is judgment which is this truth-act. It is important to observe, then, that for Thomas this duality of affirmation, which constitutes the absolutely unique nature of judgment, is necessitated by the fact that the human intellec-

⁴"But the human soul which acquires its knowledge of the truth through a certain discursiveness is called rational. This is owing to the weakness of the intellective light it possesses. For if the human soul possessed the fullness of intellective light as do the angels it would, in the first glimpse of the first principles, immediately comprehend the full extent of their power by understanding whatever could be reasoned from these principles." *Sum. Th. I*, q. 16, a. 2. (All translations of Thomas Aquinas are my own.)

5"Since everything is true inasmuch as it has the form proper to its nature, it must be that the intellect, to the extent that it is knowing, is true, because it has a likeness of the thing known, which likeness is its own form precisely to the extent that it is knowing. Wherefore truth is defined as the conformity of the intellect and the thing. Whence it is that to know that conformity is to know the truth....Consequently, properly speaking, truth is in the [human] intellect composing and dividing; not however in the sensory power nor in the intellect knowing the essences of things." Sum. Th. 1, q. 16, a. 2.

6"And this is the way it is for angels who immediately behold everything in those things which they know by nature that are knowable." Sum. Th. I, q. 58, a. 4.

⁷Sum. Th. I, q. 16, a. 2; cf. also, De Ver., q. 1, a. 9.

*...and thus the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not because the substance of the intellect is the very likeness through which it understands but because that likeness is its very form." Sum. Th. I, q. 55, a. 1, ad 2um.

9"Thus truth can indeed exist in the sense or in the intellect knowing what something is, as in a certain true thing; not however as the known in the knower, which the term truth requires, for the perfection of the intellect is the true as known." Sum. Th. I, q. 16, a. 2.

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tive act takes its rise through abstraction from phantasm.10 Further, it is important to recall that it is this same abstractive process which has necessitated the distinction between the simple and complex acts of understanding, and that hence this duality of acts and the dual dimension of the judgmental act in human knowing can never be separated, for they constitute the very essence of the human intellective act.

Yet, this is precisely what Descartes has attempted to do in beginning his philosophic quest with "I think, therefore I am." Whereas for Descartes, the "I am" is utterly empty, containing only knowledge of itself and its own doubting, for Aquinas, the "I am" of judgment is one with the "it is" of the other. There is the connatural recognition that because there is an "it is" there is an "I am," and because "I am," there is "something that is." This is possible because there is absolutely no formal difference in the act of thinking between the actuality of the self in that act and the actuality of the other to the extent that it is known. One single principle is common to both as Thomas expressly says, "But the intellect and that which is understood, just as from them is produced one thing which is the intellect in act, are one principle of this act which is the act of understanding."11

For Thomas there is no other way that the intellect could know of its own existence than by knowing something that is not itself. Yet it knows this by recognizing that the other is itself. Descartes, contrarily, claims to have a knowledge of the self without a knowledge of the other. The "I am" of the latter is an awareness of the pure self; of the self understanding its own understanding which is merely an understanding of itself. Descartes had initiated his Cogito by effecting a radical split between the act of understanding and its reflective counterpart, that is, between simple understanding and reflective understanding, or judgment. By so doing he has, in Thomas' anachronistic view, effectively sealed off the mouth of the cave through which all access to the world of the non-self is possible. Having separated understanding from judgment, and certainty from truth in a primordial way, he has no further recourse but to throw himself on the "ontological mercy" of God who, as just, cannot deceive him. Since he has opted for an initial mode of knowing that approaches that of pure intellectus, Descartes is led to exaggerate the distinction between simple understanding and judgment, and thus to occupy himself primarily with the isolated contemplation of abstract essences which, to his credit, he soon recognizes are incapable of providing him with any reliable information regarding their origin. In short, judgment as judgment is itself an unreliable witness with regard to all of his ideas other than the idea of himself, save one, that of God. Since he can know himself without knowing the "other," he cannot be sure that there is authentically a limited "other" that is not his own creation. Descartes is wholly consistent, therefore, in acknowledging that, although he reflect interiorly on the properties of triangles, he cannot withal admit or claim that there are actual triangles or triangular things.12

It again should be noted that, for Thomas, from its very inception, all self-knowledge implies more than a mere internal gazing upon oneself. From the outset, an awareness

^{10&}quot;For if our intellect were immediately to see the power of the conclusion within its source (principium), it would never understand discursively or by reasoning." Sum. Th. I, q. 58, a. 4. Emphasis added.

¹² Discourse on Method, 4, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Vol. I (New York: Dover Publications), pp. 103-104.

of other as cause of the self in knowing is indispensably present. The self understands that it understands only because of the "other." There is thus excluded altogether the very grounds upon which any initial detachment of the self from the other in the act of knowing, is radically possible. Whatever detachment of *epoche* might occur is made possible only by an antecedent primordial togetherness and identity. Consequently, the reflection Descartes employs upon the pure essences or intelligibilities within his mind is itself, for Thomas, a *derived* and not an *originating* state of consciousness. It is not a presuppositionless starting point. Perhaps nowhere else does the observation made by Aquinas at the beginning of his treatise *On Being and Essence* that a small error in the beginning results in a large one at the end, apply more fittingly, for what one initially understands by the affirmation, "I am," determines effectively the entire course of one's epistemology and metaphysics.

But one might question whether we have not gone too far in interpreting Thomas' position as one which rejects all self-awareness not accompanied by sensory experience. For does not Thomas admit to an awareness of first principles and of the self antecedent to all such experience? In responding to this question, we must consider briefly the crucial distinction Thomas makes between habitual and actual knowledge, and collocate this distinction within the broad framework of what he understands by self-awareness.

Habitual knowledge for Thomas occupies a place roughly midway between purely potential and wholly actual knowledge. In discussing habitual knowledge he straight-away distinguishes the twofold manner in which it can be understood. First, there is habitual knowledge which relates either directly or indirectly to our knowledge of sensible things. Second, there is habitual knowledge of non-sensible realities which was not obtained through the abstractive process, such as the mind's knowledge of itself and of the first principles of its knowing.¹³

Habitual knowledge of the first type differs from actual knowledge in that, although initially obtained through active intellect's having illumined the sensory experience, it does not now at this moment constitute the formal principle of the intellect's act of knowing. Nonetheless, the intellect is conscious of its possession of this knowledge in a confused way in that, nominally, it is aware that it can readily employ this knowledge if it so desires. Thus one can be aware that one speaks French without at the same time actually being conscious of even a single French word. Yet even here it is important to note that Thomas insists that the intellect again return to the phantasm and the sensible experience in order to render its habitual knowledge actual.

Now habitual knowledge in this first sense differs from newly obtained knowledge in that there is no need for it to be abstracted once again from the sensory manifold, since, as habitual knowledge, it is already present within the mind and is, consequently, already immaterial and hence de se intelligible.

As regards habitual knowledge of the second type, however, the situation is quite different, and it is at this point that one may note the closest rapprochement between the views of Aquinas and Descartes. As already noted, when speaking of habitual knowledge in the second sense Thomas is referring to that knowledge which is altogether independent of sensory experience as regards its origin; that is to say, the

¹³De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, resp.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.; see, also, Sum. Th. I, q. 84, a. 7, resp.

intelligibilities here in question were never acquired through the abstractive process. Such knowledge, then, refers to the intellect's understanding of first principles, its awareness of itself, and of its own knowing.

While Thomas continues to insist that the human soul cannot have actual knowledge of itself save through the mediacy of forms originally abstracted from the phantasm,16 he does concede that the intellect does somehow (quodammodo) know itself through its essence, and that such knowledge suffices for it to be able to proclaim its own existence. He grants this because, as he says, the intellect's own essence is inborn or initially present to itself, so that it has no need of acquiring that essence from sensory exprience.17 Consequently, even before intellect abstracts any intelligibility from sensory experience, it possesses an "habitual" awareness (notitia) of itself, and this awareness suffices for it to become aware of its own existence.18

As is apparent, the controlling word here is "habitual." Thomas is not allowing, as some recent interpreters would wish to read him, that the soul has an actual knowledge of itself and "being" prior to abstraction from phantasm. He is, however, granting that the soul is capable of moving unerringly toward such awareness of itself once some kind of experience deriving from sense is made present to the intellect. Thomas is not, then, in agreement with Descartes on this point. He does not grant that there is any special kind of actual self-awareness prior to sense experience, but rather he is simply allowing that the habitual knowledge which the intellect has of itself and indeed of the first principles, is immediately present to intellect once it is actually informed by a sensory likeness. In other words, there is no actual a priori knowledge of any kind, nor does the intellect derive an awareness of its own existence by some kind of inference, or through a further process of abstraction. Since the intellect itself is already de se intelligible, nothing more is required for it to be able to understand itself than that it understand, for its very nature is to understand. But, of course, it cannot understand unless it understands something which is not itself.19

Thomas likens the knowledge which the soul has of itself to the awareness it has of habits relating to sensible things or at least of those habits of which it becomes aware concomitantly with sensory experience.20 As seen, in order to make use of its habitual knowledge, that is, to transform that knowledge from habitual to actual knowledge, no further acquisition of an intelligible form is required, but merely a turning toward the sensible experience itself, i.e., the phantasm. In like manner the habitual knowledge of the self is converted into actual knowledge. What Thomas affirms here, then, is that actual self-knowledge and knowledge of first principles are concomitantly present to any act in which the intellect understands some thing. Thus in one act of knowing, the intellect understands the thing of which the intelligibility is an abstracted likeness, the intelligibility itself, the first principles of being, and itself as the subject exercising the act of understanding.21

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, ad lum.

^{18&}quot;But its (the intellect's) nature is inborn, so that it has no need to acquire it from phantasms." De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, ad lum.

^{19&}quot;And therefore before it abstracts from phantasms the mind has an habitual knowledge of itself, by which it is able to perceive that it is." In III De Anima, 1. 9 (725).

²⁰"Likewise the possible intellect, which is in potency only in the order of intelligibilities, neither understands nor is understood save through the form it has received]" De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, resp.

²¹De Ver., q. 1, a. 9, resp.

This mode of concomitant knowing, then, for Thomas, differs significantly from the ordinary manner of knowing in that, although accompanied by a sensory experience, the latter is merely its occasion but not its cause, since the sensory experience does not *provide* the knowledge of the self. In responding to an objection which had argued exactly the contrary, contending, that just as the sense cannot know itself, so neither can intellect understand itself through its own essence, Thomas rejoins:

Something is said to be known in two ways. In one way as when from the knowledge of some one thing comes to the knowledge of some other thing, and in this way conclusions are said to be known through their premises. In this manner no one can be known by oneself. In another way something is said to be known inasmuch as it is known in something (in quo), and in this way it is not necessary that that by which something is known be known by knowledge other than that knowledge which it itself provides. Whence nothing prevents something being known through itself, just as God knows himself through himself, and it is in this wise that the soul somehow knows itself through its essence.²²

Thomas' explanation, therefore, of intellect's concomitant self-awareness provides a consistent account as to why it is that the human intellect is not constantly aware of itself actually, even though its own essence is *de se* intelligible and ever present to itself. For just as habitual knowledge need not be known actually, "...so neither is it necessary that the intellect itself, knowledge of which is within us habitually, should always be understood in act on the grounds that its own very essence is present to our intellect."²³

Yet as already seen, in order to know itself the human intellect must have knowledge of something other than itself for, as he argues very plainly, before one can understand that one understands, one must first understand something.²⁴

It can readily be seen, therefore, how Thomas' *Cogito*, i.e., his explanation of the soul's becoming aware of itself and its own existence, differs from that of Descartes. For Descartes the awareness of self is without qualification, the first knowledge which intellect possesses, not concomitantly with knowledge of some other thing, but absolutely. Descartes leaves no doubt about his view on this matter, for he affirms that:

Because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be; and because there are men who deceive themselves in their reasoning and fall into paralogisms, even concerning the simplest matters of geometry, and judging that I was as subject to error as was any other, I rejected as false all the reasons formerly accepted by me as demonstrations.²⁵

Descartes hastens to add:

But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the "I" who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth "I think, therefore I am" was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking.²⁶

²²De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, ad 9.

²³De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, ad 11.

²⁴De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, resp.

²⁵Discourse on Method, 4, trans. Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 101. ²⁶Ibid.

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If we now inquire, however, into the quality of the connatural knowledge which Aquinas acknowledges the soul possesses of its own existence whenever it knows anything at all, we note a further distancing of his position from that of Descartes. This connatural knowledge only reveals, in Thomas' view, what is proper to the soul precisely as individual, and not what it shares with other intellects, for it uncovers nothing of the nature of the soul.²⁷ Such differentiated self-knowledge is hard to come by, he allows, and is acquired only after an arduous and subtle inquiry.²⁸ Consequently, this primitive, connatural knowledge cannot function as the first principle of inquiry into the nature of the self, the nature of truth, etc. as Descartes would want to have it, for "many have remained ignorant of the nature of the soul; many have also erred in regard to it."²⁹ Thomas is thus arguing that were we to have direct knowledge of ourselves in the manner which Descartes contends we do, we would instantaneously possess full and unerring knowledge of the self, and hence there would not be varying views concerning it taken by philosophers.

For Thomas, contrarily, connatural knowledge is no more than a knowledge of mere presence, since by it the intellect is aware of itself as present to its own act, but that is all.³⁰ Such knowledge does not suffice to distinguish this individual self-presence from any other, or indeed to uncover their similarities, even the most general. Such detailed and differentiated knowledge can only result from an ongoing dialectic between mind and thing, whereby the nature of the intellect is revealed to it gradually through its own actualization which is, in turn, unequivocally dependent upon the acquisition of intelligibilities drawn from the natures of things existing independently of the knower itself. Here the position of Aquinas would surely appear to resemble that of Hegel and Martin Buber more than that of Descartes, for both acknowledge, each in his own way, the need for an "other" somehow alien to the self to account for the phenomenon of self-appropriation.

Were we able to imagine Thomas in dialogue with Descartes himself he would simply deny to the latter the right to speak about his triangles at all, even though no claim be made that triangles actually exist, since the very idea of triangle involves a consciousness of a differentiated mode of being which could not procede from the self known as mere individual presence. Nor would Thomas allow Descartes to argue, as he does, that mathematical knowledge is implicitly or habitually present within the mind from the outset,31 since such habitual knowledge would preclude the possibility of its having been learned. In short, the very deductive process upon which Descartes himself so heavily relies to develop his philosophy, would itself be outmoded and without purpose. If all knowledge is habitually present to mind and has never been experientially acquired, its content should be completely and instantaneously grasped whenever mind adverts to it. In other words, it is contradictory to speak of a development of knowledge through time, if that knowledge was not originally in time. Nor, further, would Descartes have a ready explanation as to how it was that he himself had such an extraordinary grasp of mathematics while others, less fortunate than himself, struggled even to acquire the mere rudiments of that difficult science.

²⁷De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, resp.

²⁸Sum. Th. I, q. 87, a. 1, resp.

²⁹ Ibid.; see also, De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, ad 2.

³⁰De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, resp.

³¹ Discourse on Method, p. 103.

In short, in order for Descartes' manner of proceeding to be consistent with his initial starting point, he needs to disgard entirely the rational schema by which he reasons from the unknown to the known. Having begun his philosophy with pure intellection, he should have no need to return to the flesh-pots of reason. Thomas finds an irresolvable ambiguity in any theory of knowing which employs reason to advance knowledge and which at the same time claims to possess a differentiated knowledge of the knowing self through knowledge that is inborn, and is not, rather, the result of an ongoing encounter with the sensible world. Thomas states that:

...our mind is unable to understand itself in such wise that it might immediately apprehend itself; but from the fact that it apprehends other things, it comes to a knowledge of itself, just as the nature of primary matter is known from the fact that it is receptive of this or that form.³²

Indeed it is precisely because of the mind's initial and continuing dependency upon the experiential world that it must rely upon the reasoning process to garner its knowledge, and this dependency in turn is owing to the inherent weakness of its intellective power.

It is thus obvious that the fact that our intellect understands by discoursing, and by composing and dividing, derives from one and the same source, namely, from the fact that it is unable immediately in the first grasping of something first apprehended to view everything virtually contained within that thing. And this is owing to the weakness of the intellective light within us...³³

As suggested at the outset, perhaps the one aspect of Descartes' philosophy which made it so appealing to many of his contemporaries, as well as to numerous others since, is the central role it gives to the self and the thinking subject. In concluding this brief study I should wish, therefore, to accentuate what I perceive to be the authentic personalist dimension of Thomas' theory of knowing. I do believe that, at its profoundest level, Thomas' view is thoroughly personalist, even though it is not uncommonly represented as reflecting the quintessence of an objectivizing impersonalism.

What Thomas seeks to achieve through his complex theory of knowledge is the unfolding and appropriation of the self, the "I," which is at the center of the intellective act, and which itself orchestrates the tempo and direction of its own development. The role of the other in this quest for self-appropriation, (if I may borrow Lonergan's felicitous phrase) is altogether essential, as has already been emphasized. Yet the goal of all intellective striving is first the completion of the knowing subject, even though, as seen, such an achievement is by no means attained in isolation. His knowledge theory is, from the very beginning, essentially social and communal. There is no self-growth without the other. Self-awareness is always the result of a dialectical process, and is grounded on the primal assumption that, while being itself is not dialectical, its appropriation in time is. Only through the reception of alien differentiated intelligibilities can the human intellect structure itself, thus rendering itself actually intelligible. Only by involving itself with the other does the human intellect fulfill its destiny by

³²De Ver., q. 10, a. 8, resp. ³³Sum. Th. I, q. 58, a. 4, resp.

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becoming that toward which it is primordially ordered, differentiated being. The "It is" of the other is transformed into the "I am" of the self. This is not an impersonalist view, for the completion of this union of self with the other which is knowledge, results not in the transformation of the other which is known but of the self which knows.

Historically, it is indeed curious that the knowing-self of Thomas' knowledge theory has not been more generally recognized as containing much of what is of value in the Hegelian dialectic. Subject and object, knower and known are synthesized in Thomas as they are in Hegel and the overcoming of this dichotomy is for Thomas precisely what constitutes knowing. He plainly says that "among those things which are actually understood, the intellect is one with that which is understood." That is to say, the "I" is no longer itself, but has taken on the being of the other; it is sublimated through its union with the other. It is not only that the "I" recognizes another "I" standing over and against itself as another self in the Buberian sense, but, even more, in its act of knowing it simply is the other. Objectivity and subjectivity are transcended, for the act of understanding and the understoood are one.35

Thomas, then, rejects out of hand any explanation of the knowing act whereby knowledge can be effectively divorced and isolated from its source. Judgment can never be wholly suspended where real knowledge is concerned, for it is precisely that phase of human knowing whereby the intellect completes its act, so that intellect simply cannot be said to know the truth, that is, itself as having become the other and as intimately united with it in one actuality, one act of being, without that return. More briefly, there cannot be for Thomas an "I am" which is actual in the fullest sense of that term, where a suspension of judgment occurs. To separate in this fashion the reflexive act of understanding from that upon which it reflects, that is, the act of judging from the conceptualizing of differentiated being, as though the two were externally related or independent activities and not one complex activity constituting the fullness and completion of the intellective act, is simply to falsify knowledge from the start. The Cogito of Descartes is thus incapable of living up to the demands placed upon it of providing an unequivocal, presuppositionless ground for philosophy, because the "I" of the "I think" is as empty at the termination of its thinking as it was at the start. Discovering nothing within which is not itself, it is reduced to the sterile affirmation of "I am I." The egg which it was painstakingly incubating, turns out disappointedly to be nothing more than a wind egg, and one can perhaps envision here faint anticipations of the Fichtean Ego and of the Sartrean being as undifferentiated nothingness.

On the other hand, for Thomas, there is a close parallel between both elements of the twofold nature of the act of human understanding and of the being that is known, for judgment is related to the simple act of understanding as *esse* is related to essence.³⁶

³⁴Sum. Th. I, q. 87, a. 2, ad 3.

³⁵De Ver., q. 8, a. 6, resp.

^{36&}quot;... the intellective activity is twofold. There is one act which is said to be the understanding of indivisibles by which the nature of each thing is known. The second act is that by which the intellect composes and divides, that is, by forming a negative or affirmative proposition, and these two acts correspond to two realities which are found in things.

For the first act of intellect looks to the very nature of the existing thing... "The second act of intellect looks to the very being of the thing (ipsum esse rei) which indeed results either from the coming together of the principles of the thing, as in the case of composite beings, or merely accompanies the simple nature itself as in the case of intellective beings." In Boetii De Trin., L. II, q. 1, a. 3, resp.

Judgment is the formal completion of the intellective act just as esse is the ultimate form, that is, actuality, of essence. And just as esse adds no differentiation to essence but only the actuality of being, so judgment adds "merely" the subject's recognition reflectively, and hence existentially, of what the subject already knows essentially, that is, in terms of content. And just as there could be for Thomas no metaphysics without the inclusion of the act of being (esse) within the circle of the subject of its inquiry, so there can be no viable account of human knowing where, in Cartesian fashion, there is a systematic exclusion of judgment from the very act of knowing which is itself inquired into, for it is precisely in judgment, the reflexive act of understanding, that the act of being is formally present as the supreme actualization of the act of human knowing. Further, it is precisely in judgment that the intellect recognizes and affirms that the esse of the act of understanding is, from the very fact that it is differentiated, one with the esse of that which is known; that the "I am" is one with the "It is." There can be no "I think" or "I am" without something's having been appropriated; there can be no self-appropriation without the simultaneous appropriation of the "other." Thus all self-appropriation is at the same time other-appropriation. Selbstbegreifung is always Andersbegreifung. And that is why the duality operative within the very structure of every full act of human understanding can be brought into formal unity only through the reflexive act of judgment by which the duality is overcome and by which the formal identity between the self and the other in the act of understanding is thematically uncovered and recognized.

Ultimately for Thomas it is both the poverty of human intellective striving and the radical contingency of the object of human knowing which necessitates our differentiating between the understanding of the essences of things and the understanding of them in their being, viz., between simple and reflexive understanding or judgment. Because, constrained to know through abstracting intelligibilities from sensory experience, the human intellect is condemned to begin with a very imperfect knowledge of things and hence of itself; and only through persevering effort is it able to obtain an ever fuller knowledge of that which it already knows but imperfectly. Thus Thomas will expressly state that, were our intellects capable of knowing initially all that was knowable about the things it knows, it would never understand through composition and division, i.e., through an act of judging which is distinguishable as act from simple understanding. Rather, a simple gaze or *intellectus* would suffice.³⁷

The Cogito of Descartes, therefore, would remain for Thomas a profound anomaly, for the former has fashioned a method incompatible with the very program the latter would envisage. Descartes has attempted to conjoin a pure intellectus with the act of reasoning. The former involves much more than the connatural knowledge of Thomas, since it alone suffices to provide a clear and certain knowledge of undeniable truths. The latter is employed to provide further knowledge about what is already known, which, for reasons unknown, the pure gaze of understanding itself is incapable of supplying.

In Thomas' view Descartes has opted for a kind of human knowledge which seeks to effect a middle way between human and angelic understanding, and which, as a

³⁷Sum. Th. I, q. 58, a. 4, resp.

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result, fails to provide us with either. Descartes has ultimately misread the significance of human reasoning, I believe, because he lacks a viable theory of judgment, and such a theory escapes him because he grounds knowledge primordially on essences, which for him bear no inherent relation to that which is. One may reasonably inquire whether this may not be the weak link in the great chain of modern philosophy from his time even until our own.

The New Mentalism and the Mind

Deryl J. Howard

THERE SEEMS TO BE a new mentalism afoot in contemporary philosophy of mind. Behaviorisms, both psychological and philosophical, are increasingly viewed as inadequate to the phenomenon of consciousness, and identity materialism seems to have become the playground of modal logicians rather than a viable theory for humanistically oriented psychologists, knowledgeable psychobiologists, or serious metaphysicians. The kind of approach I have in mind has been advocated (with important variations) by, for example, Popper and Eccles, Roger Sperry, and John Searle.

It would be beyond the limitations of this paper to explore the whole history, rationale, and variations in the "new mentalism." My main purpose is to sketch some common themes and to proceed rather directly to the question of how this sort of appeal relates to the question of the "reality of the mind."

The main thrust of the new mentalism is the ontological reality of consciousness and intentionality: the full participation of the mental in the determination of behavior. This, it seems, is a more robust mentalism than the view developed by Fodor's functionalism and the artificial intelligence school; it is certainly more metaphysically interesting.

John Searle sets the tone for the new mentalism when he writes (concerning recent versions of physicalism, behaviorism, and functionalism):

My own approach to mental states and events has been totally realistic in the sense that I think there really are such things as intrinsic mental phenomena which cannot be reduced to something else or eliminated by some kind of re-definition.⁴

And he proceeds to point out that:

No one ever considered his own terrible pain or his deepest worry and concluded that they were just Turing machine states or that they could be entirely defined in terms of their causes and effects or that attributing such states to themselves was just a matter of taking a certain stance toward themselves.... No one would think of saying, for example, "Having a hand is just being disposed to certain sorts of behavior such as grasping" (manual behaviorism), or "Hands can be defined entirely in terms of their causes and effects" (manual functionalism), or "For a system to have a hand is just for it it be in a certain computer state with the right sorts of inputs and outputs" (manual Turing machine functionalism), or "Saying that a system has hands is just adopting a certain stance toward it" (the manual stance).5

¹The Self and Its Brain (New York: Springer, 1977).

²Science and Moral Priority (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1983).

³Intentionality (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983).

⁴Searle, op. cit., p. 262.

⁵ Ibid., p. 263.

Searle's own view, on the contrary, is that "mental states are as real as lactation, photosynthesis, mitosis, or digestion. Like these other phenomena, mental states are caused by biological phenomena and in turn cause other biological phenomena." But Searle in no way sees his view as entailing dualism or interactionism. Mind and brain are both thoroughly part of the "natural order." Mental states are "both caused by the operations of the brain and realized in the structure of the brain (and the rest of the central nervous system)."7

In another place Searle has argued that there is no more of a "mind-brain" problem than there is a "stomach-digestion" problem. That is, digestion is not the stomach, but it is caused by and realized in the stomach. Digestion is not something epiphenomenal. Likewise, the liquid or icy or steamy properties of H₂O are caused by and realized in the molecules, but are properties of these molecules "at a higher level of description than that of the individual molecule."8

At this point, I would like to make two comments on Searle's view, one negative, and one positive. Negatively, in the selected comments as given above (and they are representative), I fail to see what would clearly distinguish Searle from philosophical behaviorists. I think that Gilbert Ryle (in The Concept of Mind) would be happy to accept the analogy that the mind-body problem is like the "digestion-stomach" problem. Also, Searle has not overcome the notorious problem in Ryle-namely how do we deal with the phenomenological reality of consciousness. After all, Searle's examples of digestion, lactation, photosynthesis, mitosis and the properties of H₂O are all about physical properties, albeit at different "levels" of description. None of the discussion about these examples comes close to touching the vital, perplexing phenomenologically apparent dichotomy between the mental and the physical.

My positive comment on Searle is that elsewhere in Intentionality (chapter four) he develops the concept of intentional causation which presents an attractive alternative to mechanical causation. Some such viable account of mental causality must be developed if the hegemony of mechanical causation is to be overcome or an adequate theory of mind-brain relation developed.9 This would be needed even if dualism is not eventually accepted, for some model of the "interlevel" causality would be required; and to retain a "billiard ball impact" model of causality in such a context would seem to show an excessive obsession with an antediluvian mechanomorphization of human behavior.

In this respect Searle's model of intentional causation may eventually be of use, even if his treatment of consciousness remains short of the mark.

His notion of "levels of description" brings him to the interesting comment that (paralleling Leibniz):

The behavior of H₂O molecules can never explain the liquidity of water, because if we entered into the system of molecules "as into a mill we should only find on visiting it, pieces which push one against another, but never anything by which to explain" liquidity. But ... we would be looking at the system at the wrong level. The liquidity of water is not to be found at the level of the individual molecule, nor are the [mental properties of] visual perception and the thirst to be found at the level of the individual neuron or synapse.10

⁶Ibid., p. 264.

⁷Ibid., p. 265.

See also E. M. Adams, "Mental Causality," Mind, 75 (July, 1966).

¹⁰Searle, op. cit., p. 268. The parallel comment from Leibniz is from Monadology, paragraph 17; the brackets are my own.

These comments bring us to our second proponent of what I am calling "The New Mentalism" (TNM): the psychobiologist, Roger Sperry. Sperry also argues for a non-reductionist treatment of the mental, for a view of the mind as an emergent factor in evolution—although also for a definitely non-dualistic, thoroughly naturalized account of consciousness. But the ontological, causal reality of mind is definitely central:

The conscious mind in this scheme, far from being put aside and dispensed with as an inconsequential "by-product," "epiphenomenon," or "inner aspect," as is the customary treatment these days, gets located front and center, directly in the midst of the causal interplay of cerebral mechanisms. Mind and consciousness are put in the driver's seat, as it were; they give the orders, and they push and haul around the physiological and the physical and the chemical processes as much as or more than the latter processes direct them. This scheme is one that puts mind back over matter, in a sense, not under or outside or beside it.¹¹

And although the mind is thrust back into a central causal role, there is no dualism: the causal power "resides in the hierarchial organization of the nervous system and in the power executed by any whole over its parts." 12

Once generated from neural events, the higher order mental patterns and programs have their own subjective qualities and progress, operate and interact by their own causal laws and principles which are different from and cannot be reduced to those of neurophysiology.... The mental forces do not violate, disturb, or intervene in neuronal activity but they do supervene.... This idea is very different from those of extraphysical ghostly intervention at synapses and of indeterministic influences on which Eccles and Popper had earlier relied.¹³

I apologize for the above lengthy quotations, but I do feel that we need the precise wording in order to evaluate the mentalism sans dualism which Sperry is advocating, and I think we can clearly see that Sperry's approach is quite close to that of Searle. In each case there is an insistence on the mental, its efficacy, its own mode of causation, its own principles of organization and the "supervenience" of these on the physiological without "ghostly" intervention or violation of the natural order. It would seem that the most plausible way Sperry could make out this claim would be if he agreed with Searle that the mental and physical are "different levels of description of a substance, when the phenomena at each of the different levels function causally."14 The picture I derive from Searle and Sperry is reminiscent of the relation of a society and its members, wherein the society is not something dualisticically distinct from the members, but is "caused by" and "realized in its members"-yet it has its own principles of organization and causation (political, social, economic) which are at a level of description different from, and not reducible to, talk about the individuals and their personal properties (psychological, etc.). The society supervenes and there is a "downward causation" of the holistic principles over the behaviors of the parts.15

¹¹Roger Sperry, op. cit., p. 31.

¹² Ibid., p. 66.

¹³Ibid., p. 92. Italics my own.

¹⁴Searle, op. cit., p. 268.

¹⁵ Michael Polanyi has also emphasized this sort of relation in his arguments against reductionism.

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But, again, the question must be asked whether the new mentalism without dualism is satisfactory and coherent, or whether it is really not a mere physicalism diluted with mind still too ephemeral. (After all the mental is still the physical at a "different level of description"—Searle; and "extraphysical ghostly intervention is undesirable" -Sperry).

Popper and Eccles have been developing their own version of TNM which involves a full interactionist dualism. It is impossible here to summarize the arguments of *The* Self and Its Brain, but I shall try to capture the crux of the argument which carries us beyond Searle and Sperry.

The main thrust of their answer to Sperry and Searle would be as follows. The latter give us a philosophy of mind in which the mental is distinguished from the physical in terms of "level of description" (Searle) or different "causal laws and principles... [which] cannot be reduced to those of neurophysiology" (Sperry). But neither of these analyses can explain how one can have an "analytical" difference without an "ontological" difference. Both Sperry and Searle seem to verge dangerously on the edge of saying that the semantic dimension of a book differs from the physical dimension only in levels of description. But at least when Sperry talks of "different causal laws and principles" he is being ruthlessly honest to the point of undermining his own opposition to dualism. For instance, when Sperry disparages dualism by reference to "extraphysical ghostly intervention at synapses," he is missing the point radically. Such an interpretation would only be another "quasi-physical" efficient-causal agency -not something operating on entirely different causal principles. Different laws and principles are not to be understood as "ghostly" efficient causes, but as something altogether different. It is at this point that an inadequate, but incorrigible physicalism keeps showing itself in Sperry (as well as Searle).

Popper restates the perennial thesis of the interactionist-dualist in the following way:

. . . the point at issue between him [the physicalist] and the interactionist is precisely whether such things as logic (which is an abstract system) exist (over and above particular ways of linguistic behavior).16

If we follow this imitation we are led further in the direction of Popper's own more robust Dualism. Just as the semantic material of a book is something radically different ontologically from its physical material in the sense of having its own constitutional principles, logical relationships, grammatical rules, and normative-teleological modes of constitution and causality,17 it is hard to see how this dimension of the mental can be considered to be the physical as described at a "different level." Why should a different level of description have a consciousness and subjectivity supposedly not present at lower levels of description?

It is here that Popper's insistence on mind and consciousness as ontologically real per se, transcending the categories and principles of the physical, seems to make sense.

Primarily it makes sense in evolutionary terms. If Searle and Sperry are right, there seems to be no reason for consciousness to have emerged in the process of evolution.

¹⁶Popper, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

¹⁷E.M. Adams has argued for such a version of causation in the "Mental Causality" article mentioned above, and also in chapter VII of Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1960).

There might emerge physical systems of greater and greater complexity which could deal with their environments in increasingly adaptive ways—with Sperry's super-understandable in evolutionary terms, it must have an importance, a new efficacy, a mode of operation which gives it some survival value apart from any physical instantiations with which it may be associated. (All of this has been stated in classical objections to Epiphenomenalism, as Popper realizes. I restate the issue here merely because I cannot see how Searle or Sperry do anything to carry us beyond these objections.)

But Popper's Dualism does make consciousness make sense in evolutionary terms. (Certainly the primal first stages of it are obscure in his account, but so are the primal stages of matter in physical cosmology.) But the role of consciousness in general is not quite clear: it makes theories and conjectures, follows out implications, criticizes alternative lines of action, and evaluates the consequences. This has survival value: it is a great boon to the sentient organism, as Popper points out, for it allows theories to die in our stead. Intelligent organisms can bury their bad theories; unintelligent organisms die with their bad habits.

In doing this work the mind grasps the normative demand of what ought to be, of what follows, of what is necessary for closure and completion. This is done in different modes and dimensions: logical, ethical, aesthetic, mathematical, etc. These are complex tasks requiring much effort and grappling and grasping, of guessing, intuiting, estimating, and metaphor-mongering. This is what the development of minds is all about. There is no hint that this could go on in the purely physical realm. There are more realities than physical ones, and minds have evolved to trace them out.

As for computing devices, they may be constructed by us to *imitate* these processes, but surely they do not *grasp* and *grapple with* intellectual problems any more than a camera *sees*. Comprehension is one thing, going through the motions is another. Searle does recognize this point and has argued it forcefully, but I must omit reiteration of those arguments here.¹⁸

A final note about the "interaction problem" itself. It is true that it remains a mystery as to how minds and brains interact. It is a problem, and I find no satisfactory solution to it in Popper. But the fact that it remains a problem should be a stimulus to philosophical reflection and psychological research. In the twentieth century, however, it should not be the stumbling block that it was in the seventeenth century with its obsession with mechanism. An age that routinely works with interactions of fields (even probability fields) and matter should not find the interaction of mind and brain so acutely paradoxical.

Perhaps what is needed is more imagination, and certainly more spirit, in the philosophy of mind.¹⁹

¹⁸See Searle's article "Minds, Brains, and Programs," in John Haugeland, ed., *Mind Design* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 282-306. Also see Searle's *Minds, Brains and Science* (London: BBC, 1984), pp. 28-41.

¹⁹A version of this paper was read to the 1984 meetings of the Intermountain Philosophy Conference and the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. I appreciate the comments and criticisms of my colleagues at these meetings.

The Bertrand Russell Society announces a call for papers to be presented at its meeting with the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in December 1987. Papers may be on any aspect of Russell's Philosophy. They should have a reading time of about one half an hour and should be submitted in triplicate, typed and double spaced with an abstract of not more than 150 words. The name of the author, with his address and the title of his paper, should be submitted on a separate page. The submission deadline is April 15, 1987 and the papers should be sent to David E. Johnson, Chairman, Philosopher's Committee, The Bertrand Russell Society, Sampson Hall, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD 21402. Those desiring the return of their papers should enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

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Desire and Recognition in Sartre's Saint Genet and The Family Idiot, Vol. 1

Judith Butler

Each torpid turn of the world has such disinherited children, to whom no longer what's been, and not yet what's coming, belongs. Rainer Maria Rilke¹

BIOGRAPHY APPEARED a promising form of philosophical inquiry for Sartre as early as L'être et le néant (1943), for it seemed to be the only way to establish the truth of his claims about the structure of human reality in concrete and demonstrable terms. As Hazel Barnes has pointed out, the biographical studies of Genet and Flaubert fulfill the expectation that L'être et le néant aroused—the performance of a concrete existential psychoanalysis of individual lives.² In the chapter, "Existential Psychoanalysis," Sartre maintains: "this psychoanalysis has not yet found its Freud. At most we can find the foreshadowing of it in certain particularly successful biographies. We hope to be able to attempt elsewhere two examples in relation to Flaubert and Dostoevsky." In a related passage Sartre makes clear why the reconstruction of an individual life is crucial for the fulfillment of his own philosophical project:

...to be, for Flaubert, as for every subject of "biography," means to be unified in the world. The irreducible unification which we ought to find, which is Flaubert, and which we require biographers to reveal to us—this is the unification of an original project, a unification which should reveal itself to us as a non-substantial absolute.

Every individual is organized by a unitary project, a striving after possibilities which either do not or cannot exist. Thus, human reality is a project; in other words, to be human is to be projected into a world ontologically differentiated from oneself. Human reality is ek-static, beyond itself, incessantly referential. A being comported toward what it is not, the individual is not a self-contained entity, but the lived experience of being enthralled with the world. This being whose fundamental feature is

¹Rainer Maria Rilke, *Duino Elegies*, tr. J.B. Leishman and Stephen Spender (New York: Norton, 1963), p. 63.

²Hazel E. Barnes, Sartre and Flaubert (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 2.

³Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, tr. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 575. All reference to L'être et le néant will be to the English translation.

⁴Ibid., p. 561.

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to be outside itself is defined as desire. "Desire is the being of human reality,"5 the concrete expression of the original project, the non-substantial absolute. As an implicit quest after substance, desire can never be fulfilled except through the death of consciousness. The attainment of substance, a pure and seamless presence, would be the eradication of all ontological difference, the collapse of consciousness into the factic world. Because consciousness cannot relinquish itself, it remains desire. And desire is absolute to the extent that this fundamental project to exhaust itself into the world remains impossible.

Human beings are indistinguishable in this "original project" to achieve and to become a substantive presence in the world. They begin to exhibit individuality in the various ways they contend with the ever-present problem of elusive substance. Hence, the self is a style of responding to inevitable dissatisfaction, a particular configuration of longing which, over time, becomes distinctively one's own. As a project and choice, this constitutive desire is itself constituted, but not for that reason deliberately created. Human desire, although spontaneous and unreflective, is nevertheless a kind of choice; in Sartre's terms, desire is the concretization of a pre-reflective choice, the kind of volitional act which we make but only later realize that we have made. The choice manifest in desire, the project which unifies the individual, is lived as a passion and pursuit. Hence, it is distinguished from those kinds of deliberate choices executed at an instrumental distance from the world. As pre-reflective, this constituting choice stylizes the spontaneous urge for presence. Desire is never a simple immediacy, but contains an interpretive element as its inception. As Sartre claims, "the fundamental project, the person, the free realization of human truth is everywhere in all desires...it is never apprehended except through desires..."6 Desire is, then, the hermeneutical occasion for the disclosure of an individual's fundamental project, the unified legacy of choices over how to be in a world where substantial and final being is an experiential impossibility.

The hermeneutical task of discovering a fundamental project in and through desire proves problematic in Being and Nothingness, and the turn to biographical inquiry seems a necessary supplement to the schematic character of the earlier text. Being and Nothingness presents desire as a unity of three interrelated projects: the original project (the anonymous and universal desire to be), the fundamental project (the individual desire to be a determinate way), and the myriad projects of everyday life (the particular desires directly manifest in lived experience).7 Sartre argues that these three desires are only analytically separable, and that in experience they are given in one stroke as a symbolic unity. As early as Baudelaire (1947), the biographical studies sought to clarify the interrelationship of these various dimensions to desire in the context of a concrete individual.

In Hegelian terms, Sartre attempts in the biographical inquiries of Genet and Flaubert to exemplify these two individuals in their "concrete universality," elucidating affective life as a symbolic unity of particular and universal elements. In terms which recall the Kierkegaardian filter through which Sartre appropriates Hegel's view of the subject, Sartre claims to illuminate Flaubert's life as a "universal singular."8

⁵ Ibid., p. 575.

⁶ Ibid., p. 567.

⁷Ibid., p. 567. *Sartre uses this term in The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert, 1821-1857, Vol. 1, tr. Carol Cosman (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press), 1981, p. ix. He also entitled a lecture on Kierkegaard, "The Singular Universal," delivered at an international colloquium entitled "Kierkegaard Living" in Paris in April, 1964. A

The mediation of particular and universal desires is less an assumption of ontology—an inexorable development—than a task or demand to which every individual effects an original response. Although Sartre's study of Flaubert is written after Sartre's Marxist turn, the existential framework still serves his theory of the self. Sartre's acknowledgment of the profound effects of infantile development and social and political structures on the life of desire does not culminate in a renunciation of the doctrine of choice; rather, choice is recast as a subtle process of appropriation and reinterpretation, a daily task of reproducing a complex historical situation in one's own terms, reworking this history, fashioning it anew. Flaubert's struggle with substantial being takes on historically specific terms: "summed up and for this reason universalized by his epoch, he in turn resumes it by reproducing himself in it as singularity."

Both Genet and Flaubert singularly reproduce their personal and historical circumstances in their literary works, and these works, in turn, become for Sartre the unified symbolic expression of their fundamental desires. Because desire always and fundamentally intends an object beyond its reach, satisfaction resides in a merely possible, or imaginary, world. Desire manifests the pre-reflective choices at its origin through the imaginary—the symbolic expression of desire. Sartre's selection of Genet and Flaubert as the intentional objects of his biographical desires seems hardly accidental; both authors sought resolution for desire in the imaginary realm, and both concretized or "realized" the imaginary in actual literary works. Sartre remarks, "The reason I produced *Les Mots* is the reason I have studied Genet or Flaubert: how does a man become someone who writes, who wants to speak of the imaginary?" Questioned on why he chose Flaubert, Sartre answers in words which might well explain his choice of Genet as well "Because (Flaubert) is the imaginary. With him, I am at the border, the barrier of dreams."

Sartre is interested in how these individuals come to dream and how their dreams are *realized*, how they take form as literary works, and how these works reflect the fundamental passions which constitute these lives. Desire's goal finds satisfaction only in the realm of impossibility; the imaginary, as a postulated presence, relieves consciousness temporarily of its estrangement from plenitude. The particular ways in which Genet and Flaubert author the imaginary universe reflect their fundamental attitudes towards being; thus, the literary transcription of the imaginary becomes the hermeneutical situation in which to read back the tacit rationality of desire, the cultivated style of responding to impossibility, the singular choice implicit in that response.

translation by Peter Goldberger can be found in Josiah Thompson, *Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press), pp. 230–265.

⁹Sartre, *The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert, 1821–1857, Vol. 1*, p. ix. All further quotations will be from the English translation of volume I of *The Family Idiot*. The succeeding volumes, available in French in the Gallimard editions, are not considered here mainly because the first volume elaborates the theory of desire more explicitly than the later volumes. Volume I also attends to the problem of childhood experience and its relation to the literary imagination. The later volumes cover the material and cultural traditions from which Flaubert laboured, and thus do not attend the problem of how the dialectic of desire and recognition constitute personal identity. Certainly, these themes are taken up in a limited way in the succeeding volumes, but Sartre's efforts seem more concerned with a reconciliation of psychoanalysis and Marxism than with a concretization of his own earlier theory.

¹⁰Interview with Sartre, "Itinerary of a Thought," New Left Review (November, 1969), p. 52.

11 Ibid., p. 52.

The literary "realization" of the imaginary provides a tentative satisfaction of the desire to overcome the ontological disjunction between consciousness and substantial being. Literary works foster the illusion that consciousness can transfigure substance itself. Genet takes issue with a social world which seems intractable; through the production of literary works, he achieves a sense of personal efficacy otherwise denied him. The "difference" he overcomes is between himself and others; through the performance of his plays, "he forces others to dream his dream." In his earlier vocation as thief, Genet imagines that his crimes will disrupt the complacency of bourgeois life, but he cannot sustain this dream of disruption precisely because he is caught. Genet's desire to create a dream which effectively transforms the social world is realized only through art. He cannot escape this defining—and degrading—look of the Other, so he endeavors in his plays and poetry to direct the Other's look, to captivate his audience and thereby gain mastery over their perspective on him. Sartre writes, "The fact is that he prefers the work of art to theft, it is because theft is a criminal act which is derealized into a dream, whereas a work of art is a dream of murder which is realized by an act....Murderers achieve glory by forcing good citizens to dream about crime."13

Genet seeks to escape the look of the Other, to become an invisible power, non-corporeal, who inconspicuously determines the experience of others as they watch or read his plays. But Genet also *solicits* recognition through writing; as Sartre points out, "with words, the Other reappears." The transformation from thief to poet is predicated on the recognition of the Other's inevitability. And yet for Genet, the Other cannot simply be accepted; from childhood on the Other has signified a social reality which has excluded and illegitimated Genet. Banished from the world of the Other, Genet attempts through art to assimilate the Other to *his* world, the inverted world of the bourgeoisie in which crime, vulgarity, and sexual license are prevailing norms. As Sartre remarks, "...incapable of carving out a place for himself in the universe, he *imagines* in order to convince himself that he has created the world which excludes him."

Sartre's biography of Genet traces a career that begins with victimization and culminates in radical invention. Genet inverts his relationship to the social world through an original reproduction of language. As a young orphan alienated in his adopted home, Genet decides to steal silverware from his adopted family. Genet is caught and called a "thief" whereby he becomes in others' eyes the social outcast he already sensed himself to be. According to Sartre, Genet's theft is his first act, the moment in which he determines himself as the kind of individual whom others fear and loathe. Illegitimate by birth, Genet takes up this illegitimacy and transforms it into a personal mission. He will become the illegitimate child who robs others of their tokens of legitimacy. His tools are wrought from the weapons originally turned against him; he becomes a master of inversion, sensing and exposing the dialectical possibilities of the social opposition between himself and others.

The possibility of a dialectical inversion of the power relations characterizing his original relations with others is to be found in language: "'I'm a thief,' he cries. He listens to his voice whereupon the relationship to language is inverted: the word

¹²Sartre, Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr, tr. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Braziller, 1963), p. 546.

¹³Ibid., p. 485.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 455.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 468.

ceases to be an indicator, it becomes a being." 16 "Thief" is, in effect, Genet's initiation into poetic words. The word does not refer, but creates; through being so named, Genet has become the name itself. The name clings to him as an essential moment of his being. Sartre argues in Saint Genet that "poetry uses vocables to constitute an apparent world instead of designating real objects." Hence, poetic words are those which constitute imaginary realities, just as the vehement appelation, "thief," transforms the child Genet, invests him with an identity, a destiny, and restricts his possibilities. The transformative power of language will become Genet's weapon in forcing others to "dream his dream". Upon the discovery of this power, Sartre maintains, "Genet wanted to name, not only to designate, but to transform." And the object of his transformative acts will be the social world of "the just," the instrumental world of the bourgeoisie, and the rigid and hypocritical moralities which sustain those orders.

Sartre's biographical narrative of Genet and Flaubert trace the resolution of desire into the imaginary, and the imaginary into a set of literary works in which a long-standing struggle for recognition is taken up and pursued. For both Genet and Flaubert—indeed, also for Sartre—words become the vehicle through which childhood is renewed and revised. The primary desire to be implies the primary desire to be affirmed, and this life-long struggle for recognition is thematized and reenacted in the linguistic construction of imaginary words. Moreover, in both cases the literary appropriation of this struggle effects an inversion of the power dynamics constituted by the original situation. Sartre's biographical study of Genet has been called his most Hegelian work, 19 but we can also see in *The Family Idiot* the constituting role of recognition in Flaubert's struggle to create a self. 20 For both Genet and Flaubert early

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁷*lbid.*, p. 512. Cf. Sartre, *What is Literature?*, tr. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 35–37.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 280.

¹⁹Douglas Collins argues that in Saint Genet "the most powerful outside influence is Hegel," that "the master-slave relationship...reappears in Saint Genet as the framework for moral questions" and that "in Saint Genet all issues are approached dialectically." Sartre clearly departs from Hegel's program in Collins' view: "Hegel's individual consciousness, without being anulled, becomes at one with itself and others, whereas Sartre's unhappy consciousness must resort to a more earthly cure...the projection of the self upon the other," Sartre as Biographer (Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 84-85.

²⁰Desire finds its proper object in the recognition of any by another self-consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Chapter IV. Introduced earlier in the section on "Self-Certainty," desire is claimed to be "self-consciousness in general" (#167), tr. A.V. Miller. Before encountering another self-consciousness, Hegel describes desire as a ceaseless quest after objects; the implicit project of desire, *qua* self-consciousness, is the reproduction of the world of substance as the world of the subject. In the transition to the Master-Slave dialectic, self-consciousness, in the mode of desire, realizes that it can only effectively assimilate the exterior world through the assimilation of another self-consciousness. The reasons for this are varied and much documented: see Hans-Georg Gadamer's "Hegel's Dialectic of Self-Consciousness" in *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, tr. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1976), and Ludwig Siep, "Zur Dialectik der Anerkennung," *Hegel-Jahrbuch*, 1975.

The Master-Slave dialectic underscores the role of recognition in the constitution of subjectivity. Neither Master nor Slave can understand themselves as having objective existence without the recognition of the other. Recognition thus becomes central to the quest for substantial being. Alexandre Kojeve and Jean Hyppolite sought to accentuate the relationship between desire and recognition in their various lectures and writings on Hegel in the 30's and 40's in France. In particular, Kojeve used the framework of Chapter IV of the *Phenomenology* to establish Hegel as a social theorist and political philosopher. Marcuse sought to do this as well, but not through reference to desire, but to its derivative form, labor. Sartre was clearly influenced by the French reception of Hegel, attending Kojeve's lectures at the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes* and engaging in dialogue with Hyppolite on a number of occasions.

childhood is a scene of deprivation; Genet is excluded from the legitimate social community, while Flaubert is *mal aimé*. These original situations of victimization are reinterpreted—although not entirely overcome—through the imaginary transcription of the scene. In Sartre's view, the literary works transform the meaning of early childhood suffering through the active process of its imaginary representation. Imaginative writing makes use of the passive and receptive sensibilities of early childhood, effecting enough critical distance from these sensibilities to embody them in literary form. Writing does not transcend or resolve victimization, but is condemned, as it were, to reformulate this original situation again and again. As active reformulation, writing becomes an assertive response to a passive past, but that is not to rewrite the past, nor to escape it as a necessary and relentless theme. As Sartre says of Genet, "to write is to explore systematically the situation into which one is thrown."

Sartre understands the struggle for recognition intrinsic to early childhood as the self's dramatic evolution into existence. The desire to be at its earliest states is the urge to exist for another—in other words, the need to be loved; this primary relation to the Other forms the pathic structure of every individual life. Rejecting the tendency in *Being and Nothingness* to treat fundamental projects as choices emerging *ex nihilo* from the for-itself, Sartre claims in *The Family Idiot* that "what is important here is to reject idealism—fundamental attitudes are not *adopted* unless they first exist. What is taken is what is at hand."²² The original and constituting project of the self is thus primarily a relation to others, and the development of the self over time is the reenactment of these earliest relations. Incorporating this Freudian insight into his own terms, Sartre realizes that the ontological sketch of desire in *Being and Nothingness* must give way to analysis rich with biographical detail. In *The Family Idiot* Sartre writes, "without early childhood, it is obvious that the biographer is building on sand."²³

Sartre shows in Saint Genet and The Family Idiot how these dissatisfied children come to assume adult careers as authors of the imaginary. Significantly, since the writing of Psychology of Imagination (1960), Sartre viewed the imaginary as the only possible satisfaction for desire.²⁴ Genet and Flaubert thus seem to exemplify truths which characterize the human situation universally for Sartre. Their dissatisfactions are so many appearances of a primary human dissatisfaction. As desire is a "useless passion," so the constituting desires of Genet and Flaubert persist without a final destination in being. Although Sartre refers to the abused child Genet as a "crack in the plenitude of being," he refers to human beings generally in such terms; indeed, consciousness is said to be a "rift" in being. The loneliness of the unloved child reflects the existential loneliness of every consciousness, its differentiation from substance, its exile from the realm of being.

The turn to the imaginary as a possible satisfaction for desires is precipitated by the belief that worldly fulfillment is impossible. The absence of a primary Other who might attend and recognize the child culminates in an adult belief that the world as such is hostile to human desire. For Genet, this constitutive absence in his life prompts

²¹Saint Genet, p. 558.

²²The Family Idiot, p. 43.

²³ Ibid., p. 44.

²⁴Sartre wrote, "A desire is never satisfied to the letter precisely because of the abyss that separates the imaginary from the real" (p. 211) and "the image is a kind of ideal for feeling" (p. 103), *The Psychology of Imagination* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948).

his turn to imaginary worlds as a temporary and compensatory filling for the impoverished social landscape. Inferring his illegitimacy, Genet reacts to this lack of recognition through the linguistic invention of a universe, effecting his own transubstantiation into words. Without a body, Genet tacitly figures he will be exempt from the need for recognition. Genet writes, "this wonderful language reduces the body, wears it down until it is transparent, until it is a speck of light." Genet's self-denial becomes the precondition of his illuminary life. Sartre concludes: "Genet evaporates; he believes seriously, profoundly, in a transubstantiation that would wrest him from his actual life and embody him in words, those glorious bodies." Flaubert suffers a somewhat altered fate at the hands of his mother: "Gustave is immediately conditioned by his mother's indifference; he desires alone..." As a child Gustave suffers from intense lethargy, and Sartre describes him as living in a state of "passive emotion." Lacking recognition, i.e. lacking parental love, Gustave becomes convinced of his own inevitable inefficacy and resolves, paradoxically, to use his characteristic receptivity to absorb the world:

Without *value*, Gustave feels need as a gap, as a discomfort or—at best and most frequently—as a prelude to an agreeable and imminent surfeit. But this discomfort does not break away from subjectivity to become a demand in the world of others, it remains inside him, as inert and noisy emotion; he suffers it, pleasant or unpleasant, and when the time comes he will suffer satiety....He has neither the means nor the occasion to externalize his emotions through outbursts of any kind; he savors them, someone relieves them or else they pass, nothing more. With no sovereignty or rebellion, he has no experience of human relations; handled like a delicate instrument, he absorbs action like a sustained force and never returns it, not even with a cry—sensibility will be his domain.²⁷

Sartre argues in *The Family Idiot* that the constitution of the self follows only from the internalization of parental attitudes. The parental "look" becomes the manner of the child's self-regard, and the "self" that one sees is always the self first seen and, hence, constituted, by others. To make a demand for oneself, to translate desire into speech and action, presupposes the existence or possibility of another who might respond. Where there is no Other, desire turns back on itself and becomes rigid and mute. Unconvinced of the possibility of such an affirming response, Gustave the child remains mute and inexpressive, unable to discover or know a self. Of Flaubert Sartre writes: "He was...frustrated well before weaning, but it was a frustration without tears and rebellion." Similarly, Genet's early abandonment leaves a mark of essential poverty on his character; Genet does not grieve or despair over his loneliness because "grief and despair are only possible if there is a way out, whether visible or

²⁵ Saint Genet, p. 20.

²⁶The Family Idiot, p. 133.

²⁷Ibid., p. 130-1. Without recognition, Sartre argues, a child lacks a sense of personal rights. Flaubert does not dare to desire in his early years, for desire itself presupposes belief in the right and capacity to be fulfilled: "...in order to desire one has to have been desired; because he had not internalized—as a primary and subjective affirmation of the self—this original affirmation of objective, maternal love, Gustave never affirmed his desires or imagined they might be satisfied. Having never been valorized, he did not recognize their value. As a creature of chance, he has no right to live, and consequently his desires have no right to be gratified; they burn themselves out, vague transient fancies that haunt his passivity and disappear, usually before he even thinks to satisfy them...he is consumed by the negative of desire, by envy.", p. 409.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 129.

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secret."29 Both Genet and Flaubert lack the means to recognize their own substantiality, and because they cannot see themselves reflected in their parents' gaze, they are forced to invent themselves. Imaginary characters become the key ways in which these unmirrored selves find objective existence for themselves in the social world. Remarking on the youthful Flaubert, Sartre writes, "Gustave is certainly tormented by the need to know himself, to unravel his tumultuous passions and find their cause. But he is put together in such a way that he can understand himself only through invention."30 Genet is denied the benefits of early recognition, and although he senses his exclusion as a determinate, though negative, relation to others, he still lacks the means to see himself as the exiled being that he is. After he commits his crime, the young Genet "is ready to hate himself if he can only manage to see himself."31

Although the early childhood struggle for recognition is surely definitive of adult life, it does not determine the texture of adult experience in a strict sense. The earliest dramas of desire establish the reigning motifs of a given life and circumscribe the domain of possible choices. Early childhood does not unilaterally produce adult life; its causality is less mechanical than dialectical. Childhood maintains its power in adult experience to the extent that its themes are appropriated and reinterpreted in contemporary terms. Gustave remains passive only because he continuously believes that this is his only option. Sartre explains: "... passivity does not simply exist; it must continually create itself or little by little lose its force. The role of new experience is to maintain or destroy it."32

Sartre understands subjectivity not only as the culmination of a history of circumstances but, more importantly, as the singular realization or determination of this history. In other words, subjectivity is an essentially reflexive structure, one which is not only made, but makes itself. Circumstances cannot be denied, but neither can they be viewed deterministically. The individual appropriates historical and biographical cuircumstances and concretizes—or realizes—them in his own personality; this is the concept of the universal singular. In The Family Idiot, Sartre refers to the individual as both sign and signifier, and suggests that the effects of history and circumstance ought to be understood as constituting the person as sign. He concludes that "... if every person in the singular contains in himself the structure of the sign, and of the totaled whole of his possibilities and his projects is assigned to him as its meaning, the hard, dark core of this meaning is early childhood."33 Sartre's fundamental project of Being and Nothingness, now filterd through the medium of early childhood, calls for reformulation: choice becomes the incessant process of taking up a childhood drama which has already asserted itself as the guiding motif of one's life. One is not free to take this motif up again—one must: subjectivity is bound to thematize the conditions of its own existence: this is the necessity of its reflexive structure, and the inherent logic of its desire.

Sartre seems implicitly to refer to Hegel's formulation of self-consciousness in claiming that the particular historical situations of Genet and Flaubert gain their significance only through their realization. Mid-way through the first volume of The Family Idiot, Sartre warns his readers that a comprehensive understanding of Flau-

²⁹ Saint Genet, p. 191.

³⁰ The Family Idiot, p. 211.

³¹ Saint Genet, p. 47.

³²The Family Idiot, p. 42.

³³ Ibid., p. 44.

bert's life cannot be content with a causal history of his internal life, for no "cause" can take "effect" save through the moment of its appropriation or realization in the person of Flaubert. Hence, Sartre argues that we must seek an explanation in terms of Flaubert's intentional aims, his fundamental project. In language which recalls Hegel's doctrine of self-consciousness, Sartre writes,

...intimate experience is characterized ontologically by doubling, or self-consciousness. It is therefore not sufficient to have shown the original structure of this life and its particular kind of alienation, not even to have reconstituted its immediate savour; starting with the facts at our disposal we must determine the way in which this experience is made living. If he is condemned, how does Gustave realize his condemnation?³⁴

As in his earlier works, Sartre questions in *The Family Idiot* the origin of the fundamental projects of human beings. In contrast to the analysis offered in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre's ontological categories in *Saint Genet* and, particularly, in *The Family Idiot* reveal the concrete mediations through which fundamental projects appear. In *Saint Genet* and *The Family Idiot* the earlier categories still prevail: the fundamental projects of Genet and Flaubert are formulations of a "lack," responses to a "look," incorporated in desire. But the biographical studies also historicize these categories: the "lack" from which human projects emerge is understood as the concrete deprivations of childhood; the "look" of the Other which constitutes identity is understood as the earliest forms of affirmation that a child receives. Desire itself is seen as a nexus of agency and cultural life, a complex mediating act by which the past is taken up and reproduced, a way of concretizing one's history and determining its course.

Paradoxically, Flaubert must seek to realize a past that never was, that is, to give form to a history which is the history of absence. Without value he has no rights to exist, so he must borrow the rights of his father. He gains a sense of legitimacy by darkening himself in his father's shadow. Sartre explains, "[Gustave] derives his right to be born only from his relationship to his progenitor, he bases it equally on the material whole that represents him: feudal property. . . ."35 The symbolic fusion of father and feudal lord becomes, in Sartre's view, a primary interpretation of the Other for Flaubert. As the young bondsman, Flaubert struggles for recognition always within the terms of this dynamic:

Their connection, experienced, becomes a subjective structure within him. Not that it is ever felt or suffered; it is a matrix, an infinity of practices—actions, emotions, ideas—evoked by the most diverse situations and unwittingly, invisibly marked; without ever assuming its role, these practices reveal or reproduce the original connection in the objects they pursue. Thus the subjective moment is the moment of mediation; the first relation is internalized so as to be externalized once again in all other areas of objectivity.³⁶

In his adult life, Genet carries his deadly experience of rejection with him as "a melodious child dead in me." Starved of recognition, the young Genet does not "exist"; in effect, he is a stillborn condemned to live; "to the child who steals and masturbates, to exist is to be seen by adults, and since these secret activities take place in

³⁴The Family Idiot, p. 382.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 330.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Saint Genet, p. 1.

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solitude, they (and he) do not exist" (my addition). Genet's criminal acts are ways of realizing what he takes to be his fate—his exile. In Sartre's words, "we do not see that he lives on two levels at the same time. Of course Genet condemns theft! But in the furtive acts he commits when he is all alone he does not recognize the offense which he condemns. He, steal?" Genet does not understand himself as an offensive being prior to the offensive acts which reveal this identity, but his awareness of this identity—this internalization of the Other's disapproving glance—persists tacitly or pre-reflectively. This sense of his own social undesirability precipitates the desire to steal and is, in turn, confirmed through the realization of that desire. His pre-reflective sense of his identity surfaces in experience as anguish, urgent and ill-defined. Sartre writes,

The truth is that he is impelled by anxiety. At times he feels obscurely within himself a kind of budding anguish, he feels that he is about to see clearly, that a veil is about to be torn and that he will know his destitution, his abandonment, his original offense. So he steals. He steals in order to ease the anguish that is coming on. When he has stolen the cakes and the fruit, when he has eaten them in secret, his anxiety will disappear, he will once again find himself in the lawful and sunlit world of honesty.³⁹

Neither Genet nor Flaubert ever come to believe in his own social substantiality; neither ever gains what Sartre understands as the right to desire and to receive an affirming recognition. Both individuals retreat into imaginary worlds, attesting to their abiding belief in the impossibility of a real fulfillment. This exclusion from reality, however, is itself realized in the making of literary works, and for both individuals literary production subverts the project of self-defeat. Both Genet and Flaubert create fictive Others, embody them, struggle with them, and give them the material form of a written text. Through the public delivery of their productions, both Genet and Flaubert create and receive the affirming looks of Others, indeed, both come to be held in high regard.

The recognition that both authors procure from their audiences is less a reparation of the past than a paradoxical affirmation of the past as it was and continues to be. In other words, both Genet and Flaubert remain *absent* in their works, escaping the direct looks of Others, and yet their characters and linguistic creations are ways in which their absence from reality becomes very present. As a writer Genet is described by Sartre as "a perpetual absence," a disembodied vision which escapes another's stare even while creating the spectacle that entrances him. Flaubert as well is lost to his objectifications, claiming that he *is* Madame Bovary, then appearing in the figure of Satan, recapitulating the themes of infinite dissatisfaction that have structured his identity from the start.

In the case of Flaubert, literary works thematize the infinite dissatisfactions of desire, thereby giving present and recognizable form to an abiding absence. Sartre argues that the success of Flaubert's literary works depends upon the failure of Flaubert's desire. In becoming a writer, Sartre maintains, Flaubert does not alter his desire's inefficacy—he merely uses this inefficacy to his advantage. It becomes the lack from which his novels emerge. In Sartre's words, "praxis becomes the efficacy of

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 15.

³⁹ Ibid.

the passive."40 Literary praxis does not resolve passivity, but gives it a form which lets it persist and produce.

The intimate link of desire and defeat in Flaubert's consciousness contains within itself the seeds of subversion. Flaubert desists from desire, convinced of the inevitability of dissatisfaction. And yet this refusal to desire implicity avows the infinite life of desire. Flaubert's characters time and again evidence the boundless passion of passivity. Sartre remarks that,

in all [Flaubert's] early works there is an identical motif, that of alien *intentionality* or *stolen* freedom; in every life a great computer has worked out the Umwelt beforehand, as well as its tools and circumstances, so that each desire should be evoked at the very moment when the organization of the surroundings makes it most inopportune.⁴¹

For Sartre, this literary charcaterization of defeat thematizes Flaubert's fundamental dilemma. In a sense, defeat is the necessary precondition of Flaubert's desire, for only as a defeated being can Flaubert recognize himself. Flaubert is not quite without a self—he has internalized an impoverished self, a self devoid of rights. As all desire tacitly seeks to make explicit the fundamental projects which form identity, Flaubert's desire seeks to realize and confirm his essential poverty. In effect, he can only realize himself as a de-realized being; hence, he requires the imaginary to exist. Flaubert thus lives a life of pure desire, dwelling only among the possibles of a literary universe, much like the disembodied souls of Dante's Hell or the figure of Satan in Flaubert's own "Rêve d'enfer" whose lack of organs precludes the satisfaction of desire.

As much as Sartre's earlier ontological schematism is historicized through his biographical inquiries, his search for the concrete details of these individual lives returns him to the broader ontological concerns of *Being and Nothingness*. Flaubert's lack of rights makes him into a suitable existential hero for Sartre, because Flaubert, like Genet, is born "illegitimately" into the world. This absence of a "birthright" characterizes every human birth for Sartre; one comes into existence without necessary reasons or purposes, unjustifiably, without ontological legitimation. The figure of the unloved child exemplifies the existential abandonment of every individual. Note in the following how Sartre's ontology seems to find literary transcription in Flaubert's symbolism:

sovereignty...seems to be *desired* rather than truly possessed. At this point in the investigation we discover the depth of Flaubert's descriptions and the convergence of his symbols; the *nothingness* that touches being, the negativity that can engulf all positive plenitude, the *suctioning void* that sucks up reality is quite simply pure subjectivity, inchoate and *conscious* insofar as it has become pathos, meaning the desire for valorisation. The basis of the *non-existent* rights which the envious person maintains are his against all odds and which cause him suffering is *desire in itself*, which knows its impotence and is preserved in spite of everything as a gaping demand, all the stronger because unheeded.⁴²

Flaubert's life of dissatisfaction confirms Sartre's view of desire as a lack in search of an impossible plenitude. Presumably, all human desire would have this character,

⁴⁰ The Family Idiot, p. 139.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 379.

⁴² Ibid., p. 418-9.

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including the desire of those who claim to have found satisfaction and set up permanent lodgings there. Flaubert suits Sartre, however, precisely because he renounces the bad faith of the satiated. That human reality is "fundamentally desire" means, for Sartre, that human beings generally labor under impossible goals. Imaginary writers thus undertake this definitively human task in explicit ways, and thus provide the rest of us with an illuminating view of ourselves. That desire always fails does not imply that human life is necessarily failure; indeed, desire's permanent dissatisfaction underscores our ontological status as *striving* beings. And the human response to inevitable dissatisfaction may become the stuff of true success. Flaubert reveals Sartre's ontology by responding to his exile from substantial satisfaction with the desire to invent insubstantial worlds. This reminder of human limitation becomes the occasion for unexpected *hubris*:

From the beginning, Flaubert experienced his desire as a need since he recognized the impossibility of satisfying it and managed to internalize that impossibility through experienced death...this desire stands on good grounds, posing its own impossibility, tearing itself apart; its wounds embitter but enflame it. Better, it would be quickly soothed, suppressed, if the thing desired were within reach; because that is impossible, it swells. Impossibility conscious of itself awakens desire and provokes it, adding rigor and violence; but desire finds this impossibility outside itself, in the object, as the fundamental category of the desirable ...man defines himself as a right to the impossible.⁴³

Sartre seems to say that human beings are less interested in satisfaction than in desire itself. The fundamental desire unifying particular desires is the desire to sustain desire. Sartre claims, "Desire comes afterward. If dissatisfaction characterizes desire, it is because [desire] is never awakened except by the acknowledged impossibility of being satisfied."

In the wake of desire's dissatisfaction emerges the ineradicable alterity and specificity of the substantial world. In effect, desire's failure returns consciousness to an appreciation of the world's texture. No longer interested in a fusion with substance which would eradicate difference, consciousness dissatisfied becomes alert to qualities. In this sense, the experiences of dissatisfaction occasion the successive revelation of the world in its alterity and variegation. This Sartre seems to find confirmed in Flaubert:

When Gustave claims that the essence of desire is contained in the lack of gratification, he is far from wrong. Still, this claim must be properly understood. Desire, aside from all the prohibitions that mutilate and curb it, cannot be gratified to the extent that its *demand* is not amenable to a correct statement or has no rapport with articulated language; whatever its current objective, it seeks a certain relation of interiority to the world which cannot be conceived or consequently realized. With the exception that in the present, pleasure exists, even if it is seen as corresponding imperfectly to what was demanded; in order to perceive that by the sexual act one is asking for *something other* that vanishes, one must still 'possess' the body of the other and take pleasure from it. In this sense it would be more valuable to say that desire is revealed as ungratifiable the more it is gratified.⁴⁵

⁴³ Ibid., p. 420.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 426.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 421.

Desire seems also to be an assertion of freedom in the face of factic limitations. In discussing "Rêve d'enfer," Sartre suggests that Flaubert is like Satan, revelling in the expansive world of pure desire; "Satan professes to be prey to infinite and insatiable desires; only the lack of organs, he tells us, makes him deficient. He is boasting. In actuality, he effects imaginary desires because he desires to desire.46 Flaubert prefers his disembodiment as well, for without his body Flaubert belongs to no place and no time-free of his history, he becomes a pure freedom. Sartre argues that infinite desire is Flaubert's strategy to "wrench himself away from the ponderings that tear him apart, from the grip of the past, from that retrospective passion which makes him advance backward, his eyes fixed on a childhood lost forever. . . to negate the deep, narrow circle in which his passions revolve...." Denying his own body, Flaubert projects that body outward in literary characters who desire audaciously and ceaselessly. On the one hand, Sartre observes, "...this driven, morose, fierce, and wretched adolescent wants to take, and refuses to give himself, the freedom to desire, to love, in a word to live." Yet Flaubert's abstention becomes the condition of authorial omniscience. In Sartre's words, Flaubert has "set against the iron collar of his finitude... the immense abyss of his unreal desire for everything, that is, for the infinite."47

Because both Genet and Flaubert had childhoods marked by deprivation, and because each took to the imaginary world of literature to thematize this primary void, they illustrate in clear terms the doubling of a consciousness exiled from substantial identity. Sartre writes in a post-Hegelian framework which no longer assumes that all negativity will be harnessed within the wider circumference of being. The thematization of the negative is not its resolution into substance for Sartre-it is its imaginary life. Sartre heeds the negations which structure these lives. He sees these children as ill-loved, unattended, undervalued. The question he poses to these lives echoes the Hegelian drama which all subjectivity must undergo: how can a negation, through self-negation, posit itself as positive being? Hegel's answer seems to be this: a negation which inverts itself and becomes a positive being must have been all along a positive being, but in implicit form. Every negation is revealed to belong to a prior unity which required the labor of the negative for its disclosure. Sartre challenged Hegel's "ontological optimism" in Being and Nothingness, and his revival of certain Hegelian themes in the biographies does nothing to diminish the force of that earlier challenge. Denying the postulation of prior unities, Sartre argues that a negation which resolves itself into positive being is an impossibility. The doubling of consciousness does not restore us to a hidden substance, but becomes a mediation on the ontological disjunction between consciousness and substance. In other words, human beings can thematize and reformulate the constitutive negativities of their lives, but that reflection or repetition is not reparation.

The lack characterizing human existence remains an indisputable premise in Sartre's works, but in *Genet* and again in *Flaubert* we begin to understand the historical fluidity of this category. Every life begins as a negativity, but also as a determinate relation—this is the meaning of an infant's need to be loved by another. The specificity of that relation gives a peculiar form and style to negativity—it helps to form a distinctive desire. Although this lack is never overcome, human beings remain preoccupied with its thematization, the discovery and recapitulation of the determinate absences, depri-

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 263-4.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 264.

vations, separations, and losses which make human personalities what they are. These negations are repeated (doubled or given positive expression), often with the hope that this time satisfaction will be at hand; negation's repetition, however, succeeds only in reaffirming its inevitability.

For Sartre, then, desire does not articulate a substantial self which has been there all along, but neither does it invent an identity ex nihilo; it labors within the terms of historically entrenched relations. Consonant with Freud's theory of ego formation,48 Sartre's biographical works, especially Flaubert, view personal identity as a derivation from early experiences of separation or dissatisfaction. In Freudian terms, the ego arises as a defense against loss, as a self-protective agency which infers its exclusion from parental presence. If desire is, to use Hegelian terms, a double-negation which creates the being of the self, then we might in Sartrean spirit understand desire as a vain striving to heal this wound at the inception of life, the wound of original separation, through a repetition which seeks to be reparation but never can. Human beings can negate the negations that constitute them only by creating a fantasy of pure presence. For Sartre, the imaginary poses as such a seamless presence, but is truly a "nothingness." Hence, the imagination reenacts negativity only to instate it once again. For Sartre, the enactment of thematization of negation is the limit to what human beings can do with respect to the losses of the past, but this re-presentation can also be the occasion of singular achievement. Indeed, the meaning of Genet and Flaubert, for Sartre, seems to reside in the extreme fertility of these authors of the imaginary who transformed their losses into occasions of unparalleled and distinctive literary creation.

The biographical narratives of Genet and Flaubert trace the careers of these two lives, but also establish the contours of a developed theory of personal identity. The self appears as a paradoxical task of representing a constitutive lack. In the case of Flaubert, his passive constitution becomes a source of pathos and, in turn, a singular literary presentation of passion. Like every consciousness, Flaubert must objectify himself to know himself. Paradoxically, the self which he comes to know cannot be said to exist prior to its objectification. And yet there is experience prior to this selfobjectification, if only in the mode of the desire to become objectified. This inchoate "self" prior to its objectifying acts is, for Sartre, the lived experience of internalized early relations with others. Surfacing as anxiety, this tacit self is taken up and given form, thereby coming into "existence." Flaubert writes from his passivity, and yet in writing pathically, he subverts the passivity at the source of his writing. The realization of a lack always entails a process of inversion; the act of representing asserts itself as constitutive of the self which it seeks to represent. In effect, there is no knowable self prior to its representation. The representation draws upon a latent history and reworks that history in the moment of its representing. The act of representation thus

⁴⁸See Freud's explanation of ego formation in Beyond the Pleasure Principle in which the experience of loss precipitates the formation of an ego "shell" for protection. See also Freud's discussion of ego formation in "Mourning and Melancholia" for which the notion of internalization is central. In that article, Freud claimed that the loss of a loved one becomes internalized as part of the ego itself, at least in the case of melancholia. Mourning is distinguished from melancholia insofar as it does not essay to "preserve" the other through incorporating the other into the ego; the mourner recognizes the other as both other and lost. Later in The Ego and the Id Freud argued that the work of melancholia, the incorporation of lost loved ones into the ego itself, provides a model for understanding all ego formation. In this developed theory, Freud seems to be arguing in consonance with Sartre that the "self" is wrought through the internalizations of early losses.

itself becomes integral to the fundamental project of the self. Representation becomes the mode of projecting an implicit past, and instating it as part of the present.

Writing becomes for Sartre the paradigmatic act of self-negation which effects this transition from a latent history to an invented self. In Hegelian terms, the literary work emerges as the necessary mediation between the mute and inchoate dimensions of the self and the recognition that confers value and objective existence on that self. This double-negation forms the activity of writing, although writing is less a solution than a continuous reflection on a life which can have no solution. Writing also becomes a way in which Flaubert and Genet sustain desire, for both write imaginatively—they desire impossible worlds. Words become the realization of desire, and its perpetual reinvention. In Sartre's terms,

the love which is lived cannot be named without being reinvented. One will be changed by the Other, discourse and lived experience. Or rather, the claims of feeling and of expression are mutually heightened...since both issue from the same source and interpenetrate from the beginning.⁴⁹

Sartre's reflections on writing, desire, the invention of the self and the invention of the Other bear rhetorical consequences for his own biographical writing. In one interview Sartre maintained that The Family Idiot was less empirical research than a novel in its own right. He termed this work a "true novel"50 and proceeded to question whether biographical narrative was not the only novel possible today. Similarly, when Genet disputed the accuracy of Sartre's portrayal of his life, Sartre found the criticism inconsequential. As novelistic enterprises, it remains unclear whether these biographies report or invent the lives they consider. Sartre's developed view of interpersonal relations seems to indicate that "to know" and "to invent" an Other are indissolubly linked. When Sartre predicts, "one will be changed by the Other," he means, too, that Flaubert, dead though he is, will be transformed by Sartre. Biography is less an empirical study whose truth consists in correspondence to the facts than it is an original effort to take up one's own cultural history through its embodiment in another person. Sartre is not a neutral observer of Flaubert; Flaubert is Sartre's cultural past, the champion of French Letters, and Sartre's participation in the tradition so greatly influenced by Flaubert makes clear that his writing about Flaubert is an effort both to recover and invent Sartre's own cultural past.

Sartre maintained that *empathy* is the biographer's proper attitude.⁵¹ We might well speculate that this attitude was one that Sartre cultivated over time with regard to Flaubert, who, Sartre confessed, always evoked antipathy in him.⁵² Sartre's project in writing *Flaubert* might partially have been to transform this antipathy into empathy. And we might well ask whether this emotional transformation required that Sartre find common ground with Flaubert. The subject of biography is almost always a subject of the past, and we can see that Flaubert is to a certain degree Sartre's cultural past as well as his past vocation as a writer. That Sartre no longer writes literature by the time he writes *The Family Idiot*, indeed, that he concludes that novels must now

⁴⁹The Family Idiot, p. 28.

⁵⁰Interview with Sartre, "On the Idiot of the Family" in Sartre's *Life/Situations* (New York: Pantheon, 1977), p. 112.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 113.

⁵² Ibid., p. 110.

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become biographical narratives, suggests that there is no standpoint of pure inventiveness which does not sustain a relation to the cultural and personal past. Biography is the kind of invention which enters into an ongoing story to tell it again slightly altered. The dream of a leap into the imaginary which releases one from the weighty facticity of history is no longer a tenable pursuit for Sartre; invention, choice, desire must mediate the present through the past which produces it, and through that mediation, produces the past anew.

In cultivating antipathy into empathy, Sartre the biographer seems to be imaginatively reconstructing the affective life of Flaubert, and thus seems to be asking how far it is possible to know another human being. The biographer is implicated in this quest after the Other, for only through summoning up the Other in oneself can such knowledge be had. The question Sartre posed repeatedly throughout his career, "Why write?" Formulated in The Words, in What is Literature?, in Saint Genet and finally in The Family Idiot, the question haunts his works as a constant inquiry into the existential project informing this desire. The transformation of desires into words and, finally, literary and philosophical works seems to be, for Sartre, the transformation of an original silence into an articulated self. The process of writing typifies the act of selftransformation which characterizes every career in that writing dramatizes the labor of desire. In Saint Genet Sartre writes, "with words the Other reappears." We might well add, so too does the self. Writing becomes the new scene for the struggle for recognition, the struggle to exist which can only occur in the presence of an Other. In this sense, the word becomes a solicitation and an affirming regard, and the labor of desire offers up ourselves.

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Peirce's "Most Lucid and Interesting Paper": An Introduction to Cenopythagoreanism¹

Kenneth Laine Ketner

Mathematicians have always been the very best reasoners in the world; while metaphysicians have always been the very worst. Therein is reason enough why students of philosophy should not neglect mathematics. (MS 316)

INTRODUCTION

PPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS before his death on April 14, 1914, in a long letter to his friend, F.A. Woods, Peirce reflected upon some of his previous work.

It was 17 years ago, lacking between 2 and 3 calendar months, that it first forcibly struck me...that my paper of Jan. 1897 ("The Logic of Relatives," *The Monist* 7:161-217)²...required considerable modification. Not that I had said anything *false* but that I had failed to state the matter in the simplest and best form. Thereupon, I wrote the most lucid and interesting paper I have ever written; but I had no way of publishing it. The editor to whom I sent it refused it on the ground that he was afraid I should soon make some further discovery; so he preferred the old mumpsimus to my sumpsimus.

Nine years later, [I] found that system of expressing assertions that I had given in my rejected article to have been a perfect Calumet mine in my own work (the letter was interrupted here, but continued on November 7). I undertook to write such an account of that system as no *stultus stultorum* could refuse to print; and as a natural consequence, it was far the worst I ever perpetrated (probably a reference to "Prologomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," *The Monist*, 16:1903). (MS L 477:30–32)

Peirce is widely respected as America's most original and versatile intellect. It seems obvious that the best essay of a great scholar might be quite important for increasing our understanding of the true nature of that thinker's overall efforts. So when I first

¹I have particularly benefitted from the works of Brunning and Herzberger cited below. My thanks to Carolyn Eisele and Richard Martin for encouragement and advice. For valuable asisstance from two colleagues at Texas Tech, Joel Weinsheimer and Thomas McLaughlin, I send thanks. The Department of Philosophy at Harvard University has kindly given permission for publication of items from the Harvard Peirce Papers. I wish to dedicate this essay to the memory of Richard M. Martin.

²In this paper I will use '[]' to indicate editorial emendations in a text, while '()' will show my own inserted remarks. Peirce's Harvard MSS will be referenced according to a system presented in Richard R. Robin, Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1967) as supplemented by Robin, "The Peirce Papers: A Supplementary Catalogue," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 7 (1971), 35–37. Thus, MS 318:20 means number 318 in Robin's catalogue, sheet number 20. CP followed by numbers representing volume and paragraph refers to C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burke, eds., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1935, 1958).

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read this passage, it immediately raised the prospect of locating a piece of writing that Peirce regarded very highly. Hoping for these results, I began searching for clues that might lead to identifying this work among the extant MSS. Because there are a number of places (in addition to the above letter) where Peirce mentioned and described that "rejected article," we know several of its properties. On the basis of an analysis of the contents³ of the surviving MS 482 "On Logical Graphs," I have argued⁴ that it fits Peirce's descriptions well, and that it is a nearly complete version of the essay Peirce regarded so highly.

It is clear from the beginning of MS 482 that topology is its context. Explanation of that background, and of a number of other important and relevant themes, must be reserved for later projects; the purpose of this one was first to undertake the collateral efforts of identifying the important MS and analyzing it. Then as a way of showing that it is indeed important for gaining a better understanding of Peirce, I have prepared an account of an important formal system implicit in it. On this basis we can vindicate Peirce's claim that the contents (this formal system, for one example) of his "most lucid and interesting paper," did indeed become a central part of the "perfect Calumet mine in [his own later] work."

The system presented here—which I name "Valency Analysis"—has been prepared by me using clues from MS 482. I have attempted to be consistent with what I take Peirce's insights to have been. He gave the system no special name. What I present is in the spirit of fleshing out and organizing (didactically) what he outlined.

One of the effects of this study of MS 482 will be an addition to our knowledge of the basis of Peirce's categoriology. Students of that topic have often lamented that there seems to be no place in the extant papers where he wrote out the proof he claimed to have that tetrads or higher order relations could be reduced to combinations of triads. Many persons have without success searched his writings for an account of this "reduction proof," presumably seeking something that is like a contemporary mathematical or logical proof, expressed algebraically. But perhaps they have been looking for the wrong thing. After having been one of the pioneer developers of logical algebras, Peirce came to favor a topological and diagrammatic approach in logic and logical analysis. Hence it would be quite natural for him to have expressed the reduction proof in some (nonalgebraic) diagrammatic form. If so, then students of the reduction proof ought to be familiar with Peirce's topological interests and with Existential Graphs, his system of logical diagrams. Indeed, if we were to use the contemporary name of the mathematical field that seems to lie under the reduction proof, it would

³After a careful study of the folder for MS 482, I have concluded that internal evidence—such as Peirce's pagination, section numbering, and content—amply support the conclusion that the following represent a complete paper: 482:2–30 plus 482:38–45. This thesis is sustained by the continuity of content and of Peirce's section numbering. This was probably a hold-back rough copy. Persons who wish to review the argument in detail may write for a copy of my complete analysis.

⁴The arguments which indicate that MS 482 is indeed the "most lucid and interesting paper" begin with reviewing discussions about that paper in other Peirce writings, to wit: MS 500:02–03 (1911); MS 1589:02 (late); MS 479:02 (1903); MS 483:02 (1898–99); MS 485:02 (1898); MS 488:02 (1898). These passages together list several properties that the "most lucid paper" must possess. MS 482 indeed has all these properties. It is especially important that MS 482 includes the very development of Existential Graphs out of simplified entitative graphs. Again, the details of this argument are too lengthy to be presented here; I would be pleased to send a copy to any interested person.

be "Graph Theory," an offshoot of topology⁵. Peirce's awareness of, and participation in, the early development of graph theory is a story yet to be told.

I believe that MS 482 represents at least one place where Peirce came very close to stating explicitly the reduction proof in terms of valency analysis. So what I present here (based on MS 482 and allied items) will include a reconstruction of what that proof might have been if it had been fully displayed.

Why did Peirce not present valency analysis or this proof in an explicit manner? The best speculation I can produce so far is that it was simple, as he often stated (for example, MS 292:80). Peirce was an accomplished mathematician, and it might have been a potential source of embarassment to him to have written out such a "simple" presentation—he may have thought other mathematicians might regard it, and him, as trivial. And perhaps it is in the context of research-level mathematicians, but the application of it in the theory of categories, and elsewhere in Peirce's system of science, is far from trivial. I should add that I have presented only one aspect of MS 482, and when the whole piece has been fully studied it may involve items that even a research mathematician would regard as important.

PART ONE: VALENCY ANALYSIS

Let

[Fig. 1]

represent an entity with one "loose end," and let it be named "Monad." Let an entity with two loose ends

[Fig. 2]

be named "Dyad." Let

[Fig. 3]

an entity with three loose ends, be named "Triad." Let an entity with N loose ends be named a "spot." (Monads, dyads, and triads are also spots.) What I am here describing as an "entity" is some as yet unanalyzed relation name. For example, consider a triad: the entity could be specified as

or as [Fig. 4]

[Fig. 5]

⁵N.L. Biggs, E.K. Lloyd, and R.J. Wilson, *Graph Theory 1736-1936* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976).

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
The point of concentrating upon Valency, and leaving the "content" of the relation unspecified is precisely to achieve results that will apply to any triad no matter what its content (or to any spot of valency N no matter what its content).

Loose ends may connect with other loose ends to form a "bond" or bonds. Each bond always requires two and only two loose ends. Any series of spots with or without bonds is a "valental graph." "Valency" refers to the total number of loose ends in a valental graph. The valency of a monad is 1, of a dyad 2, of a triad 3, of a spot with N loose ends is N. (My terminology is sometimes not quite that used by Peirce, but I think the overall effect is the same.)


An "unbonded," or equivalently, a "simple" valental graph, is one that contains no bonds. This allows the statement of a rule.

alpha: V simple VG = Sum V spots

That is, the valency of a valental graph composed only of unbonded spots is equal to the sum of the valencies of all the spots in the graph. Here are three examples of simple valental graphs, I, II, III, together with their valencies:



A valental graph that contains at least one bond we shall name a "complex valental graph." Here are eight examples of complex valental graphs:




The valency of a complex graph is:

beta: V complex VG = sum V spots minus 2x sum Bonds

That is, the valency of a complex valental graph equals the sum of valency spots (imagined as if they were simple and unbonded) minus 2x the sum of bonds. In MS 482, Peirce established this rule on the basis of general topological considerations. We can see, however, that one subtracts 2x sum bonds because each bond is seen as the result

⁶Compare typical discussions by Peirce, such as that in J.M. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (New York: Macmillan, 1902), vol. 2, 447-450.

of joining 2 loose ends, starting from an appropriate simple valental graph. That is, a complex valental graph can be understood as having been created from an appropriate collection of nonbonded spots plus the act of bonding (called "composition") 2 or more loose ends at a time. Because each bond consumes exactly 2 loose ends, each bonding act decreases overall valency (of the imagined simple spots) by 2. Here are some (eight) examples (letting "+" = compose).



A corollary of beta is:


gamma: It is not the case that any "perissid" (odd valency) spot can be composed exclusively from "artiads" (even valency) spots.

Gamma may be established from Beta by means of a reductio ad absurdum:

Assume as an hypothesis the contradiction of gamma, which would be: Some perissid of valency 2N+1 = sum V spots minus 2x sum Bonds, and that "sum V spots" includes only artiads.

That is, by hypothesis there is at least one perissid that can be composed exclusively of artiads. We can see that "sum V spots" is even by hypothesis, and "2x sum Bonds" is necessarily even in any case. An even number subtracted from an even number always gives an even number. Therefore, the right side of the hypothesis equation would always be even. That creates a contradiction in the hypothesis, since by assumption, the left side is odd. This means the hypothesis is not the case. This completes a proof that establishes the truth of rule gamma.

Two valental graphs are "valency equivalent" if the two graphs have the same valency, no matter what other properties they might have. Thus, these four graphs are valency equivalent (the valency of each is 4):




While valental graph composition is accomplished by bonding loose ends, exactly two at a time, "decomposition" may be accomplished by breaking bonds, one bond at a time, each broken bond always creating exactly 2 loose ends.

The result of composing any collection of two or more monads, whether simple or complex, is that only "medads" (graphs of valency zero) are created. Simple monads cannot be decomposed, for there are no bonds to be broken. But complex monads


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
may be decomposed. For example (letting "—— com" = "may be composed from," and "—— decom" = "may be decomposed into"):




If any simple or complex monad and any simple or complex dyad are composed, a monad results, thus:



Any simple dyad, like a simple monad, cannot be decomposed, because there are no bonds to break. But any complex dyad may be decomposed.



If any dyad and any other dyad (either dyad being simple or complex) are composed, a dyad results, thus:



From the definition of bonding by two loose ends at a time, it follows that no set of monads only can compose a triad (either simple or complex), and no set of dyads alone can compose a triad (either simple or complex). Hence it follows that:

delta: A triad (either simple or complex) cannot be composed of dyads exclusively, nor of dyads and monads exclusively, nor of just monads.

However,

epsilon: For any spot S which has a valency of four or more, a graph which will be the valency equivalent of S may be composed from triads exclusively.

Here are some examples (the sign '=V=' means "is valency equivalent to"):

We can see that rule epsilon is established by the "Fermatian Inference" (mathematical induction). From epsilon will follow:

zeta: Any spot of valency 4 or higher is decomposable into (may be seen as the valency equivalent composition from) N minus 2 triads, or: spot V (greater than or equal to 4) =V= comp (V minus 2) triads

That is, any spot of valency N, where N is greater than or equal to 4, is valency equivalent to the composition of some N minus 2 triads.

To summarize, WITHIN THIS SYSTEM OF VALENCY ANALYSIS: (1) triads may not be composed exclusively from only monads, or only monads and dyads, or only dyads; (2) but any tetrad or higher valency spot (of valency N) is valency equivalent to the composition of some series of N minus 2 triads; (3) thus tetrads and above are not indecomposable, but can be expressed as the valency equivalent composition of triads; (4) simple monads, dyads, and triads are, however, indecomposable.

Peirce's principal focus in MS 482 and elsewhere was on keeping track of bonding, or "putting things together." He was not especially interested in "medads," graphs with zero valency, except perhaps in how they came to be zero (how they came to be bonded as they are). This is the attitude of a chemist who sees a finished reaction (comparable to a medad) as the result of the activity of combining some more elemental compounds that have free ions (comparable to loose ends). We might object to this decision to bond two at a time. We might want to say, "let there be bondings greater than 2," bonding 5 at a time, for example:

But Peirce could respond: "I can analyze that with my two at a time bonding and with my unique and elemental 1's, 2's, and 3's, especially my lovely 3's. Perhaps your bond 2N+1 at a time method will work, but my bond two at a time method works also, and mine is simpler."

I worked out the above before I first noticed Peirce's nearly identical solution.7

PART TWO: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VALENCY ANALYSIS

One who has followed the discussion thus far might be inclined at this point to ask if Valency Analysis is of any importance, either in understanding Peirce's System of Science, or perhaps in a broader context. The germ of an answer to that very appropriate question lies within Peirce's 1913 letter to Woods, in his remark that "nine years later" (which would be 1897 + 9, or about 1906) he found the results of MS 482 to have been "a perfect Calumet mine in my own work." This suggests that the answer to part of this question might perhaps be found in works from 1906 or a few years earlier. A study of the whole period 1897-1906 is needed, especially the last two years. I have space only for briefly considering one of the more relevant groupings of essays. The principal published works of 1906 are: "Recent Developments of Existential Graphs and their Consequences for Logic," read before the Washington meeting of the National Academy of Sciences in April (MS 490 is probably a set of notes for this presentation); "Prologomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," in the October Monist (MS 292 and 295 are earlier drafts of that article); and "Phaneroscopy, or Natural History of Signs, Relations, Categories, etc.: A Method of Investigating this Subject Expounded and Illustrated," a paper read before the Boston meeting of the National Academy of Sciences in November (MS 299 is probably a draft of this lecture). I think that we should take particularly careful notice of the title of this last mentioned presentation, and of the fact that in his description of it in The Sun, New York, Wednesday 28 November 1906, 6:5-7, Peirce revealed that it emphasized valency analysis and diagrammatic thought.8

In MS 292:33f, while applying valency analysis to a graphical analysis of logic, Peirce stated:

⁷See Carolyn Eisele, *The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce* (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), Vol. 4, 307.

^{*}See also a briefer account of it by Peirce in K.L. Ketner and J.E. Cook, eds., Chares Sanders Peirce: Contributions to The Nation (Lubbock, Texas Tech Press, 1979), part 3, p. 269.

Every graph has a definite valency.... A number of dyads can only make a chain, and the compound will still be a dyad...unless the two ends are joined making it a medad.... But a number of triads can be joined so as to make a compound of any valency not exceeding the number of triads by more than two, and any odd number giving any odd valency under the same restriction. This shows that there are five natural classes of forms of graphs, namely, medads, monads, dyads, triads and higher perissids (odd valents), tetrads and higher artiads (even valents)....

It is noteworthy that here, nine years later, the discussion given by Peirce in outline form in part of MS 482 (which I have fleshed out in the first part of this essay) reappears virtually intact, and even with the same terminology. A new finding is added to Valency Analysis, namely that there are but five natural classes of forms of valental graphs.

Valency Analysis, according to Peirce, has an important application (continuing MS 292:34f):

In classification generally, it may fairly be said to be established, if it ever was doubted (remember that Peirce was an expert in scientific classification), that Form, in the sense of structure, is of far higher significance than Material. Valency is the basis of all external structure; and where indecomposibility precludes internal structure—as in the classification of elementary concepts—valency ought to be made the first consideration. I term [this] the doctrine of *cenopythagoreanism* (compare 292:98).

That term was an appropriate choice, given Peirce's wish to honor his scientific ancestors, and given his own conclusions that mathematics is the most fundamental science, the ultimate basis for all intellectual activity. I do not recall seeing any essay in the literature on Peirce in which this doctrine of classification according to form, which he called Cenopythagoreanism, has been noticed accurately. Usually it is simply taken as an odd name for the categories. But it is clearly something much broader than that, for we find Peirce classifying according to external form in many areas of his thinking. In a number of places in his later work, Peirce gave a careful analysis of Form in terms of Icons, Diagrammatic Thought, and Mathematics. A late name for some of his more familiar pragmatic thought is indeed Cenopythagorean Pragmaticism.9

Now we are beginning to discover the significance of Peirce's "most lucid and interesting paper." For a further brief exploration of the classificatory doctrine of Cenopythagoreanism and how it can be further applied in cenoscopic philosophy, let us examine a parallel passage in MS 292 (sheets 56–81, beginning at 62).

The chief purpose which governed the construction of [Peirce's logical] algebras and still more exclusively that of existential graphs has been the facilitation of logical analysis, and the resolution of problems in logic. . . . For example, one of the puzzling questions of logic is how concepts can be combined.

Peirce classified sciences of research according to the following hierarchy:10

[°]CP 5.555.

¹⁰See K.L. Ketner, ed., "A Brief Intellectual Autobiography by Charles Sanders Peirce," American Journal of Semiotics, 2 (1983), 70.

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MATHEMATICS PHILOSOPHY

Phenomenology, or Ideoscopy (also Phaneroscopy)

Normative Science

Esthetics

Ethics

Logic (or Semiotic)

Speculative Grammar

Critic

Methodeutic

Metaphysics

IDIOSCOPY (Special Sciences, physics, psychics, etc.)

He also stated in 1904,¹¹ "In order to understand [my] doctrine, which has little in common with those of modern schools, it is necessary to know, first of all, how [I classify] the sciences." If we add to this Peirce's well-known identification of logic (the third of the normative sciences) with semiotic, we can see that Valency Analysis, which originated in Mathematics, has found its way down the scale of sciences, now appearing as the fuller Doctrine of Cenopythagoreanism, which is being used to analyze and explicate a puzzling problem in semiotic/logic. The proposed solution of the problem of concept combination, found at MS 292: 62–67, is too lengthy to consider now, but we note that Valency Analysis is a part of it. Indeed, the graphical representation of concept combination is "bonding of loose ends." The way this lies at the basis of Existential Graphs will be displayed shortly. This same manuscript sequence, by the way, contains evidence that the classification of signs is done according to the doctrine of Cenopythagoreanism.

A. VALENCY ANALYSIS IN THE EXISTENTIAL GRAPHS

The purpose now is to show how Valency Analysis (VA) and bonding is fundamental in Peirce's Existential Graphs (EG). In order to gain that understanding, we must quickly review the alpha part, roughly truth-functional logic. It contains no VA elements, but is essential for progress later. One should supplement this very condensed outline by studying some of the more complete accounts of EG.¹²

A single capital letter represents a simple proposition, and writing that letter on an appropriately designated surface called the sheet of assertion (SA) asserts the proposition. Writing two such letters side by side on SA conjoins them. Thus juxtaposition is


¹¹ Ibid., 69.

¹²See Don D. Roberts, The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce (The Hague: Mouton, 1973); Kenneth L. Ketner, "The Best Example of Semiosis and its Use in Teaching Semiotics," American Journal of Semiotics, 1 (1981), 47-84; Ketner, "Peirce on Diagrammatic Thought," in Zeichen und Realität, ed. Klaus Oehler (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 1984); Ketner, "Semiotic is an Observational Science," in Iconicity: Essays on the Nature of Culture, ed. P. Bouissac and R. Posner (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag, 1986). See also J. Brunning, Peirce's Development of the Algebra of Relations, Diss. University of Toronto, 1981; Hans Herzberger, "Peirce's Remarkable Theorem," in Pragmatism and Purpose: Essays Presented to Thomas A. Goudge, ed. J. Slater, T. Wilson, and T. Sumner (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1981). Also consider Alfred Tarski, "On the Calculus of Relations," Journal of Symbolic Logic, 6 (1941), 73-89; Tarski, Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), chapter 5.

the sign of conjunction. If a circle or other lightly drawn self-closing figure, called a cut, is drawn around a capital letter, then the proposition represented by the letter is understood to have been denied. With these two conventions, all the truth-functional connectives, and hence any truth-functional proposition, can be generated. Here are a few examples (where '&' is "and," and "is "deny," 'im' is material implication, and 'eq' is material equivalence):

Algebra	Language	EG		
A	atomic sentence	A		
-A	deny sentence A	A		
A	not not A	(A)		
A & B	A and B	AB		
A & -B	A and deny B	A	B	
-(A & -B)	A materially implies	BA	B	
A or B	A or (inclusive) B	(A)	B	
A eq B	A equivalent to B	A	BB	(A)
	[Fig. 17]			

If one insists upon reading each EG graph by first translating back into the equivalent not-and algebraic form, the power of EG will be unnecessarily lost. To realize its considerable facility, one should learn to see the connectives directly as cut patterns. Here are several important ones (where \$ and @ represent any truth functional sentence of any complexity).



Thus, one quickly learns to think of each "implication" connective as generating a kind of one-eyed binocular cut pattern, while an "or" connective generates a binocular pattern, and so on. To create the graph of a complex proposition, simply begin with the proper cut pattern of the principal connector in the proposition, then progress toward the least connectors, adding the appropriate graphs on top of cuts already drawn. Once one grasps this simple technique, the full computational power of the graphs is released.

Peirce developed five easily remembered and powerful transformation rules, but a discussion of them is not possible here.

If we add a bit more, properties may be represented in the system. A required new symbol is a heavy line drawn from the left of a capital letter. The heavy line, called the line of identity, means "something exists." Moreover, we think of the line as composed of dots that touch. And we also understand it as asserting the identity of all dots within it. So, a simple unattached line states that something exists and that the dots on its extremities are identical to each other and to every other dot in the line. A capital letter having such a line attached to its left side represents a property. In VA terms, this

is a monad. By employing the "matrix" of truth-functional logic, we can generate the following parallels (where "SS" is the existential quantifier and "II" is the universal quantifier).


Algebra	Language	EG
SSxAx	Something is A	A
IIx-Ax	There is no A	
SS-Ax	Something is not A	→
IIxAx	Everything is A	(A)
	[Fig. 19]	na e

If we introduce two monads involving two different properties, by using an act of assertion/bonding, we can produce the kind of medads traditionally known as the Aristotelian Categorical Propositions. Notice that the assertory act of bonding amounts to taking up two loose ends and asserting that the dots at their unattached extremities are identical, so that what before were two separate lines (two individuals) now through a new act of assertion (bonding) become one individual. In the examples to follow I will use "+" to show where bonding occurred. Try to imagine before and after bonding conditions by means of these + signs. Ordinarily one omits + in writing existential graphs.

Algebra	Language	EG
SSx(Ax&Bx)	Some A is B	A +-B
IIx(Axim-Bx)	No A is B	(A-+-B)
SSx(Ax&-Bx)	Some A is not B	d-+-€
IIx(AximBx)	All A is B	(d-+
	[Fig. 20]	Walter and International

Notice that these are Boolean contradictories. A full Aristotelian square of opposition is obtained if one adds A as an extra premise to both the universal propositions. This of course is an advantage for a system designed to analyze as deeply as possible.


Dyadic relations may be introduced into EG in the following manner (where R is a dyadic relation).



[Fig. 21]

Notice that our convention will be that the left line of the R represents the x place-holder, and the right line represents that for y. Generally in EG in a given graph there

are as many individuals as there are separate lines of identity. Mixed quantification can be represented in ways illustrated by these examples.




It works out that a line of identity, the least enclosed part of which is on an even area, expresses existential quantification; while one, the least enclosed part of which is odd, expresses universal quantification. Odd and even enclosures can readily be ascertained by regarding the paper or other surface on which graphs are written (SA) as even. Then the area within one cut is odd, within two cuts is even, and so on.

The six examples just given are unbonded dyads. We may represent the bonding of dyads and monads in these ways (where a lower case letter with a line of identity at its left represents a definite individual).

Two monads representing definite individuals may be bonded to represent their numerical identity. Nonidentity may be expressed by having a line of identity pass through a cut.

Algebra	Language	EG
t = c	Twain is Clemens	ct_+-c
-(t = j)	Twain is not Jones	€-+ +1
	[Fig. 24]	

Triadic relations may be represented in the following way, where, to provide a useful example, 'S' will mean the sign relation "______ stands for _____ to



We could bond three monads to the above to get a full sign relation (where r is a specific representamen, o is the object, and i the interpretant).


Of course, given the results of VA, one does not need to introduce symbols for tetrads or relations of higher valency because according to VA they are in principle reducible to patterns of triads.

In terms of VA and EG, something in the spirit of the above is how one would represent sign relations. I can recall no place where Peirce represented a sign relation as a triangle such as this.

[Fig. 27]

This is often attributed to him, but falsely so, for this portrays a triadic relation as composed EXCLUSIVELY OF DYADS, something that was disproved in VA at rule gamma.

We can now use these ideas to experiment briefly with adapting the techniques of VA and EG to an important principle of Peirce's semiotic, that "Every sign_1 is interpretable in another sign_2 ." Consider the following graph (where S_1 is the first temporally occurring sign relation and S_2 is a later occurring sign relation).



At *, two elements that are the same entity in both of the two triadic relations are bonded, allowing lines to be joined. This would enable us to read Peirce's principle in the following way: "sign₁ means r_1 in the diagram, and "interpretable" means "in a second triadic relation like S_2 " and "another sign₂" means the r_2 of the S_2 mentioned in the interpretable clause. There are a number of other permutations that one might try. Also, because each of the extremities is a sign, that means that there is potentially some additional triad bonded to each such sign, and triads on the signs of those ex-

tremities, and so on *ad infinitum*. So we see that we have made but a limited and tiny snapshot of the vast network of semiosis which is the intelligible world.

I hope this outline will make plausible the claim that VA underlies EG, and that both are important tools which Peirce used in applying diagrammatic thought to study semiotic scientifically (using hypothesis, experiment, and observation). These considerations seem to vindicate remarks like those at CP 2.227.

B. VALENCY ANALYSIS AND PHANEROSCOPY

If we return to MS 292, we can find Peirce using Valency Analysis and Cenopythagoreanism to resolve one more issue within another of the sciences in his classification scheme: I mean the science of Phaneroscopy.

I invite you, Reader, to turn your attention to a subject which, at first sight, seems to have as little to do with signs as anything could. It is what I call the Phaneron, meaning the totality of all that is before or in your mind, or mine, or any man's, in any sense in which that expression is ever used. There can be no psychological difficulty in determining whether anything belongs to the Phaneron, or not; for whatever seems to be before the mind ipso facto is so, in my sense of the phrase. I invite you to consider, not everything in the Phaneron, but only its indecomposable elements, that is, those that are logically indecomposable, or indecomposable to direct inspection. I wish to make out a classification. or division, of these indecomposable elements; that is, I want to sort them into their different kinds according to their real characters. I have some acquaintance with two different such classifications, both quite true; and there may be others. Of these I know of, one is a division according to the Form or Structure of the elements, the other according to their Matter. The two most passionately laborious years of my life were exclusively devoted to trying to ascertain something for certain about the latter; but I abandoned the attempt as beyond my powers, or, at any rate, unsuited to my genius. I had not neglected to examine what others had done but could not persuade myself that they had been more successful than I. Fortunately, however, all taxonomists of every department have found classifications according to structure to be the most important.

A reader may very intelligently ask, How is it possible for an indecomposable element to have any differences of structure? Of internal logical structure it would be clearly impossible. But of external structure, that is to say, structure of its possible compounds (bondings!), limited differences of structure are possible; witness the chemical elements, of which the "groups," or vertical columns of Mendeleef's table, are universally and justly recognized as ever so much more important than the "series," or horizontal ranks in the same table. Those columns are characterized by their several valencies, thus... (here Peirce gave long lists of chemical elements that are medads, monads, dyads, triads, tetrads, pentads, hexads, heptads, and octads).

So, then, since elements may have structure through valency, I invite the reader to join me in a direct inspection of the valency of elements in the Phaneron. (MS 292:71-75)

If, then, there be any formal division of elements of the Phaneron, there must be a division according to valency; and we may expect medads, monads, dyads, triads, tetrads, etc. Some of these, however, can be antecedently excluded, as impossible.... In the present application, a medad must mean an indecomposdable idea, altogether severed logically from every other; a monad will mean an element which, except that it is thought as applying to some subject, has no other characters than these which are complete in it without any reference to anything else; a dyad will be an elementary idea of something that would possess such characters it does possess relatively to something else but regardless of any third object of any

category, a triad would be an elementary idea of something which should be such as it were relatively to two others in different ways, but regardless of any fourth, and so on. Some of these, I repeat, are plainly impossible. A medad would be a flash of mental "heat-lightning" absolutely instantaneous, thunderless, unremembered, and altogether without effect. It can further be said in advance, not, indeed, purely a priori but with the degree of apriority that is proper to logic, namely as a necessary deduction from the fact that there are signs, that there must be an elementary triad. For were every element of the Phaneron a monad or a dyad, without the relative of teridentity (which is, of course, a triad) it is evident that no triad could ever be built up. (That conclusion is a direct application of valency analysis.) Now the relation of every sign to its Object and Interpretant is plainly a triad. A triad might be built up of pentads or of any higher perissid elements in many ways. But it can be proved —and with extreme simplicity...that no element can have a higher valency than three (the reduction theorem from valency analysis). (MS 292:78)

Experienced students of Peirce will readily recognize that this long passage terminates in a short presentation of his famous categories, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. It is quite enlightening to notice that he referred to them as his Cenopythagorean Categories.13 Perhaps more importantly, what the foregoing shows can be summarized in the following way. It is well known that Peirce argued that mathematics was the most fundamental science, even more basic than philosophy. In MS 482, He developed in outline the mathematical system of Valency Analysis. In conjunction with his classification of the sciences, and with his own training as a scientist lurking in the background, he applied these fundamentals of Valency Analysis to sciences below mathematics, the first being philosophy. In other words, he interpreted this abstract mathematical system onto the structures of other subject matters, fundamentally a movement of diagrammatic reasoning (mathematical reasoning), but one that any expert mathematical physicist such as Peirce would regard as a mere routine, almost unconscious, aspect of scientific work.

PART THREE: CONCLUSION

It is important to re-emphasize clearly that the doctrine of Cenopythogoreanism is not to be equated with Peirce's doctrine of the categories, as some scholars have done. It is a doctrine of classification based upon valency analysis of external form, developed within the science of mathematics, and deployed into the sciences that come later in Peirce's System of Science. Its appearance with the categories within phaneroscopy is but the first of many applications of it in a number of different sciences.

Indeed, application of the technique of classifying and analyzing in terms of the results of Valency Analysis, named the doctrine of Cenopythogoreanism, created a number of other results within Peirce's whole system, for example: the Existential Graph method of logical diagrammatization,14 the doctrine of the categories which is a central part of Phaneroscopy; and the classification of signs. It has been possible to consider only some of these topics here briefly.

Given all these extensions and ramifications, it is clear that the doctrine of Cenopythagoreanism (classify in terms of external form by means of valency analysis)

¹³For example, see K.L. Ketner, ed. "A Brief Intellectual Autobiography by Charles Sanders Peirce," American Journal of Semiotics, 2 (1983), 77.

¹⁴For introductions to the Existential Graphs, see the works of Roberts and Ketner cited above.

occupied a central and fundamental position in Peirce's later works. That is a result which appears to vindicate our initial hypothesis that identifying and understanding the "most lucid and interesting article" would produce a more accurate understanding of Peirce.

My only goal has been to develop a truthful account of Peirce's thinking, or at least a part of it. I have not raised the other question, namely, "Are his hypotheses correct?" He thought they were on the basis of evidence that he sifted. Perhaps it seems odd to ask, within philosophy, "Is this hypothesis correct?" But Peirce argued that philosophy was a science, hence we should not simply say, about his hypotheses, that they are his views. They are that, of course, but if they are also correct, then they should become the view of every scientific intelligence.

And indeed, if Peirce's hypothesis in the present matter is correct, it would have far-reaching consequences. Among these would be that mathematics, the science of diagrammatic thought, provides a way to "see into" (comprehend) mind, which is a semiosis, a bundle of relations. As a telescope is used in astronomy, so mathematics is the "scope" of Phaneroscopy, and the means whereby mind can be scientifically observed and studied. That was clearly expressed by Peirce more than once, the earliest I have found being from a review of Abbot's *Scientific Theism* in *The Nation* from 1886:16

The knowledge of relations (according to Abbot) depends upon a special "perceptive use of the understanding." This view, although it is not adequately set forth, is the centre of all that is original in the book, and it is sure to excite a fruitful discussion of the question of the mode of discernment of relations. Of all the sciences—at least of those whose reality no one disputes—mathematics is the one which deals with relations in the abstractest form; and it never deals with them except as embodied in a diagram or construction, geometrical or algebraical. The mathematical study of a construction consists in experimenting with it; after a number of such experiments, their separate results suddenly become united in one rule, and our immediate consciousness of this rule is our discernment of the relation. It is a strong secondary sensation, like the sense of beauty. To call it a perception may perhaps be understood as implying that to understand each special relation requires a special faculty, or determination of our nature. But it should not be overlooked that we come to it by a process analogous to induction.

Moreover, this tool (diagrammatic thought, or general mathematical method) for objectively observing the highest kind of reality, is the technique for making scientific progress in semiotic, as Peirce clearly stated (for instance, at CP 2.227). This means that diagrammatic thought with its valency analysis background (especially as ultimately embodied in Existential Graphs) is a vital tool for Peirce's conduct of scientific inquiry in semiotic.

On a more general level, Peirce's conception of general mathematical method may be a means for our very survival as a civilization. Briefly, by this cryptic remark, I mean that because much of what now constitutes our civilization are systems of relations (food distribution systems, power grids, computer networks, and so on), and

¹⁵See the works of Ketner cited above, plus Ketner, "How Hintikka Misunderstood Peirce's Account of Theorematic Reasoning," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 21 (1985), 407–418.

¹⁶K.L. Ketner and J.E. Cook, eds., *Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to The Nation (Lubbock: Texas Tech Press, 1975)*, part one, p. 73.

because we may be rapidly reaching the point where we may lose control of those systems (remember the shorter response times in missile defense computers, as one prominent example, not to mention other systems involving our environment), we may thus be blindly going about creating the kinds of systems which if they fail or get out of control in a certain kind of way, may bring our species to extinction. Indeed, we may be the first species on Earth to have created a kind of artificial environmental niche (our various systems) which has the potential to make extinct our whole species, either through being out of control or through collapsing. Systems of relations, so it is plausible to think, are more than the things and motions of things one associates with them—thus a functioning computer is more than a collection of parts, even electrified parts. Perhaps this "something more" could properly be called relations. It is clear that we know how to observe things and their motions. Peirce's Cenopythagoreanism and associated topics offer us, however, a way in which we might begin to develop a theory of how better to be able to observe and experiment upon relations. That, in turn, might yield a better understanding of the relational part of systems, a result which, if attained, might possibly allow us to control them, as opposed to the other unhappy possibility which now seems to be steadily drawing closer.

The foregoing point has been eloquently expressed by Walker Percy,¹⁷ an independent discoverer of Cenopythagoreanism about one hundred years after Peirce found it, to whose essay I refer persons who would like to continue this line of thought, persons who, like me at this juncture, may be saying to themselves, "I think I may be a Cenopythagorean."

CONTEMPORARY CURRENTS

Univ. of Missouri

Some Metaphysical Perplexities in Contemporary Physics¹

George Gale

I. INTRODUCTION

TIES BETWEEN philosophy and science are many, varied, and complex. Today I wish to focus upon only one of these many strands, namely, the link uniting phsyics and metaphysics, that link eternally revealed by each discipline's unceasing efforts to discover what is really out there. My hypothesis is straightforward: it seems clear to me that we are entering a phase of scientific activity during which the physicist has out-run his philosophical base camp, and, finding himself cut off from conceptual supplies, he is ready and waiting for some relief from his philosophical comrades-in-arms.

Such an impasse is not frequent; but it's not entirely rare, either. At least twice before in Western intellectual history, natural scientists have taken the point position in our conceptual assault against nature. The first time occurred when the classical Greek natural philosophers began to bring back their theoretical and observational booty for discussion, critique, and hypothetical dispersion among their more speculative philosophical bretheran. Thus returned Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes to the camp where Heraclitus and Parmenides awaited.²

The same thing happened again when Copernicus, Kepler, and, of course, Galileo divided theit spoils among the likes of Bacon, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and Leibniz.

It would appear to be happening again. The discussion which follows is divided into three parts, with each third focused upon a different research program in recent physics. First, I look at the situation in particle physics. Here, it would appear that the theoretical conflict between two competing programs has come to an end, but not before bringing into independent existence a specifically metaphysical response to what, from the start, was perceived by both of the competing sides as a philosophical perplexity.

Following this, I turn to present-day cosmology in order to review the status of several research programs based upon various formulations of the Anthropic Principle, *i.e.*, programs based upon the claim that the very existence of human beings might be a significant datum in cosmological research.

¹Physicists John Urani and James Cushing have each given me an enormous amount of help, each in his own way, in the conception and production of this paper. My gratitude to both. But they most certainly are not responsible for any errors I might have made. I am also grateful for the comments and encouragement of Ernan Modulli and Management and and

of Ernan McMullin and James Felt, S.J.

²This view is most certainly not original with me; it has been beautifully argued by J. LaLumia,

Diogenes 22 (Winter 1974), 1, and, indeed, is not all that different from Benjamin Farringdon's in Greek

Science (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969).

Finally, I examine the recent furious burst of activity in quantum mechanics, in an attempt to demonstrate that the furor results from the sudden loud closing of a metaphysical escape hatch, one which had existed since Einstein's first successful flight from the terrors of quantum irreality.

My essay attempts no grand conclusion; rather its goal is simply to present these three cases in such a way that each reveals its own metaphysical allure, and, at the same time, indicates some of the essence of the task awaiting us.

II. BOOTSTRAP, QUARKS, AND EASTERN PHILOSOPHY

Both S-matrix (or "Bootstrap" theory, as it came to be called) and the original version of quark theory arose out of the widely perceived failure of quantum field theory to deal with strong interactions between nucleons, those hypothetical constituents of the atomic nucleus.³ Although, as Cushing has ably argued, the subsequent success of quantum chromodynamics has most likely doomed the Bootstrap as a viable alternative in *theoretical* high energy particle physics,⁴ philosophical responses to the earlier theoretical crisis seem to have acquired a life of their own.⁵

Bootstrap theory's formal structure exhibits some very unorthodox features of the philosophical proposals consequent upon it. Just as we shall see in the Anthropic Principle case, theoreticians attempted to reduce the degree of arbitrariness and contingency in fundamental theoretical hypotheses, in this case by generating a genuinely global theory, one which was universally *unique* simply in virtue of logical necessity. That is, this theory presented a universe which is as it is because it couldn't be otherwise—the actual universe is in fact the *actual* universe simply because there is no other logically possible universe. Hence the name "Bootstrap"6—the universe generates itself?

Along with this overall macro-cosmic logical fatalism, a kind of bootstrap self-causality extends to the micro-cosmological level as well, since the entities which make up the fine-structure elements of the theory *also* exhibit an unorthodox sort of self-causality. For example, if an object A interacts with another object A to produce object B, it is quite possible for two B's to interact to produce another A. Chew and other Bootstrap theoreticians have dubbed this sort of interaction "circular" causality, in order to distinguish it from the sorts of causal relations seen in traditional physics. For example, Chew distinguishes his circular interactions from compositional interactions such as those which might be illustrated in the atom-molecule or nucleon-nucleus relationship.8

Subsequent to their theoretical proposals, Chew and others began to deepen the discussion, entering into philosophical interpretations of their earlier theoretical hypotheses. A sense of crisis attended this move. Indeed, one of Chew's early and

³Chew, G., Gell-Mann, M., and Rosenfeld, I., Scientific American 210 (Feb. 1964), 79.

^{*}Cushing, J., "The S-matrix Program: Anatomy of a Scientific Theory," National Science Foundation Proposal #8318884, Sept. 1, 1983.

⁵Capra, F., The Tao of Physics (London: Wildwood House, 1975); Zukav, G., The Dancing Wu-Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1979).

⁶Chew, G., Physical Review, D4 (1971), 2330.

⁷Gale, G., Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1974), 334.

⁸Chew, et al., op. cit.

very influential papers was entitled "Crisis for the Elementary Particle Concept." In this paper, as well as others, Chew argued that physicists should terminate the 300-year long process of digging ever more deeply into matter, looking always for a fundamental (or, at least, *more* fundamental) constituent. In its stead he offered, via Bootstrap theory, a domain of entities of which *each* in its own way was fundamental, but since there existed an infinity of them, none was fundamental. Particle physicists thus began to hear about "nuclear democracy."

A serious proposal to end the long, honorable search for the fundamental particle must be taken seriously, and Chew's was. Scientists and philosophers alike provided responses to the Bootstrappers, the responses allying themselves more naturally along radical vs. conservative lines, than those of profession. On the other hand, however, many physicists continued to use the fundamentalist philosophy. They proposed hypotheses which argued that nuclear constituents themselves were composite systems, whose components, the quarks, were simply the latest candidates for the status "fundamental." Quarks, however, presented their own special problems: evidence was accumulating that these proposed entities, unlike their fundamentalist predecessors, were *in principle* unobservable. The heterodox feature of quarks, when coupled to the obvious heterodoxy of the Bootstrap, has generated a two-fold response.

One main interpretation saw both Bootstrap theory, and its immediate alternative, quark theory, as evidence of a crisis in methodology and epistemology, namely, as evidence that the means of scientific knowledge acquisition had undergone a sudden and radical change from that of the preceding 200 years.¹⁰ In particular, the requirement that theoretical objects and their behavior be verified via observation was apparently in sudden danger of extinction. According to this view, physics was at heavy risk of losing its status as an *empirical* science.¹¹

The other interpretation viewed Bootstrap theory, but obviously not quark theory, as evidence of the collapse of the leading idea in scientific metaphysics, namely, the dismissal of our central fundamentalist notions in the philosophy of matter. Indeed, linking together the ideas of circular causality, nuclear democracy, logical fatalism, and the collapse of the central notion of Western scientific metaphysics, several theorists began to argue that Western science was in such serious crisis, that it needed to consider investigating Eastern philosophies of reality in an effort to re-found its scientific grip on the world.¹²

Although, as Cushing argues, it seems today that Bootstrap theory, as a purely theoretical proposal, is not especially viable, it is not at all clear what is the status of either, on the one hand, its concomitant epistemological/methodological interpretation, or, on the other hand, the metaphysical proposal. What is clear, however, is that the whole bootstrap movement itself did and does result from a sense of desperation, and, as such, indicates the existence of a clear perception of metaphysical crisis in the minds of some important physicists and their interpreters.

Of great interest in this case is the dynamics of crisis propagation. First occurred a fairly routine theoretical crisis, albeit at a fundamental level, namely, genuine the-

⁹Chew, G., "Crisis for the Elementary Particle Concept," University of California LRL Preprint #17137 (1966).

¹⁰Shrader-Frechette, K., Synthese 50 (1982), 125.

[&]quot;Ibid

¹²Capra, op. cit., Zukav, op. cit.

oretical perplexity in the physics of fundamental matter. Response to this crisis came in the shape of two alternatives, Bootstrap theory and quark theory. But these responses themselves, simply because each in its own way has heterodox elements, elicit further critical situations, which then extend into the philosophical frameworks underlying this most basic region of physics. Bootstrap theory, for its part, denies the long-standing metaphysical program of atomistic fundamentalism, a move so drastic that many gave up Western metaphysics altogether, and began investigating the possibilities of Eastern views of reality.

Yet, quark theorists can rest no more easily than their bootstrapping colleagues, because quarks by nature quite evidently violate the long-standing empirical canons of the Western science of matter. Thus, although quarks apparently satisfy the classical metaphysical desiderata of the atomistic research program, they do so at enormous cost: the sacrifice of the epistemological and methodological criteria which explicitly define modern science.

Although theoretical developments seem to have overrun the original conditions of the Bootstrap/quark conflict, the philosophical dilemmas engendered by the conflict still loom, unresolved, directly across our path.

III. THE ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE

Even one of the ablest and most conservative defenders of the orthodoxy of mainstream physics has admitted that use of the Anthropic Principle in cosmology arises out of "desperation." Our question here thus reduces to the two-part query: First, does the *desperation* of certain cosmologists indicate a crisis in that part of physics, and, secondly, if so, then exactly what sort of crisis is it?

The Anthropic Principle has several formulations, each of which expresses some link between the content of physical hypotheses and properties of intelligent, *i.e.*, human, life.¹⁴ Clearly, the nature and severity of any potential crisis involving use of the Anthropic Principle depends upon which formulation is at issue. One thing remains constant across formulations, however, and that is the purpose which underlies use of the principle: reduction in the degree of arbitrariness surrounding choice of models of the early universe.¹⁵

Physical scientists in general prefer to deduce predictions from first principles. This is no less true for cosmologists than for any other physical investigators. Cosmologists, however, are faced with a unique problem, namely, there are neither deeper theories nor earlier times from which to derive logical, physical and mathematical constraints in generating their models of the universe. Certain values, for example the value of any of the basic interaction constants—gravity, strong, and electro-weak—appear to be simply arbitrary, and not necessitated by any general principles or laws. Each thus remains an empirical surd and a theoretical indigestible. The answer to the question "Why is the universe such as it is?" looks more and more like the arbitrary

¹³Cushing, J., in Weingartner, P. (ed.), Abstracts of the Seventh International Congress of Logic, Methodology & Philosophy of Science (Salzburg, 1983).

¹⁴Barrow, J.D., Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society, 24 (1983), 146.

¹⁵Carter, B., in Longair, M.S. (ed.), Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observation (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974), p. 291.

¹⁶Gale, G., Scientific American, 245 (December, 1981), 154.

¹⁷Carr, B.J. & Rees, M.J., Nature 278 (1979), 605.

"Just because it is, that's why." This answer is surely unacceptable to a cosmologist, if for no other reason than it makes him/her some kind of a historian, investigating unique singular events rather than repeated general processes and patterns, such as form the subject matter for other physical sciences.

Faced with this theoretical (and methodological as well) impasse, Dicke, drawing on some earlier speculations by Eddington, proposed in 1961 that the values of the universal constants might in some way be related to the existence of humans. "It is well known," said he, "that carbon is required to make physicists." Although Dicke provided only a suggestion, and an intriguingly ambiguous one at that, response was not long in coming.

And from the variety of responses have emerged today three main formulations, each of which exhibits a particular philosophical tenor of its own.

Simplest and most straightforward among the formulations is that one which reflects a logical, methodological or heuristic response to the perceived arbitrariness affecting cosmological model building. This attempt represents an implicit defeat for the traditional method of deduction from first principles.¹⁹ The deductive method does not allow substantive coupling between first principles and those objects or events whose behavior or occurrence provide subjects for the principles. The new method of reasoning sanctioned by the Anthropic Principle rejects precisely this prohibition, since it proposes that our investigation of initial stages of the universe proceed as if cosmological processes, from the start, were determined to produce conditions suitable for the development of human life. The existence of human life, as a fact, thus acts as a necessary condition constraining features of the early universe. Examples of reasoning produced via this method might be hypothetical propositions of the sort "Human life exists today only if the value of g (or of the fine structure constant, etc.) is such and such."

It is essential to note that this formulation of the Anthropic Principle is a response only to desperation involving the method of constraining model-building or the heuristic of hypothesis discovery.

A second sort of response has two distinct but related types of formulation. The two formulation types are related because each implies a causal mechanism, although a different one, which functions to constrain-indeed determine-the values of the universal constants. It must be noted that each of these formulations entails modification of the most fundamental philosophical sort, namely, modification in our metaphysical beliefs, beliefs about the nature of those ultimately real objects, processes and events of the natural world.

The first, and slightly weaker, formulation, imputes to the natural order a goaldirectedness, or teleological causal mechanism.20 An example of reasoning produced via this formulation might be hypothetical propositions of the sort "The value of g (or of the fine structure constant, etc.) is such and such in order to produce intelligent life." Teleological reasoning of this sort does not require conscious purpose, as might be thought. Rather, as it has been shown in recent work on the subject, goal-directed

¹⁸Dicke, R.H., Nature 192 (1961), 440.

¹⁹Demaret, J. & Barbier, C., Revue des Questions Scientifiques, 152 (1981), 181.

²⁰Leslie, J., American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1982), 141; Hoyle, F., Religion and the Scientists (London: SCM, 1959).

systems may be fully described in terms of negative and positive feedback mechanisms, or using the logic of tendencies and potentials.²¹

A final formulation inserts intelligent observers themselves into those very causal processes which bring them about.²² On this view the existence of intelligent observers is just as necessary for the existence of cosmological processes, as those processes in turn are necessary for the observers. A hypothetical proposition expressing this view might be of the sort "The gravitational constant (or the fine structure constant, etc.) has such and such a value because intelligent observers exist." This view gains what plausibility it has from the coupling of the Anthropic Principle to the quantum version of the reality principle, which asserts that only observed events are real.²³ This latter principle will be discussed more fully during the investigation of the purported crisis in quantum mechanics.

Metaphysical responses as exhibited by the two formulations above result from a much deeper desperation than that seen in the methodological formulation. This desperation involves deep philosophical issues, such as the ultimate origin of the universe itself. Although most philosophers and scientists today would deny scientific status to such issues,²⁴ it is quite evident that scientists themselves are not immune to the urgency of these issues. Evidently, metaphysical formulations of the Anthropic Principle represent proposals that such ultimate issues have an appropriate place within genuine science. As such, they most assuredly illustrate a sense of crisis about what constitutes the proper limitations of genuine science.

IV. QUANTUM CRISES

Eighty years ago, quantum theory itself was born as the offspring of an earlier theoretical crisis. But right from the start, it generated its *own* long-standing philosophical perplexities.²⁵ And now, recent quantum experiments appear to have plunged today's physics back again into a sudden and unexpectedly severe re-eruption of those same long-standing perplexities.

From its very beginning quantum physics represented a clean and drastic break from the classical tradition in physics. For the most part, the break centered on the fact that the quantum, the theory's basic entity, exhibited behavior unlike classical entities. According to the formalisms of the theory, both wave-like and particle-like interactions were required. In particular, *empirical* observations of discontinuous particle-like behavior resulted from activities of a continuous wave-like nature. That is to say, determinate observations were carried out on a system which could only be represented probabilistically.²⁶

Attempts failed to interpret philosphically an entity whose theory and observations

²¹Nagel, E., *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1961); Weiland, W. in Barnes, J. (ed.), *Articles on Aristotle* (London: Duckworth, 1975), p. 146.

²²Wheeler, J.A. in Woolf, H. (ed.), Some Strangeness in the Proportion: A Centennial Symposium to Celebrate the Achievements of Albert Einstein (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1980), p. 341.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Wheeler, J.A., in Butts, R. & Hintikka, J. (eds.), Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1977), p. 3.

²⁵Weinberg, S., Daedalus 106 (1977), 17.

²⁶Shimony, A., International Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1978), 3.

the non-deterministic nature of the quantum formalism, Einstein and others argued that quantum theory as then known could not be the final answer. According to them, there had to be another theory. Their position was bolstered when, in an extremely inwere so inconsistent. Because of this failure, and, moreover, because they opposed fluential 1935 paper, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen²⁷ (hereafter EPR) were able to show via the robust logical analysis of an elegant thought experiment that the probabilistic formalism of quantum theory in fact allowed "hidden variables" —processes not yet revealed in either theory or observation—to exist, thus providing an underlying micro-deterministic foundation for the macro-probabilistic behavior on the higher level described by quantum theory. In this way Einstein and his colleagues felt justified to hang on to their metaphysical belief that nature was deterministic, even in the face of the unparalleled successes of the quantum theory's probabilistic predictions. Indeed, many were the phsyicists who felt relieved to second Einstein's comment to Heisenberg that "God does not play with dice." 29

But Einstein's ploy was not the only sort of response to the philosophical perplexity caused by quantum theory. One alternative involved Bohr, Heisenberg, and others who argued against Einstein's hidden-variable determinism in favor of an alternative philosophical view, the so-called Copenhagen interpretation.³⁰ This view, although it has metaphysical consequences, is essentially an epistemological/methodological response to the crisis generated by quantum theory's representation of nature. This interpretation proposes that there is no single consistent metaphysical interpretation of both observable entities and the entities represented by quantum theory. Thus, physicists should accept quantum theory as merely an excellent conceptual device to predict behavior in certain sorts of systems. Beyond this, there is no need to attempt further to characterize metaphysically the entities of the quantum domain. It is clear that on this view physical knowledge of the empirical sort is limited to the observational domain of our laboratory instrumentation and measurements. Theoretical knowledge cannot be taken to extend beyond the quantum formalism itself, into the domain of the quantum objects themselves.

After the late 30's the philosophical situation settled down fairly nicely, with the two opposing camps each relatively secure in its own position. At bottom, the determinsts' security rested comfortingly on Einstein's robust logical analysis, which created space for a deterministic domain hidden within the over-arching probabalistic superstructure of quantum theory. Moreover, nicely enough, it looked impossible ever to carry out Einstein's thought experiment in reality. This was certainly an advantage to the metaphysical determinists in their logical defenses against the Copenhagen theorists. But despite the deep conflict going on in its philosophical foundation, the empirical formalism of quantum theory itself continued to grow in achievement, and two generations of physicists came to rely upon its precision and success. It has ultimately become the most accurate and well verified theory in the history of physics.

²⁷Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., & Rosen, N., Physical Review 47 (1935), 777.

²⁸Although the term is associated with Einstein, he never used it himself (Pais, A., 'Subtle is the Lord...' The Science and Life of Albert Einstein (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982). My thanks to Jim Cushing for alerting me to this rather fascinating point—one wonders just who did coin the term, if it wasn't Einstein?

²⁹ Pais, op. cit.

³⁰d'Espagnat, B., Scientific American 241 (1979), 146.

In recent years, this situation has changed dramatically. Developments came in two stages. First, in 1967, physicist J. S. Bell provided an extension of Einstein's (and Bohm's) logical analysis, showing for the first time that in certain definite (but luckily enough still untestable) situations, Einstein's logic would predict different results than would the quantum formalism.³¹ Bell's analysis, predicting his so-called "inequalities," thus showed how the hidden variables—if they exist—might be exposed. At this stage, however, the Einstein-Bell logical analysis remained only a thought-experiment. Indeed, because there still appeared to be no way to test empirically either Bell's or Einstein's analysis, the hidden-variable interpretation continued to provide solace to the metaphysical-determinist physicist.

But unfortunately for the determinist, by the middle 70's physicists had not only figured out ways to *test* Bell's inequalities, they were beginning to actually *run* the experiments.³² And then, as the results from various experiments were reported in the literature, a sudden and growing sense of crisis became evident in the physics and philosophy communities. The crisis continues today, unabated and indeed growing.³³ For example, at the most recent international congress for logic, methodology and philosophy of science, out of the 56 papers presented by the philosophers and physicists of the philosophy of physics section, fourteen devoted themselves to topics centered on the EPR-Bell quantum perplexity.³⁴

The crisis brought about by tests of the Bell analysis is not something empirically new which has suddenly crashed onto the scene. Rather, it is the *direct* and dramatic result of the quite sudden realization that metaphysics can no longer either hide in Einstein's deterministic hidden variables, or, via the Copenhagen interpretation, refuse to admit the need to take a stand about the real metaphysical nature of quantum reality. Until these tests, physicists could accept the *methodology* (and epistemology) of quantum mechanics, but, for either reason, deny that the quantum formalism gave us a correct view of fundamental physical reality. This, suddenly, can no longer be done. Hence, the sudden and dramatic evidence of crisis among quantum physicists.

Responses to this crisis have been somewhat bizarre, at least in terms of preceding philosophy of physics. Several alternative interpretations have been offered, each with its own choice regarding that element of traditional philosophy which must be given up. Proposed modifications group themselves nicely into the classical philosophical triad, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics.³⁵

Proposed logical modifications are at the same time both simple and significant. Einstein and Bell both used the classical two-valued logical calculus—the logic of true-false and the excluded middle. Against this, so-called quantum logicians have proposed a three-valued logical system, which would appear to be much more amenable to the probabilistic, wave-like entities which inhabit the domain represented by quan-

³¹Bell, J.S., Physics 1 (1965), 195.

³²Aspect, A., Grangier, P. & Roger, G., Physical Review Letters 49 (1982), 91.

³³The title of one of the most significant recent articles tells it all: "Facing Quantum Mechanical Reality" by R. Rohrlich, *Science* 221 (1983), 1251. Another title, via a bit of ironical humor, manages to convey the ubiquity of quantum perplexity: Mermin, M.D., "Quantum Mysteries for Anyone," *Journal of Philosophy* 397 (1981).

³⁴Weingartner, P., Abstracts of the Seventh International Congress of Logic, Methodology & Philosophy of Science (Salzburg, 1983).

³⁵D'Espagnat, op. cit.

tum formalisms. Although these logics are somewhat new, their properties are relatively well-known, and may be modeled in many ways by classical two-valued logics.

Quantum logics, however, do have significant drawbacks. It is generally held that any logical system which functions as a basis for scientific reasoning ought to function in mathematical and ordinary formal reasoning as well. But it is not yet clear that quantum logics can so function, even though they do possess classical models. For example, it has been strongly argued that the law of distribution, which is a theorem of classical logic, does not hold in quantum logic.36 If these, or any similar claims were to be demonstrated, then the result would be significant, since it would involve the conclusion that either classical logic must be replaced by quantum logic, or that there is no single consistent logic for both the classical domain and the quantum domain. This latter result, of course, is merely the reappearance of the original quantum perplexity in yet another domain.

Epistemological proposals have been somewhat limited in scope. Since, as a method, quantum theory has had unprecedented success, questions about the status of the knowledge generated by quantum physics are and can only be just that, namely, questions to the effect "Does quantum theory provide scientific knowledge?" This question presupposes that the goal of science is to provide knowledge about our physical world, the world in which human beings live and die. But the world represented by quantum theory is manifestly not that same human world.37 As Shimony proposes, it just might be the case that "The world investigated by the physicist is very different from what it has been thought to be."38

Metaphysical proposals resulting from the crisis precipitated by tests of the Bell inequalities offer the best evidence of the depth of the philosophical unease, indeed, desperation, felt by quantum physicists. Central to all proposals is the quite natural notion of an "object." The metaphysics of science, insofar as it involves concepts of physical objects, constitutes our theory about the physical universe as an independent, objective world, distinct from the observer who measures and tests it. Although some philosophers might cavil at the notion, among theoretical physicists this metaphysical theory is simply called realism.39 It is believed by many theorists that the very possibility of science itself depends upon our being able to make the distinction between the observer and the observed, between scientist and scientific object. Thus, if realism is called into question, then so also is science itself threatened.

Two propositions have been put forward, each of which has its own radical significance. In the first case, it has been proposed that entities might be able causally to affect each other at velocities faster than light. If this were the case, then the breakdown in the hidden-variable position might be explained. But accepting this proposal would have the unfortunate consequence that the Special Theory of Relativity could be violated. And since the STR is a highly verified, quite generally accepted theory, many physicists would strongly resist the move. In essence, this proposal requires one to discard a previous highly accepted theory, in order to avoid philosophical perplexity engendered by yet another highly accepted theory. Which course to take requires

³⁶Hughes, R.J.G., Scientific American 245 (Oct. 1981), 146.

³⁷Rohrlich, op. cit.

³⁹Even two otherwise radically opposed physicists can agree on this point: Rohrlich, op. cit., & d'Espagnat, op. cit.

careful analysis of the depth of the problem, and the nature of the trunk connections between the two theories. It may well turn out that any modification of the realism underlying quantum theory would affect STR. In that case, it might be less damaging to respond to the quantum/realism crisis by retaining realism but severely modifying

Most radical of all is the proposal that we scrap our concepts of objects, and the objective world.40 Realism is thus eliminated as a metaphysics of physics. According to this view, observers and observed are not independent of one another. Indeed, the observer in some sense contributes to the properties of what is observed. In the simplest sense, this might be related even to the simple fact of the observer's choice of the exact moment when the measurement is carried out: since the measurement is done at t, the observed values must be v, rather than v2, which latter would have been the value had the measurement been done at t2.

Of course, most versions of this anti-realistic stance go much further. Some proponents of radical interpretations of the so-called quantum reality principle have gone so far as to claim that unobserved quantum phenomena simply do not have values unless and until those values have in fact been observed. Thus, it is claimed, objects and their properties become objective only when they become subjects of scientific observation.41

It is significant to note that this final metaphysical proposal links up with elements of both the Bootstrap theory and Anthropic Principle problems. Insofar as both these earlier discussed domains have metaphysical crises, they are consistent with the major crisis question of the quantum domain: What is the nature of the scientific object, and how does it interact (if at all) with the scientific observer?

V. CONCLUSION

It should be clear from the above that today's physics exhibits some tantalizing philosophical perplexities. Moreover, although each of the three cases-Bootstrap, Anthropic Principle and quantum theory-has its own individual features, they together reflect one underlying question: What is the real nature of the triad formed by man, Nature, and their relation? And this exact question, it is plain for all of us to see, is precisely the one which has unremittingly supplied the energy driving humanity's three-millenia-long metaphysical quest to understand itself and its world. Thus, although the guise is different, the metaphysical perplexities abounding in today's physics simply represent one more version of the compelling task facing metaphysicians. It's time for us to turn our efforts once again to the task at hand.

⁴⁰d'Espagnat, op. cit.

⁴¹Wheeler (1977), op. cit. Rohrlich vigorously denies this proposal. Rohrlich, op. cit.

BRIEFER BOOK REVIEWS

The Argument of the "Tractatus": Its Relevance to Contemporary Theories of Logic, Language, Mind and Philosophical Truth. By Richard M. McDonough. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. Pp. 311. \$39.50.

This is one of the very best books on Wittgenstein's philosophy to appear in many years. It offers an extremely illuminating interpretation of the *Tractatus*; the insights which McDonough provides into this difficult work do just what Wittgenstein said a correct understanding of the *Tractatus* would do: it enables us to understand the point of much of Wittgenstein's later philosophy with far greater clarity than we would otherwise have. This is a book which should be read by everyone who is more than merely casually interested in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

This book is by no means an introduction to the *Tractatus*. It presupposes that the reader is moderately well acquainted with the central issues of the *Tractatus*, and concentrates on offering an interpretation of the work which centers on certain key texts which were obviously of great importance to Wittgenstein, but have been extremely puzzling to most of his readers, and which, surprisingly, have been discussed very little by most of Wittgenstein's commentators.

In 4.0312 Wittgenstein said: "My fundamental idea is that logical constants are not representatives." In 6.12 he wrote: "The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal-logical-properties of language and the world." McDonough tries to demonstrate precisely how Wittgenstein's fundamental idea, or Grundgedanke, functions in warranting the inference from the fact that there are tautologies to certain general theses concerning language and ontology. What McDonough calls the argument of the Tractatus is thus an inference "from the fact that certain expressions are tautologies, plus a certain interpretation of the nature of tautologies, to the ontological and linguistic theses which constitute the system of the Tractatus" (p. 12). In his first four chapters the author shows with great lucidity how in this way Wittgenstein sought to establish his claims, for instance, that a genuine proposition is contingent, that it is about a subject matter external to its symbol, that its subject matter is substance in the sense that, "as far as that which is presented with the symbol is concerned, the meaning (Bedeutung) of the proxies remains constant" (p. 113), that a genuine propositional symbol is a picture of what it is about, and so on. It is impossible to reproduce the details of McDonough's argumentation here, but it seems to me that by the clarity of his exposition and his marshalling of details McDonough has made a major contribution to our understanding of these matters.

While some of the more recent interpretations of Wittgenstein have exploited his "Viennese connection" with cultural figures such as Karl Kraus, Fritz Mauthner, Adolf Loos, Heinrich Hertz, etc., McDonough situates Wittgenstein firmly in the context of Russell's logic and logical atomism. Typically he begins by first explaining Russell's position in the period just prior to the *Tractatus* on matters such as negative facts, logical propositions, etc., before going on to explain how Wittgenstein either agreed or, more frequently, disagreed with Russell. This may seem artificial, but is not really so. McDonough succeeds in showing us how Wittgenstien's work is both in continuity with Russell's work and yet is profoundly different.

Chapters five and six consist in an exposition of Wittgenstein's important distinction between the perceptible propositional sign and the imperceptible propositional symbol or thought. It is the thought which serves as the "meaning locus" of the proposition. McDonough rightly points out that most commentators have overemphasized the various perceptible elements in Wittgenstein's account of propositions to the neglect of the imperceptible thought. He argues that Wittgenstein's notion of the thought as that which has meaning and does not stand in need of interpretation is very similar to and in continuity with Brentano's account of a mental entity as an intentional entity. He also sees important similarities between the theory of meaning in the *Tractatus* and contemporary psycholinguistic theories of meaning such as those developed by

Fodor, Chomsky, Katz, etc. These are theories which are characterized by the notion of meaning as an entity which accompanies the perceptible propositional sign, and which is inferred from the propositional sign by the quasi-mechanistic application of rules. Wittgenstein, of course, vigorously rejected this idea in his *Philosophical Investigations*, but the sense of his argumentation there is probably only clear to one who realizes that the position which he is rejecting in the *Investigations* is precisely the one which he defended in the *Tractatus*.

McDonough offers new and interesting interpretations of Wittgenstein's doctrine of showing, the delineation of the realm of the mystical, and the sense to be made of the famous throwing away of the ladder at 6.54. He also offers illuminating comparisons between Wittgenstein's program for developing his system in the *Tractatus* and the methods of German Idealism, especially that of Fichte.

In explicating Wittgenstein's doctrine of what can be said and what one must be silent about, McDonough distinguishes between two kinds of communication, which are more than vaguely reminiscent of Kierkegaard's Communication A and B, although McDonough does not advert to the parallel with Kierkegaard. A subject communicates in the first sense with someone if he possesses certain meanings which, by means of perceptible signs formed in accord with a set of transformation rules, he succeeds in conveying to another subject who possesses the same transformation rules and is thus able to make sense of the signs. A second type of communication is one in which the "subject influences another by means of a perceptible sign. But the end points of the successful communication are not a pair of meaning loci within the two selves, they are relevantly similar patterns of activity in which the two selves participate" (p. 240). Philosophical propositions which are shown by the fact of tautologies are communicated in the second sense. Communication in the first sense is that which is appropriate to statements of the natural sciences. In communication of the second type it looks as if the kind of knowledge which is being communicated is a knowing how rather than a knowing that, although Mc-Donough does not say this explicitly. If this interpretation is correct, then perhaps one way of understanding the transition from Wittgenstein's earlier to his later philosophy is to see it as reflecting an increasing awareness on his part that propositional knowledge is grounded in a knowing how.

In this volume the author confines himself to an explication of Wittgenstein's views in the *Tractatus*. He does not offer here criticism or evaluation of the truth of these views, although he does indicate that he believes "that almost none of the particular views of the *Tractatus* can be accepted just as they stand, and that the basic presumptions of the whole system can be brought into question" (p. 14). For McDonough's criticism and alternative proposals on the substantive philosophical issues we must await a promised sequel to the present work which will be entitled *The Truth of the Argument of the Tractatus*. If the sequel is as good as the present volume McDonough will have made a major contribution to the understanding of philosophy in our century.

If I may end on a negative note, the SUNY press should be ashamed of itself for the numerous typographical mistakes, dropped letters, etc. throughout this volume. Without even trying, I noted mistakes of one sort or another on ten different pages.

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Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? By Henry Veatch. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. Pp. xi + 258, \$30.00

Henry Veatch, in his important new book, condemns as inadequate the dominant approaches to ethics in contemporary philosophy. In their place, he substitutes an ethics based on natural law. Veatch, using this approach, defends the rights to life, liberty, and property. He rejects positive rights. This view of rights resembles that held by libertarians, but Veatch distances

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himself from them. He concludes with a sketch of the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that underlie his ethical system.

Veatch launches his attack on modern ethics in Chapter I, "The Law In Search on An Ethics." Some writers claim to derive moral rights from a state of nature in which self-interest determines people's acts. This method must fail: that one is at liberty to do something in a state of nature entails nothing about rights. "[T]he inference from all right to [do in the state of nature] to having a right to will not bear asserting for a moment" (p. 9).

Deontological ethics also must be dismissed. To say that an action is our duty is inevitably to invite the question, 'Why is it?' The school of deontology spurns what in Veatch's opinion is the only possible grounds for an answer, human ends or purposes: it is therefore bereft of justification for its allegations of duty. Nor will it do to appeal to self-evidence; claims that certain moral rules are intuitively seen to be true rest upon arbitrary assertion. Whether this is true of all such intuitions is a matter on which it seems to me there is room for more than one opinion.

Utilitarianism fares no better in Veatch's hands. It can offer no reason why an individual should sacrifice his own happiness to the general happiness. The principle of universalizability offers no escape: it serves no purpose to argue that since each person values his own happiness, he must recognize as a goal the happiness of all. "Thus if I say. . . that I like X, or that I find X pleasing, there is no way in which such a subject can be considered to be universalizable" (p. 43). It is only objective goods that can properly be universalized. Veatch uses this same criticism later in the volume against Gewirth's derivation of rights. From each person's wish to act, no application of universalizability is possible (pp. 159–160). Ethical egoism escapes this attack, since unlike utilitarianism it makes no appeal beyond each individual's pursuit of his own interest; but for this reason Veatch holds that it cannot be considered an ethics at all.

What then is the alternative to all these fallacious systems? To Veatch, the answer lies in natural law. Some philosophers, e.g., J. L. Mackie, have dismissed appeals to objective values or natural ends as ontologically "queer." Veatch dissents. Is the development of an embryo into an adult, according to the laws of biology that define the embryo's end, an unnatural, odd occurrence? Not in the least: there is nothing philosophically outrageous, either, in the appeal to man's natural ends. The precepts of natural law differ, in an important particular, however, from scientific laws. They do not state invariable regularities: rather, they are humanly devised rules based on consideration of man's natural end.

Of what does this end consist? Veatch finds the answer in intelligent living. He uses "intelligence" to designate, not theoretical thought but rather practical wisdom. "[T]he distinguishing activity of a human being consists not just of living but living intelligently—being guided in one's day-to-day conduct by a knowledge of what ought or ought not to be done in the particular case" (p. 81). Veatch elucidates what he means with several references to literature, notably to the novels of Jane Austen. But I am not sure that he can be altogether acquitted of reasoning in a circle: the precepts of morality are founded on man's natural end, yet the latter is defined in part by adherence to these very precepts.

Once given man's end, Veatch believes that he can demonstrate that human beings have rights. The key to his derivation is the principle of universalizability. Wrongly employed, as it is by utilitarians and Gewirthians, it profits nothing. But if one starts with objective ends, one can properly universalize. If my end is to promote my own flourishing, then, Veatch maintains, others have a duty not to interfere with me. I have, in other words, a right not to be hindered in the pursuit of my natural end. Since this natural end is objective, that is, not peculiar to me or anyone else, everyone has such a right. I confess that I am not quite clear how Veatch thinks rights emerge out of natural ends. If something is required for my flourishing, why need this be of moral importance to others? The fact that flourishing is their end as well offers no answer. (Gilbert Harman, in an article which Veatch cites at p. 165, has raised this objection; Veatch wrongly thinks that Harman endorses the derivation of rights from human flourishing.)

If Veatch is correct that each person has a right to the unhindered pursuit of his flourishing, what specific political rights does this claim generate? In this third chapter, "Law as the Imple-

mentation of Ethics Within the Political Sphere," Veatch presents a detailed response. Each person must have the right to liberty: the pursuit of one's natural end can take place only by autonomous action. Further, persons have the right to hold private property: human beings are material creatures and cannot pursue their natural end in the absence of property under their control. Some have argued that persons have rights to food, medical care, shelter, etc.; do not people also require these? Our author braves conventional wisdom by denying that the possession of any of these items is a right. "My answer must take the form of a simple denial that individuals have any positive rights. There are no such things" (p. 180). Negative rights, e.g., the rights to liberty and property, merely forbid others from taking what is already ours. Positive "rights," by contrast, are demands that we be provided with goods and services we do not now have. No doubt it is desirable that we have food and other goods, but this gives us no right to use others as natural resources to provide these items for us. (Veatch endorses Fred Miller's argument that Rawls' theory of justice is guilty of overlooking this point.)

Though his view of rights places him close to libertairianism, Veatch draws back. There is more to society, he holds, than individuals and their rights. Society, as Aristotle long ago argued, exists to promote the common good. And if there is a comon good, must there not be a body to coordinate the efforts of individuals aiming at that good? If so, libertarian anarchists err in wishing to dispense altogether with government. The argument has here proceeded in rather a rapid way. Why does the existence of social order require a directing apparatus? Are there not social orders which flourish without such direction, e.g., the free market? Veatch is aware of the importance of the free market, as we see from his perceptive discussion of the socialist calculation debate, but unfortunately he fails to consider the point that the free market is prima facie a counterinstance to his assertion that social coordination requires centralized direction.

Suppose, though, that Veatch is correct. Is anything beyond a minimal state to preserve law and order justifiable? Veatch answers in the affirmative. To the virtue of beneficence in individuals corresponds a social virtue of public-spiritedness. Just as individuals may give charity to those in need beyond what strict justice requires, so may a society promote the common good through welfare and educational programs. These programs are not demanded by positive rights—remember, for Veatch there are no such things. (He does make an exception as regards the rights of children, but this is not to the point here.) But society may still undertake them, even, surprisingly, against the wishes of those who do not wish their property to be used in this way. One wonders whether a measure which violates rights can properly be termed an instance of beneficence.

To many, the discussion above may have seemed academic in the bad sense. Has not modern physics shown false the outmoded cosmology on which any appeal to natural ends rests? Veatch addresses such worries in his book's last chapter. He contends, using arguments of Karl Popper and other philosophers of science, that modern science makes no pretence of discovering the essences of things. As such, it can have no quarrel with views which claim essences can by other means be studied. There is a conflict between natural law ethics and Kantian doctrines which contend that ends are imposed by the mind rather than found in reality; but these doctrines cannot be rationally maintained. This is a most stimulating and enlightening book which everyone interested in ethics and political philosophy ought to study.

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David Gordon

Vatican II and Phenomenology: Reflections on the Life-World of the Church. By John F. Kobler. Dordrecht: The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985. Pp. xvi + 257.

After several years of involvement in church administration, Fr. John F. Kobler, C.P., in 1979 attempted to write a book on pastoral management theory in the light of the teachings of

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Vatican II. Deciding that the task was impossible because there was no generally agreed upon theological model for the Council's work, Fr. Kobler in order to discover a paradigm engaged in five years of research. *Vatican II and Phenomenology* is the result. The effort and erudition of its author is evident throughout the pages of this provocative and persuasive book.

Situating the Council within the European history of ideas, Kobler argues that Vatican II is a demonstrative model of the phenomenological method used on an international scale. In his *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy* written in 1937 with Europe on the brink of World War II Edmund Husserl insisted that phenomenology was the last scientific hope for a resurgence in the cultural and intellectual life in Europe. Noting that the German philosopher devoted the last years of his life to this problem Kobler points out that Husserl always approached this problem as a theoretician. Articulating Husserl's vision and desire Kobler writes.

Science needed a *new empiricism* capable of attaining universals, or general essences, on the basis of their intuitive giveness. Out of this empiricism would develop a radically *new experience* and a fresh *new attitude* towards reality (p. ix).

Kobler argues that through the use of the phenomenological method the Council has fashioned a new experience and a new attitude and that this method enabled the Council Fathers both to listen and to speak to the contemporary world in a new way. Admitting that phenomenology at Vatican II did not touch the substance of Catholic doctrine but claiming that it did give it a new tonality, Kobler suggests that the best way to appreciate the impact of the Northern European bishops and theologians on Vatican II is to read the Council's documents under the light of phenomenology as developed by Husserl. Noting the strong influence that Husserl's phenomenology has had on European intellectual life since the end of World War II, Kobler emphasizes that the theologians adopted the phenomenological method in order to serve the practical, pastoral renewal of the Church and indeed of all people. One example is what Husserl referred to as the teleological nature of consciousness: in the Council documents Husserl's teleological consciousness has been adapted to become the Glorified Christ and this notion is to function as a concrete universal throughout all levels of communal Catholic consciousness.

Kobler, who refers to his work as an "extended essay" written for professional scholars and the educated public, has broken down his argument into ten chapters and added an Epilogue to draw out some of the more startling implications, both global and historical, of Vatican II and also added nine brief technical excursives commenting on topics ranging from "Concrete Human Relationships and Cardinal Suenens" to "Dialogue, Martin Buber and the Council." A strange structure to say the least and one that makes difficult a first reading but facilitates a second reading and should aid the reader who wishes to study carefully Kobler's book. Admitting that his footnotes, which make up about fifty-five pages of his book, are "unforgivably extensive" the author says that they do contain the developmental substance of his book and so they assume a special importance. Chapters 1–4 and 8–10 are basically chronological starting with a discussion of Pope John XXIII's Humanae Salutis right through to commentaries on Lumen Gentium and Gaudium et Spes. Chapters 5–7 deal with what Kobler sees as ambiguities and technical problems as he views the Council shifting from a scholastic style of thought to a phenomenological style.

Vatican II and Phenomenology is never boring and often stimulating and enlightening. In his early chapters Kobler is very convincing as he charts the shift in consciousness which appears in John XXIII's Humanae Salutis and develops further in his Pacem in Terris. The latter, Kobler points out, contains a phenomenologically derived anthropology rather than a traditional scholastic view of man. According to Kobler, Pacem in Terris, which he describes as a phenomenological via media between the transcendent world of religion and the emprical world of everyday living, became a demonstration-model for the European bishops and theologians at the Council—a demonstration-model of phenomenology dealing with the natural

life-world of global society. This demonstration-model moved the European bishops and theologians to follow a similar route at the Council. In Chapter 3 Kobler traces the developing consciousness of the bishops at the Council and points out that their collective consciousness was metamorphosed from a consciousness ready to produce abstract theoretical religious statements to a consciousness meeting head on the concrete problems of contemporary people. Though the collective consciousness of the bishops at the beginning of the Council may have been focused excessively on the spiritual, the metamorphosis led them to a profound view of temporality but a view deeply rooted in their Christ-consciousness. Kobler sees that the Council Fathers' decision to direct their analysis in the direction of the religious life-world instead of in the direction of pure theory as fitting in with the pastoral nature of the Council. Of course though Husserl's phenomenological methodology served the bishops well, they did not accept his philosophical presupposition that metaphysics is impossible. Kobler's discussion in his later chapters of Lumen Gentium and Gaudium et Spes is inspiring as well as enlightening.

Vatican II and Phenomenology is a detailed, deep, and, in places difficult to follow, discussion that ultimately is convincing about the influence of Husserl's phenomenological method at the Second Vatican Council. Kobler has made an important contribution to our understanding of the Council, a contribution that should be of special value to scholars studying the Council's documents.

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Robert E. Lauder

To Be Human: An Introductory Experience in Philosophy. By Xavier O. Monasterio. New York: Paulist Press, 1985. Pp. vi + 241. \$7.95.

Xavier O. Monasterio's new book provides a vibrant lesson in how to make philosophy interesting and involving. In his Preface Monasterio writes

Let me become personal and bluntly challenge you, the readers, whoever you are. Read this book. If after having done that you still believe that philosophy is an impractical and hardly intelligible discipline, good only for those who have nothing better to do with their time than waste it in ethereal speculations, I promise you a personal apology in writing. I may be contacted at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio 45469 (p. 3).

I don't think Monasterio will have to write many letters of apology. He has produced a clear but not shallow, provocative but very readable, thought provoking explanation of the human mystery. Geared for beginners in philosophy, most likely college students taking their first philosophy course, Monasterio's text should prove very helpful to teachers looking for a text and even for scholars looking for a lesson in how to communicate.

To Be Human basically explores four paradigmatic philosophies of human nature: B. F. Skinner's, Jean-Paul Sartre's, Karl Marx's and Abraham Maslow's. Monasterio's treatment of each of the four thinkers is not excessively scholarly but it is accurate. His way of using the four doctrines to underline the importance of philosophy is exceptionally effective. Though psychologists, Skinner and Maslow are included because Monasterio rightly contends that the theories of these two men amount to sets of basic convictions about the world and the agent who has to respond to that world and are thus genuine philosophies.

Explaining why he uses only contemporary thinkers Monasterio claims that this will make the readers' access to philosophy easier and also because through the study of contemporary thinkers the impact that philosophy can have on a culture will be more obvious. Even with the four contemporary thinkers he uses, however, Monasterio does not deal with them chronologically. Rather he uses them thematically and so tries to capture the readers' attention, increase their interest, and motivate them not to study about philosophy but to do philosophy. Skinner is

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treated first because he is simplest to understand and thus provides an accessible starting point. Also Monasterio notes that because Skinner claims that his vision is the result of the scientific method applied strictly it makes some sense to begin with a method that has been so successful in other fields. Monasterio discusses Huxley's *Brave New World* as an illustration of a society in which human behavior is engineered. Sartre is then treated because he is the opposite of Skinner and will provide a different type of challenge to the reader. The discussion of Marx, Monasterio hopes, will illustrate to the reader several factors neglected by both Skinner and Sartre and, lest any reader think that Marx is infallible, Monasterio offers Maslow as a possible antidote. Monasterio writes

In short, the order followed here aims at promoting the readers' own philosophical progress. Instead of being just baffling, their exposure to different philosophies should be positively enriching in this framework, for it is a means to reach a coherent set of fundamental convictions by which it is really possible and worthwhile to live. Since that is something for which any intellectually adult person looks, implicitly or explicitly, no reader is likely to miss the importance of that achievement (pp. 10–11).

Monasterio's eight chapters contain explanations, comparisons, contrasts and criticisms of the visions of Skinner, Sartre, Marx and Maslow as well as portions of Monasterio's own philosophy of human nature. Especially interesting are Monasterio's reflections on trying to live humanly in this century. Not buying Skinner's scientism, nor Sartre's individualism, nor Marx's collectivism, nor the options available in Huxley's *Brave New World*, Monasterio favors aspects of Maslow's self-actualization theory, though he indicts Maslow as being a very shallow social thinker whose doctrine is open to egotism and narcissism.

Coming down very hard on capitalism, Monasterio opts for what he calls post-capitalism, which would be a society in which people really care about people and work to arrange that everyone has the physical necessities required to live a human life. Throwing a challenge to readers to work for such a society, Monasterio describes post-capitalism as "a grown-up capitalism, a capitalism with a human face" (p. 218).

I hope Monasterio's book is widely read, especially by college students. It is one of those too rare books that may lead readers to become excited about philosophy.

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G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* (Vorlesungen; Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte, Bd. 3, 4, and 5). Three tomes in 4 volumes: Bd. 3: Teil 1, Einleitung, Der Begriff der Religion, LXXXVI- 426 pp.; Bd. 4a: Teil 2, Die bestimmte Religion (Text), XIII- 648 pp.; Bd. 4b: Teil 2, Die bestimmte Religion (Anhang), pp. 649–1024; Bd. 5: Teil 3, Die vollendete Religion, VIII- 374 pp. Herausgegeben von Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983–4.

The history of philosophical research contains happy surprises! Among them we may mention Meiner's new edition of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. For quite a while now Hegel scholars have been looking forward to a new and scientific edition of these *Lectures*. But, knowing that the "historico-critical" edition of the Rhineland-Westphalia Academy of Sciences was in the works, they were convinced that they would have to wait ten more years. Two distinct events, however, have changed the situation. On the one hand, new sources have recently been discovered, which render all previous editions obsolete. Ten years ago, for example, nobody knew of texts referring to the courses of 1827 and 1831. On the other hand, R. Ferrara and P. C. Hodgson were preparing a new edition in Spanish and in English. It would

have been a pity if nothing similar were available in the original language. The Meiner publishers took account of these "signs of the times." They decided to promote a new edition, preliminary to the edition of the Rhineland-Westphalia Academy.

This edition may look somewhat like a hybrid, since it states that it wishes only to prepare the historico-critical edition. Do we have, then, to do with a "quickie," a hastily prepared reedition? Far from it! In order to prepare the historico-critical edition, M. Jaeschke had to use strictly scientific methods, making fullest use of the different sources: Hegel manuscripts, notes of the auditors, secondary literature, including the former editions. But then does this not mean that we have to do with the critical edition itself? No, because all the critical data have not been incorporated and published. So the Meiner publishers offer us a reference edition, established along scientific criteria, but made more legible through the omission of interpolated variants and passages.

Nobody minimizes the importance of Hegel's Lectures on the philosphy of religion. In the history of philosophy they represent the dawning of a new discipline, the philosophy of religion, which had not been clearly identified before and which was often confused with theodicy. It is precisely because he discovered this discipline that Hegel did not discuss it before 1821. In Hegel's philosophy, too, these Lectures constitute an important stage. Many exegetes center their interpretation of the nature of religion on the Spirit's becoming. From this point of view it is fascinating to follow the evolution of Hegel's thought from the first presentation (1821) to those which followed (1824, 1827, 1831). M. Jaeschke says, only the threefold division (der Begriff der Religion, die bestimmte Religion and die vollendete Religion) has not changed. All the rest of the hegelian project has been transformed, either because the philosopher gradually discovered the systematic structure of the new science, or because he enriched his work by using other sources. We may affirm that the systematic form which suits the investigated concept emerges only in the last lectures of 1821.

The students of that time were not mistaken about the importance of this philosophy "course." In 1821 Hegel had 49 auditors, in 1831 he had 119 of them!

It is true that Hegel's research occurs within the history of the ideas of his time: it is part of a dialogue with other famous opinions. It is not by chance that in 1821 Hegel decided to study the philosophy of religion. His colleague and adversary, Schleiermacher, had recently published the first volume of his Glaubenslehre, of his "dogmatic theology." Hegel felt that it called for a reply, especially because more than an intellectual problem was at stake. The question was who would show the way for the fundamental options of the Evangelical Church of the Prussian Union. Clearly the lectures had a polemical purpose. It would keep growing since few theologians were willing to follow Hegel. In the 1827 text, for instance, we discover clearly Hegel's reply to Tholuck's criticism and a real defense against the accusation of "spinozism."

It is into this intellectual milieu, that of Hegel and his time, which the splendid edition of M. Jaeschke invites us to enter. The presentation of the volume is as clear as the Master's thought is at times obscure.

We have now the most reliable text with its apparatus criticus and with the most important variants and complements. The notes and remarks have been placed at the end of the volumes. They were so numerous for die bestimmte Religion that it seemed advisable to put them out in a separate volume which contains also much information useful for all three tomes. Let me also mention the admirable indices, especially, the index of philosophical and theological topics (pp. 866-985). They help make this new edition an indispensable tool for research. The Academy's historico-critical edition will hardly do any better, and will do it much later.

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
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